Sexual Preference from the "View from Somewhere Different"
|
Since the reaction Moulton refers to is itself a socially located reaction based on a perception of the incomprehensibility of sexual perversion, I suggest that the concept of sexual perversion be replaced with the concept of sexual difference . This replacement has the advantage of making all sexual behavior different, not just perverse behavior, since by jettisoning the notion of sexual perversion, we jettison the concept of the normal as well. In this sense, the concept of sexual difference is a deconstructive concept designed to explode the polarity of normal/perverse that equates the perverse with the unacceptable, corrupt, sick, bad, and the normal with the acceptable, innocent, healthy, good. The concept of sexual difference avoids the pejorative connotations of being on the "wrong" side of the polarity of the normal yet does not deconstruct the concept of difference itself that allows us to locate, particularize, and evaluate worldviews. In so doing we can reconstitute sexuality as a differentiated category of nonstigmatized sexual variation. When all sexual behavior is "other" than some "other" behavior, the value of otherness remains an open question. 51
|
What my critique of the philosophical literature on sexual perversion suggests is that when perversion is regarded as subversive or in some other way bad, we close the question as to whether some sexual perversion may be unobjectionable. Yet when we retain the concept of sexual perversion but ascribe it normative neutrality, sexual perversion becomes empty of meaning or inadequate as a way of distinguishing sexually perverse behavior from the normal. I have suggested that this is because the concept of sexual perversion only makes sense when polarized against a norm of behavior that is preferred to the perverse in order to encourage social compliance with the norm. Once we deconstruct that polarity, we can make room for an exploration of difference that does not presuppose that some sexual behavior ("ours") is better than others ("theirs").
|
For those who bristle at compulsory sexual normality but find marginalization equally oppressive, such deconstruction can create new ways of thinking and talking about sex that makes marginality and centrality equally valuable in their difference. Indeed, many contemporary philosophers and social critics argue that gender constitutes a broad spectrum of socially constructed behaviors, revealing the lability and complexity of gender in such phenomena as the inventive cross-gender performance of drag queens, the sadomasochistic sex play of lace and leather-clad dominatrixes, the gender fascination and sex transformation of transsexuals, and the dynamic and conflicting uses of the term "queer." 52 Moreover, if we continue to treat the perverse as the bad, we repeat the mistake of the "view from nowhere" by refusing to countenance alternative points of view; or we reiterate the "view from somewhere better" by acknowledging alternatives but refusing to question the superiority of our own location. If thinking and talking about sexual perversion in terms of sexual difference can create new avenues for sexual understanding, then we may well question Freud's contention that heterosexual norms are the necessary price of civilization.
|
The notion of sexual difference derives its significance from the "view from somewhere different," which eschews assumptions of superiority in the name of recog-
|
|