Jihad Joe (24 page)

The dreaded prison cell had taken Awlaki ever closer to joining the ranks of violent jihadists, yet he still held back. It would take a fellow American to strip away all pretensions and push him firmly into the camp of terrorism.

On November 5, 2009, Maj. Nidal Malik Hasan walked into a medical processing center in Fort Hood and opened fire on unarmed soldiers who were between deployments. He discharged his weapon more than a hundred times, killing thirteen and wounding at least twenty-nine more.
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Within the first few hours, the media covered the story as a mass shooting consistent with such lone gunman cases as the 2007 Virginia Tech massacre,
where a schizophrenic college student went on a shooting spree that left thirty-two people dead. But reports soon began to filter out that during his spree, Hasan had been shouting “Allahu Akbar!”—a Muslim superlative exclamation meaning “God is great” that has been appropriated by jihadists to celebrate attacks.
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An American born in Virginia in 1970 to Palestinian immigrants, Hasan worked for the family business before attending Virginia Tech, where he majored in biochemistry. In 1997 he enlisted in the U.S. Army and enrolled in medical school, his tuition paid in full by the U.S. government. He specialized in psychiatry—according to an uncle, he chose the specialty after fainting at the sight of childbirth during medical school. In exchange for his tuition, he agreed to an extended tour of duty—he was committed to the army through at least 2010.

Hasan was a lonely man, religious to begin with and even more religious after the death of his mother in May 2001 (his father had died a few years earlier). He worshipped at the Dar Al Hijra mosque in Falls Church, Virginia, where he became captivated by the imam, Anwar Awlaki. During the same period, Hasan could count at least two of the September 11 hijackers among his fellow worshippers.
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Desperate to marry, he nevertheless rejected the few women he managed to meet for failing to meet his standards.
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To be his wife, a woman would have to be a virgin, an Arab, and young. She had to cover her head and pray five times a day and live according to the Koran and Sunnah. He considered dozens of women, but no one was right.
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At the Walter Reed Army Medical Center, where Hasan was stationed as a psychiatrist after his graduation, things weren't going much better. After September 11 Hasan told friends he had been harassed by fellow soldiers. He told his psychiatric patients to look for healing in Islam, and he was prone to lecture random colleagues who crossed his path about the Koran. He told his fellow soldiers he was deeply opposed to the war in Iraq and tried to get out of the army, but he was not released from his obligation.
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In June 2007 the then captain Hasan gave a PowerPoint presentation to a room full of medical colleagues as part of his residency. His topic was not medical, however; it was religious:
The Koranic [sic] World View as It Relates to Muslims in the U.S. Military
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The presentation aimed to provide tools for military officers to “identify Muslim soldiers that may be having religious conflicts with the current wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan.” Hasan could hardly have offered a better diagnostic tool than the presentation itself.

Much of the PowerPoint was pure proselytization—slide after slide of quotes from the Koran, along with basic concepts and generalizations about Islam. But it didn't take long for Hasan to show where his real interests lay. One slide defined an “Islamist” as one who “advocates rule by Gods [sic] law.” Jihad was “a Muslim holy war or spiritual struggle against infidels.” He derided American Muslim clerics' fatwas on America's wars as “vague and ambiguous” and suggested that they were made “under duress.”

Muslims who killed other Muslims were condemned to hell by the Koran, Hasan continued. This conflict could lead to “adverse events,” such as the 2003 murder of two U.S. soldiers by Sergeant Hasan Akbar, who threw a grenade into three tents at a base in Kuwait. Hasan delved into complex justifications for defensive jihad, at times grasping for the language of Islamic scholarship.

He went further still, outlining arguments for offensive jihad—the concept that Muslims are obligated to take political control of the world—and quoting the notorious jihadist slogan, “We love death more than you love life.”

