Oswald and the CIA: The Documented Truth About the Unknown Relationship Between the U.S. Government and the Alleged Killer of JFK (3 page)

Oswald was not an agent, employee, or informant of the Central Intelligence Agency. The Agency never contacted him, interviewed him, talked with him, or solicited any reports or information from him, or communicated with him indirectly or in any other manner. Oswald was never associated or connected directly or indirectly in any way whatsoever with the Agency.'

According to the HSCA Report, "The record reflects that once these assurances had been received, no further efforts were made by the Warren Commission to pursue the matter."3

A diametrically opposing view of Oswald and the CIA came from James Wilcott, who served as a CIA finance officer in Japan at the time Oswald served there in the Marines. Wilcott claimed that a CIA case officer told him-the day after Kennedy was assassinated-that Oswald was an agent. In 1978 Wilcott told the HSCA that "Oswald was a CIA agent who had received financial disbursements under an assigned cryptonym." Wilcott could only cite informal conversations as evidence, and after talking with Wilcott's coworkers, the HSCA "concluded that Wilcott's allegation was not worthy of belief."4

The record suggests that neither the Agency's official story nor Wilcott's characterization is accurate. The truth lies in between. The Agency appears to have had serious operational interest in Oswald and there probably was a relationship, though not that of an "agent" or "informant." While Oswald wasn't James Bond, it is increasingly apparent that the Agency's operational interest may have led to his use or manipulation. For its part, the HSCA Report accepted the CIA official position:

There was no indication in Oswald's CIA file that he had ever had contact with the Agency.... This finding, however, must be placed in context, for the institutional characteristics-in terms of the Agency's strict compartmentalization and the complexity of its enormous filing system-that are designed to prevent penetration by foreign powers have the simultaneous effect of making congressional inquiry difficult.'

The HSCA said they tried to overcome "the Agency's securityoriented institutional obstacles that potentially impede effective scrutiny of the CIA." But the CIA withheld an important key to Oswald's CIA files: the internal dissemination records for those files. In the absence of those records, the HSCA was unable to resolve the most glaring deficiencies in the Agency's account of the Oswald files.'

We have those internal dissemination records and other information not shared with the Warren Commission, Church Committee, or HSCA investigations. This information indicates, at the least, that Oswald was probably involved in CIA operations. No attempt is made in this book to evaluate this material with respect to any conspiracy theory. Beyond the scope of this book, that discussion is already under way with several new works, such as Norman Mailer's Oswald's Tale: An American Mystery (New York: Random House, 1995); Ray and Mary La Fontaine's Oswald Talked: The New Evidence in the JFK Assassination (New Orleans: Pelican, scheduled for publication in 1995); and David Lifton's Oswald (New York: Dutton, scheduled for publication in 1995).

Some useful information has been drawn from previous government investigations, but the vast majority of research for this work was conducted in the newly released files, especially those made available in 1993 through 1995. The two million pages that have been added to the National Archives will take years to process, and the references to these materials in the footnotes reflect the shape and size of the "chunks" of records as they were initially released from contributing agencies. For example, if the footnote states "CIA January 1994 (5 brown boxes) release," researchers will know to go to the five large brown boxes that became available on that date. The Record Identification Form (RIF) numbering system used by the Archives was used in this book whenever possible, but some of the early RIF numbers may no longer be valid. With few exceptions, however, all of the CIA and FBI documents referred to in this book should be easily retrievable at the Archives.

There is something to be said for going first. It is humbling to look at two million pieces of paper. Several disciplines in the social sciences will have enough case study material to last for decades. Pulled forward by our curiosity for the unknown, yet unsettled by the fear of what we might find, we can enter these boxes and finally discover for ourselves. No matter our convictions about the case, to finally look inside those boxes in pursuit of the truth is a liberating experience.

OSWALD AND THE CIA

CHAPTER ONE

Defection in Moscow

"There's a man here and he wants to renounce his citizenship," Jean Hallett announced to American Consul Richard Snyder.' Jean, the receptionist for the American Embassy in Moscow on this particular Saturday morning in October 1959, then produced the man's passport and laid it down on Snyder's brown wooden desk. Snyder looked up; it was a little after eleven A.M., and on Saturdays the embassy always closed at noon. "Well, send him on in, then," Snyder replied.

