Invisible Romans (47 page)

The ancient sources are clear about one group that yields outlaws: the desperados, i.e. those without hope. In Apuleius, for example, Haemus, the new bandit leader, notes that he can recruit many new men for the band because there are so many poor, desperate men out there (
The Golden Ass
7.4). In Xenophon’s
An Ephesian Tale,
Hippothous
hopes to recruit ‘able-bodied young men’ in Mazacus, a town in Cappadocia (2.11–14). In
Chaereas and Callirhoe,
Theron goes around to the port brothels and taverns and there collects men for his crew. Strabo attests that the general poverty and ruggedness of the land gave people a reason to turn to piracy. And when Bulla the outlaw captured a centurion, ‘he assumed the dress of a magistrate, ascended the tribunal, and having summoned the centurion, caused part of his head to be shaved, and then said, “Tell your masters that they should take care of their slaves, and then they wouldn’t become bandits”’ (Cassius Dio 77.10.5). Dio goes on to state, ‘Bulla had with him, in fact, a very large number of imperial freedmen, some of whom had been poorly paid, while others had received absolutely no pay at all.’ I have noted above the condition of ex-soldiers, which often provided motivation for outlawry. On the other end of the spectrum of possibilities, Xenophon notes in
An Ephesian Tale
a noble who, meeting with reverses in life, took up the life of a bandit: Hippothous started as a wealthy young man in Perintus, Thrace; after adventures revolving around a homosexual affair with one Hyperanthes (who dies in a shipwreck), Hippothous makes his way to Pamphylia.

There, since I had no means of supporting myself and was distressed at the tragedy, I took to brigandage. At first I was only one of the rank and file, but in the end I got together a band of my own in Cilicia; it was famed far and wide, until it was captured not long before I saw you. (
An Ephesian Tale
3.2/Anderson)

Heliodorus also has a bandit of this sort. The outlaw captain ‘came from a distinguished family and had taken up his present way of life only out of necessity’; he had been the son of a high priest of Memphis in Egypt, but had been illegally pushed aside by a younger brother and forced to flee to bandits ‘in the hope of gaining revenge and regaining [his] position’ (
An Ethiopian Story
1.19/Morgan). And it is safe to assume, although there is no mention of such a person by name, that there was a share of social misfits and ne’er-do-wells who could not or would not fit into the stratified society, and escaped into outlawry.

However, some must have become outlaws purely out of greed, not because of desperate circumstances. Apollonius claimed to have
thwarted a recruitment effort, but the tale is illustrative nonetheless of the temptation that outlawry could put in the way of good citizens:

But Apollonius replied: ‘Since you tempt me to talk about pilotage, I would have you hear what I consider to have been any soundest exploit at that time. Pirates at one time infested the Phoenician Sea, and were hanging about the cities to pick information about the cargoes which different people had. The agents of the pirates spied out accordingly a rich cargo which I had on board my ship, and having taken me aside in conversation, asked me what was my share in the freight; and I told them that it was a thousand drachmas, for there were four people in command of the ship. “And,” said they, “have you a house?” “A wretched hut,” I replied, “on the Island of Pharos, where once upon a time Proteus used to live.” “Would you like then,” they went on, “to acquire a landed estate instead of the sea, and a decent house instead of your hut, and ten times as much for the cargo as you are going to get now? And to get rid of a thousand misfortunes which beset pilots owing to the roughness of the sea?” I replied that I would gladly do so, but that I did not aspire to become a pirate just at a time when I had made myself more expert than I ever had been, had won crowns for my skill in my profession. However, they persevered and promised to give me a purse of ten thousand drachmas, if I would be their man and do what they wanted. Accordingly I egged them on to talk by promising not to fail them, but to assist them in every way. Then they admitted that they were agents of the pirates, and besought me not to deprive them of a chance of capturing the ship, and instead of sailing away to the city whenever I weighed anchor thence, they arranged that I should cast anchor under the promontory, under the lee of which the pirate ships were riding; and they were willing to swear that they would not only not kill myself, but would spare the life of any for whom I interceded. I for my part did not consider it safe to reprehend them, for I was afraid that if they were driven to despair, they would attack my ship on the high seas and then we should all be lost somewhere at sea; accordingly I promised to assist their enterprise, but I insisted upon their taking an oath to keep their promise truly. They accordingly made oath, for our interview took place in a temple, and then said: “You betake yourselves to the ships of the pirates at once, for we will sail away by night.” And they found me all the more plausible from the way I bargained about the money, for I stipulated that it must all be paid me in current cash, though not before they had captured the ship. They therefore went off, but I put straight out to sea after doubling the promontory.’
(Life of Apollonius
3.24/Conybeare)

