Is Journalism Worth Dying For?: Final Dispatches (17 page)

What, specifically, are the grudges most Chechens hold against the middleman Mufti?

In the first place, money. In 1992 Kadyrov was the treasurer of a mass pilgrimage of Muslims from Chechnya to Mecca. Kadyrov collected between $300 and $500 from each of them, only for the King of Saudi Arabia to pay for all the Chechen pilgrims. Kadyrov did not return the $220,000 he had collected. Outrage ensued, a criminal case was brought, and for six months Kadyrov was held in a pre-trial detention facility, after which the case was dropped by the Prosecutor’s Office and, on the orders of then President Dudayev, Kadyrov was released.

The next detail of his portrait is more recent. It concerns one of Kadyrov’s first acts after his appointment, and also tells us something about his morals. Budruddin Djamalkhanov, by now already the exdirector of the provisional administration’s liaison department with the
security agencies, relates, “My father-in-law, Nasukha-hadji Akhmadov, built a mosque in 1989 in Kurchaloy, which was later turned into a madrasah. My father-in-law supported it to the best of his ability, but in the spring he asked the provisional administration for support. Koshman [the Russian Government’s representative in Chechnya] agreed, seeing that the children were at least being taught something there. At this point came Kadyrov’s appointment. Naturally, all the papers with the detailed budgets, staff lists and time-sheets were passed to him. The first thing he did was to write in his own name: ‘Kadyrov – 3,000 roubles.’ He went on to demand that the staff list should be augmented with his relatives as sham teachers. My father-in-law gave up in disgust.”

In the second place, Kadyrov is not a mufti, since there already is a living mufti, Mahomed-Bashir-hadji Arsanukayev, elected in 1992 in accordance with Chechen custom at a council of
ulema
(delegates from all districts). Arsanukayev, one of the Republic’s most eminent theologians, fell into disfavor with President Dudayev for cursing his actions in dividing the Chechen people. The history of the rise of Kadyrov as a counterweight to Arsanukayev is that in August 1995 a famous assembly of the major field commanders took place in Vedeno. Here Dudayev proclaimed the founding of a new state, the Islamic Republic of Ichkeria. He next proclaimed Kadyrov Mufti, who until then had been a little-known and unpopular mullah. Kadyrov was, however, agreeable to declaring jihad on Russia. The appointment was contrary to Chechen tradition, and accordingly the population came to regard Kadyrov as no more than a kind of chaplain or mufti for the field commanders. From February 1996 Kadyrov orchestrated the persecution in Chechnya of all members of the Arsanukayev Muftiate. Mullahs have been mercilessly abducted and killed and the elected Muftiate destroyed. Presidents Dudayev, Yandarbiev, and subsequently Maskhadov several times reconfirmed Kadyrov’s status without consulting the
ulema
.

Maskhadov rewarded him with several oil tankers and oil wells in the Nozhai-Yurt and Grozny Rural Districts, enabling Kadyrov to become extremely rich and maintain a large detachment of well-armed
mercenaries. In the spring of 1999 one of the periodical redistributions of influence began between the members of Chechnya’s ruling elite, and Kadyrov fell out with Shamil Basayev who was encroaching on his oil interests. This was the real reason behind Kadyrov’s condemnation of Basayev’s incursion into Dagestan [which the Russian Government used to justify beginning the Second Chechen War]. The split between them deepened, and in August 1999 Maskhadov relieved Kadyrov of the post of Mufti. Kadyrov refused to acknowledge this and to this day considers himself the Mufti of Chechnya, having now switched sides to support the federals, the very people on whom he had declared jihad.

Yakub Deniev, who until he retired on June 20 was the Acting Head of the Provisional Administration, having worked as such for eight months of the war, says, “Kadyrov is the worst possible option for Chechnya. His appointment is an insult and a humiliation for most Chechens and a slap in the face for the clergy. There is no getting away from the fact that he is a brigand. Indeed, the appointment of Kadyrov is a signal that the military phase of the operation will be continued and escalated. There is absolutely no desire for peace in Moscow at present and Kadyrov feels at home in conflict. His policies aim to deepen the divisions within Chechnya. One does of course come across confrontational individuals, but Kadyrov breaks every record in that respect.”

