L.A. Noir (35 page)

As the campaign proceeded, Poulson grew increasingly concerned about the unsavory characters flocking to his campaign. The fact that he found himself mingling with the likes of District Attorney Ernest Roll and his wife in such mixed company did nothing to allay his concerns. It was highly worrisome to find the county DA associating with such dubious characters. Poulson also discovered that there was an anti-Parker clique within the police department, just as Mickey Cohen had alleged. On one occasion, Gach took Poulson to the offices of a former LAPD captain who had hung out a shingle in Beverly Hills as an attorney. His specialty was defending officers (and others) against Parker’s “Gestapo” (presumably the department’s Bureau of Internal Affairs). There Gach collected a check for $1,200 for pro-Poulson newspaper advertisements and campaign work. The attorney in question (whom Poulson was surprised to see surrounded by four or five uniformed officers) informed the candidate that all he wanted was “a fair deal.” Naturally, Poulson agreed to provide that. Then he took the check and fled.

Los Angeles has a nonpartisan election system that requires mayoral candidates to win an outright majority in order to become mayor. As a result, mayoral elections are generally a two-step affair: the primary typically narrows the race to two candidates and then a runoff determines the winner. In April 1953, Poulson defeated Mayor Bowron in the primaries, winning 211,000 votes to Bowron’s 178,000. Bowron tried to put a game face on this loss, insisting that he had saved “his best ammunition for the finals.” With Screen Actors Guild president Ronald Reagan at his side, Bowron lashed out against the “the Mammon of First Street” (i.e., Norman Chandler) and “the small group of people who control a vast commercial, financial, agricultural and industrial empire.

“Norman Chandler should run for mayor himself,” Bowron asserted,
before pausing to note that neither Chandler nor many of his coconspirators even lived in Los Angeles. (Chandler lived in Sierra Madre. Beebe and Hotchkis lived in San Marino.)

But even Ronald Reagan couldn’t save Fletcher Bowron. Mammon retaliated, to devastating effect. Its point of attack was Mayor Bowron’s alleged softness on communism. Its weapon was Chief William Parker.

On May 18—exactly one week before the general election—the House Subcommittee on Government Operations announced that it would be coming to Los Angeles to hold two days of hearings into how Communists had infiltrated the city’s housing authority. Democratic members of the committee protested this brazen attempt to influence the election—to no avail. Republican congressman Clare Hoffman insisted he knew nothing about local elections and pressed ahead. The hearings were broadcast on local TV. Three former employees who had refused to answer questions about their potential membership in the Communist Party on an earlier occasion were summoned to repeat the performance for the cameras. The star witness, though, was Parker. After carefully noting that he was appearing at this sensitive time only because the committee had subpoenaed him, Parker proceeded to relate how in early 1952 he had given Mayor Bowron dossiers on ten housing agency figures with radical connections, including a dossier on Frank Wilkinson. At the committee’s instruction, Parker then read the confidential dossier in its entirety. Bowron, he told the committee, had simply thrown the dossier out.

Parker’s testimony was extremely damaging to the mayor. But Congressman Poulson wasn’t exactly reveling in what looked increasingly like an approaching victory, for as the odds of an upset grew, the underworld became even more overt in its overtures. A former city councilman whom Poulson knew well, Roy Hampton, approached the candidate to offer him “an enormous campaign fund” if he would “pledge to appoint a friendly Police Commission and get rid of Parker.” Again, Poulson begged off, promising only to “investigate this situation thoroughly.”

Just days before the election, Poulson went to breakfast with someone he would later identify only as “a former deputy district attorney and now the vice president of a Los Angeles and nationally known institution.” When he arrived, the candidate was startled to find the shady ex-LAPD-captain-turned-attorney and a well-known “Las Vegas gambling man” waiting for him. As he sat down to breakfast, Poulson was “really scared.” The men got right to it: They offered Poulson $35,000 if he would agree to name three men to the five-member Police Commission. Poulson tried to stall. The men then insisted that “I go out and talk in the gambler’s car.”
Even though he suspected that he was being maneuvered into a “bugged” car, Poulson was too frightened to refuse.

