Nixon and Mao (31 page)

Kissinger delayed his flight back to the United States, and he and Winston Lord worked late into the night of October 24 on the Chinese draft, seeking, said Kissinger, “a tone of firmness without belligerence.” All the next day and night, the two sides went back and forth. “I pointed out with melancholy,” Kissinger later reported to Nixon, “that the Chinese draft still accentuated our differences in provocative fashion.” The two sides gradually inched closer together on the wording of the communiqué. The language became calmer, although the differences remained. And the issue of Taiwan remained intractable. Finally, on the morning of October 26, as Air Force One stood ready at the Beijing airport, Kissinger came up with language on Taiwan that seemed acceptable to both sides: “The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Straits maintain there is but one China. The United States Government does not challenge that position.” Chou accepted it, later remarking to his colleagues, “After all, a Dr. is indeed useful as a Dr.” By 8:00
A.M.
on the morning of October 26, the two sides had agreed on a draft. As he stood at the door of the Diaoyutai guesthouse to see Kissinger off, Chou spoke in English for the first time: “Come back soon for the joy of talking.”
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“The one thing that Doctor Kissinger had not worked out yet,” according to Chapin, “was how he was going to be able to keep Secretary of State Rogers from attending various meetings, but for the most part it was all coming together in a way that pleased Dr. Kissinger.”
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As Air Force One taxied along the runway, a coded message came in from Washington. The United States had lost its battle at the United Nations to keep Taiwan as a member. Ever since 1949, the Americans had insisted that Chiang Kai-shek’s Republic of China in Taiwan was the true representative for China, and so Taiwan and not the People’s Republic had occupied the China seat in the Security Council, in the General Assembly, and in the U.N.’s agencies. At home, the well-organized and well-funded China lobby had made sure that there was no weakening of resolve. At the start of the 1960s, when the Kennedy administration had looked at the possibility of having both Chinas in the U.N., Nixon, at the time out of office, had led the campaign to make sure that the United States continued to support Taiwan as the only true China. It had gotten increasingly difficult, however, to hold the line at the U.N. itself. In the 1950s, determined lobbying by American diplomats and emergency measures such as sending a U.S. Navy airplane to collect the delegate from the Maldive Islands had kept the status quo intact. By the end of the decade, however, the end of the big European empires was producing new nations by the dozens, and most Third World countries and, of course, the Communist ones voted year after year for an Albanian resolution to admit the People’s Republic. In the 1960s the Americans were able to hold off the inevitable only by getting the vote classified as “important,” which meant that a majority of two-thirds was required; but even on that, time was running out.

In Nixon’s first couple of years in office, when he was questioned about American policy on China’s representation, he merely said he had no plans to change American policy on the issue “at this time.” In fact, he was gradually modifying his long-standing opposition to having the People’s Republic in the United Nations. This was largely because of his moves toward the People’s Republic but also because it had become clear that the United States was about to lose the vote at the U.N. In 1970 the General Assembly voted by a slim majority for the Albanian resolution to expel Taiwan and give its seat to mainland China. A compromise solution, floated briefly by the United States and others, that the People’s Republic take the seat on the Security Council but that Taiwan remain in the General Assembly went nowhere when both Chinas refused to accept the presence of the other in the United Nations. When Kissinger raised the issue of dual representation in his conversations with Chou during his first trip to China, Chou made it clear that China intended to reclaim what was rightfully its own, not share it with an illegitimate government. When Mao heard the proposal, he said firmly, “We will never board their ‘two China’ ‘pirate ship.’” That same summer, Washington sent a special envoy to sound out Chiang Kai-shek. The old leader was also firm, according to the envoy: “he would rather be a piece of broken jade lying smashed on the floor than a whole tile on a roof.”
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At the start of 1971, a high-level study group in Washington concluded that the United States was likely to lose the annual important-question vote and, therefore, the requirement for a two-thirds majority on the Albanian resolution. American allies such as the United Kingdom and Canada were indicating that they were no longer prepared to vote with the United States. Taiwan, the study concluded, might be expelled as early as that year. While the study merely laid out American options, increasingly the thinking in official Washington was that the United States should be seen to put up a good fight for Taiwan but that the admission of the People’s Republic to the U.N. was in reality a good thing.

