Lion of Jordan (84 page)

Bush emphasized that, for America, oil was a way of life, and he wanted Hussein to understand America's resolve. Hussein may have hoped that, because of the historic ties between Jordan and America and their personal friendship, America would moderate or move a little; but,
although Bush valued the friendship, he refused to budge. At one point he exclaimed, ‘I will not let that little dictator control 25 per cent of the civilized world's oil!' Sharif Zaid bin Shaker found the remark doubly disturbing on account of the property rights it assumed over Gulf oil and the implication that the Arabs were not civilized.
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The remark also inadvertently revealed that in seeking a showdown with Saddam, Bush's primary concern was with Western access to Gulf oil rather than with upholding international legality. After all, the Reagan administration, in which Bush had been vice-president, supported Saddam throughout the eight years of his war against Iran. That war was a textbook case of unprovoked aggression, and yet not once did the US condemn Iraq. Nor did Saddam's brutal oppression of his own people and his gassing of the Kurds at Halabja make any difference to American foreign policy. Saddam was a monster in human form but he was America's monster. His great mistake was to tread on America's toe by attacking its client and threatening its access to Gulf oil. Hussein's efforts at mediation were now treated as a personal betrayal of his friendship with Bush. You were either with them or against them.

Bush may also have thought that he had Jordan backed into a corner. He knew that the country was economically dependent on Iraq, from which it imported 95 per cent of its oil and to which it sold 45 per cent of its exports. Bush heard from President Mubarak that Saddam had bought off the Jordanian and Yemeni rulers with the offer of a certain percentage of Kuwait's oil in return for supporting the invasion. The story was completely groundless, but it was a factor in Bush's thinking. To wean Hussein away from Iraq, the Bush administration began considering international financial help as well as emergency Arab oil assistance, provided he implemented the UN sanctions.
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Bush said he realized Hussein was worried about Jordan's economic situation and suggested that the other Arab countries could help. Hussein reportedly replied, ‘I didn't come to raise that subject. I came because of something bigger: the subject of peace.'
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To Jordanian officials this looked like an attempt to persuade their king to join the allied coalition against Iraq by the offer of financial rewards. They took a dim view of this attempt, particularly against the backdrop of American failure to extend financial help at the height of the crisis the previous year. Hussein, for his part, remained dedicated to finding an Arab solution to an Arab problem, and he was not tempted
by the carrot dangled under his nose. As Adiba Mango has observed, ‘had it been a matter of financial payoff, the Jordanian leadership would have been more likely to take up Bush's offer of financial largesse rather than rely on promises from a cash-strapped Iraqi neighbour.'
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At Kennebunkport the diplomatic shutters were briskly pulled down. The meeting was disappointing for Bush but not half as disappointing as it was for Hussein. It marked the parting of the ways between the two old friends. Bush turned to the task of building up a military coalition against ‘the little Iraqi dictator' while Hussein continued to seek a peaceful resolution of the conflict. Washington's attitude towards Jordan hardened, and its tone gradually became more hostile and menacing. To Roger Harrison, the new American ambassador to Amman, fell the difficult task of maintaining contact between the two capitals. In the aftermath of the Kennebunkport meeting, Harrison handed to His Majesty the following message:

We recognize that Jordan, because of its geographical location, is vulnerable to Iraqi pressure. But you should have no illusion that Iraqi success in its invasion of Kuwait will satisfy Saddam Hussein's ambitions to dominate the region. No neighbour is safe.

It is vital for Jordan's essential interest that it not be neutral in the struggle between Iraq and the great majority of the Arab states.

