Read Lend Me Your Ears: Great Speeches in History Online
Authors: Unknown
Lend Me Your Ears: Great Speeches in History (135 page)
The speech was effective because it was tightly organized, appealed to reason, and utilized such presentation devices as (a) the interior dialogue answering questions (“Well, now, who is at fault?”), (b) the enumeration of points to come (“Two other significant developments”), and (c) the presentation of alternatives in such a way as to lead to an inescapable conclusion (“I can order an immediate, precipitate withdrawal…. Or we can persist in our search for a just peace”). Some in the audience winced at banalities—“this would have been a popular and easy course…. It is not the easy way”—but soon recognized the evocative power of “the silent majority.”
That phrase had been used a few months before by Vice-President Agnew, and nobody picked it up; it had been used often in history, usually in reference to the dead. Nixon had spoken of “the silent center” in his 1968 campaign, and had no idea his “silent majority” would be seized upon to encapsulate the “us” against the minority “them.” He was sensitive to memorable phrases; a policy enunciated on the island of Guam was being called “the Guam Doctrine,” but nobody elected Guam, and in this speech he straightened that out with “what has been described as the Nixon Doctrine.” When I asked him afterward whether he knew he was launching a big phrase with “the silent majority,” he said, “If I thought it would be picked up, I would have capitalized it in the text.”
***
GOOD EVENING, MY
fellow Americans:
Tonight I want to talk to you on a subject of deep concern to all Americans and to many people in all parts of the world—the war in Vietnam.
I believe that one of the reasons for the deep division about Vietnam is that many Americans have lost confidence in what their government has told them about our policy. The American people cannot and should not be asked to support a policy which involves the overriding issues of war and peace unless they know the truth about that policy.
Tonight, therefore, I would like to answer some of the questions that I know are on the minds of many of you listening to me.
How and why did America get involved in Vietnam in the first place?
How has this administration changed the policy of the previous administration?
What has really happened in the negotiations in Paris and on the battlefront in Vietnam?
What choices do we have if we are to end the war?
What are the prospects for peace?
Now, let me begin by describing the situation I found when I was inaugurated on January 20.
• The war had been going on for four years.
• 31,000 Americans had been killed in action.
• The training program for the South Vietnamese was behind schedule.
• 540,000 Americans were in Vietnam with no plans to reduce the number.
• No progress had been made at the negotiations in Paris, and the United States had not put forth a comprehensive peace proposal.
• The war was causing deep division at home and criticism from many of our friends as well as our enemies abroad.
In view of these circumstances, there were some who urged that I end the war at once by ordering the immediate withdrawal of all American forces.
From a political standpoint this would have been a popular and easy course to follow. After all, we became involved in the war while my predecessor was in office. I could blame the defeat which would be the result of my action on him and come out as the peacemaker. Some put it to me quite bluntly: this was the only way to avoid allowing Johnson’s war to become Nixon’s war.
But I had a greater obligation than to think only of the years of my administration and of the next election. I had to think of the effect of my decision on the next generation and on the future of peace and freedom in America and in the world.
Let us all understand that the question before us is not whether some Americans are for peace and some Americans are against peace. The question at issue is not whether Johnson’s war becomes Nixon’s war.
The great question is, How can we win America’s peace?
Well, let us turn now to the fundamental issue. Why and how did the United States become involved in Vietnam in the first place?
Fifteen years ago, North Vietnam, with the logistical support of Communist China and the Soviet Union, launched a campaign to impose a Communist government on South Vietnam by instigating and supporting a revolution.
In response to the request of the government of South Vietnam, President Eisenhower sent economic aid and military equipment to assist the people of South Vietnam in their efforts to prevent a Communist takeover. Seven years ago, President Kennedy sent sixteen thousand military personnel to Vietnam as combat advisers. Four years ago, President Johnson sent American combat forces to South Vietnam.
Now, many believe that President Johnson’s decision to send American combat forces to South Vietnam was wrong. And many others—I among them—have been strongly critical of the way the war has been conducted.
But the question facing us today is, Now that we are in the war, what is the best way to end it?
In January, I could only conclude that the precipitate withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam would be a disaster not only for South Vietnam but for the United States and for the cause of peace.
For the South Vietnamese, our precipitate withdrawal would inevitably allow the Communists to repeat the massacres which followed their takeover in the North fifteen years before.
• They then murdered more than fifty thousand people and hundreds of thousands more died in slave labor camps.
• We saw a prelude of what would happen in South Vietnam when the Communists entered the city of Hue last year. During their brief rule there, there was a bloody reign of terror in which three thousand civilians were clubbed, shot to death, and buried in mass graves.
• With the sudden collapse of our support, these atrocities of Hue would become the nightmare of the entire nation—and particularly
for the million and a half Catholic refugees who fled to South Vietnam when the Communists took over in the North.
For the United States, this first defeat in our nation’s history would result in a collapse of confidence in American leadership, not only in Asia but throughout the world.
Three American presidents have recognized the great stakes involved in Vietnam and understood what had to be done.
In 1963, President Kennedy, with his characteristic eloquence and clarity, said, “We want to see a stable government there, carrying on a struggle to maintain its national independence. We believe strongly in that. We are not going to withdraw from that effort. In my opinion, for us to withdraw from that effort would mean a collapse not only of South Vietnam but Southeast Asia. So we are going to stay there.”
President Eisenhower and President Johnson expressed the same conclusion during their terms of office.
For the future of peace, precipitate withdrawal would thus be a disaster of immense magnitude.
