Operation Solo (32 page)

Morris started at the back and worked toward the front. The book perplexed and concerned him too; he had studied it and reached some tentative conclusions, which he offered for whatever they were worth. In his efforts better to understand how the capitalists manipulated the masses, he had been reading the
Reader's Digest
for forty years; it was notoriously and irredeemably anticommunist and reactionary. Its sponsorship of a book slandering the Soviet Union and socialism, therefore, was not surprising. The magazine had been publishing condensations of the manuscript
for some time; this publication of the book itself represented no change in U.S. policy. The author claimed to have gained assistance from the FBI, the CIA, “special organs” of other capitalist countries, and Soviet traitors (KGB defectors). Had the author known about the transfer of money, he certainly would have said something about it because that would have made the book more sensational. Morris therefore concluded that neither the author nor any of his sources knew anything about the money. He noted that the book contained a one-sentence reference to Vladimir alleging that he had engaged in “disinformation” operations abroad; if that were true, perhaps those activities brought him to the attention of the author. Since publication of the book, he and Jack had watched for any signs that they were under surveillance or suspicion; they detected none. As for the “special comrades,” they had been supportive and efficient, and Jack especially liked and trusted Vladimir because he was so careful and punctual.

Chuchukin said nothing but his face expressed relief and gratitude. Ponomarev thanked Morris for his analysis and the comments about Chuchukin, and said that his judgments would be taken into account. The implications of the book and the question of whether contact could be resumed in New York nevertheless were still under evaluation, and he could not predict the outcome.

Here Morris issued a subtle threat, yet one to which nobody could take exception. He and Jack appreciated as well as anybody the necessity of security; after all, their “necks were in the noose.” They understood that the “special comrades” would know best how to manage security, and they in good grace would accept whatever was decided. For fifty years, he and his brother had tried to serve the party; he hoped they had made some small contributions; and he was proud they had helped create a secret channel of communications that for more than fifteen years had proven impervious to the “imperialists” and the FBI. But he and Jack were now in their seventies; their work was dangerous; it was physically demanding; Jack and Vladimir before transferring money had to drive around the countryside for hours in rain, snow, and storms to make sure they were not being followed, and sometimes his brother did not get to bed until 3 A.M.; Morris now
was making four or five trips a year to Moscow and Eastern Europe, and travel was arduous. If the “special comrades” judged that the existing channel of communications and money transfers could not be maintained, then an alternate one would have to be established from nothing. If so, then this might be an appropriate time for Morris and Jack “to retire from active service.” For the rest of their lives they would of course do all they could to serve the party to which they had devoted most of their lives, but perhaps the time had come for younger, more vigorous men to take over their arduous and perilous duties.

Feigning slight embarrassment and indecision, Morris then took Ponomarev and the rest into his confidence and thereby made them co-conspirators. He was not authorized to speak for his general secretary, Comrade Hall, but in the strictest of confidence, he felt obligated to say that Hall was extremely upset by the severance of contact. Comrade Hall was a loyal and devoted man; he also was a man of principle, consistently rejecting overtures from the Chinese, who wanted the American party in their hands, like the other parties they were courting around the world. So Morris thought that, if contact in New York was to be permanently ended, it would be prudent to have a long talk with Comrade Hall before the Chinese had a long talk with him.

Ponomarev, who rarely displayed emotion, except in voicing vitriol against the West, came from behind his desk, lifted Morris from a chair, hugged him in the Russian fashion, and said, “My dear comrade, my dear friend, you may never retire.”

Walt, you must learn to think like they think
. Doing just that, Morris in less than an hour had imparted to the International Department and the KGB a message that made all who heard and comprehend it need to run to the lavatory: If you cannot reopen the New York channel, then you lose MORAT, Jack, and me; you may lose Gus and control of the American party, possibly even lose control to the Chinese. You may explain that to the Politburo as you wish, or, if you prefer, Gus and I will explain when we see Brezhnev in May, as you know we will.

