Jewish Life in Nazi Germany: Dilemmas and Responses (26 page)

The elimination of the cohabitation of Germans and Jews was on the agenda of the top-level meeting convened at Göring’s headquarters in Berlin on 12 November 1938. The Nazi leaders took stock of what the pogrom had unleashed, and talked about the post-pogrom strategy.
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There was a general consensus to speed up and complete the processes of exclusion, expropriation, and expulsion of the Jews. Three years later, at the wannsee Conference, the decision-makers talked about the results in Germany, and then about strategies to complete the “final solution” in europe. In November 1938, there were still opposing views expressed when the issues of ghettos and badges were raised. Reinhard Heydrich, on his way to expanding his jurisdiction over anti-Jewish policy, proposed the introduction of a
bestimmtes Abzeichen
(special badge), and emphasized the advantage of public stigmatization—the surveillance “by the vigilant eye of the population.” Göring, obviously taken by surprise, exclaimed: “A uniform!” Heydrich repeated: “A badge.” Göring responded by proposing his idea: “My dear Heydrich, you will not be able to avoid having ghettos in the cities on a really big scale. They will have to be established.” Heydrich responded: “From a police point of view, I think, a ghetto, in the form of a completely segregated district with only Jews, is not possible. we would have no control over a ghetto where the Jew gets together with all of his tribe. It would be a permanent hideout for criminals and [a source] of epidemics.”
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once the decision was made in November 1938 to terminate the cohabitation of Germans and Jews, preparations commenced for the relocation and concentration of Jews. As in other areas of Nazi Jewish pol-icy, the decision-making processes followed the patterns of what Hans Mommsen once termed “cumulative radicalization.”
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Jürgen Matthäus has introduced the term “controlled escalation”
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as a concept to describe the transition from persecution to genocide. Indeed, “control” and “escalation” were characteristic features of the
Entjudung
of the housing market. After the November pogrom, guidelines were issued from the “center,” via clear channels of command, to the “periphery,” to local communities where the Jews were to be driven out from their homes, relocated, and isolated. The instructions from “above” clearly stated that the
Wegschaffung
, the removal of Jews, had to be carried out “inconspicuously,” “systematically,” “gradually,” and should be “free of trouble,” in the interest of “public security and order.”
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The first step involved the eviction of Jews renting large apartments in “Aryan” buildings and their removal to smaller flats located, if possible, “under one roof.” Secondly, Jewish-owned buildings were selected and transformed into
Judenhäuser.
They were earmarked for later “Aryanization.” In other words, once the
Judenhäuser
had fulfilled their function, the final
Entjudung
of the housing market was to complete the entire process of “Aryanization.” The third step involved encourag-ing “Aryans” residing in Jewish-owned buildings to move into “Jew-free” houses. Since these “Aryans” enjoyed tenant protection, the Nazis appealed to their
gesundes Volksempfinden
(concern about health of the people), or strongly advised them in the name of “public sentiment” to leave the
Judenhaus
. Finally, many types of Jewish-owned buildings were converted to provide alternative accommodation for the evicted Jews. They included not only private homes, apartments, and boarding houses, but also buildings belonging to the Jewish community, such as kindergartens and schools, nursing homes and hospitals, offices and halls, prayer rooms, and even funeral parlors.
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Hitler approved the removal strategy, designed in the aftermath of the November pogrom, and left it to Göring to convey his “wishes” and “directives” to the inner core of the party, the Gauleiters (district leaders), and to encourage them to follow the orders of the Führer. on 6 December 1938, they were told that no ghetto was to be established, no badge introduced, no general
Judenbann
imposed, and no forced labor camps—as demanded by Austrian Nazi leaders—to be set up.
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Instead, every effort was to be made to force Jews out of Germany and to confine any remaining Jews in a ghetto without walls—until, as Göring put it,
das Stichwort gegeben wird
(the specific command or “key word” was uttered) for the “Aryanization” of the
Judenhäuser.
The guidelines were sent to the relevant Reich ministries to prepare a new
Sonderrecht
(special right) to legalize the termination of cohabitation of Germans and Jews. Göring’s instructions of 28 December 1938 contained the following message: wherever rental conditions permit, the Jews are to be placed together in one building. For this reason the Aryanization of Jewish-owned homes will be the last step—completing the
Gesamtarisierung
[total “Aryanization”]. only in individual cases, provided that there are compelling reasons, can they be Aryanized at an earlier stage.
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In April 1939, the “Law Concerning Tenant Relations with Jews”
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sanctioned the termination of the cohabitation of Germans and Jews. The first implementation order followed suit.
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Any and all protection for Jewish tenants was declared null and void. Jews could be evicted only on the condition that alternative accommodation in Jewish-owned buildings was guaranteed; this requirement ensured that Jews put out on the street would not become a burden on the welfare services for the homeless. In many places, Jews were forced to meet the cost of improvements and repairs requested by the new tenant. Henceforth, Jews were permitted to sign leases only with other Jews. Jewish landlords were obliged to accept Jews as tenants or subtenants “at the request of the local authorities.” It was up to the municipalities to place several Jewish families in one
Judenhaus
, “forcibly, if necessary.” one basic principle was reconfirmed: the selection of
Judenhäuser
was not to lead to the establishment of ghettos. The law prescribed the registration of all living spaces, whether vacant or occupied and whether rented to Jews or to Germans. Furthermore, ev-ery eviction, letting, and change of residence required the permission of the authorities.
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Later, these housing records—together with the
Judenkarteien
(catalogues containing Jews’ registration cards)
—
were to facilitate the “round ups” of the Jews for deportation.

