Magnificent Delusions (37 page)

Bhutto's supporters soon began spreading allegations that the United States, particularly the CIA, had funded the opposition. Payments of as much as $25 million were mentioned. In a speech to Parliament, Bhutto mocked the Carter administration's concern with human rights, stating that if his party had been given $25 million, “I could afford to be worried about human rights, too.”

In some demonstrations members of Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party (PPP) marched as they shouted, “Down with Jimmy Carter.” A senior government figure was quoted in the
Washington Post
as saying, “With the advent of a new right wing government replacing Mrs. Gandhi in India, it is entirely possible that the US is making some sort of deals in New Delhi at our expense.”
⁷⁵

Interestingly, a similar suspension of military contracts did not accompany the ban on tear gas. Shipments of wire-guided TOW antitank missiles, bombs, machine gun ammunition, communications equipment, vehicles, and two World War II vintage naval destroyers were under way. This materiel, worth $150 million, was delivered on schedule.

Finally, Bhutto himself went public with allegations that the violent PNA protests against him were part of a “vast, colossal, huge international conspiracy” financed by the United States. The reason for the alleged conspiracy, Bhutto told a joint session of Pakistan's Parliament, was that the United States could not forgive him for failing to support the US role in Vietnam and for supporting the Arab cause against Israel.

The
Post
reported on the “rambling, one hour and 45 minute speech delivered without notes” as “marked by outbursts of fist-shaking rage against the United States”—which he termed “an elephant which does not forget or forgive.” Bhutto claimed that a US diplomat in a telephone conversation with one of his colleagues on April 12 allegedly said of Bhutto: “The party's over, the party's over. He's gone,” evidently meaning that the opposition would succeed in ousting the premier. “Well gentlemen,” the premier said, to cheers, “the party is not over.”
⁷⁶

Bhutto did not explain how he knew of the telephone conversation. Pakistani intelligence, which often conducts wiretapping
widely in the country, most likely provided him the nugget. One of the diplomats in the conversation, Howard Schaffer, told me years later that he was talking about an actual dinner party in Karachi that Bhutto attended. He had asked his colleague in Karachi if the party was over, and his colleague replied, “The party is over. He's gone.”

The prime minister's intelligence service could have misled him, or he could also have been playing to Pakistanis' emotions. “People like to believe in conspiracy theories on the subcontinent,” the
New York Times
quoted a Pakistani political observer soon after Bhutto's allegations.
⁷⁷
In some ways Bhutto was simply maneuvering for political space by externalizing a domestic problem. The US embassy in Islamabad referred to this as “the reemergence of the anti-American theme in Pakistan.”
⁷⁸

By now the polarization within Pakistan had reached its peak. The Islamist parties had whipped up hysteria about Bhutto being a bad Muslim and the need to Islamize Pakistan's laws. American missionary Clifford Manshardt, who had experience in South Asia, tried to explain what was going on to Americans. He recognized Bhutto's mistakes and excesses, but “What puts Bhutto in such jeopardy,” he wrote, “is the determination by orthodox religious leaders to frame their opposition as a Holy war.”
⁷⁹

As summer approached, Pakistan's political standoff continued. Saudi Arabia persuaded Bhutto and PNA leaders to negotiate over new elections. Then, just as the negotiations were on the verge of concluding successfully, Zia imposed martial law. Most American observers blamed “the quarrelsome blundering of the politicians” rather than generals' ambition for the return to military rule.

The military was said to have taken over “after six years of initially promising but eventually inept and unstable democratic government.” The
Los Angeles Times
described Bhutto as “a talented but volatile politician” who had invited his own downfall by coming to rely increasingly on the military.
⁸⁰
Initially Zia detained all politicians including Bhutto, announced that fresh elections would be held within ninety days, and promised that the army would return to the barracks after holding elections. But he soon reneged on his promise.

Zia ruled Pakistan for eleven years, longer than any other military dictator and with far greater brutality. He executed the still-popular Bhutto after a show trial, ostensibly on charges of plotting the murder of a political opponent. Bhutto refused to seek clemency from Zia, and his death by execution made him a folk hero as well as a symbol of civilian resistance to military dictatorship; his political weaknesses and flaws were forgotten by even his opponents, with the exception of hardcore Islamists, who continued to hate him in death as they did when he was alive. Zia went on to change many aspects of life in Pakistan as part of “Islamization” of the country. The country's educational system was revamped to ensure that future generations of Pakistanis would be more Islamic and xenophobic than were previous ones. From an early age anti-Semitism as well as fear and hatred of India were instilled in Pakistan's fast-growing populace.

Pakistan had received almost $ I billion in US economic assistance from 1972 to 1977, the years that Bhutto governed the country. But military aid during this period stood at a meager $1.87 million, most of it in the form of training for officers and spare parts for US-made equipment. Bhutto was, however, able to secure considerable military assistance from China and was also able to purchase weapons from European countries.

But Pakistan's generals attributed Bhutto's failure in reopening the American pipeline to his socialist leanings and past anti-American rhetoric. Although he remained suspicious of India and saw it as an existential threat to Pakistan, Bhutto did not initiate any adventures against India either. Zia attempted to rectify those “mistakes.”

Chapter Five

A Most Superb and Patriotic Liar

O
n July 4, 1982, Pakistan's military dictator, General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, served coffee to General Vernon Walters at Army House, the British-era bungalow in Rawalpindi that served as the official residence of Pakistan's army chief. Although Zia had declared himself president of Pakistan, he had chosen not to move to the official Presidential Palace. The modest military bungalow went well with Zia's cultivated image of humility, as it also signaled that the real source of his power was not the office of president but rather his status as army commander.