When Morris returned to Moscow in late April in advance of Hall, he was informed that things were not as bad as feared and
contact would be renewed. A new and well-qualified “special comrade” (Yuri Zhuravlev) had been assigned to work with Jack, and before Comrade Hall spoke to Comrade Brezhnev he should be assured that $500,000 would be delivered to Jack shortly. Radio communications would resume and previous operational procedures remained in effect.

Brezhnev, along with Suslov, Ponomarev, Mostovets, and four Central Committee members, received Hall and Morris cordially on May 6 (Morris made detailed notes of the meeting). After pro forma greetings, Brezhnev remarked, “Life in your country is very interesting. Your press is interesting. I have been seeing all kinds of people, senators, etc., all good friends of your party.”

“Many people are beating a path to Comrade Brezhnev's door,” Hall responded. “You are seeing more senators than Nixon. This is good because it shows the world the role and power of the Soviet Union. Our relationship [with the Soviet Union] gives our party a much greater status and influence.”

Having rehearsed with Morris, Hall briefed Brezhnev about economic and political conditions in the United States. “There is a great deal of political instability which comes from the Watergate affair. There are new revelations every day. This instability will continue this year and part of next year.” Hall explained impeachment procedures and predicted political turmoil for another year.

“You are our dear friends and comrades,” Brezhnev said. “We did not really appreciate Watergate until you explained it to us. John Reed wrote his book,
Ten Days That Shook the World
. Watergate is taking years shaking the United States and the world. You mentioned the book that has been published with transcripts of the Watergate tapes—we hear that people are lining up in the United States to buy these revelations. It is difficult to tell what will happen to Nixon. We ask all around about him but nobody knows. Even the editor of
Pravda
doesn't know.”

“Even Nixon doesn't know,” Hall interrupted.

Brezhnev said that no matter what happened to Nixon, the Soviet Union would continue to seek détente with the United States. “We cannot have one policy before lunch and another for
after lunch.” But there were problems. “During the last visit of Kissinger, we found many difficulties, especially on military matters, but also in trade and credits. We took these up in our Politburo. There were also problems in regard to the Middle East. I was very sharp in telling him that he cannot act alone—without partners—that the [UN] security resolution was a joint Soviet–U.S. resolution. Then Kissinger started his individual diplomacy, as if solving all world problems himself… Kissinger will be in Moscow again soon to finalize Nixon's [forthcoming] visit and to discuss limitations of armaments. The United States claims that there is superiority on the part of the Soviet Union. But he refuses to include U.S. strategic air power, and bases, etc. We do not have to make concessions to achieve balance; the United States needs to do that. I proposed withdrawal of nuclear forces from the Mediterranean Sea—to make it a ‘Sea of Peace'—but Kissinger said no. We proposed that planes do not carry nuclear bombs or rockets—‘No,' he said.”

Kissinger obviously knew what Brezhnev had said to him. Nevertheless, the fact that Brezhnev repeated his proposals to Hall and Morris, as if he really believed in them, was significant, for it showed that he either was very naive or that by “disarmament” the Soviets meant disarmament of the United States. Soviet naval forces in the Mediterranean did not threaten the continental United States; American aircraft carriers and submarines very much threatened the Soviet land mass. Soviet ability to strike the United States with nuclear bombs delivered by aircraft was small compared to American capability to bombard the Soviet Union both from long-range bombers and tactical aircraft ringing its borders. Accepting Brezhnev's proposals would have meant giving up much for virtually nothing.

Seeming to enjoy exhibiting his mastery of foreign affairs, Brezhnev took Hall and Morris on a tour of the world, as seen through his eyes and those of the Politburo. He also recited stupefying statistics to demonstrate that the Soviet economy was sound and its prospects bright.

Upon alighting in New York May 23, Morris was able to tell the FBI what the Soviets oligarchs really thought—oligarchs who
lived in total isolation from the people they ruled, who never set foot on a Moscow street except to get in and out of a limousine.

