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Authors: Linda Lemoncheck

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dialectical relation between gender and sexuality in women's lives, then a feminist philosophy of sex appears to advocate exactly the kind of epistemological authoritarianism and moral elitism that oppresses dissent and difference.
It would appear, therefore, that a feminist philosophy of sex cannot, without hypocrisy, advance the "true" story of women's sexuality if its own agenda is one of challenging the philosophical canon's assumed monopoly on truth. Indeed, the very presumption of a theoretical foundation in feminist philosophy of sex would seem to be no more than a thinly veiled attempt to offer an ahistorical, univocal, and universalizable definition of
the
feminist philosophy of sex from what is more accurately described as a historically situated, culturally loaded perspective of a female author. Furthermore, if a feminist philosophy of sex is being constructed within a patriarchal context, how free of male bias and female misrepresentation can it be?
What these questions imply is that both the nature and evaluation of women's sexuality are social constructions arising out of the particular culture, history, and context in which claims to women's sexuality are made. The assertion that there exists a dialectical relation between gender and sexuality is simply an instantiation of the more general assertion that human practice is socially situated. As Linda Alcoff points out, "Gender is not a point to start out from in the sense of being a given thing but is, instead, a posit or construct, formalizable in a nonarbitrary way through a matrix of habits, practices, and discourses."
10
According to this view, theories of women's sexuality that are gender-sensitive are more representative of the complex and diverse group that makes up the class "woman" than those that are not because they are theories that acknowledge the bias of social location. Because feminist theory is itself socially situated, what we cannot say is that feminism presents an undistorted or "true" vision of women's sexuality.
11
If we adopt Alcoff's relational matrix, then it also appears that a woman's gender cannot be discretely separated from such features as her race, class, or sexual preference. Being the woman who is Linda LeMoncheck
means
being a white, middle-class, heterosexual female, not someone who is a woman
and
white and middle-class. Such features of human being are relational and interlocking, such that "one cannot dislodge one piece without disturbing the others."
12
The affinity many feminists feel for the struggle against racism, classism, heterosexism, and imperialism is a function of our belief that interlocking social relations will generate interlocking social oppressions as well. However, the insidious and complex nature of the interlocking of social oppressions has the unfortunate consequence that many women, including feminists, do not recognize our complicity in our own and others' victimization.
13
How can these observations be used to flesh out a dialectic between gender and sexuality that is sensitive to the sexual experiences, preferences, and desires of a wide variety of women? I have already argued that such a dialectic acknowledges both the potential for individual women's sexual subordination by men and by male-dominated institutions, and women's capacity to liberate themselves from such subordination to define their sexuality in their own terms. Moreover, if gender is but one of many interlocking social relations, then when we investigate the relation between gender and women's sexuality, we will be embarking on a complex contextual study of the ways in which all such social relations as race, gender, class, ethnicity, sexual preference, nationality, religion, age, and physical ability inform, and are informed
 
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by, women's sexuality. I will refer to this composite of interlocking social relations as a person's "social location" or as the "contextual relations" in a person's life. Third, such a study will also ask us to pay careful attention to the unique as well as the unifying details of the lives of the individual women whose erotic preferences are under investigation. From this perspective, women are understood both in terms of their sexual specialness and in the ways they may share sexual anxieties, needs, or interests with other women. And finally, because we are adopting the perspective that the philosophy of sex is socially constructed, any philosophizing about the nature and value of women's sexuality will be informed by a dialectic between the philosopher and her subject, which will affect the social locations of each. Not only is the subject socially situated in the complex ways I just described. the philosopher is socially situated as well.
14
The existence of such bias in the philosopher of sex can be a source for either exclusionary or visionary practice. The remainder of this chapter discusses three ways in which the bias of social location figures in traditional philosophizing about sex and sexuality. My claim is that the contextual and dialectical investigation just outlined offers a more representative vision of women's sexuality than any of the three philosophical perspectives I will describe later. The chapter concludes with an elaboration of this alternative perspective, whose appreciation of sexual diversity within a caring community can provide us with the feminist philosophy of sex that informs the remainder of the book.
The "View from Somewhere Better"
One perspective in philosophy of sex is a perspective familiar to feminist philosophers; I shall call it the "view from somewhere better." The "view from somewhere better" is a perspective in which a philosopher's social location becomes social prejudice due to a belief in the superiority of his social location. This view informs the work of some of the ancient philosophers, such as Aristotle, and medieval scholars, such as Thomas Aquinas, both of whom believed that because men's rational faculties are superior to women's, a husband should act as his wife's governor in marriage. By adopting the "view from somewhere better," Arthur Schopenhauer could assert that a woman's primary purpose is to act as the inferior but necessary procreative instrument by which a man reproduces other men. This same perspective prompts Friedrich Nietzsche to claim, "When a woman has scholarly inclinations, there is generally something wrong with her sexual nature; . . . man, if I may say so, is the barren animal."
15
These philosophers perceived themselves as having an intellectually privileged place from which to expound on human nature because they were men purportedly endowed with superior rational faculties to those of women. It is the sort of socially located bias in which little, if any, attempt is made to understand or empathize with the view of "others" (in this case, women) because others are believed to be inferior to "us" (in this case, men). It is a perspective that acknowledges social location yet fails to acknowledge the social bias inherent in that location. To use María Lugones's terminology, this prejudice is the result of an absence of "'world'-traveling," in which the philosopher not only acknowledges the partiality of her own location
 
