Oswald and the CIA: The Documented Truth About the Unknown Relationship Between the U.S. Government and the Alleged Killer of JFK (11 page)

Here is the sequence from the time of the defection. The CIA acknowledged it received the Snyder cable, probably on Wednesday, November 4, because that is when the State Department also sent it to the FBI. The CIA acknowledges it received the Navy Liaison cable, and it is likely this also happened on November 4, because we know from Navy records that is the date the Navy sent it. The CIA's records show it received the "something of special interest" dispatch and we know that it was received on Friday, November 1312 probably by chief mole-hunter Birch O'Neal, whose signature is on the dispatch. These documents must therefore have formed a file with identifying numbers or letters, at least in CI/SIG. Evidence of these files is still accumulating, and we will return to them in a later section of this chapter, where we will examine some of Oswald's early Security and Counterintelligence records.

For the moment, we need to focus on what the CIA actually did after Oswald defected and threatened to commit espionage. What the documents show is hard evidence of keen CIA interest in Oswald during the November 4 to December 6 "black hole" period. A single document which has emerged is significant. The CIA did not share this document with the Warren Commission in 1964, possibly because its existence suggests that the Agency's projection of only trivial preassassination interest was misleading. This document shows that on Monday, November 9, 1959, someone in the CIA put Lee Harvey Oswald on the "Watch List:" meaning that as of that date the CIA authorized the illegal opening of his mail."

"SECRET EYES ONLY," someone in a supersecret compartment of James Angleton's counterintelligence staff wrote on the notecard which put Oswald on the Watch List. In 1975, the CIA explained to the Senate the criteria for putting someone on this list:

Individuals or organizations of particular intelligence interest [one should also add counter-intelligence] interest [sic] were specified in Watch Lists provided to the mail project by the Counterintelligence Staff, by other CIA components, and the FBI. The total number of names on the Watch List varied, from time to time, but on the average, the list included approximately 300 names including about 100 furnished by the FBI. The Watch List included the names of foreigners and of United States citizens." [First brackets and underline in original]

Thus, this SECRET EYES ONLY document proves that in November 1959 Lee Harvey Oswald joined a select set of 300 people whose mail was opened by a highly sensitive, and very illegal, CIA program: HT/LINGUAL

What is more, this piece of evidence proves Oswald's status and makes the late 201 issue all the more controversial. The talk about needing a "trigger" for a 201 on Oswald is silly because of his presence on the Watch List. The absence of a 201 file was a deliberate act, not an oversight. Moreover, this particular configuration of being on the Watch List without a 201 is another anomaly that encourages speculation about whether Lee Harvey Oswald's defection could have been designed as part of a U.S. operation from the beginning, or if an operation was built around his defection after the fact.

While the Warren Commission never knew about the mail intercept program or Oswald's entry on the HI/Lingual list, the House Select Committee on Assassinations did find out. Naturally, the HSCA wanted to know who put Oswald on it. On August 15, 1978, the CIA responded to the HSCA's request.

The CIA had much to explain. To begin with, on the top righthand corner of the notecard is typed "CI/PROJECT/RE." Under this is a date-November 9, 1959-which is also typed, and underneath the date is handwritten "7-305." Finally, underneath that number is handwritten "N/R-RI 20 Nov. 59." The CIA explained these notations in this way:

The office within the CIA staff responsible for the exploitation of the material produced by mail intercept in New York was known as the "CI/Project," a cover title to hide the true nature of its functions....

"RE" represents the initials of a CIA employee now retired under cover. The presence of the initials indicates that on 9 November 1959, RE placed Oswald's name on the "Watch List" for the reason given on the card, to wit, "Recent defector to the USSR-Former Marine."

The number 7-305 indicates the communication (not necessarily written) to the Office of Security informing the latter of the Staff s interest in seeing any mail either coming from or going to Lee Harvey Oswald in the Soviet Union.

N/R-RI, 20 Nov. 59-this notation indicates that a name trace run in central files resulted in a no record on 20 November 1959.

This response, in the CIA's view, was sufficient to explain both the significance of "Cl/PROJECT/RE" and the handwritten notations on the November 9, 1959, Watch List card.

