Mosquito: Menacing the Reich: Combat Action in the Twin-engine Wooden Wonder of World War II (19 page)

We were fortunate at Downham in having a FIDO installation: the fog dispersal system consisting of a double line of burners running parallel to either side of the runway, which burned large quantities of petrol on the Primus stove principle. The intense heat so generated burned off the fog and thereby enabled the airfield to remain operational when the test of the area was blanketed in fog. Coming in to land when FIDO was operating was rather like descending into the jaws of hell and proved a very useful incentive to keeping straight after touch-down!

The Mossies were given a wide variety of tasks including such niceties as dropping route markers and target indicators over a false target while the Main Force pressed on elsewhere. With the introduction of the ‘pregnant’ Mosquito version adapted to carry a ‘Cookie’ we became a reasonably lethal bombing force in our own right, particularly as we could operate in weather conditions that grounded the heavies. The inhabitants of Berlin would be the first to acknowledge that 100 Mosquitoes each carrying a ‘Cookie’ weren’t the most welcome visitors night after night. When bad weather grounded the Main Force, small groups of Mosquitoes could be sent to a wide variety of targets in the Reich. Their objective was to get a large part of Germany out of bed and into the shelter so there were very few nights when the sirens were silent.

Our first operational trip in a Mosquito was to Berlin on 15/16 September, when twenty-seven Mosquitoes of the LNSF were despatched to raid Berlin, nine others going to Lübeck and eight to Rheine airfield. One aircraft of 608 Squadron failed to return.
¹³⁸
We’d just released the bombs and had completed the requisite straight and level run for the benefit of the camera when a master searchlight switched straight on to us and we were immediately coned as its satellites joined in the fun. At the same moment Jock, who had scrambled back from the bomb-aiming position in the nose, spotted an Fw 190 closing in on us but slightly high. The pilot obviously hadn’t seen us yet or his cannon shells would have blown us out of the sky by now and we were apparently in the blind spot created by the 190’s large radial engine. This situation posed a bit of a problem as any sort of diving turn on our part would undoubtedly bring us into his line of vision and a highly probable early end of our tour. The only alternative seemed to be to try to stay in his blind spot. I throttled back slightly until he was immediately above us. For about the next ten minutes we performed a graceful
pas de deux
over the city; watching him like a hawk and responding as soon as we saw his wing dip as he searched left and right for his prey. Finally, and to our profound relief he gave up and turned steeply to starboard while we turned equally steeply to port and high-tailed it for home. We had a few chuckles on the way back trying to guess the gist of the conversation, which must have gone on between the 190 pilot and his ground controller. The latter probably asked what sort of short-sighted
dumkopfs
the
Luftwaffe
were recruiting these days, the pilot responding by asking the controller kindly to clean his screen as he didn’t want to spend the rest of the night being vectored on to fly dirt.

After this initiation our second trip, to Bremen on 17/18 September, when forty-two Mosquitoes of the LNSF raided Bremen, and six others Dortmund, all without loss, promised to be a bit of an anti-climax. The Intelligence Officer at briefing assured us that women and old men were now manning the anti-aircraft guns at Bremen owing to the demand for manpower to stem the Allied and Russian advance. We’d just completed our bombing and camera run over Bremen when all hell broke out around us as we were introduced to one of the problems of ops in Mossies. We were often used on diversionary raids, involving extensive use of Window, which produced a blip on radar screens similar to that produced by an aircraft. This could be used in a variety of permutations to confuse the enemy and give the controllers problems as to where to send up their fighters. One popular ploy was for the Mosquitoes to overfly the main force of heavies and heave out masses of these strips as the Main Force either continued or diverted to its target. Meanwhile the Mossies carried on to an alternative target, leaving the Germans to decide which was the Main Force. Sometimes they got it right and sometimes they didn’t. But the net result as far as we were concerned was that only a limited number of us would finally bomb our particular target and Jerry was able to dispense with his usual box barrage and concentrate on one aircraft at a time. What was happening at Bremen left us in no doubt that we’d drawn the short straw.

Climb and dive, twist and turn as we might, the flak was deadly accurate and it was only a matter of time before the flying shrapnel found a vulnerable spot. That spot turned out to be the cooling jacket around the starboard engine and a violent juddering accompanied by belching smoke signified the imminent loss of interest of the engine in any further proceedings. Jock feathered the propeller while I throttled back and trimmed the aircraft for single-engine flight and his finger hovered anxiously over the fire extinguisher button as we watched the trailing smoke but there was no fire. The smoke ceased and we breathed again.

