July 1914: Countdown to War (40 page)

The meeting lasted clear through the night. We do not know what was said, but it is not hard to guess at the subject. Back on Sunday, Jules Cambon, France’s ambassador in Berlin, had reported that “any mobilization orders issued in Russia will certainly be followed by mobilization orders in Germany.”
¹⁵
Sazonov had just confirmed the veracity of Cambon’s report by informing the French government that Ambassador Pourtalès had warned him that if Russia mobilized, Germany would have to as well. Sazonov had then hinted that this was exactly what Russia was about to do (“it only remains for us to hasten our
armaments”). Whether or not Viviani and Poincaré had signed off on Russian mobilization measures taken since the weekend, they needed to weigh in now. In a wire sent off to Paléologue in St. Petersburg at seven Thursday morning, 30 July, Viviani recounted what he had learned from Sazonov’s telegram—and from Izvolsky—about the “inevitability of war” (
l’imminence de guerre
) and the need to “hasten [Russia’s] armaments,” commenting that Russia was evidently “counting on the support of her ally, France, and she considered it desirable that England would join Russia and France without further delay.” Viviani instructed Paléologue to tell Sazonov that, while “France was resolved to fulfill all obligations of her alliance, in the interest of general peace and in view of the conversation pending between the less interested powers, I believe that it would be opportune that,
as regards the precautionary and defense measures which Russia believes it necessary to adopt
, she should not immediately take any step which might offer to Germany a pretext for a total or partial mobilization of her forces.”
¹⁶

There are several contradictory notes in this ambiguous message. The phrase “in the interest of general peace” was clearly Viviani’s (he also inserted a reminder that he had written Paléologue in this vein back on Monday, 27 July, from aboard the
France
). There is no reason to doubt Viviani’s sincerity in desiring to avert a European war, no matter how ineffectual his policies had been so far in furthering this aim. Just as clearly, we can detect the hands of Poincaré and Messimy in the telegram’s tacit approval of the “precautionary and defense measures” Russia was taking, conditioned only by a gentle hint that she should avoid giving the Germans a too obvious casus belli. In a diary entry that day, Poincaré explained his thinking: the idea in “warning” the Russians was not to prevent war from breaking out but to avoid “offering Germany a pretext,” “because of the ambiguous attitude of England” (
à cause de l’attitude ambiguë de
l’Angleterre
).
¹⁷
Poincaré’s tacit approval of Russia’s impending general mobilization is further confirmed in a telegram Izvolsky sent to Sazonov Thursday morning, reporting that he had been assured privately that “the French government had no desire to interfere in our military preparations.”
¹⁸
Just as Bethmann, in Berlin, was busy trying (and largely failing) to put the diplomatic onus on Russia, so Poincaré wanted the Russians not to blow their cover in England by tipping their hand too early.

Considering how far Russia’s mobilization had gone by Thursday, this was easier said than done. Still, though it had infuriated War Minister Sukhomlinov and Chief of Staff Yanushkevitch, the tsar’s decision to reverse the general mobilization order had opened a diplomatic lifeline of sorts. By intervening to cancel his own general mobilization order of Wednesday night, Tsar Nicholas II had given not only the Germans but also his own French allies a brief stay of execution. So long as Russia refrained from raising the red placards of general mobilization, there remained a faint glimmer of hope that everyone would back down from the brink.

R
USSIA
’
S SOVEREIGN
, however, still had to reckon with his own advisers. It was not only the military men who had been taken aback by his rescinding of the general mobilization order. By Thursday morning, it was clear that most of his cabinet was against him as well. Krivoshein, the bellicose agriculture minister, was livid. So, too, was M. V. Rodzianko, the president of the Duma. In light of the common view of Nicholas II both in Russia and abroad as a lightweight,
*
it is interesting to note that,
on this critical day, he stood rather like the formidable Tisza had against the war party in Vienna—alone against all others.
¹⁹