The perception of a de facto Iraqi–Jordanian alliance has already damaged the reputation of Jordan in the United States and elsewhere. We sincerely hope that you would take firm steps to reverse this deterioration…

Hussein described this message to an American journalist as ‘nasty' and ‘very, very rude'.
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In the last week in August, Hussein visited Yemen, Sudan, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Mauritania and Morocco. His purpose was to find some common ground among the Arab states that were opposed to foreign intervention. In the first week in September he visited Spain, Britain, Germany, France and Italy. In all these countries he met with heads of state or government and presented to them the Jordanian version of the origins and causes of the crisis. His main purpose was to persuade them to support a peaceful solution. In all these countries, except Britain, he was encouraged to persevere in his efforts at mediation. Britain's prime minister at that time was Margaret Thatcher, with whom Hussein had always had close and cordial relations in the
past. He was a man with authority who knew how to command her sympathy and support, and she clearly liked him.
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Recent events in the Gulf, however, placed a serious strain on their relationship. Thatcher had successfully led her country into the Falklands War and considered herself an expert on dealing with dictators. She was firmly of the opinion that you do not negotiate with dictators; you throw them out on their ear. On day one of the crisis she dogmatically ruled out diplomacy. She happened to be with Bush in Aspen, Colorado, when news of the invasion arrived, and he talked about referring the matter to the Security Council. Thatcher apparently brushed aside the idea. ‘This is no time to go wobbly, George!' she said.

At their working lunch in Downing Street, Hussein found Thatcher so inflexible and belligerent that he had doubts about her sanity. She assumed a Churchillian posture, glowered at him and sounded like a megalomaniac. She began by asking the king why he was backing Saddam, whom she described as ‘an evil man'. ‘I am not backing anybody. I am trying to save peace in our area,' the king replied. He told her frankly that gunboat diplomacy belonged to the nineteenth century. Her famous eyes blazed with anger. ‘You are backing a loser and I want you to know that before it is too late,' she said. She dismissed Saddam disdainfully as ‘a third-class dictator'.
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In an imperious voice she concluded by saying, ‘Your Majesty, you have no more of a role in the Middle East.' Adnan Abu-Odeh was the note-taker, and he wrote at the end of his notes of the meeting: ‘Oh, God, it was like Queen Victoria speaking to an Indian maharaja.' He felt as humiliated as the rest of the party. The friendship between the king and the prime minister ended during that working lunch, and the subsequent correspondence between them was less than civil, at least on her part.
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After the lunch with Thatcher, Hussein held a secret meeting with Israeli officials in London. A fascinating glimpse of the evolving relationship is provided in a book written by Efraim Halevy, who was deputy director of the Mossad at that time and probably the king's closest Israeli contact. The Israelis were watching events from the sidelines with mounting anxiety. Israel had intelligence that Jordanian pilots were being trained together with Iraqi pilots in Iraq. When this intelligence was first presented to the king he did not deny it but explained it in terms of cost-savings; it did not signal a change of policy towards Israel. After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the Israelis discovered that Iraqi
aircraft bearing the insignia of the Royal Jordanian Air Force were patrolling the border between Jordan and Israel south of the Dead Sea, virtually within striking distance of the atomic reactor in Dimona. It was inconceivable that these flights were taking place without the king's approval. In Jerusalem strident voices were raised, calling for an end to the secret honeymoon between Israel and Jordan. Proponents of a Palestinian state on the East Bank saw the approaching war as a chance to achieve two things simultaneously: retaliate against possible Iraqi missile attacks on Israel and strike at the Jordanian Air Force. They knew that this scenario, if carried to its logical conclusion, would spell the end of the monarchy. A decision was taken to confront the king about the consequences of this latest development. He was presented with a stiff warning that the Iraqi flights had to stop instantly. The warning was delivered to the king on the day of his working lunch at 10 Downing Street. In a later conversation the king remarked that while Thatcher's tone had been bitter and unpleasant, the Israeli message was more threatening in content.
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The king seized the opportunity to explain to the Israelis some of the facts of life as he saw them. In the eyes of the Arab masses Saddam was the real hero. He had saved the Sunni Muslims from the onslaught of the Iranian Shi'ites. He commanded not only respect but awe and fear. He personified the dream of glory, sacrifice and success. What in Western eyes looked like ruthlessness and cruelty stood in Arab eyes for courage, strength and pride. One must never forget the importance of pride, the king kept repeating. He was especially bitter about the treatment he was receiving from Bush. He had known every American president since Eisenhower, and he had invested a great deal of effort in cultivating the friendship with Bush when he was director of the CIA and after. But now he simply could not yield to Bush's naked pressure with regard to the Iraqi affair. After years of patient cultivation of relations with the United States, he had reached a dead end. His relationship with his long-standing ally was falling apart. For Jordan and for him personally, this was disastrous, but he was powerless to stop the drift towards war. Every time Efraim Halevy met him during those months, the king repeated to him that he was convinced that he had behaved honourably and that he was prepared to confront his fate, just as he had been many times in the past when faced with threats to his life and to the survival of his kingdom. During the lead up to the
Gulf War, Halevy saw a leader in a sombre and fatalistic mood but at peace with himself and ready to accept whatever Allah had ordained for him.
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On 5 September, Hussein returned from his tour of Europe's capitals and flew straight to Baghdad to try once again to persuade Saddam to withdraw from Kuwait. This was the second of three trips he made to Baghdad in the quest for a peaceful settlement. On this trip he conveyed to Saddam his firm conviction that the Western leaders and their allies were not going to allow him to stay in Kuwait. ‘Make a brave decision and withdraw your forces,' Hussein advised the Iraqi leader. ‘If you don't, you will be forced out.' Saddam, however, remained unmoved.
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He was less concerned with the future of Kuwait than with his own future. He probably calculated that if he ordered his army to execute a humiliating retreat, his own leadership would be called into question. The Western logic said that if he did not withdraw voluntarily and unconditionally, he would be compelled to withdraw by force. From his own perspective, however, it was probably less risky to let his army be driven out by force than to lose face with an unconditional surrender. Pride in the Arab world was very important, as Hussein was reminding his Israeli friends.