What does the Kremlin need all this for? What does it hope to achieve by these provocations? We appear to be facing a transition to a new phase of what it calls the “counter-terrorist operation.” Since the guerrilla warfare shows no signs of slackening and the sore tooth which is Chechnya can’t be extracted by military means, the intention seems to be to destroy Chechnya by the tried and trusted method of sowing internecine strife.

The West will turn a blind eye, taking the view that “they are just fighting among themselves,” and nobody in Russia will be particularly bothered by the slaughter, even though it has been instigated from above.

SKETCHES FOR A PORTRAIT OF AKHMAT-HADJI KADYROV

September 16, 2002

The “Chief of Chechnya,” Akhmat-hadji Kadyrov, controls his own illegal armed group which engages in abductions, and which also has a private prison in the village of Tsentoroy.

How come? First of all, the unvarnished testimony of an eyewitness who survived. The necessary explanations can come later.

“Opposite the house in which Kadyrov lives in Tsentoroy, some 20–30 metres away, near the road and the water tap, is a small single-storey building. The Kadyrovites call it their HQ. The Head of the Republic’s bodyguards are usually in there. The house has five rooms, one of which is permanently used as a cell for prisoners.

“Behind the HQ a lean-to has been built which has a further three cells, invariably occupied by detainees.

“Who are they? Firstly, people caught planting explosives. Secondly, people associated with the [Islamist] Wahhabi jamaat. Thirdly, miscellaneous other people. Their cases are judged by Ramzan, Kadyrov’s younger son. It’s like a real court, only with Ramzan presiding.

“People he finds not guilty of anything very serious are left in the cells for various periods; sentences are decided by Ramzan and Ruslan, the head of Kadyrov’s ‘Security Service.’ Those found guilty of something serious are sent off to Youth Soviet Farm No. 15, about 15 or 20 kilometres west of Grozny. What happens to the detainees after that nobody knows.

“Youth Soviet Farm No. 15 has a reputation as a haven for kidnappers. Under Maskhadov’s rule, too, there were many kidnappers and their victims in this village. The Zavgayevs’ sister was held there for a year and eight months, for example. Today the same outlaws are in the same place, only legitimised by Kadyrov’s protection.”

Before explaining in detail exactly what this is all about, I should mention that I have chosen this tale as typical of many others. Much the same thing is described by other people who have had the misfortune to come into contact with Kadyrov’s “Security Service,” but who
have succeeded in getting out and even agreed to testify on condition of anonymity.

What is going on in Chechnya today? It is my profound conviction that what is going on is an unambiguous civil war, deliberately provoked by the three-year-long so-called “anti-terrorist operation,” which sees brother rise up against brother, one family against another.

The whole area is crammed with armed detachments of every sort. These are mainly Russian Army troops, special operations units, rapid reaction squads, militia special purpose units, alpha groups and so on. These troops are opposed by the so-called resistance forces, illegal armed groups, a thoroughly diverse collection of fighters who, for the most part, answer only to their own consciences.

During the last six months, however, a new punitive force has appeared, a kind of Chechen sandwich filling in the sense that they are not on either side, although they have an ideological affinity with the federals.

These punitive detachments are known as the Kadyrovites, named after their organiser, Akhmat-hadji Kadyrov, who two and a half years ago was appointed Chief of the Republic by President Putin of Russia.

The Kadyrovites are also an illegal armed group. They are commonly referred to as Kadyrov’s “Security Service,” which would appear to provide them with a vestige of legitimacy, but this is not the case. The Chechen Ministry of Justice has confirmed that Kadyrov’s “Security Service” is not registered anywhere, and accordingly has no legal right to exist, any more than Basayev’s brigade, or what remains of the detachments of Khattab or Barayev.

Exist it nevertheless does, and it feels right at home in a civil war. The “Security Service” has no desire at all to see Putin’s promised “dictatorship of the law” arrive. Quite the reverse.

At first things looked less ugly. Kadyrov’s personal security detachment was assembled mainly from the ranks of his relatives, but with the passage of time it has degenerated into a monstrous hybrid in the traditions of the Tsarist secret police and the Soviet NKVD–KGB.

The secret prisons and the torturing are, of course, highly secret; the more so since the Kadyrovites are no fools and try to leave no
witnesses. Modern Chechen life has, however, conspired against them.

