Legio XVII: Battle of Zama (54 page)

Rasce’s horsemen scoured the area searching for Vermina.  Three days after the Legions arrived at Ouled, Rasce came racing back to tell Manius that he could see approaching cavalry and infantry.  He estimated the cavalry at about 5,000 horses along with 10,000 infantry.  Manius alerted the Legions.  The Numidians were coming!

Rasce continued to watch and reported that the enemy was aiming for the Southern Pass.  Manius rode to the wall and climbed up a tower.  One hour later the enemy’s Advance Guard spotted the Roman defenses and alerted their Commander.  He rode forward to look at this unexpected obstacle.  He sent two riders towards the wall.  They waved their arms in the air and shouted something unintelligible.  Manius passed the word for the scorpio to hold their fire.  The two riders stopped at the first ditch, 60 feet from the wall.  Then, in very poor Latin, one of the two explained that Masinissa was their Commander and they had come to reinforce Scipio.  Manius was doubtful.  This could be a ruse.  He called for his horse.  Cassius and Modius rode with him.  They went through the gap alongside the wall and crossed by the ditch.  The two riders began to slowly ride over to Manius.  He yelled, “Stop!” and raised his arm.  They stopped.  Manius said, “I will meet your Commander half way between the wall and your cavalry.  He can bring two other men with him.”

The two riders spun around and rode off.  Soon three men began a slow ride towards Manius.  He nudged his horse and rode to meet them.  “Cassius be ready for anything.  I don’t like this.”

Manius pulled up his horse about 30 feet from the three men and they stopped as well. Manius looked at a handsome well dressed man who spoke perfect Latin.  “I am Masinissa, a friend of Proconsul Scipio.  He is expecting me.”

Manius said, “What do you know of Vermina?”

“That traitor dog is the son of Syphax whom I captured and sent to Scipio.  Vermina wants to join Hannibal so that if the Carthaginian are successful against Scipio, they will give Vermina my kingdom.  I will deal with him after the battle.”

“Is he raising an army to join Hannibal?” asked Manius.  He was testing Masinissa.

“I have heard that.  While I was off in the east and south, he was recruiting among his father’s loyal men in and around the coast, including my capital Cirta.  He may be a day or two behind me, but his men are untrained and will not be much help to Hannibal.  You are in the right position to intercept him.”

Manius was still suspicious.  “Masinissa, with all due respect, I would like you to stay here until I can confirm your identity.”

“As you wish,” replied Masinissa.

Manius dispatched two couriers to ride to Scipio’s camp and to return with someone who could positively identify Masinissa.

Two hours later, Silanus arrived from Scipio’s camp and was escorted to the Southern Pass.  He rode around the wall and met with Masinissa and introduced him to Manius.  Three hours later, Masinissa’s entire cavalry and infantry were through the Pass and enroute to join Scipio.  Silanus remarked to Manius that his ditch and wall should stop Vermina, but added, “He can ride south to get around these mountains, but it will add an extra five days to his journey.  Perhaps, that’s the best we can hope for.”

After Silanus departed, Manius told Rasce to send patrols south on the other side of the mountain.  If he was in the wrong position to block Vermina, he wanted Rasce to notify him as early as possible so he could shift his forces south.

After weeks of waiting, Scipio rejoiced when Masinissa arrived.  He brought with him 6,000 infantry and his invaluable 4,000 horsemen.  Scipio’s army was now complete and he could focus his efforts on engaging Hannibal.

Blue Flag Hannibal’s Position at Seba Biar
(Google Maps)

Red flag Scipio’s Position at Sakiet Sidi Youssef
(Google maps)

Scipio ordered his army to move to El Kef, 24 miles to the east, but upon hearing that Hannibal had beaten him there, he stopped after marching 12 miles.  He found high ground alongside the River Kseub that overlooked a broad open field.  Hannibal moved through El Kef and made his camp four miles from Scipio’s in a large flat area suitable for cavalry and elephants.  He had chosen the battlefield.  Very soon, Hannibal discovered that Scipio’s camp controlled access to the river and its drinking water.  Scipio’s men could easily descend the hill and gather all the water they needed.  Hannibal’s men had to travel far to get water to avoid Scipio’s patrols.  What would normally be an inconvenience turned into a major problem for Hannibal.  His horses and elephants required large quantities of water daily.  He was also running short of rations for his men.

To buy time to gather supplies, Hannibal sent envoys to Scipio’s camp to open talks.  Hannibal even proposed modest peace terms along the lines of those earlier exchanged between Carthage and Rome.  Scipio would have none of it.  His army was ready to fight!  The terrain suited his advantage in cavalry and his men were rested, well fed and eager to engage.  No more delays!

The day after Masinissa and his men passed through the blocking position, Rasce rode into Ouled.  He was in a hurry.  He found Manius and said, “We spotted an army about 15 miles to the west and they appear to be headed this way.  It’s a mixed force of infantry and cavalry.  I think Vermina is coming straight for us.”

“Keep me informed of their progress.”  Manius summoned his staff and Commanders.  He told them, “Rasce believes Vermina is about 15 miles to the west.  Since it’s late in the day, I expect him to make camp shortly.  We should see them tomorrow around noon.  I’ve also just learned that the Proconsul has moved his camp closer to El Kef.  He is now only four miles from Hannibal.  I expect they will engage within a day or two.  If we can delay Vermina here tomorrow, I’m hoping that even if he goes south around the mountain, he will be too late to influence the battle.  If it plays out like that we will have accomplished our mission.  Notify the troops.  Put out listening posts tonight.”

