Authors: Martin Bowman
Tags: #Bisac Code 1: HIS027140
The five cells on the west Nyropsgade wing took direct bomb hits. Bombs passed through cells 2 and 3 killing Admiral Carl Hammerich, Chief of the Danish naval staff, Ole Stang, a resistance leader, and a Danish collaborator who shared Stang’s cell and penetrated to the lower floors of the south-west corner before exploding. (Stang’s body was found later but no trace of Admiral Hammerich or the informer was ever found). Three prisoners on kitchen duties were killed when the room opposite Cell 1 used for washing-up received a direct hit. Captain Peter Ahnfeldt-Mollerup was killed while he was being interrogated in an office next to Pøul Borking’s cell. Professor Brandt Rehberg in Cell 14 survived and out in the street he and Ove Kampmann made their way to a safe house before escaping to Sweden. Pøul Bruun, Pøul Sørensen, Karl Wedell-Wedellsborg and Mogens Prior, the four prisoners in the remaining three cells, found themselves lying in the rubble on the floor below their cells. They were not seriously injured but were trapped by fire on one side and a huge hole in the floor on the other. They made up a makeshift escape rope from belts and lowered themselves down to the fourth floor. Desperate to get away from the clutches of the
Gestapo
and not having any other way to escape, they jumped one at a time to the pavement four floors below. All received serious injuries and were recaptured by the Germans. Mogens Prior received no proper medical attention and he died on 26 March. Karl WedellWedellsborg also died having received no medical treatment except that from fellow prisoners. Against all the odds Bruun and Sørensen survived their terrible injuries and were gradually nursed back to health. Colonel Tiemroth and another prisoner left behind in the attic corridor with their guard did not try to escape once they reached the safety of the street, mainly because they feared reprisals against their families. After they had helped two fellow prisoners to flee to safety they awaited recapture.
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The second wave of six Mosquitoes of 464 Squadron RAAF led by Wing Commander Bob Iredale
DSO DFC RAAF
and Flying Officer B.J. Standish arrived over Copenhagen some 2 minutes behind the first. By this time the sky over Copenhagen was being criss-crossed by flak. The smoke coming from Kleboe’s wrecked aircraft was greater than that coming from the
Shellhaus
and it distracted the leading three crews. Confusion reigned and the force was split into two. (The Mosquitoes, together with the Mustang escort, began to circle the area to clarify their position. In the first manoeuvre some Mosquitoes were too far left of the target and only those aircraft closest to
Shellhaus
were able to bomb). A split-second decision had to be made. Iredale broke off his attack and circled to come in again. At the same time the three remaining Mosquitoes of Blue Section led by Flight Lieutenant Archie Smith
DFC
and Flight Sergeant E.L. Green had realised the mistake and located the target slightly to the right of their track. Smith made two orbits of the target area before bombing. His bombs struck the outside of the east wing, destroying a pillbox situated on the corner. Both Iredale, who got his bombs away on the east end of the
Shellhaus
and Smith, who also attacked a flak position at Hundested, managed to bomb
Shellhaus
. During his orbit, Flight Lieutenant W. Knowle Shrimpton
DFC
and Flying Officer Peter R. Lake
RAAF
in the No.2 position behind Iredale in the second wave came into conflict with the incoming third wave. Shrimpton explains:
We came up to the lake where we would drop our wing tanks. I had to keep the Mosquito level and straight during this part of the operation, no skidding, so that the tanks would fall away cleanly without rolling into the tailplane. This was no easy task due to the extremely high turbulence. Peter was then concentrating more on map reading whilst I concentrated on accurate flying. I prayed that he had memorized the track. Then on the outskirts of the city I recognized the first landmark shown on the briefing model. Flying became precise; height 50ft, engine revs and boost. We wanted 320 mph but settled for 305 to 310, which was about all we could get. I set the bomb fuses and opened the bomb bay doors. We were getting close. Flak was looping over the target from the right with not much room over
Shellhaus
. The next event was a shock. Peter yelled, “Don’t bomb, smoke to port!” He signalled to me that something was wrong. Were we on target? This all took place 10-15 seconds from what we believed to be the target, time enough to see that the building in question was not damaged but not enough to evaluate all the facts. Therefore, I aborted the attack, cleared the building and closed the bomb doors. Throttling back and keeping low, I commenced a left-hand orbit. After a moment we had left the flak area and I reduced the rate of turn. We then had the opportunity to assess the situation and make a plan. The building which we were confident was the target was not damaged, no fire or smoke. We decided that the preceding aircraft had probably bombed the wrong target. Was the fire a decoy? We decided to get ourselves into position for another run up to the target. Then, realizing that we were alone without orientation of our position, we commenced another orbit. After about 325° we both became re-orientated, first by Peter’s recognition of the run-up track and as a result of that, my identification of the target. Here we determined that
Shellhaus
had been hit. We could see dust and smoke. I continued to turn on the run-up and as we came in we both agreed that the job had been done. We observed heavy damage to the base of the building and lots of dust and smoke. More bombs might have unnecessarily endangered the Danes in the building so we aborted the attack. Later, on the long flight home, there was a distinct sense of failure or at least disappointment that we still had our bombs.
