July 1914: Countdown to War (16 page)

Berchtold, too, went right to work. Pursuant to Tisza’s request, an emergency Ministerial Council was to convene at three
PM
Tuesday afternoon to discuss the German reply to the diplomatic notes. In part to make amends for having kept Tisza out of the loop over the weekend, Berchtold summoned him to the Ballplatz for a full debriefing on Hoyos’s mission, along with the German ambassador, Tschirschky, and the Austrian minister-president, Count Stürgkh. Hoyos read out Szögyény’s two telegrams from Berlin and then repeated what he had told Berchtold about his conversation with Zimmermann. He did not hide anything, laying out the whole scenario of a surprise attack on Belgrade and the partitioning of Serbian territory. Tisza was horrified: he insisted that Hoyos’s remarks be regarded as solely the latter’s “personal opinion.” Berchtold, awkwardly, was forced to disavow his own chief of staff’s stated views on the record. A surprise attack was thus ruled out, along with the goal of partitioning Serbia. Tisza had won his first point, and it was a big one.
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Nevertheless, the odds were stacked heavily against him that afternoon. Tisza was not merely outnumbered by the ever-expanding war party; he stood essentially alone. In addition to Berchtold, who chaired, and Hoyos, who kept the meeting protocol, the men arranged against Tisza included Biliński, the minister for Bosnia-Herzegovina, keen to avenge the act of terrorism committed on his watch; Count Stürgkh, who had been urging war all along; War Minister Krobatin, a hawk of Conrad’s ilk; and Conrad himself, who, everyone knew, wanted to mobilize as soon as possible.

Berchtold began the meeting by bringing everyone up to speed on the Hoyos mission to Berlin. The “discussions with Germany,” he informed those not already in the know, “brought about a most satisfactory result, since Kaiser Wilhelm as well as Herr von Bethmann Hollweg solemnly promised the unconditional support of Germany in case of a warlike complication with Serbia.” The German government, he continued, was fully aware that “an armed encounter with Serbia might lead to war with Russia.”
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Despite the risks, however, Berchtold believed that showing weakness in the current crisis would be fatal. Only a “timely settlement of accounts with Serbia,” he concluded, could halt the disintegration of the dual monarchy.

Tisza now took the floor. Having been sidelined by the dispatch of Hoyos to Berlin with instructions he had not approved, he had every right to cry foul. Berchtold’s envoy had all but confessed that he was a loose cannon, letting slip unauthorized
scenarios at the Wilhelmstrasse about an Austrian war of conquest against Serbia. Displaying an open mind, Tisza graciously admitted that “the facts revealed by the inquiry in Sarajevo” showed that he had initially been “mistaken” about Serbian involvement in the assassination.
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In light of the dramatic developments “of the past few days,” the Hungarian said that he now saw “the possibility of military action against Serbia as less remote” than he had a week ago. Nevertheless, Tisza expressed regret that Hoyos had spoken in Berlin of “a surprise attack on Serbia without preliminary diplomatic preparation.” If Austria attacked without sufficient diplomatic cause, he warned, she must “count on the enmity of the entire Balkans, except for Bulgaria”—and Bulgaria, prostrate following her comeuppance in the Second Balkan War, could offer Austria little help on the battlefield. An opportunistic Romania would in that case surely come in alongside Serbia, and quite possibly Russia too. Austria-Hungary would then have a three-front war on her hands.

To prevent such a nightmare scenario, Tisza proposed a careful diplomatic strategy to precede any war against Serbia. First, the dual monarchy must draw up unequivocal demands on Serbia; if she rejected them, an ultimatum could be prepared, with a threat of armed intervention. If Belgrade then accepted Austria’s demands, Tisza promised, “we would have won a resounding diplomatic success and our prestige in the Balkans would rise.” If, on the other hand, the Serbs said no, then Tisza would agree to “warlike action”—if, and only if, Austria’s war aims were limited to a “reduction in the size of Serbian territory,” but not any kind of partition. Tisza warned that Russia would regard the “full annihilation of Serbia as a struggle of life and death.” Moreover, as Hungary’s minister-president, Tisza declared himself resolutely opposed to any annexation of Serbian territory by the dual monarchy, preferring that any postwar border changes benefit smaller Balkan states instead. On
the question of “now or later,” Tisza stated a clear preference for “later,” on the grounds that the low French birthrate meant that Germany’s relative strength was increasing. Finally, Tisza distanced himself from the Hoyos mission, declaring that it was “not for Germany to decide whether we ought to go to war with Serbia or not.” The question of war or peace was, in Tisza’s view, up to Austria-Hungary alone—meaning, in effect, it was up to him.

