Iran: Empire of the Mind (50 page)

6
Hasan-e Fasa’i, pp. 256-60.

7
Amanat 1997, pp. 44, 66.

8
For a case study of the Qashqai tribe bringing out these points, see Beck 1978.

9
Keddie 1999, pp. 26-8; Amanat 1997, pp. 113-17.

10
Cambridge History
, vol. 7, pp. 182-3.

11
Amanat 1997, pp. 428-9;
Cambridge History
, vol. 7, p. 180.

12
Cambridge History
, vol. 7, p. 180.

13
Ibid., pp. 401-4 (Greaves).

14
Quoted in Abrahamian 1979, p. 400.

15
Keddie 2005, p. 24 (I drew on Keddie also for the last part of the previous paragraph).

16
Levy 1999, p. 397.

17
Cambridge History
, vol. 7, pp 199-200.

18
Abrahamian 1979, p. 404.

19
Ibid., p. 408-9.

20
Levy/Ebrami 1999, pp. 490-1.

21
Mottahedeh 1987, pp. 221-2; Martin 1989, pp. 193-5.

22
Ibid., p. 223; Moin 1999, p. 22.

23
Levy 1999, pp. 498-507.

24
Cambridge History
, vol. 7, pp. 206-7; Arjomand 1988, p. 46.

25
Schuster 1912, p. 219.

26
Ansari 2003, p. 22.

27
http://www.gwpda.org/Dunsterville/Dunsterville_1918.html
.

28
For the contrary view see Katouzian 2003, pp. 16-18.

29
Ansari 2003, pp. 21-2.

30
Katouzian 2000, p. 165; Arjomand 1988, p. 60; Keddie 1999, p. 74.

31
Wright 1977, p. 181; Katouzian 2000, p. 233; also Keddie 1999, p. 79; Zirinsky 1992,
passim.

32
Arjomand 1988, pp. 62-3.

7. THE PAHLAVIS, AND THE REVOLUTION OF 1979

1
Sackville-West 1991, pp. 100-1; Keddie 1999, p. 79.

2
Cronin 2003, p. 44 and
passim
.

3
Issawi 1971, p. 376.

4
Abrahamian 1982, p. 143.

5
Issawi 1971, pp. 375-9.

6
Matthee 2003, p. 140 and
passim
.

7
Talattof 2000, pp. 53-62.

8
Yarshater 1988, pp. 336-80.

9
Abrahamian 1982, p. 143; Katouzian 2003 pp. 29-30.

10
Ansari 2003, pp. 56-9.

11
Ibid., p. 68.

12
Katouzian 2003, pp. 26-32.

13
Abrahamian 1982, pp. 163 (the shooting) and 158-61; Ansari 2003, p. 64.

14
Ibid., p. 164.

15
Katouzian 2003, pp. 32-3.

16
Levy/Ebrami 1999, pp. 544-6.

17
http://users.sedona.net/~sepa/sardarij.html;
http://www.wiesenthal.com/site/apps/s/content.asp?c=fwLYKnN8LzH&b=253162&ct=285846
.

18
Ansari 2003, p. 110.

19
Ansari 2003, pp. 78-85.

20
Katouzian 2002, pp. 13-14; Katouzian rather dryly suggests that the reorientation would have shifted as easily in the other direction if Axis powers had occupied Iran.

21
Mottahedeh 1987 pp. 98-105; Abrahamian 1982, pp. 125-6.

22
Ibid., p. 164.

23
Moin 1999, p.105.

24
Keddie 2006, p 130; Dariush Bayandor’s researches toward a new book on the coup argue plausibly that the role of the secret services was rather less significant than previously thought and that of the clergy and their bazaari supporters rather more.

25
Mottahedeh 1987, pp. 287-323; Morrison 1981, pp. 201-2 (Kadkani); for Simin Daneshvar’s revelations, see Talattof 2000 p. 160.

26
Ansari 2003, p. 133.

27
Abrahamian 1982, p. 420.

28
Issawi 1971 pp. 375-382

29
Quoted in Ansari 2000, pp. 38-9.

30
Keddie 2006, p.145; Graham 1978, p. 69.

31
Moin 1999, pp. 107-8.

32
Ibid., p. 123.

33
Ibid., pp. 1-8.

34
The best account of such an education is Mottahedeh’s brilliant
Mantle of the
Prophet
35
Moin 1999, pp. 42-4.

36
Ibid., p. 64.

37
Keddie 2006, p. 147.

38
Ibid., p.152.

39
Abrahamian 1982, pp. 535-6.

40
Keddie 2006, p. 158.

41
Abrahamian 1982, pp. 430-1.

42
Bill 1988, pp. 379-82.

43
Farah Azari 1983 (pp. 130-2 and
passim
) drew attention to the sexual aspect of the revolution in an insightful chapter, and Mottahedeh 1987, p. 273 makes a similar point.

