Muslim Fortresses in the Levant: Between Crusaders and Mongols (72 page)

and partially or completely replacing the sea route between India and Alexandria via Aden and the Red Sea to Alexandria would have had a devastating effect on the Sultanate’s trade. The fortifications the Sultanate sought to control were vital components in protecting the trade routes that crossed the region.

The conquest of Baghdad (1258) and the fall of the principality of Antioch (1268) caused the trade routes between the Persian Gulf and the Eastern Mediterranean to gradually move northwards. Thus, at the beginning of the fourteenth century Tabrīz became a thriving commercial city. A large percentage of the merchandise in its markets arrived from the Persian Gulf. Part of those goods traveled westwards from Tabrīz to the Cilician port of Ayās. The route between Tabrīz and Ayās is given a detailed description by Francesco Balducci Pegolotti, a well-educated entrepreneur from Florence employed by the Florentine banking house of the Bardi. The details of his travels are found in his book
La Pratica della Mercatura
.

The trade route starting from Tabrīz went west through the following cities: Khoy (Xoy), Arzanjān (Erzincan), Sivas, Kaysariye and Geben (Gabon).
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It then turned south and ran parallel to the
River and down to Ayās. The pot of Ayās was
one of the few connecting Asia and the Eastern Mediterranean. It gradually became a prosperous station from which eastern goods were exported to the west and European products traveled east (linen was one of the main European products exported to the east). The Genoese and Venetian merchants had warehouses in the nearby town of Mesis just north of Ayās.
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The Tabrīz–Ayās route has a number of advantages: the merchants using it received substantial benefits from both Armenian and Īlkhānid rulers. Merchants passing through the Armenian kingdom were given generous rights. Well-garrisoned strongholds secured the caravans traveling between Persia and the region of the Black Sea and the ports of Cilicia.
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Safety along the trade routes was the main condition for the existence of trade in the region. A large portion of the Armenian kingdom’s wealth derived from taxes collected from merchants crossing its territories and using the services provided at its ports. Part of these revenues was reinvested in maintaining fortresses and building new ones.
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The destruction of Frankish ports along the coast of the Levant in the second half of the thirteenth century may well have contributed to the rise of Armenian trade. The Armenian king was quick to grant Genoese and Venetian merchants trading rights in Ayās. Most of the goods in Egyptian and Levant harbors and markets could be found in Persia and brought to the Cilician ports. The arrival of the Italian merchants boosted the trade and the economy of this Armenian port.
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This change did not escape Mamluk eyes. The commercial activity along the Cilician land route and in the ports probably diverted profits that would otherwise have made their way into the sultan’s treasury. To this one should add the trade in slaves that passed through the Armenian kingdom en route to Egypt. Although only a small percentage of the slave trade moved through Ayās, it seems plausible that the Mamluks wished to keep a close watch on this valuable commodity.

The Īlkhānids made their own contribution by reducing the taxes collected along the trade routes that passed through their lands. According to Ashtor, the taxes in the Īlkhānid state ran at about 4–5 percent in comparison to the 10–20 percent collected by the Mamluks from merchants trading in Egypt. The Italian merchants were highly respected at the court of the Īlkhān; some even served as diplomatic emissaries when the Īlkhān corresponded with the papal court or any of the European monarchs.
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Although most European traders ignored papal bans on commercial activity between Europe and the Mamluk sultanate, these restrictions may have led to a search for new markets and alternative routes. The volume of trade between Persia and Europe grew steadily during the last quarter of the thirteenth century and the first three decades of the fourteenth.

Ashtor adds that the Īlkhāns may have hoped commercial ties would help build political relations and possibly a military alliance with Europe.
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The trade routes described above were dominated by Genoese, Venetians, Pisans and Sienese. Genoese and Venetian consulates opened in Tabrīz and Sivas; a Genoese colony was established in Trebizond and some merchants founded communities in cities between Tabrīz and Ayās. The latter became a thriving pot where Italian, Egyptian, Syrian and other merchants met. Tabrīz, on the other hand, became the starting point for European traders heading east to China and India.
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This route however, had several disadvantages and the revival of trade was short-lived. Though taxes were reduced, the great distances and the time caravans had to spend on the road turned transportation by land into an expensive undertaking. With the death of
(736/1335), the last Īlkhān, political unrest struck the region.
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The Jalayirid dynasty that rose to power could not restore peace and quiet and European merchants gradually left the markets and ports and turned elsewhere.
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The last section of this route, from Kaysariye south to the port of Ayās, is important in order to complete this discussion. The numerous Mamluk raids, aimed at disrupting both stability and economic affairs within the Armenian kingdom, were partly concentrated against the strongholds and towns along this very last section. Ayās, Sīs and Mesis, where merchandise was stored, were plundered and burnt down several times. Since the kingdom relied heavily on foreign merchants, the damage caused to the economic infrastructure must have been considerable.

