Ostkrieg (96 page)

19
. Gerlach, “German Economic Interests,” 213–14; Müller, “Economic Alliance,” 118–34; Koch, “Hitler's ‘Programme,' ” 898–99; Kershaw,
Fateful Choices
, 69.

20
. Müller, “Economic Alliance,” 118–34; Kershaw,
Fateful Choices
, 69; Tooze,
The Wages of Destruction
, 420.

21
. Müller, “Das ‘Unternehmen Barbarossa' als wirtschaftlicher Raubkrieg,” 177; Koch, “Hitler's ‘Programme,' ” 899–905; Halder,
War Diary
, 22 May, 25–26 June, 9, 11, 13, 22 July, 26 August, 5 December 1940 (quote), 161, 217–18, 224–25, 232, 251, 294; Tooze,
The Wages of Destruction
, 411–19; Müller, “Economic Alliance,” 134–35; Förster, “Hitler's Decision,” 23–25. For the Soviet perspective on tensions in the Balkans, see Gorodetsky,
Grand Delusion
, 23–66.

22
. Ueberschär, “Hitlers Entschluß,” 98; Förster, “Hitler's Decision,” 22, 25; Kershaw,
Fateful Choices
, 68–69, and
Hitler: Nemesis
, 307.

23
. Halder,
War Diary
, 31 July 1940, 241–46; Förster, “Hitler's Decision,” 25–30; Leach,
German Strategy against Russia
, 68–72; Kershaw,
Hitler: Nemesis
, 307–8.

24
. Halder,
War Diary
, 31 July 1940, 244–45; Förster, “Hitler's Decision,” 25–30; Leach,
German Strategy against Russia
, 69–70; Kershaw,
Hitler: Nemesis
, 307–8.

25
.
TBJG
, 9 August 1940; Ueberschär, “Hitlers Entschluß,” 100; Förster, “Hitler's Decision,” 27–28; Leach,
German Strategy against Russia
, 69–70; Kershaw,
Hitler: Nemesis
, 307–8, and
Fateful Choices
, 69–70.

26
. Kershaw,
Fateful Choices
, 70; Förster, “Hitler's Decision,” 38; Koch, “Hitler's ‘Programme,' ” 904–7; Megargee,
Inside Hitler's High Command
, 87–92, and
War of Annihilation
, 20–21; Halder,
War Diary
, 27 August 1940, 252; Schreiber, “Mittelmeerraum,” 80–82.

27
. Förster, “Hitler's Decision,” 40–41.

28
. Ibid.; Koch, “Hitler's ‘Programme,' ” 911–12; Kershaw,
Hitler: Nemesis
, 325–26, and
Fateful Choices
, chaps. 3, 5.

29
. Förster, “Hitler's Decision,” 40–41; Schreiber, “Mittelmeerraum,” 80; Kershaw,
Fateful Choices
, 76–79, and
Hitler: Nemesis
, 326–27. For a detailed discussion of the Mediterranean strategy, see Schreiber, “Political and Military Developments,” esp. pt. 2.

30
. Schreiber, “Mittelmeerraum,” 80–82; Kershaw,
Fateful Choices
, 76–80.

31
. Schreiber, “Mittelmeerraum,” 82–83; Leach,
German Strategy against Russia
, 72–75; Koch, “Hitler's ‘Programme,' ” 910; Kershaw,
Hitler: Nemesis
, 327–28, and
Fateful Choices
, 81–82.

32
. Kershaw,
Hitler: Nemesis
, 329–30, and
Fateful Choices
, 82–83; Schreiber, “Mittelmeerraum,” 83; Halder,
War Diary
, 1 November 1940, 272; Schmidt,
Hitler's Interpreter
, 193–96.

33
. Kershaw,
Hitler: Nemesis
, 330–31, and
Fateful Choices
, 82–83; Hillgruber,
Staatsmänner
, 1:142–49; Schmidt,
Hitler's Interpreter
, 198–99; Halder,
War Diary
, 1 November 1940, 272; Weinberg,
A World at Arms
, 206.

34
. Below,
Als Hitlers Adjutant
, 249–50; Halder,
War Diary
, 1 November 1940, 272; Bock,
War Diary
, 11 November 1940, 193; Schreiber, “Mittelmeerraum,” 84–85, 87; Koch, “Hitler's ‘Programme,' ” 912; Kershaw,
Hitler: Nemesis
, 331–32, and
Fateful Choices
, 83–84; Engel,
Heeresadjutant bei Hitler
, 4 November 1940, 89–90; Warlimont,
Inside Hitler's Headquarters
, 120. On Gibraltar, see also Goda, “The Riddle of the Rock.”

35
. Förster, “Hitler's Decision,” 42–43; Koch, “Hitler's ‘Programme,' ” 912; Müller, “Das ‘Unternehmen Barbarossa' als wirtschaftlicher Raubkrieg,” 177; Kershaw,
Hitler: Nemesis
, 332–33; Gorodetsky,
Grand Delusion
, 67–75.

36
. Kershaw,
Hitler: Nemesis
, 332, and
Fateful Choices
, 84; Schreiber, “Mittelmeerraum,” 85.

