Operation Storm: Japan's Top Secret Submarines and Its Plan to Change the Course of World War II (51 page)

A
S
N
AMBU AND
Ariizumi struggled to control the
I-401
, Johnson continued pressing Bando for concessions. He wanted his officers to board the Jap sub,
⁷
after which the
Segundo
would escort her to Yokosuka. Johnson was unaware of Ariizumi’s resistance to his
plan. Nor did he realize the commander wanted to scuttle his boat. If anything, Johnson wanted to avoid a mass suicide. It’s doubtful Bando relayed Ariizumi’s message asking Johnson to torpedo them. If he did, Johnson either ignored or dismissed it as too bizarre for consideration.

After 20 minutes of negotiation, Bando finally agreed to carry Johnson’s terms to the
I-401
.
⁸

A few minutes later, Bando was rowed to his sub.
⁹
As the
Segundo
shrank in the distance, he was sure he felt Captain Johnson’s good wishes following him.
¹⁰
But Johnson wasn’t the sentimental type. He sent Lt. (jg) J. K. Brozo to accompany Bando, giving him instructions to keep an eye on things. Johnson didn’t trust Bando, at least not yet.

Ariizumi and Nambu were waiting on the bridge as Brozo and Bando climbed the ladder. Brozo had no idea about the conflict aboard the
I-401
. Bando outlined Johnson’s demands, then Lieutenant Brozo pressed the point: “Sail to Yokosuka.”

“We must go to Ominato in accordance with the Imperial Order,” Nambu replied.

“The emperor has surrendered. You must follow General MacArthur’s orders.”

Nambu knew that he was quibbling and that the American officer was correct.
¹¹
But Ariizumi, having failed to sink the
I-401
, was still against returning to Yokosuka. Nambu wasn’t sure why.
¹²
It probably had something to do with preserving the navy’s reputation.
¹³
Of course, the IJN’s reputation was already in tatters. Still, Ariizumi’s personality was such that he insisted on upholding standards to the bitter end.

Reluctantly, Ariizumi eventually agreed to go to Yokosuka. One thing he couldn’t agree to though was Johnson’s demand to place American officers on board his sub. That would mean the
I-401
had surrendered.
¹⁴

And so the issue became whether the
I-401
could be boarded. Johnson had no intention of allowing the sub to go to Yokosuka on her own, especially given her past behavior. But neither
Ariizumi nor Nambu would surrender their sub before returning to Japan.

While this was going on, Vic Horgan was in the
Segundo
’s control room plotting the demise of the
I-401
. There was still a lot the Americans didn’t know about the sub. They had no idea that she was the flagship of a secret armada, or even that her squadron commander was on board. Nor did they know her torpedo tubes were empty, or that her deck guns lacked ammunition. As far as Johnson was concerned, the
I-401
was armed and dangerous. And so Horgan monitored the sub’s position, knowing they might have to torpedo her at any moment.
¹⁵

As Brozo relayed an update to the
Segundo
,
¹⁶
Ariizumi and Nambu developed a plan to outwit the Americans. Neither man completely trusted the other; nor did they have reason to. Nevertheless, the two Japanese officers were not in a position to negotiate. Not only was their sub unarmed, their Naval Defense Command had ordered them to comply with the
Segundo
’s instructions. And so Ariizumi and Nambu had to find a compromise that not only met the
Segundo
’s requirements but allowed them to save face as well.

Their counteroffer was nothing short of brilliant. They would agree to be boarded based on several conditions. First, the boarding party would be composed of five petty officers; no commissioned officers would be included. Next, the boarding party would limit itself to a communications role only. This meant Nambu would continue as captain of the sub. Finally, since the boarding party was in a liaison role, they would remain on deck at all times; they would not venture inside the sub.
¹⁷

It was a typical Japanese compromise, engineered to satisfy both parties’ needs yet requiring a willing suspension of disbelief in order to work. Johnson would achieve his goal of putting men aboard the sub, while Ariizumi would retain nominal command, and the
I-401
wouldn’t have to surrender until she reached Yokosuka. It was a well-crafted solution that gave both parties what they wanted.

Bando returned to the
Segundo
to sell the compromise to Johnson. Though Johnson was reluctant to send only petty officers, he
eventually came round.
¹⁸
It still must have seemed farcical, since the compromise hung on a technicality. The
Segundo
got its prize crew, and the Japanese avoided surrendering outside home waters. All the prize crew had to do was not go in the sub.

The compromise was far from farcical though. It not only preserved the Japanese sense of honor—something the Americans only faintly comprehended—it gave Johnson both the boarding party and the destination he wanted. In other words, it allowed Johnson to save face as well. Johnson might not have realized this. Hardly the sympathetic type, it would have been difficult for him to appreciate the importance of saving face to the Japanese. Still, he must have sensed they were men of their word to accept such a compromise.