Hussein's perseverance in the role of peacemaker in the face of so many rebuffs is nothing short of astounding. He felt deeply that the Middle East could not afford another war and that the world should not impose one on it. His next venture was a Maghrebi peace initiative. On 19 September, King Hassan II of Morocco hosted in Rabat a meeting to which President Chadli ben Jedid of Algeria was also invited. The prospects of an Arab solution to the crisis were far from promising, but the assembled heads of state agreed to make another effort. Three days later Hussein addressed a long letter to the Iraqi leader in which he conveyed their collective wisdom. The core of the letter was the advice to Saddam to withdraw from Kuwait and to avoid the approaching war. It was made clear to Saddam that the Arab governments could not accept the acquisition of territory by force not only as a matter of principle but because failure to uphold it would play into Israel's hands. The letter appealed to Saddam's ego by extolling his leadership and Iraq's achievements under his leadership. But it also spoke of the ambitions of the large industrial powers to dominate the region and warned him that a war would spell disaster not only for Iraq but for the entire Arab world.
These powers were deliberately laying a trap for Iraq, he was told. Saddam was invited to state his precise demands on the subject of Kuwait to enable the three leaders to work for an Arab solution. Having articulated his fears, Hussein placed himself at Saddam's disposal. ‘I left Baghdad for Jordan anxious and saddened,' he wrote. ‘I was hoping to continue my activities to prevent the deterioration that has been going on ever since. Will you not respond to my call, and the call of every sincere Arab, before it is too late?'

Saddam's reply was carried to Amman by the Iraqi foreign minister on 29 September. It did not respond to the call. Saddam was prepared to take up the challenge of war because he believed, or at least he said he believed, that war would be a disaster not for Iraq but for the United States and its allies. Saddam was prepared to accept one of two solutions to the crisis: an Arab solution along the lines originally proposed by His Majesty on 3 August or an international solution along the lines he himself had proposed on 12 August, linking the question of Kuwait to the problems of Palestine and Lebanon.
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The letter contained no new ideas for breaking the deadlock. The Arab solution had effectively been rejected by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, while the international solution had been rejected by America and Britain. Hussein's letter failed to avert war, but it established his credentials as someone who had been opposed to the invasion and annexation of Kuwait from the beginning. It showed that he was a good deal tougher on Saddam than his American detractors realized.