"Non-Germans" Under the Third Reich (219 page)

8.
Cf. the implementing regulation of January 15, 1940 (
VBl. GG
2 [1940]: 61), under the terms of which a special commissioner was appointed by the governor general to check these actions (“Diensttagebuch,” March 4, 1940; report, June 30, 1942, on the actions of the special commissioner, Nuremberg doc., PS-1709); the
Ahnenerbe
(Heritage) Bureau of the
Reichsführer
-SS claimed responsibility for cataloging art treasures in the General Government and, as early as October 1939, had undertaken expropriations on their own initiative—for example the Veit-Stoß altar from Kraków (cf. letter from the special commissioner, October 24, 1939, to the chief of the Heritage Bureau [Wolfram Sievers], Nuremberg doc., NO-572); thereupon, Peter Paulsen made an agreement with Mühlmann, according to which the Heritage Bureau would be responsible for cataloging prehistoric artifacts and collections, and everything else would be left to Mühlmann (memorandum by Mühlmann, October 31, 1939, and letter from Paulsen to Sievers, Heritage Bureau, October 24, 1939, Nuremberg doc., NO-572). But the confusion over competences remained: Himmler entered the fray with his own directive on the expropriation of art treasures, issued on December 1, 1939, as well as internal instructions (for example the decree of December 16, 1939, to the commander of the Security Police and the SD in the General Government, ZS Polen, film 60, 501 ff.) to expropriate all historic and prehistoric treasures, jewelry of artistic value, etc., where these were not owned by Germans. On the basis of the instruction of December 1, 1939, the chairman of the Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich appointed a general trustee to administer the confiscated treasures (under the aegis of the Heritage Bureau), which action was meant to establish Himmler’s remit as RKF to exercise responsibility for all art treasures in the Annexed Eastern Territories and the General Government (details from “Diensttagebuch 1940,” 1:93 ff.). Mühlmann resigned in July 1943 after receiving heavy criticism about—among other things—a “chaotic state of affairs” (“Diensttagebuch,” July 13, 1943).

9.
Cf. Nuremberg doc., NO-965 (confiscation of books, paintings, archives, libraries; enrichment of top officials); for more details, see K. M. Pospieszalski,
Doc. Occ.
6:391 ff.; concerning theft of Polish art treasures, see Piotrowski,
Hans Franks Tagebuch
, 159 ff.;
Bulletin of the High Commission Warsaw
, 4:175 ff.; Madajczyk,
Polityka
, 2:120 ff.; comments of the former special commissioner for the cataloging of art and cultural treasures in the General Government, Mühlmann, November 6, 1945 (Nuremberg doc., PS-3042), on plans to take all important works of art to Germany after the war, as well as the report on Mühlmann’s activities, June 30, 1942, Nuremberg doc., PS 1709; the basis for the expropriation of Polish cultural treasures was a decree of the governor general, December 16, 1939 (
VBl.GG
[1939]: 209), declaring the confiscation of publicly owned art collections (of which confiscated private collections were considered a part).

10.
Draft and final version (no exact date) Institute for Western Studies, Pozna
, doc. I-674, according to which Germans could not appear in front of Polish audiences, though Polish artists were allowed to appear in German shows (though not together with Germans); Polish musical performances, but not concerts, were allowed; Polish music—marches, folk and national songs, all classical pieces—was banned; also prohibited were theatrical performances and opera; maps and atlases showing the former Poland were to be withdrawn from circulation, as well as English and French works of literature and Polish flags and insignia; Poles were to be prevented from gaining access to German books.

11.
Cf. discussion between the governor general and the minister of propaganda, Goebbels, et al., on October 31, 1939, on the future cultural policy in the General Government (“Diensttagebuch 1939,” 21—excerpts in
Doc. Occ.
6:406 ff.). Among other things, Goebbels remarked that the Poles were to have newspapers containing only news, no opinion pieces. “In principle, they should also be deprived of theater and cinema to avoid having what they’ve lost paraded constantly before their eyes…. The Führer said only yesterday that we should not come along with a bee in our bonnets about helping the Poles rebuild their culture; the Poles should rebuild it themselves.”

12.
Cf. press conference held on April 14, 1942, “Diensttagebuch 1942,” 1:297 (reproduced in
Doc. Occ.
6:437 ff.), at which representatives of the Press Office, backed by Frank, endeavored to strengthen Polish
trust
in German authority; they would have to be given more than just the Wehrmacht report and a few statistics. The Central Propaganda Office had made many mistakes (441 ff.). Frank concluded: “We are clear in our minds that this population of 1 million needs a press that provides more than just straight news. This is not for the sake of the Poles themselves but is in our own vital interests. At the very least we must act as though the General Government were a protectorate in the Greater German sphere…. As long as the Poles live, they must work for us.” He wanted to stick to the “present course” of providing the Poles with “more attractive newspapers.” He sensed that the Berlin headquarters showed “a complete lack of understanding” for the situation (442):

The Poles should feel they are being treated not like swine but like Europeans and human beings. We devote so much attention to the Poles that we can say with some justification that despite the miserable conditions they must endure, the Poles live better in the General Government than the Italians in Italy…. Indeed, we are dependent on the Poles: if Polacks don’t drive the trains, who will? The responsibility is so great that we must put up with a few choice words about Christianity and Catholicism in the Polish press…. If I want to win the war, I must think clinically like a technician…. The Poles must [therefore] … be given more in [the]) press than just orders. (443)