One of the most terrible tragedies for Chechnya is the mass disappearance of citizens. Today there are almost 3,000 “disappeared,” although nobody can give a precise figure. Their relatives go out seeking them, on the earth and under the earth, among those on the Russian side and among those on the other side. When the war ends we can be confident that the best investigators in Russia will be the relatives of the disappeared.

It is these “investigators,” recruited by misfortune, who uncovered the Kadyrovites. For some time, the tracks of abductions had been stubbornly leading to the village of Tsentoroy, famously the place where Kadyrov lives. The evidence pointed to buildings adjacent to Kadyrov’s house, and more precisely to Kadyrov’s very agreeable country estate and the buildings occupied by his bodyguards. Another path led stubbornly to Youth Soviet Farm No. 15, a village on the road to Grozny.

A recurrent pattern emerged: while some did return to freedom from the Tsentoroy torture chambers, all that came from Youth Soviet Farm No. 15 was the coldness of the grave. Sometimes, by chance, the bones of those who had been traced to Youth Soviet Farm No. 15 were found, scattered or half buried by dogs.

With time, one further piece of information emerged: Kadyrov is busily buying up plots of land in Tsentoroy, displacing to other villages families he doesn’t want and replacing them with his bodyguards’ families. Dracula is building a castle hidden from prying eyes, whose inhabitants are tied to him by the powerful bonds of shared guilt.

Many conversations with relatives of the disappeared, who found that all roads led to Tsentoroy and Youth Soviet Farm No. 15, show that people at first simply didn’t believe the Kadyrovites would dare to return to their old ways, to the kidnapping notorious in the time of Maskhadov, before Akhmat-hadji Kadyrov was reborn as a law-abiding and Kremlin-fearing gentleman.

Gradually, however, the facts began to speak for themselves; acts of terrorism ensued, and those of Kadyrov’s men considered guilty of the murders were themselves dispatched to the next world in accordance
with the tradition of the blood feud. There were numerous reports of Kadyrov’s motorcades coming under fire or being blown up. He never suffered personally, but nephews, cousins and second cousins who were members of his security detail were killed.

You may approve of this approach to matters of life and death or categorically reject it, but what you or I think is not going to change anything. Given that most of the law enforcement agencies currently operating in Chechnya are fully aware of the evil-doing of Kadyrov’s “security service” but are not raising a finger against it, what can be done to stop this? More broadly, how could the intelligence agencies, with which Chechnya is teeming, have allowed things to come to such a pass?

There are two answers, one logical and the other irrational. To begin with the second: the overall policy of the agencies keeping the area of the anti-terrorist operation under surveillance is simply: “Let them fight it out among themselves. The more bloodshed, the better.” Starting from this premise, Kadyrov’s reign is just what you want.

The logical answer is that Kadyrov and the intelligence services both want to destroy Maskhadov and his supporters by whatever means they can. For the present, they are allies united by this aim, their interests overlapping so much that each closes his eyes to the criminality of the other. There are two facts to note here. The first is that some of those in Kadyrov’s torture chambers did indeed wage war against Russia in the era of the Islamic Republic of Ichkeria, or were prominent members of that government, or at least sympathised with it. Kadyrov has shown on more than one occasion that he cannot tolerate any sort of competition or rivalry. He makes an exception for resistance fighters who have recanted and sworn allegiance to himself, turncoats like Suleyman Yamadayev, the Gudermes kidnapper appointed to the position of goat in charge of the kitchen garden as Chechen Deputy Commissar of War. Yamadayev enjoys lording it over his former comrades-in-arms, many of whom he has put in the Tsentoroy cells.

The other thing to note is that, since the beginning of this year, a recurring theme in the accounts of those who witnessed abductions subsequently traced to Tsentoroy and Youth Soviet Farm No. 15 is that unidentified men in combat fatigues, flak jackets, masks, and helmets
with built-in microphones came very quietly into the victim’s house, communicating between themselves in a whisper. They have become known as “The Silent Ones” because they work so soundlessly, co-ordinating their actions by radio and moving around in shoes with thick, springy rubber soles. There have been instances when relatives sleeping in neighbouring rooms didn’t even wake up until the door closed behind the Silent Ones, and it was only when a mother went into the room where her sons had been sleeping that she realized they had been taken.