Two of the Mosquitoes from Blue Section in the second wave were hit by flak over the north of Zealand on the return flight. Flying Officer Ronald G. ‘Shorty’ Dawson
RAAF
and Flying Officer Fergus T. Murray, ditched near Lisleje Strand. Flying Officer John H. Spike Palmer
RAAF
and Sub Lieutenant Hans H. Becker, a Norwegian, ditched in Samsø Belt. There were no survivors from either aircraft.
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The third wave consisting of the six 487 Squadron FB.VIs, led by Wing Commander F.H. Denton
DFC
* and his Australian navigator Flying Officer A.J. Coe had navigation problems. They approached Copenhagen from the north-east; a completely different direction to the planned flight path. This wave had been observed in front of the returning aircraft from the first wave as they left the target area. Delayed by some minutes they were caught up by Q-Query, flown by Flying Officer R.E. ‘Bob’ Kirkpatrick with Sergeant R. Hearne that had departed the Lake Tissø area 2 minutes behind the other six Mosquitoes. By mistake, four crews in the third wave bombed the area around the school. Denton and Coe, who located Shellhaus, saw so much damage already that the pilot aborted his attack and jettisoned their bombs in the sea. Flak tore away the starboard flap and knocked out the hydraulic system but Denton managed to nurse his flak-damaged FB.VI back and belly-landed in England.
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Q-Query also limped home after taking a flak hit over the target. Kirkpatrick recounts:
As we approached the city I could see a huge pall of black smoke dead ahead and at the same time, some Mossies in a tight left turn. Our courses were converging. As they straightened out towards the smoke I had only a second to decide to join them close enough to avoid the 11-second delay bombs, rather than risk a right turn with the cruddy windshield [which had become coated with salt spray low over the North Sea]. The Mossies levelled off on track and I tucked in close, just as their bomb doors opened. I opened mine and saw their bombs drop just before we entered the smoke. I dropped my bomb load, then we got a pretty good wallop in the smoke and after breaking out I lost contact with the other Mosquitoes.
On the outskirts of the city, I saw two Mossies at about 3 o’clock on a northerly heading. I joined up with them only to see that one was smoking badly from the starboard engine. [Flight Lieutenant David V. Pattison and Flight Sergeant Frank Pygram’s Mosquito had been hit by flak from the cruiser
Nürnburg
moored in the harbour]. The escorting Mosquito waved me off, as without guns, I would be just a burden and their course was not towards England. I turned back west just in time to see a sandbagged gun pit with two guns firing at the three of us. We had inadvertently got close to a large barracks, a fenced area with several low buildings. The best and quickest evasion was to go straight towards the gun pit and dive. I opened the bomb doors to get their attention and spoil their aim. As the doors opened the gunners abandoned their guns and ducked down. We were gone in a flash, right over them.
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On the return trip we sweated fuel for over an hour. When we spotted the English coast and, not too far inland, an air base, I went straight in. I got the wheels down, but nothing for flaps or brakes, so I coasted to a stop on the grass by the runway. We had found a B-24 base [Rackheath] near Norwich. Hearne and I were escorted by MPs to the control tower to explain our presence.