It was quite a performance. Having declared himself willing, for the first time, to consider taking “warlike action” against Serbia in retaliation for Sarajevo, Tisza then hedged his support for such action with so many diplomatic preconditions that there was almost no way the foreign minister could satisfy them. Still, Berchtold tried his best. While conceding Tisza’s point that Romania’s attitude was important, he argued that any intervention by Bucharest would depend on the attitude of Bulgaria, however weakened she was by the Second Balkan War; and that Romania did not want to fight a two-front war any more than Austria did. Echoing the view of German military planners, Berchtold noted that “the reduction of the growth of the population of France was more than balanced by the increasing number of inhabitants in Russia.” Coupled with the Great Program enacted in 1913, which would speed up Russia’s mobilization, the demographic data suggested that the Central Powers were growing relatively weaker, not stronger, over time.

The others quickly rallied around Berchtold. Stürgkh took up Tisza’s point about not letting the Germans decide when Austria went to war, arguing sensibly that the Germans had not only offered “unreserved loyalty” in Austria’s time of need, but had also insisted on immediate action. “Count Tisza,” he warned, “should take into account that if we pursue a weak and hesitating policy we may not be able to count on German support in the future.” Krobatin said that even Tisza’s best-case
scenario, that of a “diplomatic triumph” against Serbia, would be “worthless.” “We have already lost two opportunities for solving the Serbian question,” the war minister reminded everyone, with an eye on the Balkan Wars. “If we do this again,” he chided Tisza, “this will be taken as proof of our weakness.” Diplomatic niceties, he argued, impressed no one—the Japanese had not declared war on Russia in 1904, nor had the Balkan aggressors of 1912 or 1913. From the military point of view, it was best to mobilize sooner, and secretly, so as to take full advantage of surprise, rather than telegraphing Austria’s intentions to everyone.

All this was logical enough. By seeking to refute the Hungarian’s talking points, however, the other ministers were, in effect, conceding the ground of debate. Slowly, at first imperceptibly, Tisza succeeded in moving things in his direction by sheer stubbornness. The others budged on essentials; he did not. At last, after two hours of discussion, the council declared itself “prepared to accept [Tisza’s] view according to which mobilization will not take place until after concrete demands have been addressed to Serbia and, after being refused, an ultimatum has been sent.” As a sop to majority opinion, the council also stipulated that “all present except [Tisza] hold the belief that a purely diplomatic success, even if it ended with a glaring humiliation of Serbia, would be worthless.” But then this hardly mattered, as Tisza had already won the point about preparing the ground diplomatically, through two stages, before mobilizing.

The same dynamic was at work over the nature of the demands to be levied on Serbia. “Count Tisza,” the transcript reads, “remarked that he was anxious to meet the others halfway and was prepared to concede that the demands addressed to Serbia should be harsh.” But the Hungarian did not really meet the others halfway. “All but Tisza,” we read on, agreed unanimously
that “such stringent demands must be addressed to Serbia, that will make a refusal almost certain.” To this, Tisza objected that the terms given to Belgrade could “be very harsh, but not so [harsh] that everyone will clearly understand that we mean them to be rejected.” The key detail was this: Tisza would have to read and sign off on the text. Having been burned over the weekend by Berchtold and Hoyos, Tisza was not about to let it happen again.

Berchtold tried to put a brave face on things as he closed the fractious meeting. “Although there are still differences of opinion between Count Tisza and the others,” he declared, “we have still come closer together, as the propositions of the Hungarian minister-president will, in all probability . . . lead to a declaration of war with Serbia.”
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If Berchtold played his cards right, that is, Hungary’s minister-president might eventually support a war against Serbia that met his strict conditions. Meanwhile, Tisza had all but declared veto power over Berchtold’s diplomacy, insisting that he approve the text of any diplomatic note sent to Serbia. Moreover, by insisting on the sending of a note in the first place—with the implication that its rejection, too, be followed not by war but by another ultimatum—Tisza had badly routed Conrad and Krobatin, who both wanted to mobilize as rapidly as possible. In this way the stubborn Magyar had ruined Austria’s prospects of taking the kind of “decisive action” the Germans had insisted on. The kaiser and his chancellor, by offering carte blanche support, were now wedded to Austria’s new Balkan policy—no matter how dilatory and incompetent it might turn out to be.

