Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East (56 page)

153
‘Panzerarmeeoberkommandos Anlagen zum Kriegstagesbuch “Berichte, Besprechungen, Beurteilungen der Lage” Bd.III 25.5.41 – 22.7.41’ BA-MA RH 21–3/46, Fol. 153 (13 July 1941).

154
One Red Army Captain told a British correspondent in Autumn 1941: ‘This is a very grim war. And you cannot imagine the hatred the Germans have stirred up amoung our people. We are easy-going, good-natured people, you know; but I assure you, they have turned our people into spiteful
mujiks
.
Zlyie mujiki
– that's what we've got in the Red Army now, men thirsting for revenge’ (Werth,
Russia at War 1941–1945
, p. 194). Another Red Army soldier wrote to his wife in early 1942: ‘However much they write in the newspapers about their atrocities the reality is much worse. I’ve been in some of the places where the beasts have been. I’ve seen the burned-out towns and villages, the corpses of women and children, the unhappy, plundered residents, but also I’ve seen the tears of joy when these people encountered us.…The spirit of these places has affected me and it has grown in all our soldiers’ (as cited in Merridale,
Ivan's War
, p. 127; see also p. 133).

155
Franz Halder, KTB III, p. 76 (14 July 1941).

156
Howard and Paret (eds.), Carl von Clausewitz,
On War
, p. 412.

157
Franz Halder, KTB III, p. 32 (1 July 1941).

158
Van Creveld,
Supplying War
, p. 168.

159
Franz Halder, KTB III, p. 62 (10 July 1941).

160
Schüler, ‘The Eastern Campaign’, p. 210.

161
Glantz,
Barbarossa
, pp. 73–74.

162
Schüler, ‘The Eastern Campaign’, pp. 210–211.

163
Reinhardt,
Moscow – The Turning Point
, p. 147.

164
Franz Halder, KTB III, p. 63 (10 July 1941); Krumpelt,
Das Material
, p. 167.

165
Halder, KTB III, p. 66 (11 July 1941).

166
Stolfi,
Hitler's Panzers East
, Chapter 12, ‘Constructing an Alternate Historical Past: Taking Moscow and Defeating the Soviet Union. August–October 1941’.

167
Schüler, ‘The Eastern Campaign’, pp. 211–213; Weinberg,
A World At Arms
, pp. 269–270. Geoffrey P. Megargee,
War of Annihilation. Combat and Genocide on the Eastern Front 1941
(Lanham, 2006), pp. 80–81.

168
Cecil,
Hitler's Decision to Invade Russia 1941
, p. 134. See also Fest,
Hitler
, p. 647.

169
Franz Halder, KTB III, p. 71 (12 July 1941).

170
Ibid., p. 78 (14 July 1941). See also p. 87 (16 July 1941).

171
The previous commander, General Ritter von Weber, was mortally wounded on 18 July 1941.

172
Liddell Hart,
The Other Side of the Hill
, p. 247. See also the informed discussion in Krumpelt,
Das Material und die Kriegführung
, Chapters 14 and 16.

173
‘KTB Nr.1 Panzergruppe 2 vom 22.6.1941 bis 21.7.41’ BA-MA RH 21–2/927, Fols. 234–235 (15 July 1941).

174
‘Kriegstagebuch der O.Qu.-Abt. Pz. A.O.K.2 von 21.6.41 bis 31.3.42’ BA-MA RH 21–2/819, Fol. 296 (16 July 1941).

175
‘KTB 3rd Pz. Div. I.b 19.5.41 – 6.2.42’ BA-MA RH 27–3/218 (14 July 1941).

176
‘KTB 20th Pz. Div. vom 25.5.41 bis 15.8.41’ BA-MA RH 27–20/2, Fol. 47 (15 July 1941).

177
Kipp, ‘Barbarossa and the Crisis’, p. 126.

178
‘3rd Pz. Gr. KTB 25.5.41 – 31.8.41’ BA-MA Microfilm 59054, Fol. 129 (14 July 1941).

179
Hoth,
Panzer-Operationen
, p. 93.

180
‘Gen.Kdo.LVII.Pz.Korps Kriegstagesbuch Nr.1 vom 15.2. – 31.10.41’ BA-MA RH 24–57/2, pp. 173–175 (14 July 1941). See also ‘Kriegstagesbuch 19.Panzer-Division Abt.Ib für die Zeit vom 1.6.1941 – 31.12.1942’ BA-MA RH 27–19/23, Fol. 14 (15 July 1941).

181
‘KTB 3rd Pz. Div. I.b 19.5.41 – 6.2.42’ BA-MA RH 27–3/218 (17 July 1941).