Sazonov was at the center of the storm. It was he who had first pushed Russia into the Period Preparatory to War over the weekend and who had convinced Nicholas II to order general mobilization on Wednesday night (before the tsar changed his mind). On both occasions, he had acted decisively, belying his reputation for hesitation and cowardice. And yet because Sazonov had long been viewed as a cautious moderate in the cabinet, Nicholas II trusted his counsel now, more than that of any other adviser. The tsar categorically refused to see Krivoshein. Next to try their luck were Sukhomlinov and Yanushkevitch, who phoned the palace around eleven
AM
and tried to persuade their sovereign that “it was indispensable to proceed to a general mobilization,” so as to “prepare for a serious war without loss of time.” After hearing his chief of staff make the same case as the war minister—the same case, indeed, that both men had made the previous night—the tsar curtly declared that “the conversation was at an end.” Yanushkevitch, thinking quickly, said that Sazonov was in the room, too: Would the tsar hear out his foreign minister, at least? After a “lengthy silence,” he agreed. Realizing that mobilization talk was a nonstarter, Sazonov asked for an audience so that he could “present a report concerning the political situation which admitted of no delay.” After another pause, the tsar agreed to see him at three
PM
.
²⁰

Sazonov had just over three hours before his date with destiny. He did not waste his time. First, he huddled with Yanushkevitch to discuss his strategy for persuading the tsar to mobilize. The chief of staff had been thinking about this all night, but the tsar had cut him off on the phone before he could make his full argument. He urged that Sazonov impress on Russia’s sovereign the “extreme danger that would result for us if we were not ready for war with Germany.” General mobilization, he explained, “would be very seriously dislocated by the partial
mobilization already ordered; this dislocation could only be avoided by an immediate general mobilization.” Every hour, every minute counted. If the tsar continued objecting to technical arguments, Yanushkevitch said, Sazonov should switch to a political tack and warn his sovereign that if he continued hesitating, Germany’s cunning kaiser would then “coax out of the French a promise of neutrality,” leaving Russia alone to face the German military machine. Assuming that this barrage of arguments would be enough, Yanushkevitch asked that Sazonov phone him from the palace once the tsar had decided. As soon as the order was received, Yanushkevitch vowed, “I shall go away, smash my telephone, and generally adopt measures which will prevent anyone from finding me for the purpose of giving contrary orders.” To Yanushkevitch’s relief, Sazonov “agreed completely.” The chief of staff then phoned Dobrorolskii, the army’s mobilization chief, and ordered him to “be ready to come to me with all the documents immediately upon my telephone call in the afternoon.”
²¹

After dismissing Yanushkevitch, Sazonov called in German ambassador Pourtalès, who had been demanding an audience after their dramatic encounter of the night before. According to the foreign minister, the ambassador “appealed to Sazonov to hold out a last straw and to make some suggestion which Pourtalès could telegraph to his Government.”
²²
Sazonov then quickly composed the following “formula,” in French: “If Austria, recognizing that the Austro-Serbian question has assumed the character of a question of European interest, declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum points which violate the sovereign rights of Serbia, Russia engages to stop her military preparations.”

Although, as Pourtalès noted optimistically in his report to Berlin, Sazonov had not—as before—demanded that Austria suspend her own military preparations, on the central ultimatum issue he had not budged an inch.
²³
Far more important than
what Sazonov did or did not include in his hastily scribbled “formula,” however, was the fact that it was Germany’s ambassador, and not Russia’s foreign minister, who was begging to keep diplomatic channels alive.

At noon, Sazonov called in Buchanan and Paléologue. Acquainting the British and French ambassadors with the gist of his exchange with Pourtalès, Sazonov claimed, erroneously, that this audience had taken place at two
AM
(the encounter that had ended with Sazonov vowing that Russia’s mobilization “could not be reversed”) rather than minutes earlier.
*
The reason Russia’s foreign minister lied becomes clear when we read Buchanan’s account of the proceedings: it was in the “two
AM
audience,” Sazonov claimed, that Pourtalès, “seeing war as inevitable, broke down completely” and asked the Russian to compose his peace formula as a “last straw.” To buttress his claim that it was the Germans who were committed to war, Sazonov told Buchanan and Paléologue that Russia had “absolute proof of military and naval preparations being made by Germany against Russia more especially in the direction of the Gulf of Finland” (whether or not he had any such proof—unlikely, as no such preparations had begun—he did not show evidence of them).
**
Because it was Germany’s ambassador who supposedly saw war as inevitable, and the Germans were up to, well, something or other “in the direction of the Gulf of Finland,” it was therefore clear, Sazonov told Buchanan and Paléologue, that “Russia can hardly postpone converting partial into general
mobilization now that she knows that Germany is preparing and excitement in [Russia] has reached such a pitch that she cannot hold back if Austria refuses to make concession.”
²⁴