 
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There is some debate as to whether Berchtold revised the meeting protocol here, having originally said that the Germans believed that “war with Russia would be the
likely
consequence” of an Austrian war against Serbia. This statement may have reflected the views of Zimmermann, as passed on by Hoyos. It would not, however, have accurately represented the views of either the kaiser or Bethmann Hollweg, who both clearly told Austria’s ambassador that they did not think Russia would intervene.

8–17 JULY

T
ISZA’S TACTICAL VICTORY
put Berchtold in a difficult position. The Hungarian had thrown sand in the gears of any swift action against Serbia; meanwhile, the Germans continued to press the need for speed. The kaiser and Bethmann were still on leave, but the policy they had outlined was clear enough. When German ambassador Tschirschky visited the Ballplatz on Wednesday, 8 July, to learn of the result of the previous day’s conference, he told Berchtold that “he could not emphasize enough, that Berlin expects the [dual] monarchy to take action against Serbia and that Germany would not understand if we let this opportunity pass without striking a blow.” That same day in Berlin, Austrian ambassador Szögyény visited the Wilhelmstrasse, where he was told by Undersecretary of State Zimmermann and “other authoritative figures” that “everyone here awaits with impatience our decision on what to do, for they have the view, that now is the right moment to move against Serbia—a moment this favorable will not easily repeat itself.” State Secretary Jagow, having at last returned from his Italian honeymoon, backed up the hawkish Zimmermann, telling Szögyény “in a most emphatic manner” that “the proposed action
against Serbia must be taken without delay.”
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Delay, of course, was exactly what Tisza was insisting on.

Some kind of delay was also all but mandated by the Austrian army’s recent institution of summer “harvest leave” for troops from rural areas. Conrad, the chief of staff, had signed off on the policy, although reluctantly, in order to appease powerful landowners in the dual monarchy. On Monday, 6 July, after rushing over to military headquarters from the Ballplatz, Conrad discovered, to his horror, that seven of his sixteen army corps had just been furloughed for harvest leave. Of these, five (the III, IV, V, XIII, and XIV) would return to active duty on 19 July, with the final two (VI and VII) on leave until 25 July. Unless Conrad wanted to telegraph Austria’s warlike intentions to Europe, he could not cancel harvest leave early. Therefore the army, too, would require two weeks to pass before mobilization was possible. Two weeks was far too slow for the Germans, but it might be enough to satisfy Tisza’s conditions.
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In Conrad’s first meeting with Berchtold after the Tuesday war council, at six
PM
on Wednesday, 8 July, the chief of staff insisted firmly that an ultimatum to Serbia be dispatched with a twenty-four- or forty-eight-hour time limit, so as not to give the Serbs time to mobilize while Austria waited for the expected refusal, which would be the signal for war. In view of the harvest leave issue—and the need to convert Tisza—both men agreed that the ultimatum could not be dispatched until 22 July at the earliest. It would be up to the foreign minister to win over Tisza in time to send a note to Belgrade by that date. Meanwhile, Berchtold suggested that Conrad and War Minister Krobatin each take vacation leave from Vienna, “to leave the impression that nothing was going on.” The chief of staff did as he was told, heading off Wednesday night to his estate, the Klammschlössel at Innichen, where he would stay for two weeks.
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Berchtold now did everything he could to break Tisza’s resistance. He told Tschirschky on Wednesday afternoon that
the Hungarian was “the one slowing things down,” so that the Germans would know he himself was doing all he could to move quickly. He then sent Tisza, who had returned to Budapest, a note outlining Tschirschky’s remarks on how keen Berlin was on speed, concluding from them that “the Germans would regard any reconciliation with Serbia on our part as a sign of weakness,” which would call into question Austria’s status as an ally. Berchtold informed Tisza that he was en route for an audience with His Majesty Franz Josef I at Bad Ischl, and “begged” the Hungarian to telegraph the palace with his response to the German ambassador’s remarks.
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