Licensed to Kill (14 page)

Deborah Avant, a political science professor and director of the Institute for Global and International Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, is less critical than Singer but is still concerned that the increased employment of PSCs encourages the growth of an industry that can provide the tools of war in exchange for the payment of money rather than the blessing of the citizenry. In her opinion, the major issue created by the hiring of private security companies is that the ones who hire the companies decide who gets to use force.

Avant sees the growth in the private sector as expected and normal, but she sees a dark cloud ahead. “It [the use of contractors] shifts authority from the Congress to the Executive.” Where Congress would have to have a full vote on and an appropriation of funds for any military action, an aggressive executive branch could dip into a variety of sources to subsidize a small force of contractors. Avant is aware of the written and unwritten checks and balances of corporations doing business with the government, but she is concerned that private providers of security can operate well outside of the media radar, and thus without the knowledge of the U.S. taxpayers or the majority of Congress. “It erodes transparency by putting so much information in so many different areas. Troops get covered about five times more than contractors,” she notes.

There is much discussion over just how far security companies will expand in services. One of the fears is that these companies could morph into offensive organizations, effectively becoming proxy armies or mercenaries. As it stands now, security contractors serve a wide variety of functions in the war zone, with the primary constraint being that they can serve only in a defensive capability. If a private security contractor were assigned the offensive duties of a regular soldier, that fine line between contractor and mercenary would be breached, and the PSC managing the contractor would have to begin identifying itself instead as a PMC—a private military company, the euphemism for a provider of mercenary services.

In Iraq today, probably their most visible and risky role comes in providing security escorts, particularly along the deadly Route Irish running to and from Baghdad International Airport (BIAP). Like Roman gladiators stepping out to do battle every day, a handful of SUVs representing a variety of companies can always be found waiting at the airport to drive their incoming passengers the short but deadly distance into Baghdad. They roll at high speeds, firing their weapons to keep other cars away, treating everything along the way as if it could be a VBIED, aka vehicle-borne improvised explosive device, aka suicide car bomber. The statistics showing the frequency of attacks along the appropriately nicknamed “IED Alley” justifies their aggressive driving manner. In addition to ensuring safe transit for everything from a carload of journalists, diplomats, or businessmen to a truckload of kitchen equipment or construction supplies, private contractors also provide static security for embassies, oil pipelines, government buildings, and other critical infrastructure. Security contractors train Iraqi soldiers and police, perform intelligence gathering, mount aerial surveillance, and handle bomb-sniffing canines. Even if they may not be technically working on behalf of the U.S. military in many of these roles, Deborah Avant says security contractors have become legitimate targets for insurgent attacks because they perform roles in support of the U.S. mission and ensure the presence of U.S.-appointed political figures and corporations.

During Blackwater's highly visible contract protecting Bremer, insurgents were reportedly offering a $30,000 bounty for the life of any one of the Blackwater bodyguards. Not only did these contractors have to operate with full knowledge of a sizable bounty on their heads, but they also knew that the man they were tasked with protecting represented the highest-value target available in the war zone. Some estimates put the price on Bremer's life as high as $45 million.

To the blossoming insurgency, Paul Bremer represented a singular symbol of unwanted Western occupation, and Blackwater had to keep this in mind when determining the level of manpower and firepower required to ensure his safety. Jay Garner initially only had a small contingent of soldiers from the Florida National Guard as protectors, but the rapidly deteriorating conditions and Bremer's insistence on moving around the country meant that he needed something significantly more substantial. Erik Prince and Blackwater were tasked to come up with a unique solution using funds from an existing DynCorp State Department contract. And so, the famous Bremer Detail—a fast-moving contingent of hired guns backed by massive firepower—was created.

DynCorp already possessed a contract to provide security for State Department needs worldwide—including guarding diplomatic installations and Afghan president Hamid Karzai—but subcontracted out the Iraq domain to Blackwater. Although the cost for Bremer's praetorian guard was never advertised, a few months after they won the job, on August 24, 2003, a separate contract for $21.3 million was awarded to Blackwater. In a good example of how new companies are formed to fill a contract in this PSC boom, a new division, Blackwater Security Consulting LLC, was registered with the North Carolina secretary of state one month later.