Walters had come as a special envoy representing US President Ronald Reagan. He had served as deputy director of the CIA, spoke at least seven languages, and was widely respected in the United States as an intermediary with foreigners. Walters had served as interpreter for Eisenhower and Nixon in their foreign visits, but he was sent to Zia on what was the American Independence Day holiday to deliver a tough message. For this, he needed diplomatic, not linguistic, skills.

US intelligence had obtained evidence that Pakistan was clandestinely purchasing sensitive technology to develop nuclear weapons. There were indications that the Chinese had provided Pakistan assistance in the form of designs of key components for an atom bomb.

At this time the Reagan administration was providing large amounts of economic and military aid to Pakistan. This aid was conditional on Pakistan foregoing the nuclear option. Walters had brought a letter from Reagan that shared US information about Pakistan's violation of its explicit stipulation. He was also given the task of asking Zia to stop the nuclear program or risk facing an aid cutoff.

During their meeting on July 4 Walters presented to Zia the US government's conclusions based on what he described as “incontrovertible intelligence.” Pakistani representatives had “transferred designs and specifications for nuclear weapons components to purchasing agents in several countries.” These agents were arranging the fabrication of nuclear weapons components. “I described to Zia our information, the problem it created for both our countries and what was needed if we were to salvage our relationship,” Walters reported to Washington after the meeting. The special envoy had emphasized that debating the evidence he had come to discuss would not be useful. Nonetheless, Zia denied any knowledge of Pakistani efforts to acquire components for a nuclear explosive device.

When Walters had finished, Zia said with a straight face that Pakistan did not have a nuclear weapons development program. “He did not doubt that President Reagan had evidence he considered incontrovertible,” Walters wrote in the cable about their meeting. Zia insisted that he would not develop a nuclear weapon and would not explore a nuclear device.

Zia then said that he could not believe that designs for a nuclear device could have been submitted to foreign purchasing or manufacturing agents without his knowing, and he had “no knowledge of any such weapons development programs.” He added dramatically: “Pakistan might not be a large or important country but it was an honorable one.” He could give his word of honor as a soldier that Pakistan would not develop, much less explode, a nuclear weapon or explosive device.

While recording Zia's response, Walter added his own comment: “Either he really does not know,” the American general said, “or he is the most superb and patriotic liar I have ever met.”

Walters and Zia met again the next day, which, coincidentally, was the fifth anniversary of Zia's military coup. This time the Pakistani ruler spoke earnestly about President Reagan. “The president must be right,” he said, adding, “Your information must be right. I accept its authenticity.” But he wanted to see the details of the evidence, knowing well that in the field of intelligence, details can give away sources and methods through which a conclusion was reached.

“It is not Pakistan's fault,” Zia pleaded. “It is a plot. I'd like you to be cautious.” Walters replied that the United States had reviewed its information very clearly and given it a second look. “We are confident of it,” he said. He would not put the fiat denial in writing and in a formal response to Reagan's letter, but Zia argued that the US information was a “total fabrication.” Walters interpreted this as a matter of keeping face. In his opinion Zia was saying that “it did not happen but you can be sure it won't happen again.”

Walters, who had been inducted in the US Military Intelligence Hall of Fame, proceeded to make a famously erroneous conclusion. “I believe that he now knows that we have the ability to watch Pakistani activities in this field that he had not suspected previously,” he said. This would “certainly have an inhibiting effect on what they do.” He recommended that the United States “must continue to watch their activities closely and give careful consideration to the awkward and difficult problems of perhaps making available to President Zia some sanitized parts of our evidence.”
¹

In October Walters returned to meet Zia because US intelligence continued to detect Pakistani efforts to procure sensitive technology and materials. He had to warn Zia that US aid was in “grave jeopardy.” Pakistan was about to receive the first batch of F-16 aircraft that it had wanted for a long time, but revelations about the nuclear program could put that transfer on hold. Walter showed drawings of Chinese-influenced nuclear weapons designs that US intelligence had obtained.

Zia went on the offensive. He insisted he was an “honorable man”—a phrase he used several times—and asked to be treated as such. He had conveyed his firm assurances on the subject to the US president in writing, and he stood by them. What else did the United
States expect him to do? Bhutto had once confronted Kissinger with the statement: “If Pakistan's existence is not important to the US, then say so.” Zia was now using a similar tack; he complained about signs that the United States was pulling away from Pakistan.

The Pakistani dictator noted that there was a press campaign “questioning Pakistan's nuclear intentions,” rumors about Indian and Israeli collusion against Pakistan's nuclear facilities, and “nonsensical speculations about ‘Islamic bombs'.” He brought up the name of
New York Times
reporter Judith Miller, who had written some of the stories about Pakistan's nuclear program. He implied that America's Jewish lobby was trying to punish Pakistan, “perhaps because of Pakistan's support for its Islamic partners on the Arab-Israeli issue.” Zia demanded to see the US intelligence information to decide if it was authentic or just an extension of the hostile propaganda by Israel's and India's supporters.

Zia ended his conversation with the words: “General Walters! I am an honorable man. We are an honorable people. I ask you to tell your President that I give him my word of honor as President of Pakistan and as a soldier that I am not and will not develop a nuclear device or weapon.” Walters said there was no way he could reject this assurance. He remarked, “I hope no further blips would show on our radars”
²
The retired American three-star general could not imagine that the serving four-star Pakistani would lie to him, especially after invoking his honor with his hand on his heart.

The blips on the radar that Walters had spoken of continued to show up. Because the United States refused to share the evidence, the Pakistanis could not figure out how the Americans kept on finding out what they were doing. Zia was due to visit Washington on a state visit that December, so Secretary of State George Shultz decided to brief Reagan about the possibility that he may have to address the matter directly when the two presidents met at the White House.