Into the Fire: A Firsthand Account of the Most Extraordinary Battle in the Afghan War (26 page)

FRIENDLY FORCE

Thirteen Marine and two Army advisors plus Capt. Kaplan, plus sixty Afghan National Army and thirty Afghan border police, plus one U.S. Army platoon in reserve, plus sixteen U.S. Army scout-sniper soldiers on northern observation post.

VERSUS

Forty-five to sixty enemy, mostly from Pakistan, with some aid from about a hundred villagers.

LOCATIONS AND CALL SIGNS

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving with Marine Embedded Training Team 2-8, Regional Corps Advisory Command 3-7, in Kunar Province, Afghanistan, on 8 September 2009. Corporal Meyer maintained security at a patrol rally point while other members of his team moved on foot with two platoons of Afghan National Army and Border Police into the village of Ganjgal for a pre-dawn meeting with village elders. Moving into the village, the patrol was ambushed by
more than 50 enemy fighters firing rocket propelled grenades, mortars, and machine guns from houses and fortified positions on the slopes above. Hearing over the radio that four U.S. team members were cut off, Corporal Meyer seized the initiative. With a fellow Marine driving, Corporal Meyer took the exposed gunner’s position in a gun-truck as they drove down the steeply terraced terrain in a daring attempt to disrupt the enemy attack and locate the trapped U.S. team. Disregarding intense enemy fire now concentrated on their lone vehicle, Corporal Meyer killed a number of enemy fighters with the mounted machine guns and his rifle, some at near point blank range, as he and his driver made three solo trips into the ambush area. During the first two trips, he and his driver evacuated two dozen Afghan soldiers, many of whom were wounded. When one machine gun became inoperable, he directed a return to the rally point to switch to another gun-truck for a third trip into the ambush area where his accurate fire directly supported the remaining U.S. personnel and Afghan soldiers fighting their way out of the ambush. Despite a shrapnel wound to his arm, Corporal Meyer made two more trips into the ambush area in a third gun-truck accompanied by four other Afghan vehicles to recover more wounded Afghan soldiers and search for the missing U.S. team members. Still under heavy enemy fire, he dismounted the vehicle on the fifth trip and moved on foot to locate and recover the bodies of his team members. Corporal Meyer’s daring initiative and bold fighting spirit throughout the 6-hour battle significantly disrupted the enemy’s attack and inspired the members of the combined force to fight on. His unwavering courage and steadfast devotion to his U.S. and Afghan comrades in the face of almost certain death reflected great credit upon himself and upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service.

The Central Command posted online a redacted but full account of the investigation by Cols. Werth and Hooker on November 25, 2009. The citations from the online documents list the exhibits by alphabetical reference; e.g., Exhibit N. The hard copy of the Werth/Hooker account lists the statements by unit and alphanumerically; e.g., Members of 1-32 Task Force Chosin, Exhibit A.1. Wherever possible, I have given both citations.

The sworn statements from the Medal of Honor packets are cited separately by an indication of the alphabetical tab reference for Meyer’s packet and the appendix reference for Swenson’s packet. All references to exhibits refer to the Werth/Hooker Investigation.

1
Staff Sgt. Kenefick and Lt. Johnson:
For the sake of Marine traditions, let me set one thing straight. On our advisor team, I never called my seniors by their first names. That is done in the SEALs and Special Forces teams, but usually not in Marine advisor units. When I write about the lieutenant and the staff sergeant in this book, sometimes I use their first names because the four of us were friends, but each of us knew his position in the chain of command.

2
Battalion 1-32, tasked with preventing enemy infiltration from Pakistan:
The battalion, called Chosin, was from the 10th Mountain Division and working in Afghanistan as part of a brigade called Task Force Mountain Warrior.

3
Afghan battalion that we were advising:
At Monti, we were advising the 3rd Coy (Company) of the 2nd Kandak, 215th Corps. The kandak/battalion’s headquarters was at Camp Joyce.

4
“Kunar people like Americans,” he told each new team of advisors:
Eshok conversation with West on several occasions, including 17 Oct. 2009 at Joyce.

5
Joyce would focus on straightening out the screwed-up Afghan logistics:
As Maj. Williams explained at Joyce to West on 17 Oct. 2009, “For instance, we supplied the kandak with plastic water jugs. Now the Afghan S-4 [logistics officer] says they’re gone—disappeared—and he wants us to come up with more. No, that’s the wrong request. He has money from his own chain of command; he buys replacements or he finds the jugs he lost. I don’t have any I’m going to give him.”

1
“If you make it through, you can become a grunt”:
Every year, between 7 and 10 percent of all recruits drop out of boot camp. Aline O. Quester,
Marine Corps Recruits: A Historical Look at Accessions and Boot Camp Performance
(Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 2010).

1
he killed more than five hundred Russian soldiers:
Tapio A. M. Saarelainen,
The Sniper: Simo Hayha
(Tampere, Finland: Apali, 2008), 135 pages. (Saarelainen cites a figure of 542; others put it at 505. Several sources agree the number was above 500. Hayha after the war became a champion moose hunter.)

2
Chris Kyle, a SEAL, recorded 160 kills:
Chris Kyle,
American Sniper
(New York: Morrow, 2012), p. 5.

1
The border meant nothing to the tribes:
Paul Overby,
Holy Blood
(New York: Praeger, 1993), p. 162. Overby described fighting alongside the mujahideen stationed at Dangam in 1988. He had walked across from Pakistan.

1
Lt. Johnson calmed down the driver:
Lt. Johnson report, “Report on Rocket Attack at Monti, 6 September 2009.” “I left the tower,” he wrote, “to coordinate an LTV [a Ford] pickup of the wounded soldier. Once the LTV pulled up to the guard tower, Cpl. Meyer picked up the wounded soldier and under indirect and direct fire carried him down two flights of stairs to the truck.”