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but also makes an effort to understand the location of others. An absence of "world"-traveling indicates that one has not attempted to "understand what it is to be them and what it is to be ourselves in their eyes."
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Because the "view from somewhere better" in much of traditional philosophy greatly distorts the lives and experiences of women, it is a perspective many feminist philosophers have sought to avoid.
Therefore, it is ironic to discover in at least some feminist theorizing about women's sexuality that it too assumes a "view from somewhere better." This bias is revealed when feminists replace an "androcentric" or "masculinist" vision of women's sexual life, in which women's sexuality is defined exclusively in men's terms, with an equally
gyno
centric vision (from the Greek "gyne" or ''female"). From such a perspective, being a woman somehow privileges, not just opens, the discourse. In a gynocentric world, women can give not simply a better account of their own sexuality but the best account of it.
17
If all philosophers of sex are socially located, however, such feminist discourse is merely one socially located vision among many and so subject to the same kind of distorting prism as traditional philosophy of sex.
As I have noted, this does not mean that all social locations are equally biased, only that all social locations are biased in some way or other. Feminists have sometimes argued that without identifying women's perspective as the right or true perspective, feminists can offer no formal justification for change in women's sexual lives. However, I have argued in favor of situating less biased, but not unbiased, theories of women's sexuality within a composite of interlocking social relations that circumscribe both women's sexual oppression and women's sexual liberation. Such a framework suggests that feminists can offer an agenda for women's sexuality that recommends listening to the diverse voices of women. Such an agenda is simply not
the
agenda for securing women's sexual agency and self-definition, nor can such an agenda promise to be representative of all women in all times and places. Furthermore, the perception that some feminists are promoting an oppressive gynocentrism has only succeeded in dividing feminist ranks, producing a sizable group of women suspicious of the essentialism that often hides behind an appeal to "the woman's voice."
18
The "View from Nowhere"
One way to avoid the prejudice of gynocentrism is to advocate what I will call, borrowing an expression from Thomas Nagel, the "view from nowhere."
19
Someone who adopts the "view from nowhere" claims that there is an ideal or privileged position from which one can ascertain indubitable truths about oneself and the world. This privileged position is purportedly devoid of the particularity and partiality of any more personal perspective. In this way, the "view from nowhere" differs from the "view from somewhere better" in that the "view from nowhere" is intended as a perspective of objectivity and emotional distance whose ideal observer avoids the prejudices of the "view from somewhere better" by being removed from any position of bias. Thus, one who adopts the "view from nowhere" claims the epistemological advantage over the advocate of the "view from somewhere better" through the ability to make claims about the world that are true for all persons in all times and places. Those who would advocate adopting the "view from nowhere" would argue that
 
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particularly in such areas as mathematics and the physical sciences, an objective and impartial perspective is essential for formulating theorems, completing proofs, and constructing empirical hypotheses whose confirmation can be validated by any observer.
Contrary to such views, some feminist philosophers have underscored how a "view from nowhere" in the sciences is in fact socially and historically biased by the particular scientific methodology, subject matter, and investigator chosen to perform the research. Feminism's contribution to philosophical questions about scientific objectivity is the recognition that science is a gendered discipline whose standards and methods may be partial not only to time and place but also to the gender of the scientist, whose traditionally male-identified research practices marginalize, ignore, or silence the scientific contributions of women. Moreover, because so-called impartial research often yields results that unjustly discriminate against women in favor of men, feminists argue that the modern notion of "objective" science must be seriously reconsidered.
20
In virtue of its purportedly unbiased stance, the "view from nowhere" also lays claim to making normative judgments without unfairly favoring one person or opinion over another. From this perspective, impartiality and objectivity are essential to making fair judgments, justifying right behavior, and condemning what is wrong. However, feminist theorists in epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics have joined feminist philosophers of science to contest the claim that men in historically and culturally situated contexts can successfully or noncontroversially determine one reality that is valid for all persons.
21
Feminists interested in epistemology and value theory have argued that in the name of objectivity and impartiality, traditional philosophy's assessment of what human beings can know and how we evaluate our world has misrepresented women's voices or excluded them altogether. Feminists contend that such misrepresentation occurs because the male philosopher who adopts the "view from nowhere" does not recognize that his sense of what counts as objectivity will reflect the partiality of his gendered location. In this sense, he differs from someone who adopts the "view from somewhere better," who recognizes his own difference but simply believes that his location is the superior one. Nevertheless, the perspective of the purportedly ideal observer from the "view from nowhere'' is like the perspective of the observer of the "view from somewhere better," because the "view from nowhere" is ideal only with reference to some favored way of viewing the world. Absent any recognition that his perspective is only one of many partial perspectives, the philosopher who adopts the "view from nowhere" assumes that
his
ideal perspective is
everyone's
perspective.
The "view from nowhere" inspired Immanuel Kant to assert that sex outside of marriage is a degradation of human nature. David Hume adopted this perspective when he claimed that marriage is an institution entered into by mutual consent and has for its end the propagation of the species.
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It is the perspective to which the "view from somewhere better" inevitably shifts when the bias of superior location must be claimed as universal truth. Postmodernists have challenged much of Western philosophy for assuming that there can be one correct use of the human faculties which will reveal truths about the world that are valid for all. A feminist philosophy of sex

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