Pilot Officer R.C. Hamilton
RAAF
’s Mustang in 64 Squadron sustained damage over the target area and he lost oil pressure before being forced to ditch in Ringkøbing Fjord near Tarm, Jutland. Hamilton survived to be taken prisoner and he was later sent to
Stalag Luft
I at Barth in Germany. In all, four Mosquitoes and two Mustangs failed to return, for the loss of nine aircrew.
Ebbe Wolfhagen imprisoned in Vestre prison heard the explosions in the distance:
My first reaction that day was of shock. Later I asked a guard for a pencil and paper so that I could write a note to
Shellhaus
to ask for permission to smoke and read. The guard replied, “You can forget that:
Shellhaus
is in flames.” I was at that time very concerned about my colleagues’ fate, were they dead or had they survived?
If all the Mosquitoes’ bombs had been dropped on
Shellhaus
it is doubtful that anyone would have survived. Had the air-raid warning been sounded on time, civilian casualties may have been much less. Casualties among the
Gestapo
were less than expected as Karl Heinz Hoffmann and all the leading
Gestapo
staff were attending the funeral of an officer who had shot himself two days previously. (After the war Hoffmann defended himself at his trial and served four years imprisonment). The total number of dead was seventy-two, with twenty-six members of the
Gestapo
and thirty Danish collaborators. The remainder were innocent Danes. The escape of so many Danish patriots provided the Resistance with the much-needed breathing space. The tragedy at the
Jeanne d’ Arc
School marred this success, as one can never balance the lives of innocent children against those of resistance fighters, nevertheless there has never been any retribution shown towards the RAF for this costly operation. After the war, a fitting memorial was raised to the children and adults killed at the
Jeanne d’Arc
School. Likewise, at the new Shellhaus building there is a memorial to the Resistance members that lost their lives. Today at
Shellhaus
, there is a memorial to the nine aircrew members that laid down their lives in the fight for Denmark’s freedom.
No.140 Wing had one more low-level pin-point raid to fly. On 17 April six FB.VIs of 140 Wing, led by Group Captain Bob Bateson
DSO DFC
**
AFC
and Squadron Leader Ted Sismore
DSO DFC
* taxied out for a daylight strike on a school building on the outskirts of Odense, which was being used by the
Gestapo
as an HQ. Air Vice Marshal Basil Embry went along, as usual. Bateson led the Mosquitoes over the building three times before he could positively identify the target, even breaking radio silence to ask the other crews if they could see it. No enemy fighters showed and once found, the six Mosquitoes destroyed the Gestapo HQ. The delay in bombing gave the Danish civilians time to flee and no Danish casualties were reported. Eighteen days later Denmark was free.
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CHAPTER TEN
‘The Forgotten Front’
O
ne of the myriad problems facing South East Asia Command (SEAC) in India in 1943 was how to perform aerial reconnaissance over Burma and Malaya from its bases in Ceylon and India. Only four camera-equipped B25C Mitchells of 681 (PR) Squadron at Dum Dum in Calcutta possessed the range and speed for such flights over the Bay of Bengal and the Rangoon area. No.681 Squadron’s aircraft situation was causing great concern, for the two of the serviceable Mitchells had been in use for over 12 months and there were no aircraft in the command, other than Mosquitoes, with equivalent operational range and high speed. At the beginning of April 1943 three Mosquito FB.IIs and three FB.VIs were allotted to 27 Squadron at Agartala. Three were for performance tests and familiarization, three to be used for weathering trials during the coming rainy season under the supervision of Mr. F.G. Myers, de Havilland’s technical representative in India. Late in the month, however, it was decided that the Mosquitoes should supplement the squadron’s Beaufighters for Intruder operations. The first Mosquito operation over Burma was a reconnaissance on 14 May 1943. It is reported that Major Hereward de Havilland, visiting 27 Squadron, was horrified to find that the FB.IIs were being put to operational use. He attempted to have them grounded because he considered that the casein glue with which they were bonded was unlikely to withstand insect attack and the tropical weather. The FB.VIs, yet to arrive, were supposedly bonded with ‘waterproof’ formaldehyde adhesive. No.27 Squadron used the FB.IIs again on only one occasion. One crashed and another was damaged by ground fire on 5 June.