Brezhnev in his economic survey noted that the agricultural situation was still “complicated”—meaning in Sovietese “a real failure” or “an overwhelming mess.” For fifty years, Morris had been hearing official excuses for the failure of the Soviet system of state and collective farms imposed upon once-productive farmers tilling and husbanding rich lands and orchards, and of new plans to correct the “complications,” and always they were approximately the same. The oligarchs first tried to persuade the people that the agricultural problem was not as severe as the bare shops suggested, and to this end they broadcast statistics, just as Brezhnev had done (which inspired another Russian saying, “If you want milk, just take your pail to the radio”). Then there was the weather, almost always bad (communism apparently brought about an enduring change in the climate of Russia, Ukraine, and the sunny, southern Republics). Next there were boasts, quite justified, about the natural resources and fertile soil of the Soviet Union, whose territory, not including that of its foreign vassal states, occupied about one-sixth of the earth's land surface. Given this natural wealth, things were bound to get better—but they never did.

Always there were new plans to eliminate the “complications.” Khrushchev, dazzled during his 1959 visit to the United States by the corn and wheat fields of Iowa, decreed that corn and wheat be planted in uncultivated areas of Siberia; uncultivated because centuries of farmers, tutored only by their fathers and mothers, understood that nothing could grow there. Huge investments in fertilizer and machinery here and there produced corn that grew about a foot high. Now in 1974, Brezhnev told Morris, “The policy in agriculture is very complicated. We are planning the use of areas not much used up to now, such as swamps and dry areas. Big sums of money are required for these projects; some on a broad scale, some on a smaller scale.” In other words, we are going to solve our agricultural problems by cultivating swamps and deserts.

Morris did not mock or laugh at Brezhnev just as an oncologist does not laugh at a tumor. He says this is something to be examined
and watched, and that basically is what Morris said to the FBI: This is another example of their propensity to dangerously delude themselves, and we had better watch that.

 

 

INITIALLY, PROSPECTS LOOKED good. While Morris was still in Moscow, the KGB, as Ponomarev promised, resumed radio transmissions three or four times a week, and on May 18 in dark woods outside Nassau City, New York, Jack's new handler, Zhuravlev, with a finger in front of his mouth—”don't speak”—handed him a package containing $500,000. The KGB again radioed on schedule the reassuring
SK
signals. (To recapitulate,
SK
meant: We have no message today; as far as we know, all is well.) But by June, the continuing fallout from the Watergate frenzy, the hemorrhage of secrets, congressional investigations, and interrogations of the intelligence community, coupled with the exposure of Chuchukin, so frightened Morris that Boyle warned headquarters he needed more reassurance.

Ray Wannall responded by assembling Section Chief William Brannigan, Assistant New York SAC James Ingram, Morris, Jack, Burlinson, Boyle, and Langtry for an operational conference in New York on July 11. Meeting Morris and Jack for the first time, Wannall declared that the value of SOLO, the existence of which he himself only recently had learned, was “tremendous, beyond measure.” He had brought everybody together so Morris and Jack could voice any complaints they had and talk about anything they desired.

Morris first said that “the dramatic disclosures which appear from day to day in the press” made him and Jack fear for their lives. The book
KGB
severely harmed the operation and very nearly destroyed it. The book was discussed among Politburo members, and its effects were still being evaluated in the Soviet Union. He believed that mention of Chuchukin in it could only have resulted from a serious security breach.

Jack interjected, “If my contact [Chuchukin] is exposed, how am I not exposed?”

Again, Morris described the psychological pressures of dealing with Brezhnev, the heads of communist states in Eastern Europe,
and the egotist Gus Hall; the pressures of having to produce reports virtually every day; his life with only one vacation in twenty years; his fears that the dearth of recognition or appreciation from Washington meant that his and his brother's efforts were not recognized or appreciated.