“I talked in circles,” Poulson wrote in his memoirs. A few days later, on April 7, Poulson defeated Bowron, 53 to 47 percent, and became Los Angeles’s next mayor. Yet as Poulson left the Gaylord Hotel downtown to go to his campaign headquarters to celebrate his victory, he was “filled with mixed emotions.” Thoughts of Cadillacs, chauffeurs, and a nice raise seemed far away. Poulson now had to worry about how he could avoid “opening up the town” in light of the fact that “some of the people who had supported me thought I would.” Some of these people were very rough. Poulson had to decide whether he would face them with Chief Parker and his intelligence division or without them.

POLICE TACTICS WERE TOUGH.

In early 1952, Chicago Outfit bosses Tony (“Joe Batters” aka “Big Tuna”) Accardo and Sam Giancana decided to pay a visit to Johnny Roselli in Los Angeles en route to a vacation in Las Vegas. Accardo was well aware of the LAPD intelligence division’s practice of reviewing passenger manifests so that it could intercept suspected gangsters. As a result, he took the precaution of booking his ticket as “Mr. S. Mann.” Giancana booked a separate ticket as “Michael Mancuso” and avoided any interaction with Accardo on the flight. But when the two underworld figures (and Accardo’s doctor) arrived, the LAPD’s airport squad quickly identified the Chicago Mob bosses. Accardo and his associates left the airport with a police tail.

Accardo’s party proceeded to Perino’s restaurant on Wilshire Boulevard in Beverly Hills, Los Angeles’s poshest dining establishment. There the men passed a pleasant meal under the watchful eye of a contingent of plainclothes policemen. As the men were finishing their meal, Lt. W C. Hull stepped up to the table and ordered the men to produce identification. They did. The police then frisked the men, removing $12,000 in cash, at which point they were driven back to the airport and put on the next flight to Las Vegas.

The men who had stalked Accardo and Giancana came from Capt. James Hamilton’s intelligence division. Its two watch lieutenants, seven sergeants, and twenty-six patrolmen (and women) conducted operations of remarkable scope. One team of officers worked full time on background checks, reviewing credit reports, bank account information, utility bills, and the like in order to monitor underworld attempts to infiltrate legitimate businesses. Another team specialized in electronic surveillance. (Olney’s commission said only that “a considerable amount of information is obtained in this manner.”) A three-man airport unit, manned by officers chosen
for their ability to memorize hundreds of mug shots of gangsters from across the country, monitored Los Angeles International Airport twenty hours a day. It was this unit that spotted Accardo and Giancana.

Visiting gangsters were sent packing, with no regard for legal niceties. Hoodlums who were L.A. residents, such as Cohen henchmen Frank and Joe Sica, were tracked constantly by two-man teams of officers. These officers were not subtle. Indeed, the department openly stated “this scrutiny may at times border on harassment and [be aimed at] driving the subject hoodlum from our jurisdiction.” The police wanted people to know they were being watched; they wanted the bad guys to feel uncomfortable. They also wanted associates of criminals to feel uncomfortable. Intelligence division officers routinely visited businessmen and casual acquaintances of known hoodlums and asked them to prove that
they
weren’t involved in underworld activities by ending the relationships. The goal was to make it difficult and unpleasant for the subject of surveillance to meet with others, transact business, or have friends.

The intelligence division was also the unit that was watching mayor-elect Norris Poulson.

At first, Poulson sympathized with those who railed against Parker’s “secret police.” But after getting a firsthand look at the underworld, he was more understanding of police tactics. His own experiences had left him with no doubt that the underworld was actively attempting to regain control of Los Angeles. Nonetheless, Parker’s black-hat operations were disturbing. No target was off limits. Indeed, soon after Parker took office, conservative councilman Ed Davenport was enraged to find two policemen hiding in a closet listening in on a meeting Davenport was having with some businessmen constituents. Local politicians saw the unit as Parker’s Praetorian guard. So did Parker himself. In a letter to a priest who had written to request details about the unit, Parker openly explained that one of the division’s missions was to protect the chief from political attack. In addition to “exceptional traits of characters,” Parker wrote that officers who hoped to be assigned to intelligence had to be “trustworthy to the Office of the Chief of Police.” The reason Parker provided for this extraordinary requirement was an interesting one: “While such loyalty to the Office might be interpreted by some to be of a personal nature”—as indeed it clearly was—“we believe such loyalty to be to the integrity of the department.” Loyalty to Parker had become tantamount to police integrity.

