Not a Good Day to Die (68 page)

4.
Based on intelligence…(IMU).
Mikolashek.

5.
The IMU fighters…run with it.
Mikolashek.
“…the main effort…”
Army doctrine defines “main effort” as “the activity, unit, or area that commanders determine constitutes the most important task at that time. Commanders weight the main effort with resources and priorities and shift it as circumstances and intent demand.” (Army Field Manual 3-0,
Operations
).

6.
…by early February…about that time.”
Mikolashek.

7.
However, CENTCOM…blocking positions.”
Mikolashek; Edwards; Task Force Dagger source. Mikolashek’s comments, echoed by several other knowledgeable sources, throw a harsh light on the following statement by Wolfowitz to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 26, 2002: “So when in Anaconda we relied more heavily on American and coalition forces, it wasn’t because we had, quote, ‘learned a lesson,’ but because we had more capability available.”

8.
If the CIA…yet again.
Mikolashek.

9.
CENTCOM finally…Edwards said.
Edwards; Nocks.

Chapter 11

1.
It was a cold…dream posting.
Wiercinski; my personal observations from Kandahar.

2.
The Army had…twenty-five infantry brigades,
Monica Manganaro, media relations officer, U.S. Army Infantry Center, Fort Benning, Georgia. In addition to the twenty-five infantry brigades, the active Army also has twenty infantry “training” brigades, which are not combat formations.

3.
The 101
^st
Airborne…the world’s militaries.
The official 101
^st
Airborne Division (Air Assault) Web site: www.campbell.army.mil/dhistory.htm.

4.
Such was the case…falling umbrella.”
The official Web site of the 3
^rd
Brigade, particularly the history pages at www.campbell.army.mil/3bde/3rdbde_history.htm and www.campbell.army.mil/3bde/187th_history.htm.

5.
The legacy of valor…was unrelenting.
Wiercinski.

6.
In early November…ranges at Jacobabad.
Sarat; Wiercinski.

7.
As the Rakkasans…operations,” Mikolashek said.
Mikolashek; Edwards.

8.
…Forces Command…
Forces Command is in charge of all the Army’s conventional war fighting units in the continental United States.

9.
In the 101
^st
, these slices…military intelligence elements.
Cody.

10.
With all its components…5,000 soldiers…
Wiercinski.

11.
But Franks didn’t want…I can’t get there.”
Cody; Edwards; Keane; Mikolashek; Wiercinski; Burns.

12.
CFLCC and CENTCOM…missing artillery.
Mikolashek.

13.
…Mikolashek was telling…“full-spectrum operations,”
Wiercinski.

14.
When TF Rakkasan deployed…Al Qaida prisoners.
Cody; Marye; Wiercinski.

15.
The force package allotted…nowhere with Rumsfeld.
Cody; Edwards; Mikolashek; White; Wiercinski; senior officer involved in Pentagon planning; another Pentagon official.

16.
The chartered flights…the Sinai.
I was on this flight.

17.
Situated several…bargained for.
Larsen; Wiercinski; my personal observations from the six weeks I spent with the Rakkasans in Kandahar in January and February of 2002.

18.
As the Rakkasans adjusted
…to go to work.
Cody; Edwards; Marye; Wiercinski; a general officer familiar with Franks’s relations with the senior Army leadership.

Chapter 12

1.
The addition…handle on its own.
Mikolashek; special operations sources.

2.
He had already…spell Bagram.”
Hagenbeck; Mikolashek; Edwards; Wiercinski; Larsen; Gray.

3.
Jim Larsen, in Bagram…disappeared inside.
Larsen; Fletcher.

4.
The Rakkasan officer…conducting in Uzbekistan.
Larsen; Gray.

5.
Larsen and LaCamera…and it showed.
Larsen; Nocks; my own observations driving from Bagram to Kabul and back.
The next morning.
The date of the meeting at the Kabul safe house is the subject of some confusion. Some documents state that it happened on February 8, others that it occurred February 9. The memories of the attendees’ are similarly nonconclusive. Weighing the evidence, it seems more likely to me that it occurred February 8.

