JFK & the Unspeakable: Why He Died & Why It Matters (72 page)

[
19
]. Lee Harvey Oswald Wanted Notice Card, FBI Jacket No. 327 925 D; Ref. Memo dated 11-4-59, Branigan to Belmont. Document on CD-ROM for John Armstrong,
Harvey and Lee: How the CIA Framed Oswald
(Arlington, Tex.: Quasar, 2003), Oct, 63-08.

[
20
]. Ibid., with the addition to the document: “FLASH CANCELLED: Information Received 10-9-63 (per v/s from Gheesling Div 5) DL 10/15/63.”

[
21
]. Classified Message from Central Intelligence Agency to Federal Bureau of Investigation on Lee Henry [
sic
] Oswald, October 10, 1963. On page 513 of John Newman,
Oswald and the CIA
(New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, 1995). The CIA sent the same 10/10/63 message to the Department of State and the Department of the Navy.

[
22
]. Newman, “Oswald, the CIA and Mexico City,” p. 4.

[
23
]. Cited by John Newman, “Mexico City—A New Analysis,” Presentation at the “November in Dallas” JFK Lancer Conference, November 19, 1999; transcript at jfklancer.com/backes/newman, p. 35.

[
24
]. Hosty,
Assignment, Oswald,
p. 166. Hoover was reacting defensively to the Warren Commission’s criticisms that “the FBI took an unduly restrictive view of its responsibilities in preventive intelligence work, prior to the assassination” and had failed “to list Oswald as a potential threat to the safety of the President.”
The Warren
Commission Report
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992, from U.S. Government printing in 1964), p. 443. The FBI director imposed disciplinary transfers on Marvin Gheesling and four other agents who had key responsibilities for the Oswald information before the assassination. Hoover sent letters reprimanding twelve more agents for their not having been more alert regarding Oswald. Hosty,
Assignment, Oswald,
p. 167.

[
25
]. The FBI memorandum with Hoover’s written comment on it is reproduced on page 5 of Newman, “Oswald, the CIA and Mexico City” (emphasis added).

[
26
]. Church Committee,
The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of
the Intelligence Agencies
,
Book V, Final Report
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 65. See also Newman,
Oswald and the CIA,
p. 394.

[
27
]. Summers,
Conspiracy
, pp. 335-36. When Anthony Summers found and interviewed William Gaudet at a retirement home fifteen years later, the CIA man claimed that his proximity to Oswald in line at the consulate and their simultaneous trips to Mexico were only coincidences. Gaudet did admit to Summers that he worked secretly for the CIA for more than twenty years. He also said he knew Oswald in New Orleans, though he quickly changed his statement to his having merely observed Oswald handing out leaflets. Ibid., pp. 336-37.

[
28
]. Ibid., p. 336.

[
29
]. Cited by Howard Hughes’s assistant John Meir; interviewed by Lisa Pease, “The RFK Plot Part II: Rubik’s Cube,” in
The Assassinations
, edited by James DiEugenio and Lisa Pease (Los Angeles: Feral House, 2003), p. 608. Hoover was commenting on the assassination of Robert Kennedy.

[
30
]. Nancy Zaroulis and Gerald Sullivan,
Who Spoke Up? American Protest against the War in Vietnam
1963-1975
(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1984), p. 12.

[
31
]. Ibid., pp. 12-13.

[
32
]. “National Security Action Memorandum No. 263,” October 11, 1963,
Foreign Relations of the United
States (FRUS), 1961-1963, Volume IV: Vietnam: August-December 1963
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), p. 396.

[
33
]. Lodge cable on September 11, 1963, calling for the overthrow of Diem in
FRUS, 1961-1963,
vol. IV, pp. 171-74; McGeorge Bundy’s supportive response in his September 11 telephone call to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, ibid., p. 176. See also John M. Newman,
JFK and Vietnam: Deception, Intrigue, and the Struggle for Power
(New York: Warner Books, 1992), pp. 379-80. Kennedy ordered a noncommittal response to Lodge saying “we are considering his cable” and urging him once again to concentrate on communicating with Diem.
FRUS
,
1961-1963,
vol. IV, p. 193.