As Bando and Johnson continued their conversation, something curious happened.
¹⁹
The two men began warming to each other. They quickly learned that each had attended his country’s naval academy. Johnson even recalled that the Japanese Navy had visited Annapolis while he was there,
²⁰
and Bando thought he might have been on that trip.
²¹
But Johnson was not buying everything Bando was selling. In fact, his attitude was a bit snide, as his patrol report indicates:

Though Bando’s English was poor, Johnson understood him well enough. Bando’s explanation of the
I-401
’s head count, flank speed, dive time, and safety depth weren’t far off the mark. Nevertheless,
Johnson’s sarcasm showed through when he noted, “Lt Bondo [
sic
] was one of the few persons I have ever seen who derived such obvious pleasure from saluting.”
²³

Bando had his own agenda, of course. By ingratiating himself with the
Segundo
’s commanding officer, he hoped to persuade him to allow the
I-401
to fly her naval ensign rather than the Stars and Stripes until her surrender.
²⁴
It was an important concession, one that could only have been made because of Johnson’s sympathy. The allegedly impetuous sub captain was turning out to be not so impetuous after all. In fact, he’d achieved the seemingly impossible: capturing the
I-401
while honoring the Japanese refusal to surrender. It was an unconventional solution, to be sure, one that a more mature and battle-hardened sub captain might not have arrived at. Then again, the Japanese were an unconventional enemy. Johnson’s out-of-the-box thinking had saved the day, plus or minus a few wisecracks.

J
OHNSON PICKED HIS EXECUTIVE OFFICER
, L
IEUTENANT
B
ALSON
, to lead the boarding party. Since Johnson had agreed that no officers would board the
I-401
, Balson stripped his shirt of rank and changed into a pair of dungarees.
¹
When the boarding party was complete, five men joined Balson as the
I-401
’s prize crew: COB (chief of the boat) E. A. Russell; MM1c (motor machinist’s mate first class) Ralph S. Austin; EM1c (electrician’s mate first class) Kenneth H. “Skinny” Diekmann; TM2c (torpedo’s mate second class) Jenison V. Halton; and QM3c (quartermaster third class) Carlo M. Carlucci. It was one more than Johnson had promised, but the enemy was in no position to object.

Balson issued each man a sidearm before boarding his raft, then at 8:45
A.M
. set out for the
I-401
.
²
Balson could tell that the small group of Japanese officers who met them were tense.
³
Then again, the Japanese felt the same way about the Americans.

The first thing Balson did, once he was aboard, was chain the
I-401
’s hatches open. Next, he sent Russell to check on the torpedoes.
⁴
The
I-401
’s sonar operator thought the reason the rest of the Americans didn’t go inside the sub was that they knew Ariizumi was on board and were afraid.
⁵
According to the terms Bando had negotiated, however, the
Segundo
’s boarding party was to remain topside. This meant Balson and his men camped on the aft section of the hangar roof, where they could keep an eye on the bridge.
⁶
Carlucci had been warned that if he heard a hissing sound, it meant the sub was submerging. In that case, he was to fire a signal flare and either run to the bridge to keep its hatch from closing or, if it was too late, inflate his “Mae West” and jump overboard.
⁷

Balson and his men weren’t eager to mingle with the enemy, so they were happy to remain secluded on the aft deck. They’d brought blankets for the cold as well as food, and when they needed water they hollered down the bridge hatch until someone rewarded them with a flask of sake.
⁸

Finally at 9:05
A.M
. the subs set course for Sagami Bay. While the
I-401
proceeded at 15 knots, the
Segundo
kept station off the sub’s port quarter. It didn’t take long though before Nambu tested the ropes that bound him. Less than an hour later, he reported engine trouble and slowed his sub to 11 knots.
⁹

“They better get their fuckin’ boat under way or I’ll blow it the fuck out of the water,” Johnson exclaimed.
¹⁰

For the Japanese to be having second thoughts this early in the voyage was concerning. Fearing that their agreement was unraveling, Johnson contacted his superiors and reported the sub as hostile.
¹¹

The USS
Tigrone
(SS 419) was sent to assist, but three hours after the
I-401
reported engine trouble, she still lagged behind. Finally Johnson signaled the sub to fix her engine or “we’ll come over and do it for you.”
¹²

Nambu assured them that wouldn’t be necessary.
¹³

Johnson was right to suspect the Japanese of second thoughts. The
I-401
’s engine had broken down,
¹⁴
but Ariizumi was also trying to find a way to avoid Yokosuka. Johnson would be damned if he’d give an inch. As far as he was concerned, he was escorting a hostile submarine barely under his control. If the
I-401
so much as looked crooked, he’d send her to the bottom.

A few minutes before six that evening, the
I-401
came to a stop and signaled she was sending an officer over. Twenty minutes later Lieutenant Bando appeared for the third time that day. Johnson was already irritated by the diversion, and hit the roof when Bando showed him dispatches ordering the
I-401
to Ominato.
¹⁵

“I take a very dim view of your actions,” Johnson told him. “We either proceed with you handling your sub, or with our Prize Crew in charge.”
¹⁶

Johnson must have thought it a childish ploy, since the only orders he obeyed came from ComSubPac. What he didn’t realize was that Ariizumi had not only informed his naval command he’d been captured, he’d also requested permission to proceed to Ominato. When he was told to comply with the
Segundo
’s orders, Ariizumi had chosen to ignore the message and try to trick Johnson instead. Clearly, Ariizumi still had some fight left.

Early the next morning Johnson received orders regarding the
I-401
’s surrender. After ordering her to stop, Johnson boarded the sub to personally relay the instructions.
¹⁷

“I’s sorry you come,” Nambu told him, but Johnson was in no mood for pleasantries.
¹⁸

The meeting lasted just long enough for Johnson to tell Nambu that the Japanese naval ensign would be lowered the next morning at 5:00,
¹⁹
with a formal surrender at 11:00. Nambu would retain the conn until then. Once the
I-401
had surrendered in Sagami Bay, she would proceed to Yokosuka, where she would moor next to the
Proteus
.
²⁰
In the meantime, the funny business was to stop.

The communication went more smoothly this time, with Nishimura serving as translator.
²¹
Nambu reassured Johnson he’d received the same orders, but the accommodation was not to last.