Lion of Jordan (36 page)

Hussein agreed with Herzog's analysis of the Middle East situation. His trouble, he said, was with his friends more than with enemies. The Americans supported Nasser to the highest degree and without
reservation. They were now also supporting the Ba'th, an unstable and destructive force that would bring communism into the area. Hussein spoke with some bitterness about the Americans and returned to them at several points in the conversation. America took Jordan for granted. He had therefore decided to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, and he had just completed a successful visit to France. Hussein said that he had nothing personal against Nasser, but that Nasser was incapable of agreeing to a union of equals. He was now careful in his relations with Nasser so as not to provoke him. The Ba'th seemed to be moving on a dangerous course. They were considering a union of Syria and Iraq, and he felt that it was their plan to try to swallow up Jordan.

The more tangible part of the conversation dealt with cooperation in the security, political and economic spheres. Hussein said that he favoured cooperation and asked Herzog to make suggestions. Herzog offered to transmit regularly their assessments of the internal situation in Jordan and of military developments in other Arab countries of the Middle East. He referred in this context to the information they transmitted in 1958 on Mahmud Roussan's plot and to the contact of their head of military intelligence (his brother, Chaim Herzog) with Emil Jamian. Hussein expressed his deep gratitude for their support and for the information they had transmitted to him in the past. Herzog replied that it was vital to establish a means for regular communication about security.

Herzog proceeded to outline a plan for coordinated political action in the Middle East. He argued that America's support for Nasser was due in no small part to the absence of a coordinated initiative on the part of his opponents. If clear lines of policy were worked out between Iran, Turkey, Jordan and Israel, a new concept for the Middle East might evolve and an effective counter-balance to Nasser be created. Hussein seemed particularly impressed with this idea and proceeded to reiterate his criticism of American policy. Herzog replied that Israel could be of assistance in an effort to project a positive image of Hussein and Jordan in the US press and in Congress. Hussein remarked that the situation was growing more difficult and that he would appreciate any help that Israel could proffer. The discussion then moved on to economic issues like water, tourism and the resettlement of the Palestinian refugees. Here the discussion helped to clarify the issues in dispute without leading
to any concrete conclusions. But in the course of the conversation both sides had ample opportunity to state their basic position. Herzog emphasized Israel's commitment to the independence and integrity of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Hussein expressed his deepest admiration for Israel's achievements.

The last part of the meeting was devoted to the technicalities of establishing and maintaining regular communication. Herzog submitted that this was absolutely vital and asked Hussein to appoint two high-level representatives, one for security and military questions, and the other for political and economic questions. Hussein promised to give the matter some thought after his return home and stressed the importance of keeping their contact secret. When Herzog reached the door, he turned towards Hussein and bowed. Hussein acknowledged with a warm smile and with a wave of the hand. To Dr Herbert, who escorted him out of the residence, Hussein said that he was highly pleased with the meeting.
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On the following day Hussein paid another visit to Dr Herbert and handed him a secret code for contacting him in Amman without any risk of the message being seen or intercepted by any unauthorized persons. Hussein said that he was very pleased with the meeting and that he had been highly impressed by the presentation that had been made to him. Yaacov Herzog needed no reminding about the importance of secrecy because he was by nature an exceedingly careful, discreet and secretive man. Even in his private diary he resorted to codes, but in his official reports he took this habit to ludicrous lengths. He registered in his hotel under the pseudonym ‘Dr Davis' and referred to the other participants in the drama by elaborate code names that are not very difficult to decipher from the context. Thus Dr Herbert was ‘the lawyer'; Queen Zain was ‘the cousin'; Jordan was ‘Menashe' – a reference to one of the twelve biblical tribes of Israel; and Hussein, for some strange reason, was ‘Charles'. At the end of his thirteen-page report on the first meeting, Herzog penned the following impression:

Charles is short and stocky, effusing simultaneously warmth and nervous energy. I was struck by the apparent contradictions in his posture – maturity with leadership, levity with dignity, escapism with responsibility. The almost crushing burden of perilous leadership seemed to have caught his youth unaware. As I watched him at close quarters I recalled the description of Bernard Shaw
attributed to Chesterton: ‘I see in him two personalities and at times they come so close to each other that I had to hold my breath.' As I took my leave I said from the depth of my heart that I felt that the meeting was providential and I prayed that the Almighty would guide the unfolding contact and cooperation towards fruition. Charles seemed moved and nodded assent.
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The most extraordinary thing about this meeting between the Arab ruler and the Jewish emissary is that it took place at all. One factor that helps to explain it is Hussein's perception that the Americans were wavering in their commitment to the survival of his regime as a result of their desire to accommodate Nasser. Fear that the Americans might abandon him, made Hussein more willing to open a strategic dialogue with Israel in September 1963.
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Meir Amit, the head of military intelligence from 1961 to 1963 and director of the Mossad from 1963 to 1968, stressed the American dimension in Israel's relationship with Jordan. America was important to both Israel and Jordan. Hussein had a feeling that Israel's influence in America was decisive and that affected his attitude towards Israel. Another factor that helped Israel get closer to Hussein was that there were fewer problems and fewer conflicts in Israel's relations with Jordan than in its relations with the other neighbouring Arab states. Amit was not sure whether the word ‘liberal' was appropriate for Hussein, but he was always more open to contacts with Israel than other Arab rulers. Amit used to say that the sea was stormy and if Israel wanted to continue to swim, it had to swim under the waves. Following this precept turned the Mossad into the secret foreign ministry of the State of Israel and led to the establishment of secret links with a number of Arab states. All these links were grounded in common interests. In the case of Jordan, however, Israel was able to get right up to the top of the pyramid.
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The basic premise of Hussein's policy was that Israel was there to stay. The issue for him was how to reach accommodation and how to cooperate in the post-peace period. For him the existence of Israel was never in question and neighbourly relations with her were desirable, if not inevitable. He never harboured any illusions of fighting Israel for the sake of eliminating it. There was thus an obvious tension between his public commitment to Arab unity and to the liberation of Palestine on the one hand, and his private commitment to a peaceful resolution of the conflict over Palestine on the other. This tension did not trouble
Hussein, according to one of his close advisers. Hussein knew that Arab leaders always had two languages on Palestine: one was solely for the benefit of the public, while the other reflected their pragmatism and directed their policy. He had no difficulty making use of the same dual discourse.
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Hussein's first face-to-face encounter with an Israeli official was followed by a successful effort to re-establish himself as an Arab and an accepted leader among the Arabs. For the British ambassador this was the most significant feature of 1964: ‘After all these years in the Arab wilderness, the prophetic lineage tainted by too close links with the West, of suspect zeal in the struggle against Zion, the Old Harrovian tie like a halter round his neck, he has made a remarkable comeback.'
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This comeback was made possible by Hussein's rapproachment with Nasser. The much vaunted and much feared UAR was consigned to the scrap heap as old rivalries and old jealousies reasserted themselves between Nasser and the Ba'th parties of Syria and Iraq.
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A major realignment was taking place in the Arab world that brought Hussein and Nasser much closer together. Hussein gained unprecedented popularity in Jordan and was able to sleep more soundly in his bed at night. But in the longer term there was bound to be a political price to pay for this association. Some politicians, notably Wasfi Tall, cautioned against what they saw as the appeasement of Nasser, but their warning was disregarded by the increasingly self-confident king.

Nasser invited all the heads of Arab states to a summit meeting in Cairo on 13–17 January 1964. This was a new departure in Arab politics, with ‘unity of objectives' being replaced by the less ambitious and more inclusive slogan of ‘unity of ranks'. The new approach enabled Jordan to return to the Arab fold, and Hussein was treated by Nasser as a long-lost friend on his arrival in Cairo. One positive outcome of the summit was an agreement to put an end to inter-Arab slanging on the radio and in the press. Below the surface, however, two conflicting forces continued to turn the wheels of Arab politics: the unifying force of the conflict with Israel, and the dividing force of separate and distinctive
national interests.
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Called in part to discuss Arab counter-measures to Israel's plan to divert the headwaters of the Jordan River from their natural storage basin at the Sea of Galilee to the Negev, the summit's hidden agenda was to bolster Nasser's leadership in the Arab world following his fracture with his revolutionary allies.

