Jungle of Snakes (5 page)
Authors: James R. Arnold
As 1900 progressed, increasing numbers of Filipinos who had been displaced by the war returned to their homes. They began
living among the Americans, which gravely worried insurgent leaders. A guerrilla colonel warned that because of the American
“policy of attraction” regular civilian contact “with our enemies may cause the gravest damage to our sacred cause.”
10
It is impossible to make a sweeping generalization about the impact of building schools, conducting classes, and providing
a host of other civil services. They probably influenced events in the 44 percent of the provinces where no conflict occurred.
Within insurgent strongholds they had little effect. Under American duress, municipal officials would perform their American-directed
duties by day and at night cooperate with the insurgents. It was a logical human choice given that neither side could adequately
protect them from the sanctions of the opponent.
The ability of the Americans to defeat the insurgents with ease in open battle had awed the insurgents. The American inability
to capitalize upon their conventional victories gave the insurgent leadership hope. At least one farsighted American Colonel
perceived this. He warned his superiors, “It seems to me that the people have less respect for the United States’ authority
than they had six months ago. They still have the same appreciation of their incapacity to meet its military power, but they
have learned what they did not know, that it can be evaded, and how this can be done. I say this with profound regret.”
11
Presidential Politics
As the pacification strategy based on a policy of attraction faltered, the upcoming American presidential election dominated
events in the Philippines. Aguinaldo and his lieutenants invested great hope in the election’s outcome. They thought that
if they inflicted some sensational losses then the American public would turn against McKinley and elect Democrat William
Jennings Bryan.
Had the Demo cratic Party nominated a different candidate this strategy might have been effective. But in 1900 American voters
were enjoying economic recovery from the depression of 1896. Consequently, Bryan’s “Free Silver” economic policy, which had
seemed appealing four years earlier during Bryan’s first contest against McKinley, failed to compete with the Republican slogan,
“Four more years of the Full Dinner Pail.” This left Bryan with only his opposition to the annexation of the Philippines as
a reason to attract voters and it proved not enough.
However, in the summer of 1900 Aguinaldo did not perceive that Bryan was virtually unelectable. In June Aguinaldo issued a
general order calling for “heavy blows” against the Americans during the summer months.
12
His subordinates echoed his call. In August General Cailles ordered “constant combats, ambuscades, surprises and encounters”
to “aid the triumph of the candidacy of Bryan who is our hope for the declaration of the in dependence of our country.”
13
Like their Filipino counterparts, American generals understood the significance of the election in determining the war’s outcome.
Civil War veterans recalled their encounters with a press corps filled with anti-Lincoln and antiwar journalists. In the Philippines
in 1900, as in Virginia and Georgia in 1864, they knew that military setbacks would provide political ammunition for the administration’s
opponents if someone could deliver that ammunition. War correspondents in Manila tried to fulfill this role. To thwart them,
the military leadership in the Philippines imposed strict censorship. An Associated Press reporter complained that this was
more “unreasonable” and “stringent” than at any prior time and that censors “suppressed” his report about “incontrovertible
military occurrences,” “delayed” controversial reports, rewrote political news, and “prohibited” the word
ambush.
14
To influence the election, the military also exaggerated its accomplishments and inflated reports to make it appear that the
war was progressing smoothly. In a war in which the capture of modern rifles was a crucial metric of progress, an official
army bulletin announced the surrender of 800 insurgents and their firearms in the province of Bayombon. On the surface this
appeared to be a notable victory. A diligent correspondent investigated and determined that in fact only forty rifles had
been captured. The army had included in its count obsolete weapons and unimportant handguns found in private homes and also
inflated the total to match the number of prisoners. The discrepancy between number of prisoners and number of firearms raised
the question of how many of the prisoners were actual insurgents.
Correspondents correctly believed that linguistic manipulation—such as forbidding the use of the word
ambush
—coupled with official censorship and exaggeration had political motives. However, when confronted by a military willing and
able to control the flow of news there was little they could do about it. Only after the election did information emerge that
would have brought into sharp question the administration’s veracity regarding the war’s progress.
Taft and MacArthur
The effort to muzzle the press during the run-up to the election consumed time that officers would have preferred to spend
in actual military operations. But they understood that the fight against the insurgents had an important domestic political
component. Reinforcing this point was the arrival of another distraction; a high-ranking, politically well-connected civil
commission headed by William H. Taft. A fat man—schoolmates had nicknamed him “Big Lub”—whose appearance disguised his gifts,
Taft was contentedly serving as a federal judge when he received an unexpected summons to the White House. McKinley still
believed that the best way to undermine the insurgency was to demonstrate America’s benign intent. His vehicle for accomplishing
this was a five-man Philippine Commission chaired by Taft.