After experiencing a delay while Air Ministry approval was sought to allow the conversion of the several Mosquitoes into PR aircraft at 1 CMU, Kanchrapara two B.IIs and their flight crews were transferred in August to the twin-engined flight of 681 Squadron. These were followed by three newly arrived B.VIs. All five were fitted with vertical camera mountings but they did not have the four cameras of the ‘PRU type’ or the additional fuel tanks nor, in the case of the ‘B’ Flight, provision for fitting underwing fuel tanks. On 23 August Flying Officer Dupee
DFM
reconnoitred the Mandalay-Shewbo-yeu-Monywa-Wuntho area. The following day a second Mosquito sortie was flown when Flight Lieutenant Picknett made a reconnaissance of Akyab Island. During September 681 Squadron flew eight PR sorties over vast areas of Burma and on occasion an FB.VI was employed. One of the Mosquitoes became a victim of enemy action, but after a forced landing, it was repaired and returned to Calcutta after three weeks. The feared deterioration of fuselage bonding adhesives did not happen, despite the aircraft being continually exposed to high temperatures and humidity, so approval was given for the delivery of more Mosquitoes to India.
On 29 September 684 Squadron was formed at Dum Dum from the twinengined flights of 681 Squadron and it was planned that they have an establishment of twenty PR Mosquitoes. However, the unit was initially equipped with four B-25 Mitchell IIIs, two Mosquito Is and three VIs. Photographic coverage of targets such as Bangkok and Sumatra could only be reached by the Mosquito PR.IX, which had a safe range in excess of 1,250 miles. One was delivered to 681 Squadron on 18 October. A second crashed the same day on landing at Ranchi, killing the crew. Three days later 684 performed the first of thirty-three PR sorties over Burma when Flight Lieutenant F.B. McCulloch and Sergeant T.S. Vigors flew over Rangoon and Magwe. Another PR.IX arrived on 23 October. Next day McCulloch and Flight Lieutenant Henry Reeves reconnoitred the Andaman Islands to bring back photos of Japanese shipping and flying boat activity. Three Nakajima Ki-43 ‘Oscar’ fighters tried to intercept the high flying Mosquito but none got near the British aircraft. Later that day Flight Sergeant Johnson and Sergeant Willis returned safely with photos of Rangoon despite another attempted interception by two fighters and AA fire at 27,000ft.
No.684 Squadron’s first Mosquito loss while on operations from India occurred on 2 November when Flying Officers Fielding and Turton failed to return from a photo recce of the Rangoon area. Two days later the supply route from Moulmein to the Sittang bridge was covered. All Mosquito operations came to an abrupt end on 12 November, however, when a series of accidents resulted in a signal being sent to all units grounding the aircraft, pending inspection. On 9 December the six remaining Mosquitoes and four B-25Cs of 684 Squadron moved to Comilla in East Bengal, where it formed part of 171 PR Wing, Air Command SE Asia, which had come into being on 16 November. Their stay was a short one, for after just month it returned to Dum Dum on 30 January 1944. On 10 December Sergeant Boot and Sergeant Wilkins flying a Mosquito II were shot down over Rangoon and a second Mosquito crashed near Feni on 23 December following structural failure, killing Flying Officer Orr and Sergeant Johnson. Operations now involved distances of over 1,000 miles from base and 8-hour operational duration was not uncommon. On 15 December Squadron Leader Basil S. Jones the CO and his observer, Flying Officer R.C. Hawson reconnoitred Bangkok for the first time. The sortie revealed new information on Japanese reserve positions and the use of ‘lay-back’ airfields and earned both men the DFC. No.681 Squadron meanwhile, moved east also to Chandina.
On Christmas Day 1943 27 Squadron, equipped with a mixed inventory of Beaufighters and Mosquito FB.VIs, despatched its first Mosquito sorties proper.