6.
The Toyotas pulled up…get ourselves into.”
Larsen; Nocks; Harrell; Bishop; Haas; other sources familiar with the meeting in the Kabul safe house and with the safe house’s design; special ops timeline….
Glenn…Mark…
In cases in which I have been unable to determine last names, or in which it is clear that the individuals involved may be operating undercover at the time of this book’s publication, I have only used first names, sometimes with last initials.

Chapter 13

1.
In the late…the puddle.)
Larsen; Wiercinski; Rosengard; another attendee at the meeting.

2.
Listening to Rosengard…trust and support.
Wiercinski; Larsen; another attendee at the meeting.

3.
The Rakkasan officers…battalion to Afghanistan.”
Larsen.

4.
Wiercinski, Gibler, and Yates…of the infantry force.
Wiercinski; Larsen.

5.
Meanwhile, Bishop…
Anaconda.
Larsen; Nocks; Bishop.

Chapter 14

Except where noted below, this chapter is based entirely on interviews with U.S. personnel familiar with events in Gardez during the prelude to Operation Anaconda.

1.
Only when the CIA…only as “Spider.”
Special ops time line.

2.
“They went with…paramilitary guys.”
Haas.

Chapter 15

1.
Blaber’s decision…lay beyond it.
Special ops time line; sources in the Gardez safe house; other TF Dagger source.

2.
For signals intelligence…ambushes now.
“SIGINT Marines Help Fight War on Terrorism in Afghanistan,”
Intelligence Community Newsletter,
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps Intelligence Department, February 2003; TF 11 source; Briley; another source in the CJTF Mountain TOC in Bagram; special ops time line; Gardez safe house sources; another TF Dagger source; Blaber briefing—this refers to a set of briefing slides I obtained that were used by Blaber to brief the story of Anaconda to many different audiences in Pentagon and around the U.S. military; I also spoke to several people who had attended one or more of these briefings for elaboration on the points made in the slides.

3.
Around this time…himself was in the Shahikot.
Special ops source; source in the Gardez safe house; “Ali Mohamed: The Defendant Who Did Not Go to Trial,” by Judy Aita, U.S. Department of State International Information Programs, May 16, 2003, accessed on the Internet at http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/af/security/a1051502.htm; “The Infiltrator: Ali Mohamed Served in the U.S. Army—and bin Laden’s Circle,” by Peter Waldman,
The Wall Street Journal,
November 26, 2001.

4.
Another document…report stated.
I obtained a copy of this debrief.

5.
During this period…those missions.
Special ops time line; Blaber briefing; sources in the Gardez safe house.

6.
But when he…AFO’s approach.
Special ops time line; a source familiar with the VTC.

7.
In fairness…element in Gardez.
TF 11 source in Masirah; special ops time line; source in the Gardez safe house; senior Army officer.

8.
As it was…went native.
TF 11 source.

9.
But to Chris…to us,” Haas said.
Haas.

10.
Part of the reason…American in Gardez.
Special ops time line; Gardez safe house source; Blaber briefing.

Chapter 16

1.
The dark…to war again.
Hagenbeck; Edwards; Gray; Wille; Mikolashek. Details on MC-130 Combat Talon landings at Bagram were provided by Major Perry Panos, a Combat Talon pilot with the 919th Special Operations Wing who made over ten landings at the air base.

2.
The 10
^th
Mountain Division had…(Light Infantry).
The Army of Excellence—the Development of the 1980s Army,
by John L. Romjue, publ. by Office of the Command Historian, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, pp. 15–16. The 10
^th
Mountain Division Web site, http://www.drum.army.mil/history/divisionhistory.htm.

3.
In November 2001…headquarters at K2.
Gray….
a more intact division like the 101
^st
…
 
The 101
^st
’s Second Brigade returned from a six-month deployment to Kosovo in November.

4.
When Mikolashek…division headquarters,
Edwards; Mikolashek.

5.
…but when…for operations.
Burns. That Cody commanded Delta’s aviation squadron is from his official Army résumé.

6.
The generals and colonels…limited war with Iraq.
Mikolashek; another senior officer familiar with the plan.

7.
The response…Paul Wolfowitz.
Woodward, pp. 49, 60–61.

8.
But in October…or Saudi Arabia.
Mikolashek; another senior officer familiar with the plan.

9.
Burns was unaware…to train,” Burns said.
Burns; Edwards; a senior special operations officer.