A closer analysis of the two handwritten entries is fascinating. The "N/R-RI," upon further reflection, would appear to mean "No Record, Records Integration Division." This is suitably close to the Agency's explanation, and so there seems no need to focus on semantic differences between "central files" and "Records Integration Division." The number 7-305, however, is worth a closer pass. The Agency says it is only a reference to a communication between the counterintelligence staff and the Office of Security.

According to the Agency's 1978 explanation of how the HT LINGUAL program worked, the Office of Security played an important role:

From the beginning until its end, the Agency's Office of Security controlled and operated the mechanics of procurement with members of the Post Office. The Counterintelligence Staff assumed the responsibility for the translation and analysis of the material both as consumer and for dissemination to selected officers in the Agency.15

Thus, it would make sense for the person working in CUPROJECT who filled out the opening Lingual index card to enter some number or designator-such as 7-305-right on the card which referred to a communication with the Office of Security.

What is fascinating about the number 7-305 is what the Agency did not say about it. It would appear that this number has two parts. Moreover, it is possible that the number "7" refers to the communication, perhaps a request, written or verbal, while the number "305" is the date. It is not uncommon in intelligence work to refer to dates by their ordinal number on the Julian calendar. If this is true, the number "305" would be the same as saying November 1, which is the 305th day of the year 1959.

It seems more than a coincidence that a number possibly referring to the day after Oswald's defection appears on his first HT-LINGUAL index card. Oswald has one other HT-LINGUAL index card, dated August 7, 1961, which has three similar handwritten references to communications with the Office of Security. The first is illegible, but can be partially read as 9-2?0, while the other two are clearly 10-288 and 11-323. All these numbers could refer to days in 1961.16 There are still difficulties with this analysis, and there may be another explanation for these numbers. For the time being we will note that someone in the CUPROJECT office called or sent a note to the Office of Security very soon after Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union.

Oswald's Early CIA Files: OS-351-164, "CI/SI, " and 74-500

The large new release of documents directed by the JFK Assassination Records Act allows us to fill in considerable detail about Oswald's early CIA files. One of the earliest files associated with Oswald is OS-351-164, the "OS" being an acronym for the Agency's Office of Security." Cables and news clippings on Oswald that were put into the file beginning as far back as Oswald's defection in 1959 were in this file. The first document is Snyder's1B cable from Moscow reporting Oswald's defection and his threat to give up radar secrets. The second is a Washington Post clipping entitled "Ex-Marine Asks Soviet Citizenship." 19

Documents were also put into Oswald's counterintelligence file, now referred to variously in CIA documents as Oswald's "CUSI" file or Cl "soft file." What these letters tell us is that the CI/SIG mole-hunting unit, like the Security Office, had an early file on Oswald. Newspaper articles about Oswald's defection that first weekend were placed in both these files in an interesting way. The Star coverage (two articles) was put in his CUSI file and the Post coverage (one article) was put in OS-351-164. Beyond who read which newspaper, that distinction tells us little. The prudent way to look at these documents registers is as incomplete records. We cannot even be sure that 351-164 was a security number exclusively for Oswald. It has yet to appear on a document under Oswald's name on the subject line. While it would be startling, it is not impossible that 351-164 belonged to another person. For our purposes, however, it appears to function as a security number for Oswald, as documents are periodically added to this file up to the time of the assassination.

Robert L. Bannerman was the Deputy Director of Security in 1959. In a recent interview he responded to this question: How did the Office of Security react to Oswald's defection? "Jim Angleton was in on this," Bannerman replied, and he emphasized how OS cooperated with Angleton's Counterintelligence Staff and others after the news of the defection arrived.20 "We were calling in all the people in all the areas," Bannerman recalled, "who might have something." As to who in OS was privy to this effort, Bannerman stated, "We had a certain amount-most of my staff-Paul Gaynor, on my staff, was one who was very active in handling that end of the business, along with Bruce Solie."