In this way, Sazonov ingeniously covered his diplomatic flank, offering up a last-minute initiative with Germany (however cynically contrived and inaccurately reported) as evidence of Russia’s peaceful intentions, along with evidence of the enemy’s warlike intentions (however specious) to justify the general mobilization order he was about to demand of Tsar Nicholas II. If Buchanan had any suspicions about what Sazonov was up to, he failed to express them—or report them to London. Nor did Paléologue object to Sazonov’s suggestion that Russian general mobilization was about to begin, but then, as he had been in the loop on Russia’s war preparations all along, there was no reason to expect that he would have.

Buoyed by the implied endorsement from the French and British ambassadors, Sazonov lunched with Krivoshein and Schilling. If Russia’s foreign minister was beset with any remaining doubts, the ever-war-ready Krivoshein did his best to scotch them. The atmosphere, Schilling wrote in his diary, “was tense and the conversation was almost exclusively concerned with the necessity for insisting upon a general mobilization at the earliest possible moment, in view of the inevitability of war with Germany, which every moment became clearer.”
²⁵
After returning to Chorister’s Bridge, Sazonov found Sukhomlinov waiting to fire him up, along with Duma president Rodzianko, who handed him a memorandum for the tsar. “As head of the representatives of the Russian people,” the message stated simply, Rodzianko, speaking on their behalf, “would never forgive a delay which might precipitate the country into fatal confusion.”
²⁶

Fortified by this unanimous Greek chorus of Russia’s civilian and military leaders, Sazonov headed over to the Peterhof, arriving, as requested, at three
PM
. Nicholas II, endeavoring not to be cornered, had insisted that the meeting include General
Tatistchev, who, incongruously, was to be handed orders for an urgent posting as the tsar’s personal liaison to Kaiser Wilhelm II (as Nicky had informed Willy in his ill-thought-through 1:20
AM
telegram, the one in which he had confessed that Russia’s mobilization measures had been “decided five days ago”). Russia’s foreign minister would have to make his case for war in the presence of the man being posted to Potsdam to work for peace.

Fortunately for Sazonov, General Tatistchev was so overwhelmed by the gravity of the moment that he remained silent as the foreign minister spoke. Having evidently forgotten Yanushkevitch’s instructions—or realizing that they would not work on the tsar—Sazonov skipped all the technical bits about partial versus general mobilization and focused instead on German intentions. “It was clear to everybody,” he declared, according to Schilling’s diary, “that Germany had decided to bring about a collision, as otherwise she would not have rejected all the pacificatory proposals that had been made and could easily have brought her ally to reason.” It was better, Sazonov continued, “to put away any fears that our warlike preparations would bring about a war, and to continue these preparations carefully rather than by reason of such fears to be taken unawares by war.” Assuming that war was now unavoidable, the foreign minister summed up his case in language similar to that of his telegram to Izvolsky the previous night: “it only remained to do everything that was necessary to meet war fully armed and under the most favorable conditions for ourselves.”
²⁷

By the conclusion of Sazonov’s remarks, the tsar was “deadly pale.” As sovereign, he felt a heavy weight on his shoulders. Finally he replied, “in a choking voice”: “Just think of the responsibility you are advising me to assume! Remember it is a question of sending thousands of men to their deaths.”
²⁸
Another long silence followed. As the fate of Europe hung in the balance, suddenly and without warning, General Tatistchev spoke up. Despite the ostensible importance of his brief, he had been
ignored, and he may have taken offense. Or he might simply have wanted to help alleviate the agony of his emperor. “Yes,” Tatistchev intoned gravely, “it is hard to decide.” Russia’s sovereign replied “in a rough and displeased tone, ‘I will decide,’” making clear that he would brook no further intervention. At last, shortly before four
PM
on Thursday, July 30, Tsar Nicholas II agreed to order general mobilization. Sazonov, on cue, rushed down to the palace telephone, called Yanushkevitch, and uttered the magic words: “Now you can smash your telephone!”
²⁹