Blackwater's Bremer detail initially comprised thirty-six independent security contractors, a fleet of SUVs, two bomb-sniffing canine teams with handlers, four pilots, four aerial gunners, a ground crew, and three Boeing MD-530 “Little Bird” helicopters. Later, Blackwater would supplement the team with three armored Mamba trucks with swivel mounts for PKM machine guns, a Saracen armored carrier, and a CASA 212 for transport. The detail made an impressive show of force, and purposefully so, because its conduct was regulated by the State Department's rules of engagement for a personal security detail. A PSD most importantly functions as a deterrent against attack, and if hit, they are authorized to engage the assailants only until the VIP is “off the X,” or evacuated away from the scene. Although many in the left-wing press call this group of armed ex-soldiers and ex-cops “mercenaries,” the government agencies consider them well-armed security guards. Either way, Blackwater was essentially fielding a small private militia, and for the first time in history, Paul Bremer, a civilian contractor, protected by a small army of private security contractors, was running an occupied country.

On Rules and Resentment

Ambassador Paul Bremer, an independent contractor assuming the position of proconsul, arrived in Iraq in May 2003 with supreme authority to make sweeping changes and radical reforms to post-Saddam Iraq. A retired but seasoned diplomat, Bremer had been hired away from his position as CEO of Marsh Crisis Consulting, a company that had been formed by Marsh and McLennan Companies after nearly three hundred of their employees died in the World Trade Center.

Bremer may have been touted as a good choice for his diplomatic style, but his strong hand and seemingly unlimited power angered many Iraqis. He was widely viewed as a new dictator squandering Iraqi oil revenue on corrupt and wasteful foreigners from the same palaces where Saddam had squandered Iraqi oil revenue on his own corrupt and wasteful programs. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) itself reeked of Orwellian Newspeak. The “coalition” was essentially America, the effort seemed more permanent than provisional, and the chaos in Iraq offered proof that it had no authority.

The CPA did seem to create an ancient form of mercantile company. The United States had invaded the sovereign state of Iraq, deposed its ruler, vanquished its army, and seized control of its treasury. They then installed essentially a business manager who released dicta designed to encourage commerce between coalition countries and the instantly created industry of “rebuilding Iraq.” Although war-profiteering is generally frowned upon, the CPA made no effort to mask the lucrative opportunity it was trying to create for corporate interests. Economic shock therapy and all-powerful market forces were expected to quickly set Iraq on a course for success. To get started, Bremer would just need a big piggy bank—the newly minted Development Fund for Iraq—to fund all the corporations who were positioned to help with and/or earn a profit from the coalition's professed selfless act of liberation and reconstruction.

On March 20, 2003, President Bush had signed Executive Order 13290 allowing confiscation of Iraqi property in the United States and funds in American banks. On May 22, UN Resolution 1483 outlined the responsibilities of the occupying powers “to promote the welfare of the Iraqi people through the effective administration of the territory…,” and to that end allowed that 95 percent of the income from petroleum export sales be diverted into the new Development Fund for Iraq—a shift over from the questionable UN Oil for Food program that had been designed to prevent Saddam from looting the income for his own purposes. The first CPA regulation Bremer issued after arriving in Baghdad established the legal basis of the CPA with him as administrator, and Regulation Number Two made him the sole comptroller of the Development Fund for Iraq.