[
34
]. Chalmers M. Roberts,
First Rough Draft: A Journalist’s Journal of Our Times
(New York: Praeger, 1973), pp. 195-96.

[
35
]. Charles Bartlett, “Portrait of a Friend,” in
The Kennedy Presidency: 17 Intimate Perspectives of John F. Kennedy
, edited by Kenneth W. Thompson (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1985), p. 16.

[
36
]. John Aloysius Farrell,
Tip O’Neill and the Democratic Century
(Boston: Little, Brown, 2001), p. 193.

[
37
]. Ralph G. Martin,
A Hero for Our Time: An Intimate Story of the Kennedy Years
(New York: Ballantine Books, 1983), p.465. Date of Kennedy’s last visit to Hyannis Port from Michael Desmond’s inspection of JFK’s Appointments Index at the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library.

[
38
]. Tristram Coffin, “CIA: Tales of a Rogue Elephant,”
The Washington Spectator
(October 1, 1987), p. 2.

[
39
]. Author’s interview of Mrs. Zola Shoup, September 9, 1999. Stephen Plotkin, Reference Archivist at the Kennedy Library, confirmed from the White House Appointments Book that President Kennedy met with General Shoup at 10:52 a.m. on November 11, 1963, and walked over with him to the wreath-laying ceremony.

[
40
]. Coffin, “CIA: Tales,” p. 2.

[
41
]. Wayne Morse, interview by David Nyhan, “We’ve Been a Police State a Long Time,”
Boston Globe
(June 24, 1973), pp. A1-2. Wayne Morse remained courageously true to his antiwar convictions after his speeches’ target and converted listener, John Kennedy, was murdered and the prowar Lyndon Johnson took his place as president. Morse of Oregon and Ernest Gruening of Alaska were the only two senators who voted against the Tonkin Gulf Resolution in 1964 that “legitimized” the Vietnam War. They were both defeated for reelection. Ibid., p. A-1.

[
42
]. Coffin, “CIA: Tales,” p. 2.

[
43
]. Henry Brandon,
Anatomy of Error: The Inside Story of the Asian War on the Potomac, 1954-1969
(Boston: Gambit, 1969), p. 30.

[
44
]. Michael Forrestal quote cited from a 1971 NBC television program by Roberts,
First
Rough Draft
, p. 221.

[
45
].
FRUS, 1961-1963,
vol. IV, p. 143.

[
46
]. Ibid., p. 252.

[
47
]. Ibid., p. 254.

[
48
]. Ibid., p. 255.

[
49
]. Ibid.

[
50
]. Harriman defined the president’s “disaster” by saying that Kennedy was sending “two men opposed to our policy [McNamara and Taylor], plus one who wouldn’t stand up [Deputy Undersecretary of State U. Alexis Johnson], to carry out policy.” Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman) and Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff, Washington, September 17, 1963, 4:20 p.m.
FRUS, 1961-1963,
vol. IV, p. 256.

[
51
]. Ibid., p. 256.

[
52
]. William Colby,
Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1978), p. 178.

[
53
].
The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of the United States Decision Making on Vietnam,
Senator Gravel Edition, 5 vols. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972), vol. 2, p. 724.

[
54
]. David T. Ratcliffe,
Understanding Special Operations and Their Impact on the Vietnam War Era:
1989 Interview with L. Fletcher Prouty Colonel USAF (Retired)
(Santa Cruz, Calif.: rat haus reality press, 1999), pp. 68-70.

[
55
]. Arthur Krock, “In the Nation: The Intra-Administration War in Vietnam,”
New York Times
(October 3, 1963), p. 34.

[
56
]. Ibid.

[
57
]. Richard Starnes, “‘Arrogant’ CIA Disobeys Orders in Viet Nam,”
Washington Daily News
(October 2, 1963), p. 3.

[
58
].
FRUS, 1961-1963,
vol. IV, p. 205.

[
59
]. Ibid.

[
60
]. By a symbolic act, Lodge made certain the CIA in Vietnam knew he had taken over its command post for “changing governments.” He moved into the deposed station chief’s former home. Peer de Silva,
Sub
Rosa: The CIA and the Uses of Intelligence
(New York: Times Books, 1978), p. 211.