Meanwhile, out in the lobby, an interesting group of people bumped into each other. The lobby at the entrance to the building was the only way to the elevator that ascended to the other sections of the embassy and the living quarters for the Americans working there. Twelve-year-old Carolyn Hallett had come out of the elevator and down the three steps into the lobby after her mother had disappeared into Snyder's office to announce Oswald's arrival. Carolyn found her mother's chair empty, but not so the couch-two young men were sitting on it. The one that fascinated twelve-year-old Carolyn was Lee Harvey Oswald. His countenance seemed to be anything but normal, and a curious little girl was probably the last thing he wanted to see before carrying out his plan to defect. At this particular moment he was working himself up for what he later referred to as a "showdown" with the American consul.'

Sitting on the couch next to Oswald was Ned Keenan, an American graduate student based in Leningrad who was there that day seeking the embassy's assistance on visa matters.' "I saw him sitting on the sofa when I arrived," Keenan recalls, "and I sat down next to him." Like Carolyn, Keenan also thought Oswald looked odd. "He was a memorable character," Keenan says. "He was strangely dressed-I remember him being lightly dressed above [i.e. on top]." Jean Hallett came back out from Snyder's office and found there were now two visitors on the couch as well as her daughter staring at Oswald, who was undoubtedly happy to be extricated from this scene.

As Lee Harvey Oswald confidently strode across the old wooden office floor behind Jean, he passed the other American consul, John McVickar, on his way to Snyder's desk. Oswald was dressed immaculately, in a dark suit with a white shirt and tie-"very businessman-looking," Snyder later recalled! But Snyder soon noticed odd things, like the fact that the man had no coat or hat on this brisk October thirty-first morning in Moscow. And then there were those thin, dressy white gloves that he wore into the room and removed rather deliberately as he came to a halt in front of Snyder's desk. Snyder, who was typing a report, was struck by the "humorless and robotic" quality of Oswald's demeanor. "Please sit down," Snyder said, still typing.'

Oswald, perhaps annoyed at being put off, complied with this invitation to sit. He later wrote a one-page essay about the visit which contains this recollection:

I do so, selecting an armchair to the front left side of Snyder's desk.... I wait, crossing my legs and laying my gloves in my lap. He finishes typing, removes the letter from his typewriter, and adjusting his glasses looks at me. "What can I do for you," he asks, leafing through my passport.6

This passage is nearly identical to Snyder's account of this scene. Of course, Oswald's perspective of himself was quite different from Snyder's, whose attention was distracted by those little white gloves.

Jean returned to her reception desk to find her daughter bursting with curiosity. "Mommy, who was that weird man at your desk?" Jean replied, "I got rid of him."'

Richard Snyder studied the scrawny, nervous young man sitting next to him as he posed the question, "What can I do for you?"8 Oswald responded with what appeared to be a carefully prepared statement: "I've come to give up my American passport and renounce my citizenship," he said firmly but without emotion. With a dignified hand movement, he then gave Snyder a note which formally announced his intention to defect to the Soviet Union.'

Oswald continued talking. "I've thought this thing over very carefully and I know what I'm doing. I was just discharged from the Marine Corps on September eleventh," he said, "and I have been planning to do this for two years."10 That remark really caught Snyder's attention. Even McVickar, the other consular official, who was across the room, began to listen more closely, and Oswald later remembered noticing McVickar look up from his work." "I know what you're going to say," Oswald said matter-of-factly to Snyder, "but I don't want any lectures or advice. So let's save my time and yours, and you just give me the papers to sign and I'll leave." By "papers" Oswald meant the forms to formally renounce his American citizenship. Snyder was struck by Oswald's "cocksure" and even arrogant attitude, and remarked later, "This was part of a scene he had rehearsed before coming into the embassy. It was a preplanned speech."12