For other early official acts as head of the CPA, Bremer issued Order 1, beginning the de-Baathification of Iraqi society. This banned all Baath party members from any “positions of authority and responsibility in Iraqi society,” effectively ostracizing 10 percent of the Iraqi population or between 1.5 and 2.5 million people. Order 2 disbanded the Iraqi Army and several Iraqi ministries, essentially cutting off employment or income for over four hundred thousand Iraqis. These two orders essentially created a pool of unemployed potential foot soldiers or suicide bomb fodder for the opponents of the occupation, and Order 19 and Order 14 handed them a propaganda victory they could use as a recruiting tool. Order 19 defined the legally permissible freedom of assembly and placed restrictions on the Iraqis' right to protest, and Order 14 outlined the limitations on their newfound freedom of the press. Neither of these orders were particularly unreasonable, but they did help the budding insurgency make the case that American rhetoric of freedom and democracy was little more than an elixir to lull the Iraqi people into complacency over the invasion of their country.

Further, as Bremer's numerous edicts continued with a clear slant to mercantile benefit rather than humanitarian assistance, they exacerbated the domestic paranoia that the United States had invaded the country to steal its oil and money. Even if these measures were taken with the best of intentions, to give economic shock therapy to an inarguably stagnant economy, they were not perceived as thus by the general population. Baath party assets and businesses were seized, 100 percent foreign ownership and repatriation of profits were allowed, forty-year contracts intended to ensure that any ventures created under U.S. occupation would endure, the banking system was privatized, a flat tax of 15 percent was created, excise and duties were abolished. All of these orders were issued in English with the Arabic translation lagging behind, underscoring the growing impression that the American occupier was taking control of the country for its own selfish purposes.

In the early months of Bremer's tenure as proconsul, the Iraqi people only saw marginal improvement in their economic status and way of life. As the desperate times dragged on, resentment grew, and so did the insurgency. To add another point of tension to the already-delicate situation, the expanding reconstruction was increasing the presence of well-armed but nonmilitary men. Their ubiquitous and highly visible security convoys drove aggressively, pushing uncooperative cars out of the way or firing shots to disable them or their drivers. No one maintains any kind of statistics on how many civilians have been injured or killed by security contractors, but anecdotal evidence from the many conversations I have had with ICs on this subject indicates that it is not an insignificant number. Even so, at the date of this writing in early 2006, no private security contractors have yet suffered legal consequences for causing any collateral damage in Iraq.

In one incident related to me by a contractor who witnessed it, the driver of a Ford F-250 “bump truck” in a security convoy drove right over the top of a small car carrying an Iraqi family while maneuvering to escape a potentially dangerous situation. In the aftermath, the car looked fairly well crushed, but the contractor has no idea if the family lived or died since the convoy fled the scene. The incident was not reported at the time, and the driver of the truck was never investigated or disciplined for the action. The contractor who witnessed the incident wanted to report it to appropriate authorities but felt he would have jeopardized his own job by doing so.

Bush had opened up the War on Terror by issuing a license to kill with his post-9/11 presidential finding authorizing targeted assassination, but it would be Bremer's Order 17 that would really unleash the security contractors in Iraq. The relevant clause of Order 17 states: “Contractors shall be immune from Iraqi legal process with respect to acts performed by them pursuant to the terms and conditions of a Contract or any subcontract thereto. Nothing in this provision shall prohibit MNF Personnel [Coalition forces] from preventing acts of serious misconduct by Contractors, or otherwise temporarily detaining any Contractors who pose a risk of injury to themselves or others, pending expeditious turnover to the appropriate authorities of the Sending State. In all such circumstances, the appropriate senior representative of the Contractor's Sending State in Iraq shall be notified.” In commoner's English, this means that the Iraqi legal system would have no jurisdiction to prosecute a contractor, even for a charge as serious as murder, if the incident occurred while he was on the job.

The appropriate process is supposed to be for the contractor to be repatriated and tried for any alleged offenses in his home country. That sounds like a reasonable solution, considering the state of the Iraqi justice system, but it just doesn't actually happen in practice. Considering the impression I have gotten from contractors with extensive experience in Iraq about the frequency of accidental civilian casualties at the hands of contractors, it is amazing to me that not a single security contractor—and by that I strictly refer to the independent contractors employed in a security position by a PSC—has come under criminal investigation for any offense.