Under “Conclusions,” Hasan laid out a view of Islam that should have raised red flags among his fellow officers. “Muslims may be seen as moderate (compromising), but God is not,” the slide read. “Fighting to establish an Islamic State to please God, even by force, is condoned by the [sic] Islam.” Finally, “Muslim Soldiers should not serve in any capacity that renders them at risk to hurting/killing believers unjustly.”
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Hasan's colleagues were stunned, but no action was taken to evaluate the captain's suitability for the military. Some chalked the speech up to religious zeal. Others noted that complaining about a fellow soldier's religious views was a good way to end the complainer's career. Ironically, Hasan would later receive the Global War on Terrorism Service Medal.
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Having faced no consequences for his presentation, Hasan decided to revisit the topic when he was required to give another talk. This time, he decided that he needed to do more research, so he e-mailed his former imam—Awlaki, who had only just been released from a Yemeni prison.
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The example of Hasan Akbar and his “adverse event” lingered in Hasan's mind. The men's worldviews had similarities. One month prior to his attack,
Akbar had written in his diary, “I will have to decide to kill my Muslim brothers fighting for Saddam Hussein or my battle buddies. [ … ] I may not have killed any Muslims, but being in the Army is the same thing. I may have to make a choice very soon on who to kill.”
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When Hasan wrote to Awlaki, he asked whether Akbar would have been considered a martyr. At least eighteen e-mails were exchanged between the two men, most of them from Hasan to Awlaki. The e-mails followed the same lines as the PowerPoint and two subsequent presentations Hasan gave to colleagues on the same topic.

The army wasn't the only institution that failed to respond to the warning signs; the FBI intercepted Hasan's e-mails to Awlaki but didn't investigate. Awlaki was, by most accounts, cautious about the missives from a U.S. military man he had barely met years earlier. He did not advocate violence, officials said, and Hasan did not volunteer that he was planning an attack.
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Yet there were clues. At one point Hasan wrote, “I can't wait to join you [in the afterlife].” He asked for guidance about when jihad was justified and whether it was Islamically permissible for innocents to be killed in suicide attacks. Elements of these discussions surfaced in his later presentations at Walter Reed, in which he praised suicide bombers and characterized the war on terrorism as a war on Islam.
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The e-mails continued through June 2009. In July Hasan was assigned to Fort Hood, Texas. His initial assignment was to evaluate soldiers headed for the front lines; then he too would be deployed to a combat zone. In Texas he lived life as a man who cared little for it, renting a rundown unit in a bad part of town near the base. He had few friends.
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Like the 9/11 hijackers (also students of Awlaki), Hasan frequented a strip club in the final days before he carried out his mission, paying $50 for private lap dances from fully naked women.

The strip club was next door to the gun shop where Hasan armed himself for the attack. Two days before his killing spree, Hasan took an extended round of target practice at a local range. The night before the attack, he stayed up all night. That morning he gave his perishable groceries to his neighbors.
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The evidence of premeditation and planning is overwhelming. The evidence of Hasan's involvement with jihadist ideology is overwhelming as well. He may also have been mentally ill; certainly he was lonely, frustrated, and socially inept.

But his expressions of jihadist ideology and his patterns of reinforcement closely track with other American jihadist cases in which mental fitness is not an issue. A Mafia enforcer might be a stone-cold psychotic, but he is still a member of the Mafia. Mentally ill individuals can and do join street gangs and crime cartels— or, for that matter, the armed forces and the police. Acknowledging mental illness does not erase affiliations.

There is no evidence Hasan was delusional. He sought out and embraced an established ideology outside the mainstream of American Islam but certainly well within the mainstream of jihadist thought. He voiced his belief in the same world-view that has justified acts of murder by many other people around the world. His actions cannot be lightly dismissed as an act of random insanity. They must be placed within the jihadist/terrorist context.

The Fort Hood shootings thrust Awlaki into the spotlight at long last. Two days after the shooting, news reports began to connect Awlaki to Hasan. Two days after that, Awlaki took to his blog with his most aggressive public statement to date. Not only did he justify the attacks, he damned American Muslims who had condemned the attacks.

