Let's Sell These People a Piece of Blue Sky: Hubbard, Dianetics and Scientology (17 page)

In his summary, Hubbard again sang the praises of Lieutenant
Kroepke of the
SC 536
. He criticized the commanding officers of the
blimps for their lack of knowledge of anti-submarine warfare. Hubbard concluded
his report with the claim that the
PC 815
had completely immobilized one
Japanese submarine, and severely damaged a second.

Another officer, Ensign Walker, mentioned only one submarine
in his report. Moulton confirmed Hubbard's report, both at the time, and 40
years later in court. Admiral Fletcher was not impressed. In his comment on the
report of June 8, 1943, he said:

SC's 536 and 537, CGC's
BONHAM
and 78302, and
blimps K-33 and K-39 engaged in this submarine search. Reports have been
received from the Commanding Officer of each of these ships in writing and in
personal interviews. An oral report has also been received from Lieutenant
Commander E.J. Sullivan, U.S.N., Commander Airship Squadron 33, who made a trip
to the area during the search on one of the blimps ... There is a known
magnetic deposit in the area in which depth charges were dropped...

An analysis of all reports convinces me that there was
no submarine in the area. Lieutenant Commander Sullivan states that he was
unable to obtain any evidence of a submarine except one bubble of air which is
unexplained except by turbulence of water due to a depth charge explosion. The
Commanding Officers of all ships except the PC 815 state they had no evidence
of a submarine and do not think a submarine was in the area.

It seems that at the time Hubbard managed to win his crew
over into believing they had disabled two submarines. They certainly believed
in him. One of the reports submitted by the crew included this statement: “But
above all the crew, each and every man looks up to and respects the captain, L.
Ron Hubbard and everything in every way that the men should respect a leader
[sic] And I might add that the crew thinks that he is one of the best leaders
of any ship afloat.” And in court Moulton said of Hubbard: “He ran a very
competent, extremely competent attack throughout the thing. He did a very fine
job.”

Hubbard's report, written before Admiral Fletcher had
interviewed anyone, was defensive from the start. His statements about those
who disagreed with him are interesting: he criticized the very officers who
were to deny the submarines' existence. For someone who claimed to have slept
during his only course in Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), and had not seen action
previously, Hubbard's comments about the other commanders' inadequate knowledge
of ASW were distinctly high-handed.

On June 28, the PC 815 put to sea once more for training
exercises. At Hubbard's order, she fired three practice rounds from her 3-inch
gun in the direction of Los Coronados Islands. Hubbard had anchored in Mexican
waters, and the islands were Mexican territory. Within two days a Board of
Investigation was underway. On July 7 a fitness report on Hubbard was written
by Rear Admiral Braisted, Commander Fleet Operational Training Command,
Pacific. In the “Remarks” section, the Rear Admiral said: “Consider this
officer lacking in the essential qualities of judgment, leadership and
cooperation. He acts without forethought as to probable results. He is believed
to have been sincere in his efforts to make his ship efficient and ready. Not
considered qualified for command or promotion at this time. Recommend duty on a
large vessel where he can be properly supervised.”

As we have seen, this observation about Hubbard's need for
supervision had been made by the US Naval Attaché in Australia and by the
Commandant of the Boston Navy Yard. This time it was heeded, and Hubbard did
not receive another command.

On July 15, 1943, Rear Admiral Braisted wrote a “letter of
admonition” to Hubbard and for the record. On the same day, Hubbard complained
of epigastric pain and was put on the sick list in San Diego. In his private
papers Hubbard later admitted that his illness was a way of avoiding
discipline. He was under observation for nine days for malaria, which he
claimed to have suffered from sixteen months before, in a “combat area,”
according to a doctor's report of Hubbard's statement at the time. Malaria was
not diagnosed at this time, nor does any diagnosis of malaria appear anywhere
in Hubbard's extensive Navy and Veterans Administration medical files, despite
his repeated complaints of the symptoms.