Then there were the intelligence division files. The division maintained an alphabetical master card file “on all persons who have been brought to our attention.” The protocol was precise: 5 × 8 card with name, physical description, photo, address, phone number, description and license of car,
friends, activities, and associations. These cards were then cross-indexed with the general criminal files. Fed by the intelligence division’s investigations and by a clipping service that monitored twenty newspapers across the country, the files grew quickly. How quickly was a closely held secret. No judge could subpoena these files. No Police Commission could review them, for, in another extraordinary decision, Chief Parker had ruled that these were not actually official police files. Rather, they were the personal property of the chief of police.

The potential for the abuse of power was obvious—indeed, Poulson himself had experienced it during his mayoral campaign. Yet far from expressing contrition, Chief Parker seemed to take pleasure in dropping hints about just how much he knew. “In my conversations with him,” Poulson would later recall, “he would inadvertently tell what he knew about this person or that…. I later found out that Chief Parker had a file on
MANY PEOPLE
and not all communist suspects.” Indeed, Parker continued to keep Poulson under surveillance, even after he became mayor. In most cities, this alone would have been a firing offense. But Parker was protected by several formidable defenses. The first was the legal defenses he had drafted in the thirties. As the liberal
Daily News
noted, Parker’s 1930s reforms meant that the Police Commission “can’t hire unless there is a vacancy and it can’t create a vacancy unless there is grave cause and then only after a hearing.” The second was his department’s growing reputation as—in policing expert O. W. Wilson’s constantly cited phrase—“the county’s best big city police department.” Just weeks before the Poulson-Bowron runoff election, the Governor’s Commission on Organized Crime had issued a report praising the LAPD for its success in keeping eastern gangsters out. (It warned that they were resettling in Palm Springs instead.) Tangling with a chief whose work was garnering such accolades carried big political risks.

There was a third reason to keep Parker in office as well: fear. Los Angeles was rife with rumors that gamblers and racketeers had already “cut the town up.” Poulson knew from personal experience that these rumors had some basis in fact. Firing Chief Parker would have been tantamount to inviting the underworld interests who had so frightened the mayor during his campaign to open shop in Los Angeles. Poulson viewed Parker as an admirable law enforcement officer but a “cold-blooded, self-centered individual.” Ultimately, though, Poulson feared the Mob more than his chief of police. Chief Parker, announced Poulson a few weeks before his swearing in, would stay.

“Chief Parker is to remain on the job on the basis of what he does from now on,” Poulson pointedly told the
Los Angeles Times
. “It will be up to the
Chief to produce and to prove to the new Police Commission—and to me—that he is the proper man to remain at the head of the Police Department.”

Although he had concluded that firing Parker was simply too dangerous (politically and personally), Poulson was determined to restrain him. The mayor’s strategy for doing this was to appoint a Police Commission that “would not kowtow to Chief Parker but at the same time would support a clean city and law enforcement.” Since Bowron’s appointees had resigned, Poulson had a chance to appoint all five police commissioners. To head the commission, Poulson turned to his top assistant, attorney Jack Irwin. Other members included John Ferraro, a former USC All-American football star who was the son-in-law of state Sen. George Luckey, one of Poulson’s major Democratic backers. He also added Michael Kohn, a prominent Jewish lawyer, and Herbert Greenwood, an African American attorney who had worked in the U.S. Attorney’s Office. One member of the old commission, Emmett McGaughey, a former G-man-turned-advertising executive (who was also in Poulson’s church), agreed to stay on.

The message Poulson intended to send was clear: A new, more assertive Police Commission was taking over. But Poulson’s stern tone and high-powered appointments didn’t obscure an even more important fact: Chief Parker had just become the first police chief since 1913 to survive a change in administration. By not selecting his own candidate to be Los Angeles’s top cop, Poulson was in effect conceding that his police chief was too valuable to lose. The LAPD had just taken a huge step toward the kind of autonomy Bill Parker had long dreamed of.