How does the state respond to outlaws?

One of the most interesting aspects of outlaws and the authorities is that there is never even an attempt to end outlawry
tout court.
Measures are taken against outlaws, of course. The emperor Augustus, so his biographer Suetonius states, set up garrisons around the empire to help control brigandage; two centuries later Tertullian notes their existence still. In Egypt, Baebius Juncinus ordered that supporters of bandits be attacked in order to deny the bandits their bases in the villages. And also there, an official named M. Sempronius Liberalis at one time issued a three-month amnesty for bandits, stating that thereafter they would receive no mercy. Marcus Valerius Maximianus, a successful career military officer, boasted on his epitaph that among other accomplishments he had headed a detail that annihilated a band of outlaws in the lower Danubian basin. These measures were an ongoing response to an ongoing problem that never went away, but rather remained to fester and irritate the authorities, wherever they were. And it was only in case of personal concern or extreme disruption that the central authority invested extensive resources to actually annihilate an outlaw threat. Inscriptions give two illustrations of such action. From Syria comes:

By order of our Lords Constantine, the Triumphant Augustus and Most Noble Julian Caesar did Bassidius Lauricius, Most Outstanding Man, Companion, and Commander, seize by force a fort long controlled by a band of outlaws and threatening to the provinces; he then secured it with a garrison of soldiers so that Antioch could enjoy long-lasting and solid peace. (
CIL
3.6733 =
ILS
740)

And from Rome:

This is dedicated to the Strength of the Army which with faithful loyalty fulfilled the high hopes and prayers of Romans by wiping out the most savage outlaws.
(CIL
6.234 =
ILS
2011)

Apuleius gives a similar account, much elaborated, of course. Bandits made the mistake of attacking the entourage of a disgraced imperial official; the wife wrote to the emperor and the emperor ordered the troops to suppress the bandits – quite effectively, as it happens
(The Golden Ass
7.7). Elsewhere in novels, the forces of the central government prove decisive in defeating large and dangerous outlaw bands. In the historian Dio, Bulla Felix became so threatening (he had perhaps a band of 600) that first a centurion with a force was dispatched to hunt him down and then, later, when that failed, a praetorian tribune: ‘Severus … sent a tribune from his bodyguard with many horsemen, after threatening him with dire punishment if he should fail to bring back the robber alive’ (Cassius Dio 77.10.6). In later antiquity (
AD
354), Ammianus Marcellinus gave a lengthy description of a serious outlaw uprising in southern Asia Minor that was finally put down after extensive imperial resources had been deployed
(Histories
14.2.1–20). These instances should not lead to the belief, however, that in reality the central authorities invested many resources in outlaw suppression. In most of the outlawry described in Apuleius, for example, the imperial power is nowhere to be seen. This is true for outlawry in the other novels as well, and nothing in other ancient sources contradicts it.

On the contrary, if any authorities are mentioned in regard to thwarting bandits and pirates, it is usually local authorities. It is the magistrates who are mentioned in Apuleius, for example, as organizing the search for Lucius after the bandits break into Milo’s house
(The Golden Ass
7.1–2). Strabo frequently mentions actions of local governments in trying to react to the piracy of the Cilician coast. These local authorities were limited in their effectiveness by the lack of a local police force, although Xenophon has an eirenarch of Cilicia, Perilaus, commanding a significant enough force to attack and annihilate an outlaw gang
(An Ephesian Tale
2.11–14).