Bannerman recalls nothing else about Oswald's defection. It is fair to point out that the event was over thirty-five years ago and that, as the number-two person in the Office of Security, he may have been too senior to have been absorbed in the details of whatever the "business" was. At least Bannerman remembered who was in on it. We would be even more fortunate if Angleton's molehunting lieutenant, Birch O'Neal, would tell us what he remembers. O'Neal is possibly the person most knowledgeable about Oswald's CIA files alive today. Now in his eighties, O'Neal has so far refused to comment.

A key document is conspicuously absent from the OS-351-164 and CI/SI files as described in the 1978 lists provided to the HSCA. It is Snyder's dispatch #234. What a strange coincidence that the document with the most foreboding piece of information-Oswald's threat to give the Soviets "something of special interest"-is one whose initial resting place in the CIA cannot be determined. This does not inspire confidence in the Agency's capability to monitor, let alone control itself. The 1978 CIA Oswald document lists have a column titled "Location of Original," and for Snyder's #234 it says "201-0748009," which is not an Oswald file at all. It is the 201 number for the American Consul in Moscow, Richard Snyder. Moreover, a close look at the copy in the National Archives suggests that it is possible that the original number might have been excised and Snyder's 201 number typed in over it at some later point.

Snyder's 201 number did not exist at the time the original document was created. Not even close to it. Snyder earned the honor of a CIA 201 file after the Kennedy assassination when Angleton's mole-hunting activities intensified. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the original location designator was Oswald's. A bracketed comment under the entry for this document (Moscow dispatch 234) in a CIA document register states, "Received in CIA on 13 Nov 59."1' The document was there all along, right from the beginning. The lack of the correct file number invites attention. This means the loss of the chain of possession and therefore our ability to determine responsibility. Nevertheless, it would make sense if it were either OS or CI--or both, because there is no doubt that the document describes Oswald's threat to commit espionage, and that this threat should have been taken seriously.

So far we have said nothing about the Soviet Russia (SR) Division. Oswald had defected to Russia. Was SR informed? If not, why not? Wouldn't SR have had a keen interest in the Oswald defection? We are still acquiring the information with which to begin answering these questions. Another early number associated with Oswald was "74-500," a number that would be put on an FBI report in May 1960, which we will discuss in Chapter Ten. This number, however, meant "Russia-miscellaneous," and was maintained by the Soviet Russia Division.

If Oswald was just a normal tourist or legitimate traveler to the Soviet Union, the SR/10 branch, known as the "Legal Travelers" branch, would have been interested in him. "We would piggy-back on their perfectly legal reasons for going there," Paul Garbler explained, "tourists, visiting professor, etc."" Garbler was chief of SR/10 in 1959. "We would brief them to be passively aware," he states. "They were not supposed to take specific actions, but sometimes this rule was violated." Garbler has no recollection of Oswald, however, until much later. Garbler does not recall seeing Snyder's cable or the Navy Liaison cable from Moscow. This seems unusual.

Even more unusual is this: When a major FBI report on Oswald arrived in May 1960, it was routed to SR/10, but Garbler says it was not sent to him. Garbler's memory could be faulty, but if he is correct, then the first FBI report on Oswald passed through SR/ 10 without coming to the attention of the branch chief. "I do not recall having heard about Oswald," Garbler maintains, "until after I had been in the Soviet Union" two years later.

The 74-500 number was not put on any other Oswald documents, although "74" would turn up on his 201 opening sheet because it is the CIA country code for Russia. A branch chief in the Soviet Russia Division who was watching Oswald worked in SR/6, the "Soviet Realities" branch. In that branch someone was keeping a "soft file" on Oswald, a subject to which we will return in Chapter Eleven.

Meanwhile, we still have some loose ends to cover in Moscow, where Oswald's defection was still in progress.

CHAPTER FIVE

The American Girls in
Moscow

"She was quite a good-looking woman," Snyder remembers of Aline Mosby. "I saw her naked once."' That moment had been innocent on Snyder's part, for he had really had no choice in the matter. Under the circumstances, Mosby had probably been extremely happy to see Snyder. The attractive UPI reporter had made the mistake of getting involved with a young Soviet man who, Snyder believes, "was either KGB or had come under KGB control." The KGB was ever present in the lives of the American journalists in Moscow, always lurking in the background and constantly devising schemes to entrap and recruit them.