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In January 1944, the Air Ministry decided to equip twenty-two bomber and strike squadrons with FB.VI aircraft to replace the Vultee Vengeance and some Beaufighters. De Havilland was to produce replacement airframe components at Karachi. Mosquito reconnaissance operations now covered distances of up to 1,000 miles from base and an eight-hour duration was not uncommon.
In February the PR Force (PRF) was formed under Group Captain S.C. Wise to bring together 681 and 684 Squadrons and the US 9th PRS. No.684, now back at Dum Dum and commanded by Wing Commander W.B. Murray, received nine pressurised PR.XVIs, which enabled higher altitudes to be flown. The remaining Mk.VIs were retired and they became a valuable source of spares, as parts were always in short supply. At the beginning of the month 684 Squadron had begun a photographic survey of Burma, while reconnaissance flights to islands in the Indian Ocean also continued. On 7 February Squadron Leader Basil Jones
DFC
and Flying Officer R.C. Hawson
DFC
tussled with a ‘Hamp’ (a modified ‘Zero’ with clipped wings) fighter over Port Blair in the Andaman Islands. On 23 February PR.IX ‘L’ returned from a ‘Special Areas’ sortie with engine trouble and had to be written off. Two days later Flight Lieutenant F.B. McCulloch and Flight Sergeant
T.S. Vigors flew to Mergui, then south down the coastal road to Tavoy where five Zeros intercepted them at 22,000ft. McCulloch climbed away and they were not attacked.
Flying Officers Jack Winship
RCAF
and Peter Haines had been involved at Cawnpore with experiments to attach a 90-gallon jettison tank under the belly of a PR.IX. Using this tank, the crew took off from Dum Dum on 29 February and flew across the Bay of Bengal on a recce of the Andaman Islands, with a stop at Ramu. Duration of the flight was 8 hours 25 minutes and the return flight was flown in the most violent weather Winship had encountered. He and Haines covered Port Blair, Stewart Sound and Port Bonington before meeting a Zero, which was unable to catch them. Another PR.IX developed engine trouble on the outward flight and later had to be struck off charge. By the end the month few Mosquitoes were available due to a shortage of spares.
In March 1944 684 Squadron made regular flights to the Andaman Islands and reconnoitred the Japanese railway system in Burma. One of the pilots on the squadron at this time was Flight Lieutenant Robin M. Sinclair (later the Right Honourable Viscount Thurso of Ulster). Robin Sinclair made many social contacts in Calcutta. Indeed, he often brought interesting people into the mess, including the Maharajahdirajah of Butdwan (whose palace was used as the squadron airmen’s’ mess) and the monocled Colonel Bernard Fergusson, one of the Chindit leaders. The young pilot would also fly to the forward landing ground with ‘Popsie’, his little dachshund bitch who had her own parachute! On the 22nd Sinclair and Flying Officer Reggie W. Stocks were briefed to reconnoitre southwards along the Siam-Singapore railway as far as petrol and prudence allowed. This trip reached into northern Malaya and established a record for that time of 2,490 miles, lasting 8 hours 45 minutes. Sinclair and Stocks landed back at advance base with 30 gallons of petrol remaining. This was the first sortie by an RAF aircraft over Malaya since the fall of Singapore.
Five days after this epic flight, on 27 March, Flight Lieutenant Kossuth ‘Kos’
J. Newman
DFC
*
RNZAF
and Flight Sergeant Ron Smith
DFM
in 684 Squadron flew a 1,860-mile trip to photograph a stretch of the Burma railway and airfields at Bangkok and Hua Hin. On the same day Warrant Officer J.A. Johnson and Flight Sergeant F. Wells flew a sortie to the Nicobars to cover Port Blair airfield and the radar site at Mount Augusta. The final sortie of March (flown on the 31st) saw Flying Officers Dupee
DFM
and McDonnell obtain the first photos of Car Nicobar Island.