37
. Kershaw,
Hitler: Nemesis
, 333–34, and
Fateful Choices
, 84; Förster, “Hitler's Decision,” 43–44; Koch, “Hitler's ‘Programme,' ” 915–19; Read and Fisher,
The Deadly Embrace
, 510–12; Schmidt,
Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne
, 525–27; Weinberg,
A World at Arms
, 201. See also Hillgruber,
Staatsmänner
, 1:166–93; Noakes and Pridham,
Nazism: A History
, 2:801–8; Bezymenskij, “Der Berlin-Besuch von V. M. Molotov”; and Gorodetsky,
Grand Delusion
, 67–75.

38
. Kershaw,
Hitler: Nemesis
, 334, and
Fateful Choices
, 84; Förster, “Hitler's Decision,” 43–44; Koch, “Hitler's ‘Programme,' ” 919; Engel,
Heeresadjutant bei Hitler
, 15 November 1940, 91; Schreiber, “Mittelmeerraum,” 86; Leach,
German Strategy against Russia
, 77–78, 82; Gorodetsky,
Grand Delusion
, 70, 75–86; Schramm, ed.,
Kriegstagebuch
, 15 November 1940, 1, pt. 1:177.

39
. Kershaw,
Hitler: Nemesis
, 334–35, and
Fateful Choices
, 84–90; Förster, “Hitler's Decision,” 46–48; Halder,
War Diary
, 5 December 1940, 292–98; Schramm, ed.,
Kriegstagebuch
, 5, 10 December 1940, 208–9, 1, pt. 1:222; Bock,
War Diary
, 3 December 1940, 2 January 1941, 193–94, 197–98.

40
. Kershaw,
Hitler: Nemesis
, 334–35, and
Fateful Choices
, 84–90; Förster, “Hitler's Decision,” 28, 46–48; Schreiber, “Mittelmeerraum,” 91; Schramm, ed.,
Kriegstagebuch
, 9 January 1941, 1, pt. 1:258; Murray, “Betrachtungen,” 322–25; Deist, “The Road to Ideological War,” 385–92; “Weisung Nr. 21 Fall Barbarossa vom 18. 12. 1940,” in Ueberschär and Wette, eds.,
“Unternehmen Barbarossa
,” 244–46.

41
. Geyer, “German Strategy in the Age of Machine Warfare,” 574–93; Murray, “Betrachtungen,” 322–25; Deist, “The Road to Ideological War,” 385–92; Kershaw,
Hitler: Nemesis
, 342–43; Klink, “Military Concept,” 284–85, 320.

42
. Engel,
Heeresadjutant bei Hitler
, 18 December 1940, 92; Halder,
War Diary
, 17 February 1941, 320; Leach,
German Strategy against Russia
, 87–123; Klink, “Military Concept,” 257–85; Megargee,
War of Annihilation
, 24–32.

43
. Leach,
German Strategy against Russia
, 101–3.

44
. Ibid., 87–100; Müller, “Das ‘Unternehmen Barbarossa' als wirtschaftlicher Raubkrieg,” 178–79.

45
. Müller, “Das ‘Unternehmen Barbarossa' als wirtschaftlicher Raubkrieg,” 178–79; Leach,
German Strategy against Russia
, 87–100; Tooze,
The Wages of Destruction
, 432–40, 452–56; Förster, “Hitler's Decision,” 48, “Der historische Ort,” 632, and “The Dynamics of Volksgemeinschaft,” 200–202; Megargee,
War of Annihilation
, 26–28.

46
. Frieser,
The Blitzkrieg Legend
, 98–99, 320–49.

47
. Schramm, ed.,
Kriegstagebuch
, 9 January 1941, 1, pt. 1:257–58; Müller, “Das ‘Unternehmen Barbarossa' als wirtschaftlicher Raubkrieg,” 179–80.

48
. Weinberg,
A World at Arms
, 187–89; Leach,
German Strategy against Russia
, 100–118; Klink, “Military Concept,” 257–92; Halder,
War Diary
, 5 December 1940, 297–98; Förster, “Der historische Ort,” 631.

49
. Leach,
German Strategy against Russia
, 124–32; Klink, “Military Concept,” 257–85; Kershaw,
Hitler: Nemesis
, 344–45; Megargee,
War of Annihilation
, 24–32; Tooze,
The Wages of Destruction
, 452–53; Förster, “Der historische Ort,” 633; Kroener, “Organisation und Mobilisierung des deutschen Machtbereichs,” 846–48, 998.

50
. Leach,
German Strategy against Russia
, 133–39; Klink, “Military Concept,” 292–97; van Creveld,
Fighting Power
, 43–61; Hartmann, “Verbrecherischer Krieg—verbrecherische Wehrmacht?” 8–9; Tooze,
The Wages of Destruction
, 452–55.

51
. Frieser,
The Blitzkrieg Legend
, 29–33; Cooper,
The German Army
, 163; Tooze,
The Wages of Destruction
, 452–55; Kroener, “The ‘Frozen Blitzkrieg,' ” 146; van Creveld,
Supplying War
, 142–201; DiNardo,
Mechanized Juggernaut?
35–54.