His offer of the chair floored Taft. “He might as well have told me that he wanted me to take a flying machine,” Taft related.
The offer seemed a perilous career detour, so Taft equivocated. Secretary of War Elihu Root applied the necessary suasion.
He told the forty-three-year-old Ohioan, “You have had an easy time of it holding office since you were twenty-one. Now your
country needs you. This is a task worthy of any man. This is the parting of the ways. You may go on holding the job you have
in a humdrum, mediocre way. But here is something that will test you . . . and the question is, will you take the harder or
the easier task?”
15
For a parochial Ohio boy, the Philippines presented a novel challenge. Taft observed to his half brother, “The situation in
Manila is perplexing. You meet men who are completely discouraged at it; you meet men who are conservative but very hopeful
of good results; and you meet men who have roseate views of the situation.”
16
In Taft’s mind, the commission’s goal was clear: to gain the confidence of the Filipino people by providing them with the
best government possible.
17
In September 1900 the Philippine Commission assumed legislative and executive duties for the islands. In practice, civilian
rule, as represented by the Philippine Commission, replaced military authority as soon as the army declared a province pacified.
Then the commission established municipal and provincial governments. Over time, the commission could boast of a rare accomplishment:
it conducted a steady transfer of power that amounted to a self-liquidating colonial management. But at the start success
seemed a distant mirage because Taft and his fellow commissioners met a wall of re sistance erected by Otis’s successor, Arthur
MacArthur.
A Wisconsin native, MacArthur compiled a distinguished combat record in the Civil War. Thereafter he spent twenty-three years
languishing as a captain in the regular army until finally receiving the recognition he craved. He lacked the tactical flair
some possessed. But he was unusually well-read in military matters and put his learning into practice as he deliberated over
alternative plans. Some called him slow and not particularly bright, while others judged him “thoughtful” with partic ular
talent for “efficient strategical movement.”
18
Regardless of what others thought, MacArthur was much convinced of his own brilliance and also was a tireless self-promoter,
two characteristics he would pass on to his son Douglas. Like many other officers, he keenly resented the notion that civilian
government could be put in place in the Philippines while the fighting still raged. MacArthur considered Taft and his fellow
civilians annoyances best ignored.
Taft also served as a con venient lightning rod for the enlisted men’s frustrations. After Taft characterized the Filipino
as “our little brown brother” who merely required American compassion to improve his lot, field soldiers replied with new
lyrics to a popular tune:
I’m only a common soldier-man in the blasted Philippines.
They say I got Brown Brothers here, but I dunno what it means.
I like the word Fraternity, but I still draw the line; He may be a brother of William H. Taft, but he ain’t no friend of mine.
19
Indeed, the song made light of a significant problem. As one American general observed around this time, “The most serious
obstacle in the way of complete pacification of the islands now lies in the mutual distrust between the troops and the inhabitants.”
20
Lieutenant William T. Johnston Goes to Work
THE INSURGENTS’ PREELECTION OFFENSIVE focused attention on combat encounters between American soldiers and guerrillas while
obscuring the more important battle to control the civilian population. Americans were learning that benign assimilation in
the face of an insurgency able and willing to terrorize the civilian population was impossible. Among them was William Taft.
By now Taft had visited some of the islands’ safer regions—including in his baggage an outsized bathtub since he could not
fit into the local ones—and reached the conclusion that most Filipinos wanted peace but were too frightened by the insurgents’
systematic terror campaign to act. An American Colonel concurred, observing that civilians “would gladly take their oaths
of allegiance if assured that our troops would remain to protect them.”
1
But the Americans were unable to provide adequate security.
General Lloyd Wheaton, the commander of the Department of Northern Luzon, studied the problem and concluded that the insurgents
had prepared carefully for the American arrival. They selected loyal delegates to confer with the Americans and participate
in the American-sponsored elections. Thus they controlled the municipal government. A vice mayor’s official duties included
fulfilling contracts to supply the Americans. He siphoned off half the profits for the insurgency. An insurgent colonel or-ga
nized the police force. The police force’s most important duty was to inform the insurgents about American movements. Their
second duty was to mislead the Americans regarding the whereabouts of the guerrillas. In sum, the insurgents had established
an embedded infrastructure, what later generations would call a shadow government. Wheaton himself did not hold such a sophisticated
view. He concluded that the policy of “benevolent assimilation” was not working because the Filipinos were “semi-civilized
natives belonging to a race whose every impulse is to treachery and perfidy.”
2
The extent of the continued Filipino re sistance surprised the man at the top, General MacArthur. He had originally thought
that Aguinaldo’s fighters represented a distinct minority. However, “contact with both in-surrectos and amigos” had taught
him that in fact most Filipinos on the main island of Luzon supported Aguinaldo.