1
pay for a tribal militia that would stop the rockets:
West notes from meeting with Ganjigal elders, together with Lt. Cols. Ayoub and O’Donnell at ABP base next to FOB Joyce, 9 July 2009.

2
“They owe you nothing for your bad behavior”:
West notes from meeting with Ayoub, Lt. Col. O’Donnell, and the Ganjigal elders, 9 July 2009.

3
“with zero status inside the village”:
Capt. Kaplan conversation with West, 1 Dec. 2011.

4
“pro-U.S. and supportive of the Afghan government”:
Dept. of the Army, AFZC-BCT-AD, 25 Sept. 2009, Subject: AR 15-6 Investigation, Cols. R. D. Hooker, USA, and J. F. Werth, USMC, Exhibit N (E.1).

5
Taliban had not sprung ambushes from inside villages:
Memo for Record, 25 Nov. 2009, CJTF-82, AR 15-6 Report of Investigation re Operations in the Ganjigal Valley, 8 Sept. 2009.

6
Gal Rahman, a border police chief:
West conversations with Kerr and Swenson at Joyce and Monti, July and Oct. 2009.

7
soft American target:
Swenson email to West, April 18, 2012.

8
“Three-070 is the Undo KE, correct?”:
Swenson email to West, 23 Jan. 2012. 81
“we could put smoke on the deck for screening”:
Maj. Castro AR 15-6 Investigation, 21 Sept. 2009, Appendix S.

9
“KE 3070”:
Swenson briefing to Bing West at FOB Joyce, 13 Oct. 2009.

10
Battalion 1-32 believed Williams was in charge:
Memo for Record, 25 Nov. 2009, CJTF-82, AR 15-6 Report of Investigation re Operations in the Ganjigal Valley, 8 Sept. 2009, Section II: Findings and Recommendations.

11
Maj. Talib, the operations officer of the Afghan battalion, was in command
: Memo for Record, 25 Nov. 2009, CJTF-82, AR 15-6 Report of Investigation re Operations in the Ganjigal Valley, 8 Sept. 2009, Section II: Findings and Recommendations.

12
equipment density list:
Werth/Hooker Investigation, Exhibit BH. Note: Fabayo (BH) and Swenson (BI) gave extensive statements of what happened and what they believed went wrong. Both statements were included in the Werth/Hooker report yet not listed in index.

13
thirty-two fighters were moving from Pakistan to reinforce Ganjigal:
Mirc Chat, 2356 Zulu, Actions in Contact, Appendix c4 of Swenson packet, report from ODA received previously at 1728Z; see also MIRC Chat time, Cpl. Dakota L. Meyer, Medal of Honor packet, Tab C.

14
two kilometers north of Ganjigal village:
See entries in Meyer packet, Tab C. Also see Mirc Chat, 1909 Zulu, Actions in Contact, Appendix c4. Times for enemy movement are given in Zulu: 1727Z, 1909Z, 1922Z.

15
Fabayo knew nothing of these movements:
However, Capt. Kaplan later testified that “reporting received and briefed immediately prior to the operation indicated the presence of 45-60 AAF (Anti-Afghan Forces).” Werth/Hooker Investigation, 25 Nov. 2009, Exhibit L (D.1).

16
“stopping under cover and hesitating at all open areas”:
Mirc Chat, 0005 Zulu, Actions in Contact, Appendix c4 (Swenson).

17
perfect intelligence a day ahead of our movement:
Rahman, a cleric, was the Taliban regional commander for Kunar and two other provinces. He led a hard-core group called JDQ, a branch of Al Qaeda that included Arab fighters and Chechens. See “Syed Saleem Shahzad, a Fighter and a Financier,”
Asia Times
, 23 May 2008.

18
two on the south side, and one in the middle:
Dept. of the Army, Memorandum for the Record, AFZC-BCT-AD, 21 Sept. 2009, Subject: AR 15-6 Investigation, Colonels R. D. Hooker, USA, and J. F. Werth, USMC, Exhibit II-1. To wit: The next afternoon, an informer reported that Taliban commanders Faqir and Ismael had entered Ganjigal on 7 September. An informant inside the Border Police had tipped them off about the Key Leader Engagement mission. A Wikileaks entry from the JTF spot reports re the Ganjigal ambush read as follows: “Already 20 T [Taliban] were in the village. Hanifullah, Haji Mamiran and Niam were the three chief planners. Mamhullah Khadim had 15 Taliban in his group; Zia Ur Rahman had 15. AAF [Anti-Afghan Forces] were staging in Pakistan. Faqir brought in 20 more and set up in five positions; two on north side and two on south side and one in middle.”

19
two kilometers northeast of Ganjigal:
Mirc Chat, 2343 Zulu, Actions in Contact, Appendix c4 (Swenson).

20
served as a major supply point in the war against the Russians:
Cols. R. D. Hooker, USA, and J. F. Werth, USMC, Exhibit L (D.1). In his statement, Capt. Kaplan was furious because Ganjigal was never estimated to hold in excess of twenty to thirty military-aged males, yet reporting immediately prior to the battle “indicated 45-60 AAF [anti-Afghan forces],” prepared to ambush CF (coalition forces). Kaplan was not informed of the updates after midnight by the Joyce TOC as he moved to his OP position. The TOC was not keeping Kaplan, the intel officer on the patrol, up to date with the Mirc Chat reports of enemy reinforcements.

1
the house of an imam, one of the village elders:
Fabayo statement, Feb. 2, 2010, DA Form 2823.

2
They had a dozen fixed positions:
An estimate of the positions plotted in different sworn statements numbered between eight and eleven.