Legio XVII: Roman Legion at War (12 page)

It appeared to Marcellus that the
Insubres
were not planning to actually besiege
Clastidium
, but rather merely threaten to do so, to draw the Romans away from
Acerrae
and then meet them in battle.  His scouts estimated the
Insubres
force at about 30,000.  Their leaders were
Viridomarus
[vere-e-doe-MAR-us], a
Gaesatae
, and Britomartus [bre-toe-MAR-us], an
Insubres
.

Scouts noted that the ground at
Clastidium
was firm ~ no rain had fallen in weeks; the forest had been cleared within a mile of
Clastidium
and the ground was relatively flat.  There was one commanding hill about 500 yards south of the fort and it was occupied and fortified by strong Gallic forces.  The Roman fort was not under any imminent threat and had enough supplies to withstand a lengthy siege if one was initiated by the
Insubres
.

The enemy continued to employ the Gallic slashing sword and small round disk shield while wearing minimal body armor.  The exception was the Chieftain Viridomarus who wore exquisitely crafted body armor that appeared to be made of gold, silver, and precious stones.  The scouts also noted that he appeared to wear what looked like a flexible metal shirt under the armor, but they could not see it well enough to provide further details.

The scouts told Marcellus that the individual enemy soldiers appeared unruly, undisciplined, and untrained except for the
Gaesatae
.  They reported seeing fighting within the Gallic camp and deserters slipping away.  Despite these negative reports, Marcellus knew the enemy was fierce, inured to hardship, motivated, and would be fighting on his turf for his homeland.  Defeating them would not be easy.

Viridomarus also had his cavalry scout spying on the Romans.  He felt the Romans would most likely abandon the siege at
Acerrae
once he threatened
Clastidium
.  He planned to resupply the fort at
Acerrae
as soon as the Romans were out of the area.  If the Romans left a detachment at the fort to hinder the resupply, he felt his forces would easily overpower them.

He knew the approximate strength of the Roman army and knew he had about a 2 to 1 advantage.  But he also knew the individual Roman Legionaire was not to be underestimated.  He envied their training, discipline, body armor, and weapons.  He had met them before at
Telamon
three years ago and had witnessed firsthand the power of the Roman
pila
, the effectiveness of their short thrusting sword, the strength of their large protective shield, and their all encompassing personal body armor.  He survived
Telamon
by mounting a loose horse and riding away before the army was totally defeated.

Viridomarus knew he would have to plan the coming battle carefully and lamented the lack of training and discipline of his army.  He knew they would revolt if he tried to institute the Roman method of rotating front line fighters or even to attack in lines like the Romans.  They were too wild and independent for that kind of fighting discipline.  No, he reasoned they would attack as a mob as they always did and trust that their individual valor and ferocity would win the day.

His men were good fighters, but that was all.  They refused to observe the most basic rules of society.  They were by nature violent and cruel.  They were totally out of place among the normal populace, but fit in well with others of their ilk.  They knew, understood, and could instinctively follow the rule of violent, smash and grab behavior whether on the battlefield or in camp.  In towns and villages they were as out of place as a normal villager would be in his army.

He had heard of both Marcellus and Scipio and knew they were competent commanders.  In the back of his mind, he began to doubt a Gallic victory.  Then he remembered that in Gallic culture once the opposing leader was killed, the troops generally lost heart and their organization fell apart. Perhaps, he could seek out one of the Consuls and kill him in hand-to-hand combat and thus break the morale of the Roman Army.

Viridomarus now had his plan and decided to make his move.  He dispatched wagons full of food destined for
Acerrae
, but instructed them to swing wide around the entrenched Roman Army and wait until the Romans were at least a day’s march out before bringing the wagons to the fort.  As best he could, he organized his forces into three large groups of 10,000 each.

He then moved this unwieldy host to the area of the fortified hill, which was south of the Roman fort, and would serve as his command post.  He put one group in the center with the hill to their immediate rear and the other two groups to the left and right of the center and a little forward of it.  Gallic culture would not allow a reserve force.  It would be a dishonor not to be first to fight the enemy.  He had to commit everyone at the same time.  His half moon formation allowed everyone to attack simultaneously and just might engulf the Romans in a deadly envelopment.  He personally would use the height of the hill to look for one of the Consuls to fight.

He knew these moves would be spotted immediately by the Roman scouts, but it did not matter.  There was nothing to do now but wait for the Romans.  To quicken the passage of time and maintain morale, he ordered large quantities of food and wine be taken from the surrounding villages and given to his troops.  The camp fires burned late for the next several nights.

When Scipio and Marcellus heard that the Gauls had completed their mobilization and were moving in the direction of the Roman supply base and not
Acerrae
, they decided it was time to move to where the enemy intended to fight them ~
Clastidium
.  Marcellus planned to stay well north of the Po River to avoid the marshes and swamps that dotted the region.

Marcellus quickly abandoned the siege and began a relatively slow march to
Clastidium
, 50 miles and three days away.  Riders were dispatched at frequent intervals to keep Rome, the port at
Genua
, and the forces at
Clastidium
informed of their activities.

