Muslim Mafia (13 page)
Authors: Paul Sperry
“Definitely,” she stressed, “do not address any questions relating to terrorism or violence and their place in Islam.”
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That was step number one. Then Farooq and Ahmed went to lunch the day of the scheduled interview with the FBI—September 1, 2004—to review her ground rules, the secret CAIR memo details. They agreed she would sit in on the meeting.
Following lunch, they went back to his office and continued to “discuss strategies,” including introducing her to the agents only as “a sister in Islam,” while not identifying her position with CAIR up front. And she again specifically advised Ahmed not to answer any questions regarding information he may know about terrorism or violence.
The agents arrived at Ahmed’s office on time, and over the course of their interview, Farooq stepped in to stop Ahmed from answering several questions she felt could “incriminate” him, even though she was not his attorney.
As a result, Ahmed withheld critical information from the FBI. For example:
Agents inquired about his recent travels abroad, and he mentioned only Canada, while neglecting to inform them that he’d also traveled to Saudi Arabia;
The FBI agents, who were attached to the bureau’s Pittsburgh field office and led by agent Terry Grzadzielewski, left the meeting unaware they were denied information relevant to their investigation—thanks to CAIR’s operative running interference on behalf of the subject of their inquiry that day.
Farooq reported details of the FBI meeting, including Ahmed’s omissions, to CAIR-Maryland/Virginia chapter executive director Rizwan Mowlana, who had assigned her to spy on the FBI. A copy of the confidential memo—which is marked
DO NOT RELEASE OUTSIDE CAIR
—was obtained from CAIR’s internal files.
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At the end of her report, Farooq recommended CAIR gather local Muslims who worship at Ahmed’s mosque in Hagerstown, Maryland, to formally train them in similar deception and obstruction tactics.
“Since the Hagerstown community seems to be a center of attention for several FBI agents,” she wrote, “I recommend CAIR conduct a know-your-rights lecture at the location with some recommendations [on] how to respond to FBI agents when approached by them.”
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At the same time, Farooq recommended mailing the FBI’s Pittsburgh field office a copy of CAIR’s “Law Enforcement Official’s Guide to the Muslim Community,” followed by “sensitivity training” for all its agents.
DON’T TOUCH MUSLIM SUSPECTS
We obtained a copy of CAIR’s largely unhelpful law enforcement guide, which for the most part dictates terms to police—the dos and don’ts (and mostly don’ts) of investigating Muslims. Here is a summary:
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The booklet spends nine pages lecturing cops about Islamic tenets and how to respect them, and none offering cops cultural clues to help them identify extremists and jihadists in the Muslim community.
Law enforcement officials say they are still waiting for the CAIR booklet entitled, “How Patriotic Muslims Can Help Law Enforcement Catch Terrorists.”
Particularly galling, the expert whom CAIR tasked with lecturing cops has an extremist background himself. Mohamed Nimer, who wrote CAIR’s police guide, previously worked for the United Association for Studies and Research, a known Hamas terrorist front.