On his secret trip to China that summer, Kissinger tried one last face-saving move for the United States when he promised Chou that the American government would allow China’s admission by a mere majority but that it would still insist that expelling a member required two-thirds. The People’s Republic would be in right away, and Taiwan would be out soon. Chou was not interested: “We do not consider the matter of reclaiming our seat in the U.N. as such an urgent matter. We have gone through this for 21 years, and we have lived through it.”
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The sensational news of Kissinger’s visit to China served to undermine the American position, but the American delegation at the U.N., led by its ambassador, George H. W. Bush, fought on during the summer and early autumn. The delegates were handicapped because Washington delayed sending them clear directives about what American policy was, whether to keep to the old line or try to get some sort of compromise, until September. That fall, when the General Assembly met, the Americans spent the days lobbying to keep the admission of the People’s Republic of China as an important question, requiring a two-thirds majority. Each night the Americans met to go over their lists as their old friends slipped away. Then, as the crucial vote in the General Assembly approached in October, Kissinger made news headlines with his second trip to China. “So,” said one of the American diplomats, “that was the coup de grace. If there was any lingering possibility that we could hold a line, that pretty well ended.”
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Kissinger, who was criticized at the time and has been since for the timing of his trip, may well have chosen his dates deliberately. In a conversation with Rogers and Nixon on September 30, Kissinger said he had been told that the period between October 19 and 28 was the tricky one. Rogers complained strenuously that Kissinger was almost certain to be in Beijing when the vote took place, pointing out that “everybody would think we were deliberately undercutting our own effort.” Kissinger agreed to see if he could change his trip, but later that day, he and Nixon talked alone and decided that it was not worth it. “I think,” said Kissinger, “the votes are set now.” Nixon concurred.
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On the morning of October 26, as Kissinger and Chou En-lai were finishing their last-minute discussions on the draft communiqué in Beijing, it was still the evening of October 25 in New York and the crucial vote was approaching in the General Assembly. Suddenly, to the dismay of the Americans, the Saudi ambassador proposed a break for dinner. The delegates poured out of the hall, and although the Americans searched the cafeteria and nearby restaurants, many simply vanished into the night. When the General Assembly reconvened, two votes took place: one to have the admission of the People’s Republic decided by a simple majority and the other to expel Taiwan. When the result was announced, many delegates—from African countries, for example—danced in the aisles, while the delegation from Taiwan slowly filed out. Nixon told the press that he was “outraged” at the display, but privately he was relieved that the issue had finally been resolved. He instructed Kissinger and Haldeman to tell conservatives such as Ronald Reagan and Barry Goldwater that the administration had fought as hard as it could to keep Taiwan in the U.N.
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In New York, Bush told the American delegates that their job was now to meet the representatives of the People’s Republic and treat them courteously. There must be no regrets. He could not resist a moment of irritation, though, when Kissinger said how disappointed he was. “So was I,” Bush later wrote. “But given the fact that we were saying one thing in New York and doing another in Washington, the outcome was inevitable.”
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In Beijing the news caused something close to consternation. The Foreign Ministry was still painfully rebuilding itself after the Cultural Revolution, and China had very few experienced diplomats available. Besides, Mao himself had said that whatever happened, China would not join the United Nations that year. Chou hastily called his top officials together to discuss China’s response. The radicals took a hard line. China should not belong to a bourgeois and bureaucratic institution “where people drank coffee, chatted and fought each other orally, which could not speak truly for the oppressed nations and peoples.” The moderates argued that China needed at least a year to study the U.N. and prepare for participation. As Chou was agreeing, a messenger arrived to summon them to Mao’s house. They found a smiling Mao who brushed aside all objections. China must send a delegation right away, he said. He had enjoyed two major victories that year: first when Lin Biao’s plot against him had been uncovered, and now China’s victory at the U.N. The United States had lost the votes of even its old allies, such as Canada and the United Kingdom, who had behaved like good rebellious Red Guards. China’s first speech at the U.N. must throw down the gauntlet to the imperialist superpowers and encourage the peoples of the world to make revolution. If China’s spokesmen needed ideas, Mao advised, they could use the notes prepared for the discussions with Kissinger.