3
MacArthur had reached a different conclusion than Taft regarding Filipino motivations. MacArthur concluded that the Filipinos
were quite happy to accept the material benefits flowing from the American pacification effort while continuing to support
the insurgents with money, supplies, shelter, and new recruits. As MacArthur pondered what to do, Lieutenant William T. Johnston
produced a brilliant analysis titled “Methods Adopted by the Insurgents for Orga nizing and Maintaining a Guerrilla Force.”
4
It arrived on MacArthur’s desk at the end of June 1900 and proved a shocking appraisal of past pacification efforts.
To date no American had systematically studied the infrastructure that supported the insurgency. Johnston set to work diligently
investigating towns and villages in the province of La Union, some 170 miles northwest of Manila. Painstaking interviews with
local Filipino officials convinced Johnston that a very active insurgent shadow government was operating right under the noses
of the American garrisons. Just how active and how close he did not know until a stroke of fortune produced an invaluable
infor mant. This was Crispulo Patajo, a suspected outlaw delivered to the Americans by the mayor of Bauang. Patajo turned
out to be a disgruntled leader of a minor religious cult, the Guardia de Honor. The cult had long been in conflict with Filipino
authorities. Patajo took the opportunity of his arrest to seek revenge against his cult’s oppressors. He told Johnston that
among others the mayor of Bauang was a member of the insurgency. He offered to prove his accusation by exposing the region’s
entire guerrilla network.
Johnston, in turn, pursued the matter like a detective investigating a crime. He gave Patajo the opportunity to establish
his bona fides by revealing the locations of hidden insurgent supply depots. At his first test, Patajo led the Americans into
a supposedly pacified town, denounced several men who turned out to be insurgent officers, and found a stockpile of guns.
Encouraged by this demonstration, Johnston unleashed Patajo on Bauang. In short order, Johnston reported, “Bauang was cleaned
up and the presidente [mayor] made to see the error of his ways.”
5
With a huge assist from Patajo, in less then three months Johnston assembled a complete picture of insurgent operations in
the region. Among his findings was the startling fact that insurgent leaders routinely circulated among multiple safe houses
in the midst of American-garrisoned towns and villages. Here they regularly met with civil authorities including mayors and
police chiefs. Those officials handed over tax receipts and forced requisitions as well as monies siphoned off from American
aid programs. If they needed muscle to enforce their demands, the insurgents summoned guerrillas from secure camps located
within two miles of a an American garrison. Indeed, the presence of American forces did little to deter the insurgents. Johnston
learned that insurgent shadow governments operated even in places occupied by substantial American garrisons. Here as elsewhere,
men serving the insurgent cause had been installed by the Americans to serve in the American-sponsored municipal government.
Armed with this knowledge, Colonel William P. Duvall, the officer commanding La Union, set to work. Duvall melded Johnston’s
talents, Patajo’s offer to provide anti-insurgent volunteer militia, and a handful of rebel turncoats into a comprehensive
intelligence system that produced dramatic results. Duvall appointed Patajo chief of detectives for the entire province and
allowed him to recruit from within his own cult. Patajo quickly raised some 400 to 500 volunteers who accompanied American
patrols. The volunteers proved their worth by guiding the Americans to guerrilla hideouts or operating on their own. At the
end of March, Patajo’s men attacked an insurgent force, capturing officers, men, and guns while they rested in their safe
houses. This was a feat the Americans alone could not accomplish.
Patajo handed the prisoners over to the Americans, who gave them the choice of prison or freedom if they betrayed their comrades.
From an American perspective, the beauty of this approach was that once a guerrilla became a turncoat, he also became highly
motivated to fight the insurgency since he well knew that he had become a marked man. Indeed, the local guerrilla commander
offered a large reward for killing the “terrible Americanista” Patajo, to no avail. Worse from an insurgent standpoint, once
Patajo’s men rooted out the shadow government and replaced it with their own, the insurgents found that they could not regain
control of the towns.
Higher in the chain of command, Colonel Duvall’s decision to rely on Patajo and his cult was problematic. It went against
official policy, upset the region’s Filipino elite, and alarmed American civil authorities. Taft reported to the secretary
of war that Duvall had merely replaced insurgent terrorism with a different system of terrorism. Taft warned that this approach
would ultimately harm American pacification efforts. However, there could be no denying results. As Johnston noted, Patajo’s
men “are the only ones who have ever told us where we could find insurrectos and guns, and who voluntarily went and helped
find them.”
6
By exploiting ethnic and religious differences, the Americans in La Union were able to sever the connection between the insurgent
bands and the towns that supported them. In a matter of months, the province that MacArthur’s predecessor had called the worst
part of the Philippine islands was pacified.