13.
The concept of the police had no place in cultural life, because its political horizons did not reach beyond the exercise of power and “holding down” the foreign population. In
Meldungen aus dem Reich
(News from the Reich), no. 257, February 5, 1942, from the chief of the Security Police and the SD (IfZ, Ma-441/5, 5800–5904), the CSSD complained about a revival of Polish cultural life that was in no way in keeping with the political line, namely “to curb home-grown cultural activities and prevent their achieving anything more than the shallowest level.” One example was the so-called coffee-house meetings, said to be common in all larger towns and at which permission had even been given for an orchestral performance of music by Chopin; the limit—the report said—was the Philharmonic Orchestra of the General Government whose German director had been confirmed in his post by Hitler himself and which was made up of 90 Polish musicians; German opinion that Poland had never possessed a high culture of its own was thereby turned on its head. The report demanded the creation of a German central orchestra under Polish direction, though this “should not be allowed to attain a level of performance above the mediocre.” This principle was to be applied to all Polish cultural performances. Furthermore, the Polish theater in Warsaw was described as “excellent”; Polish theater performances were helping to break down the barriers between Germans and Poles and establish the claim to equal treatment for the Poles. The new line must adhere to the principle of a ban on the appearance of Polish artists in front of German audiences and on Germans attending Polish performances. These latter were not to be “of a high caliber culturally or of a morally uplifting nature.” However, the governor general stuck to his line that the Poles should be permitted a measure of cultural “autonomy.”

14.
Report, F. Siebert: “Hauptabteilung Innere Verwaltung,” November 11, 1959, BA Ostdok. 13 GG Ib/5.

15.
Monthly report,
Kreishauptmann
Reichshof (Rzeszów), May 1940 (ZS, Polen 347, Bl. 564, 566); monthly report,
Kreishauptmann
Jasło, August 1940 (Bl. 101 ff.). According to the report, the raids by the Security Police—with their
summary proceedings
—gave rise to unnecessary upheaval, also in loyalist Polish circles (e.g., the working class).

16.
Cf., in general, the sources cited above in note 2.

17.
Guidelines issued by the head of the Department of Cultural Affairs on January 10, 1940 (Institute for Western Studies, Pozna
, doc. I-127); for further details, see Madajczyk,
Polityka
, 2:142 ff. The Polish grammar schools (
Gymnasien
) were not reestablished. Comments by Central Department of Science and Education (meeting on July 4, 1944, “Diensttagebuch”) to the effect that they were to be permitted again from September 1944, as a concession to the Poles, were not to be taken at face value. Himmler, alerted by the governor of the Lublin District (Richard Wendler), considered it “good that, for Polish public opinion, the matter was being treated with all seriousness. Steps have been taken to ensure that no harm will come of it” (telex from the personal staff of the
Reichsführer
-SS, Rudolf Brandt, to Wendler on May 27, 1944, IfZ, Bestand Reichsführer-SS/Pers. Stab, FB-50, Bl. 286, copy). These Polish
Gymnasien
were in any case considered nothing more than a prize for good behavior, i.e., for pupils and parents who “had proved their worth in the service of Germany,” and a way of countering the spread of illegal Polish schools (meeting on July 4, 1944, “Diensttagebuch”). For Ukrainians, in contrast, high schools were permitted (guidelines of January 10, 1940, Institute for Western Studies, Pozna
, doc. I-127).

Discussion between Frank and Goebbels on October 31, 1939, and other dates, “Diensttagebuch 1939,” 21 (quoted from
Doc. Occ
. 6:406 ff.). The Polish universities continued only on an administrative level, under the supervision of university commissioners (Decree on the Appointment of University Commissioners in the General Government, October 29, 1940,
VBl.GG
1 [1940]: 327, with decree issued by the Department of Science, Education, and Public Enlightenment to the district chiefs on December 19, 1940,
Amtsblatt der Abteilung Wissenschaft, Erziehung und Volksbildung in der Regierung des GG
, March 1941, quoted from
Doc. Occ
. 6:417 f.). In this sense see also the first guidelines issued by Mühlmann, head of the Department of Cultural Affairs (forerunner of the Department of Science and Education), on January 10, 1940 (Institute for Western Studies, Pozna
, doc. I-727 3 f.). Polish students who had finished their studies were not permitted to take exams—the only exceptions being medical students and graduates of the polytechnic school and the higher school of commerce, who were needed as qualified workers (
Gazeta Illustrowana
, April 18, 1940); however, they did not receive degrees, only certificates saying they had taken part in the examinations (decree issued by the Department of Science, Education, and Public Enlightenment to the district chief, Warsaw, on August 29, 1940, Institute for Western Studies, Pozna
, doc. I-668, quoted from:
Doc. Occ
. 6:418 f.). The Ukrainians in Galicia enjoyed certain privileges to the extent that there were university standard courses in Lemberg for doctors, veterinary surgeons, engineers, agronomists, etc.; for more details, see K. M. Pospieszalski,
Doc. Occ
. 6:392 f. nn. 6–9, with further examples.