We were now faced with a further problem. As returning Mossies would be tracked by German radar they would soon know our course for home. We would be spotted as a straggler at our reduced speed and fighters would be sent up to intercept. Some more accurate flak near Groningen convinced us it would be unwise to continue on this course and a hasty cockpit consultation resulted in our turning due North to get out to sea as quickly as possible. This wasn’t going to get us any nearer home but it would help to throw off the tracking radar and also deter the German night fighters, who were always reluctant to venture too far out to the sea. The bright red ‘Boozer’ light receiver (tuned to the transmissions of the different types of German radar) in the cockpit soon turned to dull red and finally went out and we thankfully turned westward for home. On learning that we only had one engine, Downham control promptly diverted us to Coltishall on the well-worn principle, ‘We’re all right, Jack but if you’re going to make a cobblers of your landing we’d rather you cluttered up someone else’s flarepath rather than ours’. Welcome home!

On the night of 19/20 September the twin towns of Mönchengladbach/Rheydt were the targets for 227 Lancasters and ten Mosquitoes of 1 and 5 Groups. The designated Master Bomber was unavailable and Wing Commander Guy Gibson
VC DSO
*
DFC
*, the famous Dambusters’ leader and navigator Squadron Leader J.B. Warwick
DFC
took off from Woodhall Spa in a 627 Squadron Mosquito
¹³⁹
to act as Controller for the raid on Rheydt. It would appear that Gibson did not exactly endear himself to some of 627 Squadron’s members but then 617 Squadron always engendered fierce rivalries. Squadron Leader Frank W. Boyle
DFC
*
RAAF
, a 627 Squadron navigator, encountered Gibson a few times at Woodhall. He reported that, ‘he seemed a lost soul, particularly on the last occasion when he dropped in at the Mess. He was upset by the award of Cheshire’s VC (and I would understand that after his own VC for the Dambusters raid), but he reckoned too forcibly and bluntly that, on the basis of Cheshire’s citation, he would get a bar to his VC.’ Fellow 627 Squadron navigator Wallace ‘Johnno’ Gaunt
DFC
recalled:

Guy Gibson was a brave man and did a good job leading the Dambusters but he came back from the USA too full of his own importance. He walked into our mess one night and everybody was talking, playing liar-dice, drinking, etc, so he called out, ‘Don’t you know who I am?’ He got very annoyed as he had expected everyone to stand up and cheer him. In the end he was de-bagged and put outside. He persuaded our CO to let him fly a Mosquito against his better judgement. A week or so later Peter Mallender and I were told that he wanted the aircraft we were due to operate that night. He did not return.
¹⁴⁰
While returning over Walcheren both engines of Gibson’s Mosquito cut (according to a Dutch farmer who witnessed the incident) and the aircraft crashed near the sea wall killing both crew. Gibson and his navigator are buried at Bergen-op-Zoom. The most likely theory for the incident is that the fuel transfer cocks were not operated in the correct sequence and the engines ran out of fuel.
¹⁴¹

On 27/28 September 217 Lancasters of 1 Group and nine Mosquito markers of 5 Group carried out the only major raid by Bomber Command on Kaiserlautern. Over 900 tons of bombs were dropped and 36 per cent of the built-up area was destroyed. One Lancaster and a single Mosquito were lost. Squadron Leader Frank W. Boyle
DFC RAAF
, Flight Lieutenant Leo ‘Pop’ Devigne
DFC
’s navigator on 627 Squadron, recalls:

Leo was an outstanding pilot and we got on fine together. Physically strong and cool under fire but extrovert, e.g. his victory-roll over base on return from a successful trip. Our target, the railway workshops were on our port when ‘Buzz’ Brown called “Tally Ho” and dived to mark. He was hit by the flak crossfire and we saw him crash; ploughing along the ground with an awesome display of exploding coloured TIs. We followed him down and marked the target as he exploded. It was the only time that we were legitimately beaten to a target. (By ‘legitimately’ I mean not deliberately ignoring the flight plan, which was devised to confuse enemy defences as to the identity of our target, or deliberately to mark too early, which could initiate the defences before our Main Force were timed to bomb). I made it very clear at debriefing that if ‘Buzz’ had not been ahead of us we would have been the target of that crossfire.
¹⁴²