At the end of June 1900, when MacArthur read Johnston’s eye-opening analysis, he praised it as the best description of the
insurgency he had seen. He concluded that the extent and strength of the insurgency demanded a major strategic shift. But
if he announced such a shift, he would give ammunition to the opponents of the McKinley administration four months before
the presidential election. Consequently, MacArthur bided his time and warned the War Department that the war had entered a
new phase that was likely to persist for a long time. The general relied upon his censors to keep this information from the
American public.
THE PHILIPPINES EXPLODED into violence as the insurgents began a general offensive timed to influence the American election.
In spite of the censors’ efforts, as the presidential election entered its decisive weeks, events in the Philippines assumed
center stage. McKinley responded to fierce domestic political attacks against his Philippine policy by appealing to patriotism
and asserting that victory was very near if only the country stood to the task. He did not reveal MacArthur’s altogether different
assessment. Republican advocates equated support for Bryan with support for the insurgents. Secretary of War Root openly called
into question the patriotism of the anti-imperialists, saying that insurgents firing from ambush and the anti-imperialists
were allies in the same cause. Other politicians quoted letters from servicemen saying that the only reason the Filipinos
continued to fight was because of reports from the American press that undermined the administration. The pro-administration
New York Tribune
charged that Bryan was more of an insurgent leader than Aguinaldo and “every American soldier that is killed during these
months can be laid directly to his door.”
7
On election day 1900, William McKinley won reelection with 52 percent of the popular vote and almost twice the number of electoral
votes as Bryan. In this, his second contest against Bryan, his margin of victory was substantially higher than it had been
four years before.
For the Filipino insurgents, this result spelled disaster. They had always suffered from a scarcity of military resources
and from indifferent popular support. They invested both assets heavily on the prospect of Bryan’s election. McKinley’s overwhelming
victory saw their hopes dashed and their assets depleted. It also allowed the Americans to take off the gloves and begin a
much crueler war.
The Laws of War
One of the army’s hard men, Major Matt Batson, greeted McKinley’s reelection with great satisfaction. He told his wife:
The time has come when it is necessary to conduct this warfare with the utmost vigor . . . But the numerous, so styled, humane
societies, and poisonous press, makes it difficult to follow this policy if reported to the world, so what I write to you
regarding these matters is not to fall into the hands of the newspaper men. At the present we are destroying everything before
us. I have three columns out, and their course is easily traced from the church tower by the smoke from burning houses . .
. there will be but little mercy shown to those who are carrying on guerrilla warfare, or giving them aid.
8
The soldiers doing the burning were Filipinos recruited from the town of Macabebe. The Macabebes had a tradition of military
service to Spain and detested the Tagalogs. Batson orga nized a five-company battalion named Batson’s Macabebe Scouts. As
time went on the Macabebes usefully provided scouts, guides, and interpreters, but they and their leader really excelled at
small-unit counterinsurgency operations. During the unit’s first week of existence Batson proudly wrote his wife: “With my
battalion of Macabebe Scouts I am spreading terror among the Insurrectos. They may be wily but they have found their equal,
I think. Word reaches a place that Macabebes are coming and every Tagalog hunts his hole.”
9
Exploiting ethnic divisions to squash an insurgency had long historical roots. The Romans had been masters of this approach.
In the Philippines, the success of Batson’s Macabebe Scouts encouraged the U.S. Army to take advantage of the archipelago’s
ethnic rivalries and recruit some 15,000 native auxiliaries. Employing natives was a helpful step but in MacArthur’s mind
it was not enough. Like almost all of his veteran officers, the commanding general believed that for too long American policy
had been mistakenly tilted in the direction of attraction. Even MacArthur’s offer of a general amnesty—in his mind a nonpareil
exemplar of benign assimilation—had failed. MacArthur complained that the routine reluctance of even the most active pro-Americans
to give useful intelligence was one of the greatest problems. Yet MacArthur judged that this reluctance was merely a manifestation
of a deeper problem.
According to MacArthur, the insurgency received widespread popular support by “a strange combination of loyalty, apathy, ignorance,
and timidity.”
10
So strong was the insurgent hold that civilians marked for death by the insurgent command accepted their fate without appealing
for American protection. Something had to be done to detach the towns from the insurgents in the field. In MacArthur’s view,
looming strategic defeat required a “new and more stringent policy.”
11
The new policy’s legal basis derived from an order drafted and adopted by the Lincoln administration in 1863. At that time
the Union army was occupying areas of the Confederacy where partisans waged an increasingly effective guerrilla war. The rebels
had extended the cloak of legitimacy to guerrillas who operated in civilian dress. The guerrillas’ ability to blend into the
civilian background frustrated the U.S. Army. In response, the army’s commanding general asked a noted legal scholar, Dr.
Francis Lieber, for his views.