182
Fedor von Bock, KTB ‘Osten I’, Fol. 27,
War Diary
, pp. 249–250 (15 July 1941).

183
Ibid., Fols. 27–28, p. 251 (15 July 1941).

184
Ibid., Fol. 32 (17 July 1941). The English edition of Bock's diary incorrectly dates the visit by Canaris as taking place on 15 July. Fedor von Bock,
The War Diary 1939–1945
, p. 252 (15 July 1941).

185
Hürter,
Hitlers Heerführer
, p. 286.

186
Muggeridge (ed.),
Ciano's Diary
, p. 370 (16 July 1941).

187
For the most recent overview of the Soviet partisan movement in World War II see Kenneth Slepyan,
Stalin's Guerrillas. Soviet Partisans in World War II
(Lawrence, 2006).

188
Joachim Hoffmann, ‘Die Kriegführung aus der Sicht der Sowjetunion’ in Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (ed.),
Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg
, Band IV, p. 752.

189
Alexander Hill,
The War Behind the Eastern Front. The Soviet Partisan Movement in North-West Russia 1941–1944
(New York, 2005); Matthew Cooper,
The Phantom War. The German Struggle Against Soviet Partisans 1941–1944
(London, 1979),
Chapter 2
, ‘The Failure of the Partisan Movement – 1941’. See also the useful discussion in Grenkevich,
The Soviet Partisan Movement
, pp. 157–162.

190
‘KTB Nr.1 Panzergruppe 2 vom 22.6.1941 bis 21.7.41’ BA-MA RH 21–2/927, Fol. 241 (16 July 1941).

191
Rudolf-Christoph Frhr. von Gersdorff,
Soldat im Untergang
(Frankfurt am Main, 1977), p. 103.

192
Edgar M. Howell,
The Soviet Partisan Movement 1941–1944
(Washington, 1956), p. 42.

193
Franz Halder, KTB III, p. 83 (16 July 1941).

194
Koch-Erpach, ‘Crossing of the Dnepr River’, p. 404.

195
Kempowski (ed.),
Das Echolot Barbarossa ’41
, p. 98 (25 June 1941).

196
Ibid., p. 141 (28 June 1941).

197
As quoted in Shepherd,
War in the Wild East
, pp. 77–78.

198
For a complete listing of these forces see Antonio Munoz and Oleg V. Romanko,
Hitler's White Russians: Collaboration, Extermination and Anti-Partisan Warfare in Byelorussia 1941–1944. A Study of White Russian Collaboration and German Occupation Policies
(New York, 2003), p. 122–126.

199
Shepherd,
War in the Wild East
, p. 45.

200
As quoted in Ziemke and Bauer,
Moscow to Stalingrad
, p. 207.

201
Jürgen Förster, ‘Die Sicherung des “Lebensraumes” Sowjetunion’ in Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (ed.),
Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg
, Band IV, pp. 1036–1037.

202
Trevor-Roper (ed.),
Hitler's War Directives 1939–1945
, p. 144.

203
The city of Smolensk had a wartime population of just 170,000 inhabitants and early on fell under complete German control. The city's name, however, is given to the wide-ranging battles between Timoshenko's Western Front and Bock's Army Group Centre in July and August.

204
‘Kriegstagebuch Nr.2 XXXXVII.Pz.Korps. Ia 25.5.1941 – 22.9.1941’ BA-MA RH 24–47/2 (16 July 1941).

205
‘Kriegstagebuch 4.Panzer-Division Führungsabtl. 26.5.41 – 31.3.42’ BA-MA RH 27–4/10, p. 58 (17 July 1941).

206
‘Kriegstagebuch der 10.Panzer Division Nr.5 vom: 22.5. bis: 7.10.41’ BA-MA RH 27–10/26a. This war diary has no folio stamped page numbers so references must be located using the date (16 July 1941).

207
‘KTB Nr.1 Panzergruppe 2 vom 22.6.1941 bis 21.7.41’ BA-MA RH 21–2/927, Fol. 243 (16 July 1941).

208
Rothe and Ohrloff, ‘7th Panzer Division Operations’, p. 389. The source gives individual figures for each model of tank in the division, but the addition of these figures is inconsistent with the totals given. The corrected totals have been quoted here.

209
‘1.Kav.Div. Ia: KTB Anl. Von 1.4.1941 – 23.7.1941’ BA-MA RH 29–1/5. This war diary has no folio stamped page numbers so references must be located using the date (15 July 1941).

210
Franz Halder, KTB III, p. 95 (19 July 1941).

211
Interestingly, figures indicate that some 30 per cent more wounded soldiers died of their wounds on the eastern front than in the recent western campaign. In the winter of 1941–1942 the percentage rose to 49 per cent. The vast distance and the often overwhelmed medical resources probably accounted for this. Kroener, ‘Die Winter 1941/42’, p. 879.