Marcellus wanted relatively fresh troops to arrive at
Clastidium
so he dictated an easy march pace of 12 miles per day with 10 minute rest break every hour. At the end of each day, the Legions dug their camp and ate and drank to maintain their strength for the coming battle.  In the evenings, the Centurions, the backbone of the Army, talked to the Legionaries about tactics, matters of discipline, rotation procedures, and also checked the troops’ equipment.  They talked of home, battle honors, and life after the army.  The Romans were readying themselves for battle.  For some, this would be their first battle and for others, their last.

Marcellus gathered the Tribunes, Chiefs of Engineers, Calvary and Archers, and key Centurions to discuss the impending battle.  His cavalry sent back a steady stream of information about the gathering
Insubres
including the size of the force, their activity, location, terrain, weather, equipment, morale, commanders, and intentions.

Since the Gallic cavalry was about equal to the Roman cavalry in numbers, Manius recommended to Marcellus that he use his cavalry to fully occupy theirs to prevent them from influencing the infantry battle.  When the scouts reported on the Gallic half moon formation with no reserve, Manius recommended that he approach the Gauls with two Legions abreast, the other two stacked up behind them with orders to be prepared to come alongside the lead Legions.  By initially offering a small front to the Gauls, Manius hoped the Gauls would crowd together and not overlap his front by too much.  When the Gauls were fully committed to their charge at the narrow Roman front, the plan was that Marcellus would maneuver the two trailing Legions to bring all four abreast and perhaps overlap the Gauls’ front.  He knew this would put a tremendous strain initially on the two center Legions, but felt they could hold until the two Legions on the left and right wings could swing around and move in towards the center in what he hoped would be a tactical envelopment.

Four Legions online would give the Romans an actual front of 2000 men stretching out for about three-quarters of a mile, but with no reserve.  It was a gamble, but Marcellus and Manius felt that each Legion’s three-man deep lines of 500 men each for the
Hastati
,
Principes
, and
Triarii
, when rotated properly, would wear down the Gauls’ adrenaline powered charge.

Manius planned that the three-man deep lines of the
Hastati
would rotate all three Legionaries twice and then pass through the rested and fresh
Principes
who would then take up the fight.  When the
Principes
had rotated their three men three times, he would order the
Hastati
to move forward back to their original position in the front and repeat this process until the Gauls broke.

He was relying on the maneuver discipline of the Army to successfully execute these difficult movements during battle.  Now is when the hours of training and discipline would pay off.  These same maneuvers, passing the
Principes
through the
Hastati
and then back again, had been practiced endlessly.

What Marcellus did not foresee was that Viridomarus would be looking for him!

The Romans dug in their final camp about three hours from
Clastidium
and the waiting Gallic Army.  For the preceding two days, Marcellus had his scouts out looking for an advantageous location to fight the battle.  His instruction to the scouts was to find an area less than a mile wide with swamps, hills, or thick woods on both flanks.  Marcellus was looking for a site that would provide natural protection to his flanks and offer a narrow front to the attacking Gauls.

While the Army slept, Marcellus arose in the dark the day of the battle and followed the scouts on horseback to an area they tentatively selected for the battle.  It was about half a mile from the sleeping Gauls and appeared to offer exactly what Marcellus was looking for.  The flanks were protected with a thick stand of oak, cypress, and larch on one side and a rocky outcrop on the other.  The terrain resembled a funnel and he planned to position his soldiers at the small end.  The large open end sloping downward would offer the Gauls a tempting avenue of approach.  He hoped that in their rush to attack, they may not realize that the terrain would be forcing them into an ever tightening mass and his waiting Legions.  It was not perfect, but it would do.

The Romans were up by 0400, ate a hardy meal, and were on the march by 0600 in their battle formation of two Legions up with the other two immediately behind them.  Cavalry elements acted as a rear guard.  Walking in this configuration was slow and required constant stopping to straighten the lines as the terrain separated units and slowed their advance.

The Gauls were aware that the Romans were on the march and readied their Army.  Meals were hastily eaten and body paint was copiously applied.  Fires still burned to ward off the lingering morning chill.  The morning sun was a welcomed relief.

By 1100, the leading elements of the Roman Army appeared in the distance.  To the Gauls, the approaching Army appeared like a small, shinny gray rock with hints of red sprinkled throughout.  The Gauls looked about at their own Army and realized that they were much greater in number and by their account, much better fighters.

As they got closer, Viridomarus could only see the leading two Legions and immediately suspected Roman deception.  He envisioned the other two Legions were maneuvering to get behind his forces.  He quickly ordered his cavalry to search the area to the rear to find the missing Legions and began to consider his options to handle this change of plans.  His mind eased when he realized that if the Roman commander was foolish enough to split his forces in the face of superior numbers, he was strong enough to defeat each part in turn.  After 30 minutes, the scouts returned and reported no Romans to the rear.  Still Viridomarus worried.