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China’s ambassador to Canada, the relatively experienced Huang Hua, was hurriedly sent to New York, and an official party flew into La Guardia on a Chinese plane. Mao spoke to them before they left: “One cannot capture the tiger cubs unless he risks going into the tiger’s den.” The Chinese representatives had little idea of what to expect in the United States, a Chinese diplomat later recalled, beyond the stories of poverty and oppression that were standard fare in the Chinese press. There were inevitably awkward moments, such as when a small band of pro-Taiwan supporters demonstrated outside Chinese headquarters, and there was a potentially serious incident when one of the Chinese delegates unexpectedly died of what turned out to be food poisoning. On the whole, though, the Chinese were pleasantly surprised to find the Americans friendly. The Americans, for their part, were impressed by the serious and low-key way in which the Chinese set about learning the ropes.
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Kissinger and Nixon found the presence of Chinese diplomats at the U.N. useful, too, as yet another private channel to Beijing. Outside a small circle in the White House, only Bush, under strict instructions not to tell the State Department, knew that Kissinger was meeting Huang Hua and his colleagues in a safe apartment in New York. Kissinger suggested that the Chinese limit their contacts with their American opposite numbers at the U.N. itself, saying, “We do not want to overwhelm you with every bright idea of our bureaucracy.” Huang could call him at the White House on a special line. It would not cause any comment, said Kissinger, if he gave a woman’s name. The only one he should not use was “Nancy.”
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The channel was useful for working on Nixon’s trip and very helpful when a major crisis blew up in South Asia. It had been brewing for decades. The relationship between India and Pakistan had been an uneasy one ever since 1947, when the subcontinent was partitioned to leave a predominantly Hindu India and an overwhelmingly Muslim Pakistan. Partition had seen the mass killings of minorities caught on the wrong side of the divide and had given rise to prolonged disputes over the division of resources, over water, and over territory, notably the mountainous state of Kashmir. In 1965 a major war broke out, which ended with an uneasy cease-fire brokered by the Soviet Union. Both sides looked for allies; Pakistan placed itself firmly in the Western camp in the Cold War and drew closer to the United States, while India positioned itself as a leader of the nonaligned nations but tilted toward the Soviet Union. The emergence of China as a major player in Asia after the Communist victory in 1949 added another factor. The Chinese Communists initially built good relations with India, but those soured in the late 1950s as both the powers vied for leadership in Asia and the Third World. India infuriated China by giving shelter to Tibetan refugees, including the Dalai Lama himself, and the two sides clashed over disputed territory along their common borders. In 1962, the two countries went to war. The result was a Chinese victory. Pakistan, despite the fact that it was firmly in the Western camp and was firmly opposed to Communism, understandably supported China. It was rewarded by Chinese arms shipments and diplomatic support against India.

In the early 1970s, Pakistan, to the concern of both China and the United States, started to fall to pieces. Partition had left an awkward and probably unworkable country, its two wings separated by almost a thousand miles of an unfriendly India. Only Islam held East and West Pakistan together, and that was never enough to overcome linguistic and cultural differences. The army, with officers largely from West Pakistan, developed the habit of intervening in politics on the grounds that no one else could hold the country together, and from 1958 to 1969 Pakistan was ruled by a general, Mohammad Ayub Khan. When he stepped down, he handed over power to Yahya Khan, like Ayub another West Pakistani. The inhabitants of East Pakistan increasingly resented what they saw as the political dominance of the West Pakistanis. In the summer of 1970, a series of cyclones devastated much of East Pakistan, but aid was slow to arrive from the central government. In December, when Yahya reluctantly held general elections, the separatist Awami League took almost every seat in East Pakistan. “Mr. President,” said Kissinger when they met in the summer of 1971, “for an elected dictator you ran a lousy election.”
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