In April 684 Squadron experimented with long-range flights as far afield as Khun Khaen, in central Siam and Vientiane in Laos, to see if they could fly over the monsoon weather so as to cover Japanese rear areas when the weather had passed. Until 13 April these sorties were flown from Dum Dum but then Ramu in the south was used. The Mosquitoes flew in the evening before their sorties so that they could take-off at first light and reach their objectives early in the day before cloud built up. On 4 April Sergeant T. Cocks and Flight Sergeant C. Smith set out to cover Metgui but found the Tenassetim coast covered in cloud. On the return journey, however, they photographed the Mokpaiin area and the Sittang bridge on the Burma railway, which had been damaged during a recent bombing raid. Their photos revealed that repairs had been carried out and the rail line was free between Mattaban and Rangoon. Four days later the bridge was heavily bombed by B-24s. A photo-reconnaissance carried out on 10 April by Warrant Officer J.A. Johnson and Flight Sergeant F. Wells showed that the two western spans of the bridge had been destroyed.
Meanwhile, on 5 April Flying Officers Jack Winship and Peter Haines, now on their second op, had a close call during a sortie to cover Kaun Cean and some new enemy airfields in north-east Siam. Winship explains:
Peter and I flew from Dum Dum to Ramu in MM294 to refuel for our PR flight. When the fuel tanks were all topped-off we set out for Kaungean located near the eastern border of Siam, close to the Indo-China area. After take-off we ascended to the desired altitude. The procedure was first to consume fuel from the main tank located in the bomb bay to make room for transfer of petrol from the outer-wing drop tanks. We had 50 gallons in either drop tank, so all we needed was to use 100 gallons from the main tank before we could transfer fuel from the outer drop tanks. Eventually, I had reduced the main tank by some 120 gallons or so and tried to transfer fuel. I immediately received a red light indicating there was a vapour-lock and fuel would not transfer. So I switched back to my regular tank again. According to the manual, if you have trouble like this and you can’t transfer fuel, return to base. You don’t fly around with 50 gallons of fuel in either drop tank. Now, I had done this before, had vapour-locks and continued my flights. After a while as things cooled, the lock usually disappeared and you could pump fuel from the drop to the main tank. I had never returned from a trip and I had no intention of this being the first flight I would have to scrub. We had good altitude of 35,000ft and a terrific tail wind. Peter was surprised when he computed us having over a 100 mph or so tail wind; we couldn’t believe it. We must have climbed up into a jet stream and were doing just beautifully with a terrific ground speed.
We continued flying along and everything by then was getting cooled down. I was ready to transfer fuel from the drop tanks when I noticed my port engine temperature climbing as I glanced at the gauge. I looked out and there was this horrendous plume of vapour trailing from the engine: just a colossal cloud! Startled, I realised it was my coolant and immediately shut the engine down, feathering the prop before the Merlin heated up to seize. Then it dawned on me that this was the engine I needed to transfer the fuel. The Pesco pumps were located on this engine and we needed them to pump fuel from the drop tanks. We were approximately two and a-halfhours from Ramu by this time and had covered nearly 800 miles. Peter right away gave me a reciprocal heading. This I did making the turn with the single engine. The drop tanks were of no use to me now. It was 100 gallons of fuel we needed badly. Without the tanks, you don’t have the extra weight or the drag, but there was no way I was going to utilise this fuel. So I had to get rid of it and pressed the jettison button. The tanks dropped off and I maintained airspeed by sustaining a slow rate of descent. You cannot hold 35,000ft on one engine. In the meantime, Peter was plotting out a course for me and managed to send off an SOS on the key. We were too far to reach Ramu by VHF. Another thing, the generator was on the feathered engine. We wanted to be careful to keep the batteries strong and operating as long as possible, considering the circumstances. Using the VHF radio would have drained them. Peter dropped the trailing aerial in an attempt the pick up any messages, but nobody seemed to have received our emergency distress signals, for we received no replies, but that was not our main worry.
Our main concern was whether we had enough fuel available to return to Ramu. According to the manual, the fuel consumption on one engine meant we were not going to make it. Peter suggested that maybe we should fly on to China, which was closer than Ramu. I had doubts about this, as we would have to fly through mountainous areas with very few airstrips and I don’t know if the natives in the area would be friendly to us. My thoughts were to fly as far back towards Ramu as possible, then crash-land in a riverbed, get our escape kit out and try to work our way back to the coast somehow. Even if it was going to take me months, I was determined to reach our lines. When you are young and foolhardy, you don’t realise how grave the situation is or could be.