Leo’s physical strength was needed a month later when one engine was shot out of action by Walcheren gun positions that we were dive bombing in daylight. He had to fly the Mosquito back to Woodhall on the remaining engine and land. The ground crew showed us how the pressure from one finger easily broke off the wing from near the engine casing. That cured him of his victory rolls.
¹⁴³
This was a daylight affair on 30 October when eight Mosquitoes of 627 Squadron set out to mark four gun batteries for 102 Lancasters to bomb.
¹⁴⁴
Marking proved difficult because the island was flooded and the only land above water was the sea wall and the beach. At high water only the sea wall was above the floodwater. Flying Officer ‘Sandy’ Saunders’ first TI undershot and was just visible in the water. Flight Lieutenant Peter Mallender’s Mosquito was hit by flak in the port flap but it did not stop him from beginning his first dive. Their first TI overshot but burned in shallow floodwater. The second TI undershot and went out quite quickly in deeper water. The Mosquito flown by Flight Lieutenant A.G. St. John
RNZAF
and Flying Officer L.J. Dick
RCAF
was lost after a TI exploded in the bomb bay of their aircraft. In the circumstances the Lancasters were told to bomb the gun emplacement target at the land end of a specific breakwater and they were accurate. This was the last operation by Bomber Command in support of the Walcheren campaign and the opening of the River Scheldt. Walcheren was attacked by ground troops the following day. Commandos sailed their landing craft through the breaches in the sea walls made by the Lancasters and the island finally fell after a week of fighting.

Despite the intensity of raids, ‘Don’ Bennett’s LNSF Mosquito squadrons had the lowest losses in Bomber Command (one per 2,000 sorties). During October eleven Mosquitoes of the LNSF were lost on operations. New squadrons joined the force, with 142 Squadron re-forming at Gransden Lodge on 25 October and flying their first operation when their only two Mosquito B. XXVs were despatched to Cologne. That same day Flight Lieutenant A.P. ‘Pat’ O’Hara
DFC
*
DFM
of 109 Squadron at Little Staughton, who was on his second tour, found himself on ops as he recalls:

At this time I was flying with Wing Commander Peter Kleboe, O/C ‘A’ flight. Frank Griggs, who was also my pilot on my first tour on Stirlings on 214 Squadron, had been repatriated to Australia in December 1943. Peter Kleboe and I had been to Essen on the 23rd. I was under the impression that he had done his quota and I was about to depart for Bedford but I was mistaken. Pete called me in and said we were on a daylight to Essen. We were first on target with Red TIs for the heavy boys. Our ETA target was Zero-5 minutes. Turning on the bombing run, Oboe functioning, the flak was heavy at 30,000ft. I had just received ‘C’ when a voice on sixth sense said, ‘Open the bomb doors’. I had never before on seventy-odd flights opened before ‘D’, which was the signal to be ready for the bombing signal. Anyway, I leaned forward and pressed the lever. As I did so there was a loud bang and a piece of flak came through the windscreen and took the epaulette off my battledress left shoulder and went out the back. The aircraft dived. I grabbed the stick and looked at Pete. His face was peppered with fragments of perspex but he said, “Wait for the bombing signal, which I did and we turned off. We descended to a reasonable level as we were icing up inside. During the flight home I worked out that if I hadn’t leaned forward on hearing ‘C’ to open the bomb doors that piece of flak would have taken my head off instead of my epaulette. Although Pete was practically blinded we got back to Staughton. He said, “Tell me when we are crossing the hedge.” Pete had been a BAT Flight instructor before joining 109 and he made a good landing. Pete recovered and the next time I bumped into him was at Melsbroek in March 1945 when he was CO of 21 Squadron. We had a chat and a little celebration and he asked me to join 21 Squadron. I said, “No thank you.” I returned to Evere after a promise to meet up again.

On 6/7 November RAF Bomber Command sent out two major forces of bombers. Some 235 Lancasters of 5 Group, together with six Mosquitoes of 627 Squadron again attempted to cut the Mittelland Canal at its junction with the Dortmund-Ems Canal at Gravenhorst but crews were confronted with a cold front of exceptional violence and ice quickly froze on windscreens. Only thirty-one Lancasters bombed before the Master Bomber abandoned the raid due to low cloud. Ten Lancasters failed to return from the Mittelland debacle. (On 21/22 November 138 Lancasters and six Mosquitoes of 627 Squadron successfully attacked the canal banks of the Mittelland Canal at Gravenhorst and 123 Lancasters and five more Mosquitoes of 627 Squadron attacked the Dortmund-Ems Canal near Ladbergen and a breach was made in the only branch of the aqueduct which had been repaired since the last raid.)