44
Mottahedeh 1987, pp. 270-2.

45
Quoted in Abrahamian 1982, p. 419.

46
Ansari 2003, p. 173.

47
Bill 1988, pp. 183-4.

48
Mottahedeh 1987, p. 328.

49
For a vivid picture of the lives of the Jews of Shiraz in this period, see Loeb 1977.

50
Abrahamian 1982, pp. 500-4.

51
Moin 1999, pp. 152-6.

52
Momen 1985, pp. 256-0.

53
Rahnema 2005, p. 236.

54
Ibid., pp. 208-45; Abrahamian 1982, pp. 464-73.

55
Moin 1999, p. 186.

56
This judgement is based on contributions to the Gulf 2000 Internet forum in the spring of 2007; particularly on a contribution from Ali Sajjadi, who investigated the case for a Radio Farda report.

57
Abrahamian 1982, pp. 510-13.

58
Ibid., p. 519.

8. IRAN SINCE THE REVOLUTION: ISLAMIC REVIVAL,
WAR AND CONFRONTATION

1
Or alternatively,
hich ehsasi nadaram
—‘I have no feelings’.

2
See
Chapter 3
.

3
With the partial exception, in the context of ghuluww rhetoric, of Shah Esma‘il I (see
Chapter 4
).

4
I am grateful to Baqer Moin for this quotation, and his thoughts on this subject, and the insights in his book
Khomeini.

5
Abrahamian 1982, pp. 526-9.

6
Moin 1999, pp. 207-8.

7
Roy 1994, p. 173 claims that none of the most senior Ayatollahs (the Grand Ayatollahs) supported the
velayat-e faqih
in 1981—except Montazeri, Khomeini’s pupil.

8
Moin 1999, p. 214.

9
Momen 1985, p. 294.

10
Ansari 2003, p. 233.

11
Bill 1988, pp. 1-2.

12
Moin 1999, pp. 282-3; Rundle 2004, pp. 146-50.

13
Quoted in Moin 1999, pp. 275-6.

14
Momen 1985, pp. 298-9.

15
Ansari 2003, pp. 244-5.

16
For further exposition of Soroush’s ideas on this point, see Ansari 2000, p. 75.

17
See Katouzian 2002, pp. 5-6, and Mottahedeh 1987, pp. 383-4.

18
See the interview published in the
Mideast Mirror,
20 January 2000, p.15; among other statements.

19
Moin 1999, p. 279.

20
Menashri 2001, pp. 35-8.

21
See Ehteshami 1995,
passim
and Ansari 2000, pp. 52-3.

22
Keddie 2006, p. 264.

23
Ibid., pp. 264-6.

24
See also Mir-Hosseini 1992.

25
2003 figures—Keddie 2006, p. 286.

26
Afsaneh Najmabadi 1998 and 2005 gives thought-provoking analysis on the theme of gender in Iranian history.

27
Kian-Thiébaut 2005,
passim
.

28
Brought out most clearly in the comparative surveys carried out by Mansour Moaddel, which also back up Kian-Thiébaut—for example, 49 per cent of Iranians surveyed believed love was more important than parental approval when marrying (41 per cent thought the contrary) where in Iraq the split was 71 per cent for parental approval and 26 per cent for love. In Saudi Arabia 50 per cent for parental approval and 48 per for love. Surveys accessible at:
http://www.psc.isr.umich.edu/research/tmp/moaddel_values_survey.html
.

29
The interview is discussed in detail in Ansari 2000, pp. 133-7.

30
Sanasarian 2000, pp. 47, 47n; pp. 48, 48n. Others have suggested that the number of Jews in 1948 may have been as high as 140-150,000.

31
Shirin Ebadi said something very much to this effect—that one revolution is enough—in a speech she gave at the Hay-on-Wye literary festival on 3 June 2006.

32
For discussion of the crackdown on the free press in the summer of 2000, see Ansari 2000, pp. 211-17.

9. FROM KHATAMI TO AHMADINEJAD, AND
THE IRANIAN PREDICAMENT

1
For example, 27 per cent of Iranians surveyed by Mansour Moaddel took part in religious services once a week or more, compared with 33 per cent in Iraq, 42 per cent in Egypt, 44 per cent in Jordan (and 45 per cent in the US). 55 per cent of Iranians thought western cultural invasion was a very serious problem, compared with 64 per cent of Egyptians, 68 per cent of Iraqis, 70 per cent of Saudis and 85 per cent of Jordanians. Asked whether they were primarily Muslim or country nationalists, 61 per cent of Iranians said Muslim, 34 per cent nationalist. In Iraq it was 63 per cent Muslim, 23 per cent nationalist; in Jordan 72 per cent/15 per cent; in Saudi Arabia 75 per cent/17 per cent; and in Egypt 79 per cent/10 per cent. And in Iran 60 per cent thought men made better political leaders than women, compared with 72 per cent in Saudi Arabia, 84 per cent in Egypt, 86 per cent in Jordan, 87 per cent in Iraq (and 22 per cent in the US). However, other findings suggested that (perhaps because they have had more experience of it) Iranians were less enthusiastic about democracy as the best form of government than others in the region. Accessed at:
http://www.psc.isr.umich.edu/research/tmp/moaddel_values_survey.html
.

2
For details of Iranian support against the Taliban, see the report from James Dobbins (leader of the US delegation to the talks in Bonn that set up the coalition),
Washington Post
, 22 July 2007.

3
Translated transcript from
Mideastwire.com
.

4
Poll by
Baztab.com
; reported to Gulf 2000 (a web discussion forum) by Meir Javedanfar.