It Is Dangerous to Be Right When the Government Is Wrong (3 page)

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Natural Rights

Natural Rights is a related but separate concept to the Natural Law. If each of us lived on an island by ourselves, we could live without fear of the Natural Law being transgressed. However, almost all of us live in complex societies where social interaction is the norm. The problem is that humans have a frightening tendency to impede the natural inclinations of other human beings, presenting a dilemma: Although humans must be able to mesh with one another, they need to do so in a manner which preserves the Natural Law. Therefore, there is a need for rights which establish rules respecting those interactions so as to reinforce the pursuit of our yearnings implicit in nature. Professor Randy Barnett defines them in the following manner:

Natural rights attempts to identify conceptually the space within which vulnerable people need to be free to make their own choices about the directions of their lives, which includes crucially the choices of how to acquire, use, and dispose of scarce physical resources.
³

In other words, our natural rights protect our ability to pursue our natural inclinations free from government interference: To live, to love, to acquire property, to be productive, to be left alone. If a human or if a government transgresses those rights, then it is violating those rules of social interaction, and hence the Natural Law.

Stated simply, because natural rights protect our human nature and are based on the eternal law, they are described as self-evident and inalienable. By self-evident, it is meant that these rights do not require some scientific proof in order to explain their existence. Humans have a natural inclination to preserve their own lives: Although we can certainly try to understand precisely why it is that humans try to preserve their lives, it can stand by itself and needs no further explanation or rationalization. Although a legislature may order that the right to life will be disregarded, it can never take that right away or alter the fundamental human yearning to live, just as Khrushchev could never change the fact that corn cannot grow in Siberia.

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Natural rights are in contrast to political rights, which we do in fact acquire by virtue of the government. Thus, in addition to natural rights, we can possess whichever political rights the government guarantees. For example, most of the rights recognized in the Constitution are Natural Rights. However, some, such as the right to be indicted by a grand jury before prosecution, depend upon the Constitution, and not the Natural Law, for their existence. Is there a fundamental human yearning to compel government prosecutors to present a case to a grand jury, at which no judge or defense counsel is present, and the make-up of which is usually timid souls eager to please the prosecutors? Certainly not. Although it may sometimes work as a matter of policy as a check on the government, it has nothing to do with human inclinations and the Natural Law. Nonetheless, it is an additional right which we enjoy by virtue of being under the jurisdiction of the federal government (as opposed to simply being human). Therefore, unlike Natural Rights which can be called pre-political, there are indeed political rights which rely upon government for their existence, and cannot be considered self-evident.

By inalienable it is meant that these rights cannot be taken away from us under any circumstances, although we can give them up. Thus, even if we desired to do so, we could never sell ourselves into slavery and relinquish all claims on liberty. Such a transaction would be void as contrary to the Natural Law. But one may argue, can't we sell our property, thus making it alienable? Although we can alienate our property, we can never alienate our
right
to acquire, possess, alter, and trade property. Thus when we exchange one good for another, we are merely converting the subject of that right into something else; we are not adversely affecting the right itself. If we grew corn and donated it to a local charity, the fact of that donation does not change that we always have a right to claim future corn production for ourselves.

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The cornerstone of a libertarian understanding of Natural Rights, and how social interactions should be structured so as to maximize the pursuit of our fundamental human yearnings, is the nonaggression principle. This states that we are free to do as we choose, but only to the extent that our actions do not infringe upon the freedoms of others. Thus, my freedom to swing my arms ends a few inches in front of your nose. In addition to individuals, governments must also obey the nonaggression principle, as governments are merely the constructs of individuals, deriving their just powers from what the governed have consensually given them, and are thus temporal “things” secondary to the Natural Law.

In modern society, where the natural law has been perverted, we have permitted the government to monopolize violence and coercion. This has resulted in our sheep-like acceptance of theft of property, liberty, and dignity by the government. We have also permitted the perversion of the principle of subsidiarity. Subsidiarity encompasses von Mises' assertion that government is the negation of liberty, Aquinas's view that the government's use of force should be as little as possible, and Jefferson's mantra that that government is best which governs least. To comply with the doctrine of subsidiarity, governmental tasks should be performed by the lowest level of government possible, so as to disturb the least individual freedom, absorb the fewest public resources, and endure for the briefest time period. I know what you are probably thinking. . . . This doesn't sound like anything in American government today. You're right.

Elsewhere in this book, we explore a number of different natural rights which embody the nonaggression principle, such as the right to free speech and the right to property. However, whenever we attempt to discuss Natural Rights, the same “problem” that we encountered with the Natural Law arises: What exactly are those rights? As noted above, those who criticize the philosophy of Natural Rights typically do so because they are frustrated by what they perceive to be an inherent subjectivity in the method of identifying those rights. After all, the law prides itself on being objective and determinable. And sadly, the ambiguity of the Natural Law has been abused from time to time so as to disparage our natural rights.

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Such was the case in Justice Joseph P. Bradley's concurrence in
Bradwell v. Illinois
, an 1873 Supreme Court case that upheld Illinois' refusal to license a woman as a lawyer. He famously stated that “the constitution of the family organization, which is founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of things, indicates the domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and functions of womanhood.” Just as geography was once plagued by the belief that the world is flat, so, too, has the practice of discerning the Natural Law fallen victim to ignorance, stereotyping, and invidious discrimination by the government.