Vigilantism, either in the service of authorities or not, is rampant, however. Individuals took things into their own hands. In Dacia, for example, Bassus is avenged:

Dedicated to the Spirits of the Dead of Lucius Julius Bassus, son of Lucius, of the Sergian voting district, town councilor of the Dobreta and treasurer. He was killed by outlaws in his fortieth year. Julius Julianus and Julius Bassus set this up to their father, in cooperation with Julius Valerianus, his brother, who took revenge for his death. (
CIL
3.1579)

And also in Dacia:

… [name is lost] was murdered by outlaws. Ulcudius Baedari and Sutta Epicadi, loving parents, set this grave marker up for their son. He was avenged. (
CIL
3.1585)

Indeed, magistrates usually acted only when the citizenry had taken some vigilante action already. Typically, such action was of two sorts. First, a mob set upon someone whom they deemed had broken some law, whether it be through robbery, violence, sacrilege, or some other crime; the mob dragged the reprobate(s) to a place of assembly – usually the forum but sometimes the theater – and there the magistrates held a sort of court, which usually ended up in the punishment of the people seized. This happened to Lucius after he killed three men seeking to break into Milo’s house and citizens set upon him for the deed
(The Golden Ass
3.5–6). In the second sort of vigilante action, a gang is ‘deputized’ and heads into the countryside to deal with outlaws. Again, Apuleius provides us with a good example, as Tlepolemus returned to the bandit’s cave after he had freed his love, Charite, and sought help from the villagers. Lucius narrates:

I went along willingly with a great crowd of citizens and other beasts of burden, for besides my usual, inveterate curiosity I strongly desired to see the outlaws taken captive. And indeed it was easy to seize them, held fast more by their drunkenness than by their bonds. The townsmen dug up all the treasure and carried it out of the cave, where they loaded the gold and silver onto our backs. Then they unceremoniously pitched some of the outlaws, still bound, headlong over a nearby cliff. As for the others, they beheaded them with their own swords, and left them sprawled there. Overjoyed at such vengeance, we returned happily to town.
(The Golden Ass
7.13)

Here is pure vigilante action, right down to the summary execution of the criminals without even the pretense of a trial. A similar approach to banditry appears in the life of the emperor Maximinus: As ‘a young man he was a shepherd and a leader among his peers; he would ambush bandits and so free his fellows from their attacks’ (
Historia Augusta,
‘The Two Maximini’ 2.1–2).

Another example also comes from rural life, for in those areas self-help against bandits was a given; there was no presence of a central authority. In this instance, Lucius was taken along when slaves fled their master; as they traveled at night, they were set upon by fierce dogs and attacked by the inhabitants of a farmstead, who assumed they were outlaws; they ceased their attack only after being convinced of the peaceable intent of the group.

By chance we happened to be passing by a rural estate. Suddenly the tenants, thinking that our group was a band of outlaws, determined to bravely protect their possessions. They let loose howling mastiffs, huge beasts more savage than wolves and bears, that they had carefully raised to protect their property. The dogs were further enraged by the shouts of their masters and driven even beyond their normal savagery by the uproar all around. So they rushed at us from every side, attacking, tearing at men and beasts alike until, thoroughly overwhelmed, most of us lay prostrate on the ground … It seemed like things could get no worse – but they did. The peasants suddenly began to hurl stones onto us from the rooftops and from a nearby hill. [The travelers eventually managed to show their attackers that they were not bandits. One of the attackers addressed them:] ‘But we are not outlaws with robbing you on our minds! We were only trying to avoid just that fate at your hands!’ (The
Golden Ass
8.17)

Clearly, the inhabitants were quite prepared to protect their property from bandits with violence. This episode also illustrates another basic way to deal with outlaws, namely, to not go out at night. When Lucius is set to leave a town during the night, he is warned that he is crazy – that no one travels at night for fear of outlaws
(The Golden Ass
1.15). In this case towns, especially walled towns, provided some protection in combination with solid gates and doors of houses within the town. Of
course, as the attack by three ruffians on Milo’s house shows, even being in a town and behind barred doors was no sure protection from outlaws (
The Golden Ass
2.32).