Indeed, Oswald had planned well-exceptionally well. "Since he arrived in Moscow in mid-October 1959 and was discharged from the Marine Corps in September 1959," McVickar told the State Department in 1964, "he would have to have made a direct and completely arranged trip."" In addition, Oswald had entered the Soviet Union through Helsinki, not the customary route for Americans, but an ideal place to apply for an exception to the rules and get a quick entry visa. "It [Helsinki as an entry point] is a well enough known fact among people who are working in the Soviet Union and undoubtedly people who are associated with Soviet matters," McVickar later told the Warren Commission, "but I would say it was not a commonly known fact among the ordinary run of people in the United States."14 In fact, even in Helsinki, the average turnaround time for a visa was still seven to fourteen days at that time, something which the Warren Commission checked into carefully after the Kennedy assassination." However, the point is that exceptions were often made-perhaps more often than anyplace else-in Helsinki. That Oswald had managed to go from the U.S. straight to the ideal site where such exceptions were sometimes made-and succeeded in becoming just such an exception-suggests that his defection had been well planned and was intended to be speedy.

Oswald tried to remain calm during the scene in the embassy, "but he was wound up inside tighter than a clockspring," Snyder said later, "hoping he could keep control of the conversation."" Oswald's diary corroborates this, describing the meeting as a "showdown."" Oswald told Snyder he had not applied for a Soviet tourist visa until he reached Helsinki on October 14, and that in doing so he had purposely not told the Soviet Embassy of his plan to remain in the Soviet Union. Oswald then described how he had implemented the next phase of his game plan upon reaching Moscow: On October 16 he had applied for Soviet citizenship by letter to the Supreme Soviet."

Oswald paused here for Snyder's reaction. The consul searched for a way to knock the young man off his prepared script. Snyder recalls that there was a brief moment of silence while Oswald, still clutching those little white gloves in one hand, calculated his next move. The sunlight shone through the wall of glass to Snyder's left, painted opaque so that the Soviets could not see the classified work that went on in the office.

Snyder, a seasoned diplomat, was drawn to the olive-green passport that lay on the desk between the two of them. Picking it up and examining it carefully, he was immediately able to deduce that he was speaking with a minor, a twenty-year-old young ex-marine. Snyder noticed that Oswald had deliberately scratched out his ad- dress.19 That gave the consul some leverage. "Well, I'm afraid that to complete the papers for renunciation I will need some basic information," Snyder said at last, "including an address in the U.S. and an address of your closest living relative." Oswald, upset at the prospect of involving his mother, Marguerite, in the extraordinary move he was undertaking, was suddenly out of his game plan. He began to protest, but Snyder would not budge: no address, no papers. Finally, Oswald gave Snyder Marguerite Oswald's address in Forth Worth.

Snyder knew that Oswald had lost control of the exchange, and the consul therefore decided to press his advantage. "Why do you want to defect to the Soviet Union?" Snyder probed. The "principal reason," Oswald said, thinking on his feet, was because he was a "Marxist." Of course, this answer left open the possibility that he might have other reasons for defecting, too.20 Snyder then tested Oswald with a barb that was subtle but aggressive: "Life will be lonely as a Marxist." However, this cleverly worded inference that the Soviet Union was anything but Marxist seemed to go right over Oswald's head.Z' He had no pat answer, and was clearly unprepared for a verbal duel about Marxism with Snyder. The consul was not as easy to bamboozle with Marxist quips as his marine colleagues had been in Japan, where he had been assigned. There, Private Oswald had especially enjoyed outwitting officers on political, especially left wing, subjects.

Now, however, Oswald was clearly out of his depth, and so he returned to what he had come prepared to say. Oswald declared he wanted the matter to conclude "quickly," Snyder recalls. In a feeble attempt to stop Snyder's questions, Oswald made what appears to be a slip-up. Snyder recalls that Oswald then blurted out, "I was warned you would try to talk me out of defecting."22

The significance of Oswald's remark is worth considering. Who could have forewarned Oswald about what the American consul in Moscow would say or try to do? It stands to reason-unless Oswald was lying-that someone had helped Oswald plan his defection. But who could that have been? This possibility was so startling that it would later occupy the attention of many people-including Snyder. As it turned out, Oswald had an even bigger surprise in store that morning.