Nidal Hassan [sic] is a hero. He is a man of conscience who could not bear living the contradiction of being a Muslim and serving in an army that is fighting against his own people. This is a contradiction that many Muslims brush aside and just pretend that it doesn't exist. Any decent Muslim cannot live, understanding properly his duties towards his Creator and his fellow Muslims, and yet serve as a US soldier. The US is leading the war against terrorism which in reality is a war against Islam. Its army is directly invading two Muslim countries and indirectly occupying the rest through its stooges.

Nidal opened fire on soldiers who were on their way to be deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan. How can there be any dispute about the virtue of what he has done? In fact the only way a Muslim could Islamically justify serving as a soldier in the US army is if his intention is to follow the footsteps of men like Nidal. [ … ] The American Muslims who condemned his actions have committed treason against the Muslim Ummah and have fallen into hypocrisy.
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Yet once again, at the very edge of the precipice, Awlaki pulled back, as he always had. Rather than call on all American Muslims to take up arms and follow Hasan's example, he instead suggested they leave the United States.

The inconsistency of being a Muslim today and living in America and the West in general reveals the wisdom behind the opinions that call for migration from the West. It is becoming more and more difficult to hold on to Islam in an environment that is becoming more hostile towards Muslims.
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In an interview soon after, Awlaki admitted exchanging e-mails with Hasan but still denied encouraging him to commit violence.
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Awlaki's peculiar lack of commitment in his public discourse might have been born out of his morbid obsession with imprisonment. He seemed to lack the courage of his convictions, at least when he was in the public eye, but his wall of evasion was crumbling fast.

A few months earlier, a young Nigerian Muslim named Omar Abdulmutallab had made his way to Yemen and joined a training camp run by the local terrorist franchise al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Mutallab was trained for a suicide operation: the detonation of a bomb smuggled onto a U.S bound airliner. He made his attempt on December 25, 2009—Christmas Day—but failed when the bomb, which he had hidden in his underwear, merely caught fire, severely burning his genitals. One of his trainers, he told the FBI after his arrest, was Anwar Awlaki, who had explicitly directed him to carry out the attack.
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Fueled by the two attacks in close proximity, coverage of Awlaki exploded. A Nexis search showed seven stories mentioning Anwar Awlaki in major newspapers during 2007. In 2008 there were five stories. In 2009 there were 651 stories, almost all of which were published in November and December. In the first six months of 2010, there were 948, in addition to countless television and Internet stories.

The coverage took on an increasingly hysterical tone. Dozens of reports characterized Awlaki as “the next Osama bin Laden” and one of the most serious threats to the United States in years.
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In late 2009 the Obama administration put Awlaki on a list of high-value targets, authorizing U.S. covert operations to capture or kill the American citizen.
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In March 2010, perhaps realizing he had nothing left to lose, Awlaki finally pulled the trigger. An audio message released to jihadist Internet forums positioned him squarely on the side of terrorism—while he continued to deny his connection to any previous attack. The speech was masterful and remarkably attuned to an American audience, invoking an almost Reaganesque sense of nostalgia before lowering the boom.

To the American people I say: Do you remember the good old days, when Americans were enjoying the blessings of security and peace? When the word “terrorism” was rarely invoked? And when you were oblivious to any threats?

I remember a time when you could purchase an airline ticket from the classified section of your local or college newspaper, and use it, even though it was issued to a different name, because no one would bother asking you for an ID before boarding a plane. No long lines, no elaborate searches, no body scans, no sniffing dogs, no taking off your shoes and emptying your pockets. You were a nation at ease.

But America thought that it could threaten the lives of others, kill and invade, occupy and plunder, and conspire, without bearing the consequences of its actions. 9/11 was the answer of the millions of people who suffer from American aggression. And since then, America has not been safe.
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