The following day around 10:00 A.M. Rasce informed Manius that Vermina’s cavalry scouts were only five miles east of the Northern Pass.  Manius disseminated this information and rode to the Southern Pass.  He reasoned that the scouts would report to Vermina that the Northern Pass was blocked and advise him to proceed to the Southern Pass.

Manius climbed a tower to get a better view.  As he climbed the stairs, he was reminded of his wound at Lake Benacus.

When the scouts reported to Vermina that the Northern Pass was blocked by a palisade that ran from one side of the canyon to the other, he found it hard to believe.  Two weeks earlier, a courier from Hannibal had traversed this Pass with a message pleading for Vermina to bring his troops and cavalry to El Kef.  Vermina had to see for himself.  He gathered a cavalry escort and rode to the Northern Pass.  He got within 400 yards of the wall when a storm of scorpio arrows began ripping the air all around him.  He turned his horse around and raced west, but not before nine horses were hit.  Their screams were terrible.  Some of the braver men rode back to pick up their fellow horsemen who were running on foot to get away.

Vermina rode back to his marching men and redirected them to the Southern Pass.  He sent scouts to determine if that Pass was clear.  They galloped off.

An hour later they returned and told Vermina that this Pass was also defended.  Out of curiosity, Vermina rode to the Pass.  From a safe distance, he could see the wall.  He rode back to his men and called a halt.  He gathered his Commanders and announced that they now had to go around the mountain to Souk Ahoras and turn east to Sakiet Sidi Youssef, which would add five days to the march.  He reluctantly set off.

When Manius saw that Vermina was headed south to go around the mountain, he dispatched couriers to inform the Proconsul that Vermina would be approaching his position from the west.  He then alerted the Legions to pack up and get on the road.  “We are headed to Sakiet Sidi Youssef, Scipio’s former camp.”

Manius marched the Legions 14 miles to Khedara and prepared marching camps for the night.  The following day, they marched the remaining seven miles to Sakiet, a major east-west corridor leading to El Kef.  Manius placed his Legions in two camps astride the road and planned to fight from the camps.  He had no intentions of being caught in the open opposing 4,000 horsemen.

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Battle of Zama

There were vast difference between Scipio and Hannibal and the armies of each commander.  Scipio was 34 years old and in the peak of his physical and mental prowess.  He had fought major battles in 207 BC and 206 BC.  His staff was honed to produce quick results and his men were the best in the Roman Army.  They had endured years of hardships, marching, and battle.  They were tough, professional, and highly disciplined.

Hannibal was 45 years old.  His days of defeating the Romans at Trebbia, Lake Trasimene, and Cannae were now 14 to 16 years in the past.  For the last several years, he and his army had been blockaded in southern Italy and mostly inactive.  He felt he could rely on his 14,000 veterans that returned with him to Africa, but was unsure of Mago’s 12,000 men since they contained so many Gauls and Ligurians.  The third element of his army was comprised of Carthaginians, Numidians, desert people, and some Macedonians. These men were nothing more than green recruits barely trained, and not battle tested.  He had to rely on his mostly untrained elephants to break up the Roman formation and trust that his cavalry would contain Scipio’s numerically superior horsemen.  Cannae taught him the devastating effect that cavalry could have when attacking the rear of an enemy formation.

Two days later, in September 202 BC, the two large armies moved from their camps into the open field that separated them.  Hannibal had a slight edge in troop strength, perhaps 40,000 in total, but was at a distinct disadvantage in cavalry.  He had only 4,000 compared to Scipio’s 7,000 to 8,000 horsemen.  Scipio’s army was comprised of about 30,000 Legionaries and 6,000 Numidians.  Hannibal aligned his men facing northwest.  Scipio’s men faced southeast.

Scipio and his staff devised a plan to counter Hannibal’s elephants, which had the potential to wreak his formation and scatter his troops.  Scipio formed his men into a standard triplex acies, but then had the Maniples of the three lines form rows with one Maniple directly behind the other.  He then separated the rows of Maniples to open nine lanes that ran from the Hastati in the front to the Triarii in the rear.  He placed his light troops in the gaps in the first line to make it appear solid from the Carthaginian perspective.

The intent was that the charging elephants would be funneled down the lanes and killed in the rear.  Some of the light troops were equipped with heavy four foot long poles tipped with sharpened metal points.  These brave men were expected to charge the elephants while dodging arrows and spears coming down from the boxes atop the elephants and strike at the animals soft under belly.  Some of the cavalry was also given horns to blow to frighten the elephants into reversing their course, and charging back into their own men.

Hannibal placed Mago’s 12,000 Gauls, Ligurians, local desert people, and some Balearic Islanders in his first line.  They were experience warriors and would give the Roman Hastati a hard time.  He formed his second line with the 14,000 men that were recently recruited.  They consisted of Carthaginians, Numidians, and a smattering of Macedonians under a man named Sopater.  His third line consisted of his 14,000 trusted veterans from Italy.  The first two lines were fairly close to each other, but he held his third line about 220 yards to the rear of the second line.  Hannibal was wary of Scipio’s penchant to send his men around his first line to envelop the enemy’s second and third lines.  Hannibal hoped that by the time the Romans had cut through his first two lines, their swords would be so dulled from use that they would be ineffective.