7 The battle of Smolensk

The end of blitzkrieg

The
declining strength of the motorised divisions was not the only factor compromising their ability to function effectively. The discordant strategic deployment of each corps – fanning out towards divergent objectives over wide areas – denied them the benefits of concentration and forced them to operate in a degree of isolation. The most far-flung and wayward operation was that of Kuntzen's
LVII Panzer Corps, which, on Halder's orders (and against
Bock's better judgement), was sent to enact a joint encirclement with Leeb's
Army Group North. After a difficult drive over sunken roads, the spearhead of the corps (
19th Panzer Division) took Nevel on 15 July.
¹
From
here the division could have swung north and encircled the Soviet 51st Rifle Corps (as intended by Halder) or south to envelope the 62nd Rifle Corps,
²
yet both of these options were disregarded by Hoth who instead ordered a continued forward drive to the northeast to seize
Velikie Luki.
³
There can be no question of Velikie Luki's strategic importance, yet Bock's concern that individual panzer corps had become too weak to operate alone
⁴
was especially relevant to Kuntzen's corps given that it only consisted of two divisions (19th Panzer Division and
14th Motorised Division). With strong enemy forces on each flank from the retreating Soviet
22nd Army and the newly constituted Soviet
29th Army forming to the east of Velikie Luki, Hoth's thrust shifted from bold forward operations to senseless folly. The war diary of the LVII Panzer Corps makes clear that just reaching its objective required the fullest commitment of all its resources with no available reserves,
⁵
and although the 19th Panzer Division captured Velikie Luki on 19 July
the success was short lived. Holding the rear flanks of the corridor was the hapless 14th Motorised Division which, by the afternoon of 19 July, was expecting massed Soviet attacks on multiple fronts. The division's materiel was noted to be ‘completely worn out’ and widely dispersed meaning that ‘a massed Russian attack can hardly be held.’
⁶
In the early hours of 20 July the vigorous Soviet attack broke through the German line in multiple places, forcing an indignant Kluge to order the
19th Panzer Division back to the aid of the
14th Motorised
Division.
⁷
Bock too was unswerving in his criticism. Having opposed the operation from the beginning, he now chastised
Kuntzen in his diary (it seems
Bock was unaware that the operation was ordered by Hoth's Panzer Group 3) for acting against his wishes and unnecessarily weakening his position by striking out for Velikie Luki.
⁸

Hoth's
vanity drove him to defend this operation in his memoir, even to the point of suggesting that Velikie Luki could have been held.
⁹
Yet Hoth's decision to attempt such an ill-fated move demonstrates how far removed even experienced field commanders were becoming from a pragmatic appraisal of what their forces could
achieve. It was an archetypal example of what
Clausewitz had warned against in the waning stages of an offensive. ‘The diminishing force of the attack’, Clausewitz wrote, ‘is one of the strategist's main concerns. His awareness of it will determine the accuracy of his estimate in each case of the options open to him.’
¹⁰
Understanding the relative strength of the enemy force is equally critical to making an accurate assessment of the available options. The Germans were to discover in the second half of July that Soviet forces were nowhere near as exhausted as they had imagined. Far from shattering the Soviet front in the main operation towards Smolensk, the Soviet forces reeling under the German onslaught were now being aided by new Soviet armies moving up from the east.

Hoth's debacle at
Velikie Luki was only a taste of things to come and the lesson of over-extending the weakened motorised divisions was by no means yet learned. The stubborn tendency to under-estimate Soviet forces persisted despite the growing evidence, as
Bock discovered in a meeting with General of Infantry
Hermann Geyer, commander of the
IX Army Corps. Bock recorded in his diary: ‘Geyer thinks all the reports
on the enemy are exaggerated and doesn't believe that there are serious enemy forces near
Mogilev or in the pocket around
Smolensk.’
¹¹
In fact Mogilev was garrisoned by a large portion of the
13th Army, commanded by the 61st Rifle Corps commander, Major-General F. A. Bakunin, who was to ensure the defence of the city on all sides, mobilising workers’ militia and transforming the city into what one historian described as the ‘Belorussian Madrid’.
¹²
The developing encirclement at
Smolensk was much larger and included the Soviet
19th,
20th and
16th Armies. These formed a large bulge in the German front that tied down a good deal of Bock's motorised forces for the rest of the month. Dealing with the pocket would prove taxing enough, but the real danger was as yet unknown – the new Soviet reserve armies that were massing between the Soviet front and Moscow. Far from being aware of what was to come, the latest intelligence report from
Kinzel reflected an incessant confidence in the progress of the war, which even
Halder dubbed in parts ‘very optimistic’. Beyond Bock's immediate front were estimated to be just eight or nine Soviet infantry divisions and two or three panzer divisions.
¹³
Accordingly, Halder's faith in the coming victory remained unshaken and his intelligence supported the view that, once the Soviet front was ruptured at
Smolensk, the absence of substantive Soviet reserves would ensure ample operational freedom to accomplish the march on Moscow.
¹⁴