Hubbard was on the sick list for a total of 77 days,
suffering, it was finally decided, from a duodenal ulcer. At the end of this
period, in October 1943, he asked to be ordered to landing vessels, attaching a
list of his qualifications to the request which included the command three
expeditions, and a puffed-up account of his brief spell with the Marine Reserve
at George Washington University. He also attached a statement seeking to
justify the shelling of the Coronados, saying that most of the crew of the PC
815 had asked to return to his command. He claimed to have been given
permission to fire at his own discretion, and complained that other vessels had
not been censured for anchoring off the Coronados. Hubbard added, pathetically,
that although he knew that he was in the grip of a throat infection at the
time, this could not excuse his error.

This cautious statement failed to impress. Following the PC
815 fiasco, it was a year before Hubbard put to sea again. In early December
1943, he was assigned to fitting out and training the crew of the
USS Algol
,
in Portland. In July 1944, when the
Algol
was commissioned, Hubbard was
posted as the “Navigation and Training Officer” aboard the ship, an Attack
Cargo Auxiliary Vessel. The
Algol
followed the same initial route as the
PC 815 south from Portland, but docked at Oakland, after training exercises. On
Wednesday, September 27, at 4.30 p(r)m(r), the Deck Log of the
Algol
shows that the “navigating officer reported to the OOD [Officer of the Deck]
that an attempt at sabotage had been made sometime between 1530-1600. A coke
bottle filled with gasoline with a cloth wick inserted had been concealed among
cargo which was to be hoisted aboard and stored in No. 1 hold.”

 The log is signed by the navigating officer, L. Ron
Hubbard. The FBI and Navy Intelligence were called in to investigate.

The next day's log records a dispatch received at “2214” on
the night of the incident, confirming earlier orders for Hubbard to leave ship.
The
Algol
put to sea six days later. It was to play a part in the
Okinawa invasion, and by the end of the war had won two battle stars. Hubbard
remained safe ashore. He later claimed that the title role in “Mr. Roberts” was
based on his experiences aboard ship, with Hubbard’s part taken by Henry Fonda.
His Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Commander Axton T. Jones (upon whom Hubbard
was later to claim the vicious James Cagney character was based), did give
Hubbard a generally favorable Fitness Report, but remarked: “Lieutenant Hubbard
is a capable and energetic officer, but is very temperamental and often has his
feelings hurt. He is an above average navigator and is to be trusted. This
officer is of excellent personal and military character. Recommended for
promotion when due.”

Hubbard responded to a general Navy request for applicants
“for intensive training with eventual assignment to foreign duty as civil affairs
officers in occupied areas.”
³³
Commander Jones had earlier approved
Hubbard's request for appointment to the School of Military Government. In his
application, Hubbard had claimed that he was a trained civil engineer with a
knowledge of Spanish, Japanese, Pekin and Shanghai Pidgin, Tagalog and
Chamorro. He also claimed an understanding of the social psychology of the
peoples of the Philippines, North China and Japan. Hubbard was one of hundreds
of officers who did a three month course in “Military Government” at Princeton.
However, his later claims to have studied at Princeton University are
misleading. During the War the US Navy had a training establishment on the
campus at Princeton, which was not part of the University.

It seems likely that Hubbard was in training for the
anticipated post-war occupation of Japan. By his own admission, he failed the
examination for overseas posting and became depressed as a consequence. In
April 1945, Hubbard's duodenal ulcer flared up, and he spent the next seven
months on the sick-list, largely as a patient in Oak Knoll Hospital, Oakland,
California.

N.B. this chapter is largely drawn from Hubbard's Navy and
Veterans Administration records and from sworn testimony.

1.
   
Hubbard Navy records.

2.
   
ibid
.

3.
   
The
Auditor
no.63
.

4.
   
“Field Staff Member” magazine, vol.1, no.1.

5.
   
see 3

6.
   
Flag Divisional Directive 69RA “Facts about Hubbard Things You Should
Know”, 8 March 1974, revised 7 April 1974.

7.
   
Hubbard,
Mission into Time.

8.
   
ibid
.

9.
   