The summit reached three decisions: the first was to divert water from the tributaries of the Jordan River before it entered the territory of Israel; the second was to set up a United Arab Command to deal with possible military action by Israel; and the third was to form a Palestinian entity. These decisions had far-reaching consequences for Jordan, and Hussein had misgivings about all of them, especially the last two; but, for the sake of his new friendship with Nasser, which enhanced his popularity at home and his legitimacy in the Arab world, he went along with them. The decision on water was the least threatening. It was the result of Nasser's efforts to isolate Syria and to prevent it from undertaking independent military action that risked embroiling the Arab states in a war with Israel for which he knew they were not ready. In 1955 the American envoy, Eric Johnston, presented a plan for distributing the water of the Jordan River and its tributaries. Israel was allocated 40 per cent of the water and the remaining 60 per cent was to go to Lebanon, Syria and Jordan, with Jordan getting the largest share. The Arab states adhered to their respective quotas but refrained from adopting the plan officially because it implied recognition of the State of Israel. Hussein could live with the summit decision because it did not entail military action and because only the upper tributaries in Lebanon and Syria were to be diverted, not the ones in Jordan. The decision also dovetailed with Jordan's development plan and opened up the prospect of Arab funding for the Jordanian irrigation scheme. The second decision, to set up a United Arab Command, was not welcome because it involved subordination to an overall Egyptian commander, dependence on unreliable external powers and the presence of foreign troops on Jordanian soil. Taken together, these two decisions increased the risk of an armed confrontation between the Arab states and Israel.

But the summit decision with the most profound significance for Jordan was the one that led to the establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The announcement spoke vaguely of ‘organizing the Palestinian Arab people to enable it to play its role in liberating
its country and determining its future', but the challenge to Jordan was unmistakable. Whereas the United Arab Command threatened to impair Jordan's independence in the making of foreign policy, the PLO threatened to undermine the very foundations of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan by claiming to represent its Palestinian population. The magnitude of the challenge can be gauged from the fact that, as stated earlier, two thirds of Jordan's population at this time were Palestinians. Ever since the merger of the West Bank with the kingdom in 1950, the Hashemite regime strove to integrate the Palestinians into Jordanian society and insisted that the population on both banks constituted one indivisible people. The guiding principle of the regime was to oppose the emergence of a separate Palestinian identity and to resist the formation of a separate Palestinian power base. This was reflected in the slogan of the regime: ‘Jordan is Palestine and Palestine is Jordan'.

In line with this policy, Hussein resisted earlier proposals made by Iraq, Syria and Egypt in the Arab League for the creation of a Palestinian entity.
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These took various forms but they were all intended to encourage Palestinian separatism by allowing them to have their own representatives to international forums. The government of Jordan, by contrast, had always insisted that it alone spoke officially for the Palestinians within its borders. At the Cairo conference, however, Hussein modified this long-held position by going along with the collective decision to create a new Palestinian entity. A compromise was reached whereby the UAR and other Arab governments agreed that a revived Palestinian entity, though it would be institutionalized, would not challenge Jordan's sovereignty over West Jordan.

Going along with this compromise was a serious mistake. It could be argued that the PLO was created not to take the West Bank from Jordan but to liberate Palestine from Israel; the real target was Israel, not Jordan. On the other hand, the West Bank was part of Palestine; the PLO was bound to want to include it in its sphere of operations and make a bid for the loyalty of its inhabitants. So in the long term the PLO posed more of a threat to Jordan than to Israel. As Asher Susser has noted, ‘There was a fundamental incompatibility between the PLO's ambition to exercise authority and patronage over the Palestinian population, the majority of whom were in Jordan, and the demand of the regime for complete sovereign authority over the territory of the Kingdom and its citizens.'
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At Cairo, Hussein took his first steps on the slippery path that
was to lead to war with Israel in 1967, to the loss of the West Bank, and to the civil war on the East Bank in September 1970.