Towards the end of the thirteenth century as the Armenian kingdom slowly declined the Mamluks’ aims changed; rather than raiding and retreating they seem to have wanted to conquer and hold the port of Ayās as well as the trade routes that crossed Armenian territory.

Assaults on Ayās began during Baybar’s reign. The pot was sacked in 1266 and 1275. During the 1280s it was raided twice by the Türkmen.
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In 1305 and 1322 the port was attacked again. It was finally captured in 1337 and remained under Mamluk rule.

The reasons for trying to maintain a Mamluk presence, whether permanent (fortresses and garrisons) or temporary (raids), are fairly complex. The most evident is the Mamluks’ need to defend their northern border. No less important was their wish to punish the Armenians for their loyalty, cooperation and participation in the Mongol invasions into Syria. However, it appears that the economic motives carried some weight.

The series of raids and treaties show a political and military pattern that the Mamluk sultanate found hard to break. The Armenians were just as persistent in fighting to retain their fortresses. Their attempts to regain control and rebuild their fortresses after each Mamluk raid are striking. The fortresses were vital to both Armenian trade and to the security of the northern Mamluk borders.

The Mamluk concept of a defense line along the northern border was similar to that built along the Euphrates frontier – a model that proved its strength against the Mongols for over sixty years. Thus, the Cilician fortresses were relied on to establish Mamluk military presence in the region, and sound the alarm if the enemy approached.

In reality, however, both the Armenians and the Mamluks found it difficult and at times almost impossible to hold and maintain the fortresses for any length of time. The Armenians appear to have suffered from a severe shortage of manpower and could not withstand Mamluk raids and full-scale attacks without calling on considerable reinforcements. The only occasion on which they gained the upper hand and defeated a Mamluk army was when Īlkhānid and Frankish forces joined them (summer of 1305).
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The fortresses that were of strategic importance to the Armenians became a permanent target throughout the Mamluk period; they were
plundered and burnt down time after time. Nevertheless, as soon as the opportunity offered itself the Armenians did their utmost to restore their strongholds.

Strangely enough, it seems that the Mamluks, in possession of a stronger military force, faced almost the same difficulties. Holding a large number of fortresses in a hostile territory was a difficult task for a state that had the core of its army stationed permanently in Cairo. Although most of the Mamluk raids were successful few, of their victories were translated into long-term political or strategic gains. In fact it was only when the Armenian kingdom fell (1375) that the Mamluks fully ruled Cilicia. By that time, however, their concept of frontier defense had undergone some significant changes.

During the fourteenth century the northern frontier defenses of the Sultanate were entrusted to Dulkadir and Ramadan – the two buffer states that arose in this region. The Mamluks themselves remained in command of the large cities.
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It is doubtful whether Baybars and Qalāwūn would have supported this new strategy, but the region had changed considerably and the thirteenth-century military concept of defense that relied solely on Mamluk forces was no longer suitable.

In search of conclusions

The defense system along the eastern borders would probably not have been built if the Mongols had not invaded the Middle East. The establishment of the Īlkhānid state east of the Euphrates meant that an almost constant threat hovered over the Sultanate. It is difficult to assert that this policy of strengthening fortresses, started by Baybars, would have been carried out only in order to help establish Mamluk rule in Syria, Palestine and Trans-Jordan. The restoration of fortresses along the frontier and inland, the presence of Mamluk garrisons and armies in the fortresses and in the large Syrian cities, the sultans’ frequent journeys through Syria, the construction of an intelligence network, and the
barīd
that connected the frontier with the main urban centers and the capital most certainly helped establish the new Mamluk regime throughout the region.

The spatial distribution of fortresses changed, when frontiers and borders shifted due to the rise or fall of political entities in the region. As the Frankish territory gradually receded during Qalāwūn’s reign, a number of fortresses restored by Baybars slowly lost their military importance. This tend continued for a short time after the fall of the Frankish kingdom. Thus Qāqūn, Safad,
and
al-Akrād were no longer of great importance to the Sultanate’s defense.