Flag Operations and Liaison Office East US letter to National Personnel
Records Center, 28 May 1974. From Hubbard Navy records.

10.
 
The Auditor
no.63; “LRH's autobiographical notes for Peter
Tompkins”, 6 June 1972.

11.
 
Hubbard
Navy records.

12.
 
in
CSC v. Armstrong vol.22, p.3950.

13.
 
in
CSC v. Armstrong vol.22, pp.3905, 3953-7.

14.
 
Moulton
expressed the opinion that Hubbard was a “very honest person.” (vol.22, p.3950)
Later during the case, Kima Douglas, Hubbard's personal “Medical Officer” from
1975 to 1980 (vol.25, p.4434-5), was asked by the Judge if Hubbard had any
bullet wounds in his back. Her reply was succinct: “No, sir.” (vol.25, p.4459).

15.
 
“An
interview granted to the Australian Press on January 10th 1963 at Saint Hill
Manor ... by L. Ron Hubbard”.

16.
 
“
Field
Staff Member
” magazine, vol.1, no.1.

17.
 
Hubbard,
Mission into Time.

18.
 
see
16

19.
 
Hubbard,
Veterans Administration records.

20.
 
ibid
.

21.
 
“A
brief biography of Hubbard - originally printed circa 1960”.

22.
 
Hubbard
Navy file, 28 October 1942.

23.
 
see
also letters in Hubbard Navy records from Ryders and Dave Margolis.

24.
 
Hubbard
lecture “Study: Evaluation of Information”, 11 August 1964 (Study tape no.5,
transcript p.65)

25.
 
Flag
Divisional Directive 69RA.

26.
 
Moulton
in CSC v. Armstrong vol.22, pp.3907-9.

27.
 
ibid
,
p.3911.

28.
 
Hubbard
Veterans Administration records.

29.
 
Moulton
in CSC v. Armstrong, vol.22, p.3912.

30.
 
in
CSC v. Armstrong vol.24, p.4352.

31.
 
Hubbard
in Sea Org Orders of the Day, 22 October 1971.

32.
 
Hubbard
Navy records.

33.
 
Alnav
171, information bulletin October 1944.

Chapter nine

“After serving in all five theatres of
World War II and receiving 21 medals and palms he was severely wounded and was
taken crippled and blinded to Oak Knoll Naval Hospital,”

—At
least according to one of the Scientologists' accounts
²

Scientology accounts claim that Hubbard, having served in
all five theaters of World War II, and received between 21 and 27 medals and
palms, was taken “crippled and blinded” to Oak Knoll Naval Hospital.
²
Hubbard's service record presents a different picture: A man who never saw
action against the enemy, and received not 21 – or 27 – but four awards, none
for combat or wounds.

The Scientologists frequently re-issue a Hubbard article
called
My Philosophy
,
³
which reads in part:

Blinded with injured optic nerves, and lame with
physical injuries to hip and back, at the end of World War II, I faced an
almost non-existent future. My Service record states: “This officer has no
neurotic or psychotic tendencies of any kind whatsoever,” but it also states
“permanently disabled physically.”

And so there came a further blow - I was abandoned
by family and friends as a supposedly hopeless cripple and a probable burden
upon them for the rest of my days. I yet worked my way back to fitness and
strength in less than two years, using only what I knew about Man and his
relationship to the universe. I had no one to help me; what I had to know I had
to find out. And it's quite a trick studying when you cannot see.

I became used to being told it was all impossible,
that there was no way, no hope. Yet I came to see again and walk again.

This moving history was designated “Broad Public Issue” by
Hubbard, so it is well known to all Scientologists. It is a remarkable story,
reinforced by biographical sketches published by his Church. To the
Scientologist, Hubbard's miraculous recovery gives hope for his or her own
cure.

Hubbard's
My Philosophy
is not one of the
biographical statements containing “errors made by former public relations
people who have since been removed,” as a high-ranking Scientology official put
it, in 1986.
⁴
There is no doubt that it was written by Hubbard, as
the original, in his handwriting, was admitted into evidence in the Armstrong
court case.