Journalists were on the alert to report the successful
Entjudung
of German homes, neighborhoods, and districts. Jurists commented on the new
Sonderrecht.
within their vocabulary, the familiar terms of Nazi propaganda and Nazi policy dominated. A legal opinion, published in 1940, reads: “It contradicts all National Socialist sentiment about law when German
Volksgenossen
have to live with Jews together under one roof. A true
Hausgemeinschaft
(housing community), as part of the
Volksgemeinschaft
is only tenable between people of the ‘same kind’ and ‘blood.’”
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In the “official language,” a word appeared that did not exist in the German language; as it was invented by bureaucrats, it remains untranslatable.
Entsiedelter Jude
,
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a Jew “de-settled,” forms an expression that transcends the meanings of “resettled” or “relocated,” “evicted” or “displaced,” or even “uprooted.” The symbolic meaning connotes the final exclusion from society or the “uncompromising removal” of the Jew. The term
Entsiedelter Jude
was a file heading on a form required to process the belongings left in Jewish homes that had been “vacated.”
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Regulations, proclamations, and registrations triggered the first wave of evictions in the early summer of 1939. The speed and form of the relocation and concentration of the Jews varied from place to place, depending on the specific conditions prevailing at the “periphery.” Several municipalities had already gained first-hand experience in concentrating certain Jewish groups in separate locations, such as ill and needy clients of the Jewish welfare services. These local actions commenced in 1937 and foreshadowed, as wolf Gruner argues,
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the establishment of
Judenhäuser.
As in other areas of Nazi anti-Jewish policy, local authorities were given some leeway for initiative; for example, some used more radical measures and, in doing so, competed with other cities, towns, and villages in their efforts to be the first to make their residential areas
judenfrei.
The task required a considerable amount of administrative work, involving numerous Nazi institutions, agencies, and departments. Local councils, and especially housing offices, worked in close cooperation with Gestapo officials and party functionaries, as well as with landlords, real estate agents, and other Nazi representatives.

The Nazis drew Jewish organizations into their re-housing program. As in other areas involved in the persecution—emigration, welfare, forced labor, distribution of food and other goods, stigmatization, and deportation—officials of the Reichsvereinigung and kulturgemeinden were compelled to assist in conveying the Nazi orders and in implementing the housing policy. In major cities, special Housing Advisory Boards were set up to keep the records, to draw up lists, and to organize the relocation of homeless Jews into
Judenhäuser
. Dr. Martha Moses, head of the housing department of the Jewish community in Berlin, recalls the procedures: The Jewish community was always informed of the apartments to be vacated and the appointed date. Through the land register, the Housing Advisory Board was able to trace both Jewish property owners and the Jewish tenants living in these buildings, where tenants forced to give up their apartments had to be re-accommodated as subtenants. This was done with all possible sensitivity. The professions of the parties concerned, their family status, the residents’ state of health and the sanitary condition of the building were all taken into consideration. Given the relatively large Jewish ownership of property in Berlin, the procedures went quite smoothly . . . If the parties could not agree on a subletting fee, the Housing Advisory Board stepped in. Such differences of opinion were rare, however. The parties involved settled down to a peaceful coexistence. A different state of affairs prevailed in Vienna . . . [w]here the Jews were herded together in a very small number of apartments . . . , widespread misery, illness and infestation resulted.
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everywhere, inmates of
Judenhäuser
were repeatedly warned to fol-low official instructions. Precise records of rents and subletting fees had to be maintained. Inspections of “vacant areas” could be undertaken only with official authorization. House keys were to be kept in an agreed location, to allow inspectors access at any time. Later, when the inmates had been deported and the doors were locked and sealed by the Gestapo, the keys were deposited at the local police station. Inspectors then appeared to compile a comprehensive report. The instructions, given by the Vermögensverwertungsstelle (Property Utilization office) of the Finanzamt (Tax office) in Hamburg, reveal the procedure. All items found were recorded, then compared with the property declarations the inmates had filled out and signed prior to their deportation. Bank books and securities, valuable goods such as precious metals, mints or stamps, furs and woolens, cultural objects and books in Hebrew, works of art and military medals, business papers and other relevant documents, gramophones and records were taken away, to be processed for auction or distribution. Soap and detergent were also confiscated. Rotten food had to be destroyed on the spot. Family pho-tos and letters were also burned in ovens. The Nazi officials did not re-move items that did not belong to the Jews; they merely recorded these objects, such as lamps and stoves. Before Germans were permitted to move into a vacated
Judenhaus
, officials of health and housing departments inspected the empty place to arrange the disinfection of rooms, kitchen, and bathroom, and to decide whether repairs or improvements were required. The local authorities refused to cover these costs.
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In September 1941, the Nazis introduced the large six-pointed yel-low badge, a powerful symbol that had been part of the history of Jew-hatred since medieval times.
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Some Jews tried to hide the star in public. A few wore the patch with pride and dignity, remembering the famous call from Robert weltsch shortly after the anti-Jewish boycott of April 1933: “The yellow badge—wear it with pride!”
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In September 1941, all Jews felt the stigmatizing effect of the humiliation and rejection that the star represented. Victor klemperer, living in a
Judenhaus
in Dresden, records in his diary: “Since the Star of David, which is due to arise on Friday, 19
^th
September, things are very bad. everyone’s attitude changing by turns, mine included: I shall go out proud and dignified—I shall shut myself in and not leave the house again.”
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After the war, he recalls in his notebook: “After the introduction of the
Judenstern
it really did not much matter anymore whether
Judenhäuser
were dispersed or formed their own quarter, every
Sternjude
(Jewish wearer of the star) carried his own ghetto with him like a snail its shell.”
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