• A nation cannot remain great if it betrays its allies and lets down its friends.
• Our defeat and humiliation in South Vietnam without question would promote recklessness in the councils of those great powers who have not yet abandoned their goals of world conquest.
• This would spark violence wherever our commitments help maintain the peace—in the Middle East, in Berlin, eventually even in the Western Hemisphere.
Ultimately, this would cost more lives. It would not bring peace; it would bring more war.
For these reasons, I rejected the recommendation that I should end the war by immediately withdrawing all of our forces. I chose instead to change American policy on both the negotiating front and battlefront.
In order to end a war fought on many fronts, I initiated a pursuit for peace on many fronts.
In a television speech on May 14, in a speech before the United Nations, and on a number of other occasions I set forth our peace proposals in great detail.
• We have offered the complete withdrawal of all outside forces within 1 year.
• We have proposed a cease-fire under international supervision.
• We have offered free elections under international supervision with the Communists participating in the organization and conduct of the elections as an organized political force. And the Saigon government has pledged to accept the result of the elections.
We have not put forth our proposals on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. We have indicated that we are willing to discuss the proposals that have been put forth by the other side. We have declared that anything is negotiable except the right of the people of South Vietnam to determine their own future. At the Paris peace conference, Ambassador Lodge has demonstrated our flexibility and good faith in forty public meetings.
Hanoi has refused even to discuss our proposals. They demand our unconditional acceptance of their terms, which are that we withdraw all American forces immediately and unconditionally and that we overthrow the government of South Vietnam as we leave.
We have not limited our peace initiatives to public forums and public statements. I recognized, in January, that a long and bitter war like this usually cannot be settled in a public forum. That is why in addition to the public statements and negotiations I have explored every possible private avenue that might lead to a settlement.
Tonight I am taking the unprecedented step of disclosing to you some of our other initiatives for peace—initiatives we undertook privately and secretly because we thought we thereby might open a door, which publicly would be closed.
I did not wait for my inauguration to begin my quest for peace.
• Soon after my election, through an individual who is directly in contact on a personal basis with the leaders of North Vietnam, I made two private offers for a rapid, comprehensive settlement. Hanoi’s replies called in effect for our surrender before negotiations.
• Since the Soviet Union furnishes most of the military equipment for North Vietnam, Secretary of State Rogers, my assistant for national security affairs, Dr. Kissinger, Ambassador Lodge, and I, personally, have met on a number of occasions with representatives of the Soviet government to enlist their assistance in getting meaningful negotiations started. In addition, we have had extended discussions directed toward that same end with representatives of other governments which have diplomatic relations with North Vietnam. None of these initiatives have to date produced results.
• In mid-July, I became convinced that it was necessary to make a major move to break the deadlock in the Paris talks. I spoke directly in this office, where I am now sitting, with an individual who had known Ho Chi Minh [president, Democratic Republic of Vietnam] on a personal basis for twenty-five years. Through him, I sent a letter to Ho Chi Minh.
I did this outside of the usual diplomatic channels with the hope that with the necessity of making statements for propaganda removed, there might be constructive progress toward bringing the war to an end. Let me read from that letter to you now.
Dear Mr. President:
I realize that it is difficult to communicate meaningfully across the gulf of four years of war. But precisely because of this gulf, I wanted to take this opportunity to reaffirm in all solemnity my desire to work for a just peace. I deeply believe that the war in Vietnam has gone on too long and delay in bringing it to an end can benefit no one—least of all the people of Vietnam….
The time has come to move forward at the conference table toward an early resolution of this tragic war. You will find us forthcoming and open-minded in a common effort to bring the blessings of peace to the brave people of Vietnam. Let history record that at this critical juncture, both sides turned their face toward peace rather than toward conflict and war.
I received Ho Chi Minh’s reply on August 30, three days before his death. It simply reiterated the public position North Vietnam had taken at Paris and flatly rejected my initiative.
The full text of both letters is being released to the press.
• In addition to the public meetings that I have referred to, Ambassador Lodge has met with Vietnam’s chief negotiator in Paris in eleven private sessions.
• We have taken other significant initiatives which must remain secret to keep open some channels of communication which may still prove to be productive.
But the effect of all the public, private, and secret negotiations which have been undertaken since the bombing halt a year ago and since this administration came into office on January 20, can be summed up in one sentence: no progress whatever has been made except agreement on the shape of the bargaining table.
Well now, who is at fault?
It has become clear that the obstacle in negotiating an end to the war is not the president of the United States. It is not the South Vietnamese government.
The obstacle is the other side’s absolute refusal to show the least willingness to join us in seeking a just peace. And it will not do so while it is convinced that all it has to do is to wait for our next concession, and our next concession after that one, until it gets everything it wants.
There can now be no longer any question that progress in negotiation depends only on Hanoi’s deciding to negotiate, to negotiate seriously.
I realize that this report on our efforts on the diplomatic front is discouraging to the American people, but the American people are entitled to know the truth—the bad news as well as the good news—where the lives of our young men are involved.
Now let me turn, however, to a more encouraging report on another front.
At the time we launched our search for peace, I recognized we might not succeed in bringing an end to the war through negotiation. I therefore put into effect another plan to bring peace—a plan which will bring the war to an end regardless of what happens on the negotiating front.
It is in line with a major shift in U.S. foreign policy which I described in my press conference at Guam on July 25. Let me briefly explain what has been described as the Nixon Doctrine—a policy which not only will help end the war in Vietnam but which is an essential element of our program to prevent future Vietnams.