The problem with this criticism is that it entirely misconceives the character of natural rights. Rather than be turned off by any sort of perceived subjectivity of determining our “proper ends,” we should be instilled with a sense of deep respect for and complete deference to those immutable yearnings implicit in the order of things. It is no more sensible to reject the natural law for its lack of objectivity than to disparage the field of physics for the cryptic behavior of subatomic particles, and thus revert to the belief that all things are made up of earth, wind, water, and fire because it is easier to understand. Subjectivity has absolutely nothing to do with truth, merely the ease and certainty of determining what those truths are.

Our politicians should be terrified at the prospect of encroaching upon our natural rights, and thus interfering with the natural order of things, especially because of their subjectivity, just as we would be terrified to take some experimental medicine about which nothing was known. And as we shall see, even someone who does not believe in the philosophy of the natural law must accept that, if properly followed, it avoids all of the crimes against humanity which we have seen government commit throughout human history. I speak not just of the truth of Natural Rights, but their capacity to foil tyranny.

However, the concept of rights does not in reality have to be complicated at all. Rather, all rights, and indeed all tenets of libertarian philosophy, can be traced back to one single right: The right to own property. Although we traditionally think of this as the right to control tangible, external things (and that is the understanding adopted by the chapter in this book on property rights), it really begins earlier, with a property right to one's own body. If we acknowledge this application of the right in conjunction with the nonaggression principle, then we also recognize free speech, freedom of association, freedom of travel, and a right to privacy. As Murray Rothbard explains in his book
The Ethics of Liberty
,

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A person does not have a “right to freedom of speech”; what he
does
have is the right to hire a hall and address the people who enter the premises. He does not have a “right to freedom of the press”; what he
does
have is the right to write or publish a pamphlet, and to sell that pamphlet to those who are willing to buy it (or to give it away to those who are willing to accept it). Thus, what he has in each of these cases is property rights, including the right of free contract and transfer which form a part of such rights of ownership. There is no extra “right of free speech” or free press beyond the property rights that a person may have in any given case.
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If we, however, extend this property right beyond the body and acknowledge that humans must retain control over tangible things external to them, then we also recognize the ability of one to do business and freely contract with others. Moreover, it declares government initiatives such as taxation and the Federal Reserve's inflationary policies as illegitimate and in contravention of the Natural Law. And, as we shall see, some government initiatives, such as war, violate this property right in nearly every single form it can take. Thus, although one may fairly say that libertarians share general principles such as nonaggression and “free markets,” among others, the common denominator within this philosophical movement is simply that there are certain spheres of this world which belong exclusively to the individual. We have dominion over these spheres by virtue of being human, and for that reason, they are natural rights which do not rest on any government for their existence.

Human Law

The key difference between the Eternal Law, the Natural Law, Natural Rights, and Human Law, is that the last of these is not implicit in the order of things, but is actually promulgated by humans. Nonetheless, if lawmakers are to create the best society, they must be informed by human nature. Professor Barnett notes the role that man-made law plays in the scheme of Natural Law:

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Once these [natural] rights are identified, it is a somewhat, but not entirely, separate matter of institutional design to see how they can best be protected in a world in which others are more than willing, if given half a chance, to interfere with the well-being of others. . . . Natural rights, therefore, do not enforce themselves. They are rather a mode of normative analysis used to evaluate and critique the positive law that is needed to reinforce them.
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The proper role, then, for human law is to extend those natural rights into workable legal standards. After all, we live in an extraordinarily complex world, and it is not always obvious how natural rights, such as the right to order one's personal life, apply to new and controversial questions, such as euthanasia or net neutrality. Moreover, although there may be a natural right to enter into contracts on one's own terms, there is an important role for laws which require that contracts take a certain form before they can be enforced (so as to minimize the possibility of fraud). Although one may intuit that the right to enter into contracts protects the ability of parties to enter into contracts without their signatures, legislatures are well justified in promulgating a law that such agreements will not be enforced. Thus, we can see that man-made law must not only respect, but preserve, protect, defend, and actually serve our Natural Rights.

Because human suffering results when man-made laws conflict with the Natural Law, and the very purpose of man-made law is to enforce Natural Rights, human laws are only valid to the extent that they uphold the Natural Law. Aquinas noted that “every human law has just so much of the nature of law, as it is derived from the law of nature. But if in any point it deflects from the law of nature, it is no longer a law but a perversion of law.”
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As we shall discuss below, one Supreme Court justice even saw fit to distinguish between
acts
and
laws
: Acts are commands which come from our politicians, and cannot be considered laws unless they comport with the Natural Law.

One might well question what is meant by
valid
. After all, we will most likely obey a law regardless of whether it comports with the natural law, so long as the consequence of disobeying that law is punishment. By imposing a requirement of validity, we ensure that our government is constrained by the Natural Law. Could our politicians, practically speaking, pass laws which violate the Constitution? Of course, as is frequently the case. But central to the Natural Law and to the Constitution itself is the belief, held by the people and our judges, that such laws are not valid and should be struck down. So, too, the Natural Law, like the Constitution, will only constrain our government if there are those among us who hold it accountable to the Natural Law.