52
. Klink, “Military Concept,” 294–97; Halder,
War Diary
, 28 January 1941, 314–15; Schramm, ed.,
Kriegstagebuch
, 3 February 1941, 1, pt. 1:299; Müller, “Economic Alliance,” 142–70; Kroener, “The ‘Frozen Blitzkrieg,' ” 142–44.

53
. Müller, “Economic Alliance,” 142–70; Tooze,
The Wages of Destruction
, 432–40; Kroener, “The ‘Frozen Blitzkrieg,' ” 142–44; Megargee,
War of Annihilation
, 29.

54
. Müller, “Economic Alliance,” 150–51; Leach,
German Strategy against Russia
, 140–41; Kershaw,
Hitler: Nemesis
, 344–45; Halder,
War Diary
, 23 December 1940, 28 January 1941, 308–9, 314; Bock,
War Diary
, 1 February 1941, 198.

55
. Klink, “Military Concept,” 260; Müller, “Economic Alliance,” 138–39, 149–50, 172; Tooze,
The Wages of Destruction
, 458–60; Leach,
German Strategy against Russia
, 146–47.

56
. Schramm, ed.,
Kriegstagebuch
, 3, 11 February 1941, 1, pt. 1:297–301, 316–19; Leach,
German Strategy against Russia
, 143–45; Müller, “Economic Alliance,” 150–54; Kershaw,
Hitler: Nemesis
, 345–46; Tooze,
The Wages of Destruction
, 459–60. For an assessment of Thomas's memorandum, see Lübbers, “ ‘Ausnutzung oder Ausschlachtung?' ”

57
. Browning,
The Origins of the Final Solution
, 213–15; Tooze,
The Wages of Destruction
, 459–60, 476–80; Müller, “Economic Alliance,” 150–52, 171, and “Das ‘Unternehmen Barbarossa' als wirtschaftlicher Raubkrieg,” 181–82; Aly and Heim,
Architects of Annihilation
, 234–42.

Klaus Jochen Arnold and Gert C. Lübbers argue that Backe had received a “special mission” from Hitler in February 1941. See Arnold and Lübbers, “The Meeting of the Staatssekretäre,” 616.

58
. Müller, “Economic Alliance,” 171–77; Tooze,
The Wages of Destruction
, 476–80; Klink, “Military Concept,” 294; Arnold and Lübbers, “The Meeting of the Staatssekretäre,” 616–18; Aly and Heim,
Architects of Annihilation
, 236–42.

59
. Müller, “Economic Alliance,” 174–82; Förster, “Operation Barbarossa as a War of Conquest,” 481–90; Tooze,
The Wages of Destruction
, 479–80; Browning,
The Origins of the Final Solution
, 234–40; Arnold and Lübbers, “The Meeting of the Staatssekretäre,” 619–25; Aly and Heim,
Architects of Annihilation
, 238–39;
TBJG
, 1, 6 May 1941. See also Gerlach,
Kalkulierte Morde
, 46–59, and
Krieg, Ernährung, Völkermord
, 10–84; Aly and Heim,
Vordenker der Vernichtung
, 365–93; Aly,
“Final Solution
,” 172; and Longerich,
Politik der Vernichtung
, 298.

For an argument that the meeting of 2 May 1941 rivaled that at the Wannsee on 20 January 1942 in which plans for the Final Solution were discussed, see Kay, “Germany's Staatssekretäre,” and “Revisiting the Meeting of the Staatssekretäre.”

Johannes Hürter argues for the term
hunger calculation
rather than
hunger policy
, a point supported by Alex J. Kay, since there was no clear idea among the economic planners as to how this hunger policy was to be implemented. See Hürter,
Hitlers Heerführer
, 491; Kay,
Exploitation, Resettlement, Mass Murder
, 206–7.

60
. Müller, “Economic Alliance,” 174–82, and “Das ‘Unternehmen Barbarossa' als wirtschaftlicher Raubkrieg,” 128–83; Förster, “Operation Barbarossa as a War of Conquest,” 481–90; Tooze,
The Wages of Destruction
, 479–80; Browning,
The Origins of the Final Solution
, 234–40; Aly and Heim,
Architects of Annihilation
, 242.

Klaus Jochen Arnold emphasizes that, despite the considerable ideological points of agreement between Hitler and the Wehrmacht top brass, responsibility for the implementation of the hunger policy was purposely given to Goering, as head of the Four-Year Plan and Economic Command Staff East, and State Secretary Backe, of the Reich Ministry of Food. See Arnold,
Die Wehrmacht und die Besatzungspolitik
, 74–101, 242–67; and Arnold and Lübbers, “The Meeting of the Staatssekretäre,” 613–26. On a number of occasions, Hitler had stressed that the army was not to be “burdened” with administration (Halder,
War Diary
, 5 March 1941, 327), that generals “[were], for the most part, not able to deal with and solve political questions” (
TBJG
, 19 August 1941), and that, with regard to the murder of Jews, “the soldier should not be burdened with these political questions” (3 July 1941, quoted in Arnold and Lübbers, “The Meeting of the Staatssekretäre,” 620 n. 42).