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Authors: Mark M. Lowenthal

Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy (58 page)

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LESSONS LEARNED. For each of the nations that have been attacked, the degree to which they have learned the lessons that led to their earlier vulnerability is an important question. For the United States, however, the “lessons” of September 11 are not necessarily clear or agreed upon. There does seem to be agreement that information sharing, especially between the CIA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), was highly flawed, although it does not necessarily follow that the numerous improvements made in information sharing will foil the next attack. Better sharing techniques and technologies are hollow if the necessary information or intelligence is not available. The 9/11 Commission and some other analysts have catalogued several missed opportunities in the period before the September 11 attack that they believe might have disrupted the plot. The problem, analytically, is that almost all of these missed opportunities would have had to fall into place, and even then the outcome would be uncertain. We know, for example, that the attackers had substitutes in case some were denied entry into the United States, as did happen. No critic, including the 9/11 Commission, has shown how the missed opportunities would have led to the
tactical
intelligence necessary to identify the specific four flights on September 11. It is also important to keep in mind that many of the security practices that we now take for granted did not exist on the day of the attack. Part of the problem in assessing the causes of the attack is also political. It is more comforting for the public and for officials to believe that we can identify and remedy the several factors that made us vulnerable in 2001 because then we can return to some greater sense of safety. But if the flaws are more subtle than some believe or if the remedies appear to be more difficult to implement, then we must live with a continuing sense of vulnerability.
The September 2001 attacks raised new questions about intelligence-law enforcement organization, coordination and cooperation. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), and the FBI’s new National Security Branch are all efforts to deal with this issue. The 2004 intelligence reform law puts a major emphasis on information sharing, which is an important aspect of all intelligence. There have been recurrent discussions about whether the United States needs to create an MI5, referring to Britain’s Security Service, which is responsible for domestic security and is part of the Home Office (see chap. 15 for details). The FBI is not quite analogous to MI5 and has limits on what it can do beyond those activities that are considered federal crimes. The FBI has had difficulty making the transition to greater emphasis on terrorism and also had difficulty making the shift from a largely law enforcement agency to more of an intelligence agency. The legal difficulty encountered in the United States is inherent in the federal system, which places responsibility for local law enforcement on the states and their cities or counties. As a means of improving liaison between the federal and local levels, a series of fusion centers, called
Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs),
have been formed, although the majority of them tend to be staffed by state law enforcement personnel. These are in a rather early state of development and their ability to provide the desired liaison and integration and future remains uncertain.
Once one gets beyond the traditional national security community, the issue of clearances comes up. Very few officials at the state, local, and tribal levels have clearances. Very few seem to want them. So. an immediate issue is how to pass along terrorist information without revealing sources and methods. This issue first arose as DHS was being formed. Sen. Richard Shelby, R-Ala., insisted that DHS have access to all raw intelligence. DCI Tenet refused to go along with this and was supported by the incoming DHS secretary, Tom Ridge. Ridge stated his view that if the DCI passed threat information, then he (Ridge) would assume it was well-sourced and needed to be acted upon. This rather common-sense approach is preferable to either withholding information from first responders because they are not cleared or requiring that they obtain clearances.
A more serious problem is doctrinal. U.S. policy makers and intelligence officers are still working out what homeland security intelligence (sometimes called HSINT—pronounced “hiz-int”) means. Doctrine matters because it helps determine what intelligence needs to be shared with whom and how quickly. This discussion is still under way, but some have advocated that DHS serve as a bridge between federal intelligence agencies of all sorts and the first responders, helping translate national intelligence down to the first responders and helping pass along detailed local knowledge from the first responders to the intelligence agencies. This means that DHS would take on responsibility for deciding which threats were passed and which were not, undoubtedly in consultation with other intelligence agencies. Some criteria for selectivity are crucial. Otherwise, DHS becomes a pass through for all threats, flooding the first responders, who recognize that they cannot protect everything all the time and want, most of all, vectoring information to help them safeguard those targets that are most threatened. It is important to recognize that the intelligence agencies and the first responders are working in a new field and still working out the parameters of their actions and their interactions.
But even information sharing is dependent, first, on information collection. For example, none of the investigations of September 11 found evidence that the one or two pieces of intelligence that might have led to the plot were somehow misdirected or not shared. Such evidence was never collected and may not have been collectible. Officials have also raised concerns about cyberattacks on the United States as part of a terrorist campaign. The main fear is that such actions could affect vital parts of the U.S. infrastructure. Such an attack would likely have even fewer indicators and the perpetrators might never be known after the attack.
The conduct of the war against terrorism raises questions about its future. U.S. officials have claimed that three quarters of al Qaeda’s senior leadership, including those who planned the 2001 attacks, were either killed or are in custody. The effect on al Qaeda is unclear. Presumably, deaths and arrests led al Qaeda to rely on more clandestine means of communications, including a greater use of couriers. The ability to communicate thus has been impeded, but the ability to avoid detection and interception has been enhanced at the same time.
Finally, the absence of any major attacks on the United States since 2001 (terrorist attacks took place in Madrid, Spain, in 2004 and in London, England, in 2005, and attempted in Algeria in 2007) raises questions as to why. Several possibilities come to mind, none of which precludes the others: al Qaeda may be less capable. They may feel themselves deterred by the array of U.S. and others’ actions. Or they simply may be in the midst of a long planning cycle. In the war on terrorism, much difficulty is found in gauging progress and having a sense of when the threat will be defeated.
It has been suggested that more time be spent on studying past terrorist efforts, virtually all of which failed to achieve their objectives despite rather lengthy periods of activity. Certain features begin to emerge. First, like all other activities, terrorists need success to maintain momentum and to recruit new adherents. This can prove to be a vulnerability for terrorists, as any disruption or deterrence is the equivalent of a defeat. On the other hand, it only takes one spectacular attack to regain momentum. Second, it appears that later generations of terrorists are somewhat less fanatical and more susceptible to negotiation— assuming that there is something about which to negotiate. Again, the religious aspect of early twenty-first-century terrorism makes this very difficult. Third, it is important to note that the current campaign against terrorism has created a series of operational and ethical dilemmas not only for intelligence officers but also for the policy makers who direct them. Much of this stems from the sheer novelty of conducting operations against terrorism on the scale that has evolved since 2001. As noted, terrorism has been an issue for U.S. intelligence since the 1970s, but these involved specific groups or individuals. Those terrorists who were apprehended could be tried for specific acts. Post-2001, the scope has widened. In addition to seeking individuals who can be brought to trial, there is a need to destroy terrorist cells and networks by apprehending participants. But these individuals fall into a somewhat uncertain legal status, being neither enemy combatants in the way in which uniformed soldiers of nations are nor indicted criminal suspects.
Operations and intelligence collection against known or possible terrorist threats has also raised issues for intelligence. As noted, the United States has conducted renditions (that is, extraterritorial arrests), which have become issues between the United States and some of its allies, although it is likely that there was knowledge of the U.S. activities at some level in most of these governments. Once captured, some terrorists have been transferred to other nations for interrogation. Critics have charged that this has allowed U.S. intelligence officers to use extraordinary interrogation techniques beyond U.S. territory, or to allow terrorist suspects to be interrogated in nations where harsher methods are sanctioned. This, in turn, has led to a debate within the United States about the use of techniques that might be deemed torture. In late 2007, Congress was considering legislation that would limit interrogations to those contained in the Army Field Manual, which allows nineteen interrogation techniques but not some of the harsher techniques that intelligence officers had apparently used on terrorists. There has also been a debate about the efficacy of harsher techniques. Opponents argue that information obtained under these circumstances cannot be reliable. Proponents disagree. CIA director Gen. Michael Hayden said, in November 2007, that more than 70 percent of the intelligence used in the latest terrorism NIE came from interrogated terrorists.
In addition to these controversies, there have also been issues raised about several means by which intelligence agencies have collected terrorist-related intelligence. The Treasury Department used a tracking program to trace financial transactions within SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications). Tracking and, where possible, preventing the transfer of funds to terrorists is an essential part of the counterterror strategy. Access to SWIFT allows analysts to know who is transferring funds, the amounts, and the accounts. Press revelations raised the usual concern about privacy. Interestingly, Congress was supportive of the effort to glean useful intelligence from SWIFT. The United States and the European Union agreed, in July 2007, to share data about airline passengers bound for the United States. In addition to identifying data (name, date of birth, citizenship), this exchange will include data about ethnicity, political views, religious affiliations. These data are compared to other databases in order to identify travelers who may pose a risk. Again, civil liberties groups have raised concerns. The FBI came under criticism for its use of national security letters (NSLs), as was discussed in chapter 7.
Several points stand out across these various efforts. First, as stated earlier, the campaign against terrorism has forced the intelligence agencies to reexamine how they operate and the types of information that may be useful. Second, these efforts underscore the multifaceted aspects of countering terrorism and the difficulties inherent in combating it. The terrorism target is, in many ways, much more complex than was the old Soviet foe. Third, even with a well-conceived collection plan, it will be very difficult to coordinate all of these efforts and to use the collected data in ways that produce meaningful results, as opposed to overwhelming analysts with huge databases. Fourth, these efforts will increase the demands for oversight of intelligence, both internally and externally.
PROLIFERATION
 
Preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has been a long-standing goal of U.S. policy, but it is now a more important issue with added dimensions. The United States has always given primary emphasis to nuclear weapons, given their lethal capability and the fact that they were central to the U.S.-Soviet relationship. But even during the cold war, the United States also worked to contain the spread of chemical and biological weapons (CBW or CW and BW). The nexus between terrorism and WMD has given added importance to the issue. Since the Iraq WMD estimate in 2002, intelligence efforts regarding proliferation have been an ongoing source of controversy and of political and sometimes partisan debate.
There are two major strands in proliferation, which are not entirely separate. The first is the requirement to keep track of the WMD activities of nation states, both for their own sake as factors in regional stability and as possible sources of material to terrorists. Then there is the terrorist nexus itself. Al Qaeda has stated bluntly that one of its goals is to obtain WMD—again, simplifying the intentions question but not the capabilities question. The primary concern in state-based activity is nuclear weapons, although some attention is paid to the CW and BW programs of various states as well. There clearly has been an unwelcome shift in nuclear proliferation since 1998, when India and then Pakistan tested nuclear weapons. Since then, North Korea has claimed to have tested a nuclear weapon (October 2006) and Iran has defied United Nations (UN) Security Council efforts to curtail its enrichment activities. The February 2004 admissions by A. Q. Khan also made public the details of a web of private firms and experts trading in nuclear expertise and technology.
 
ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE. The task for intelligence agencies is to identify which nations may be pursuing any or all WMD and then try to determine the state of their programs, as well as connections to other programs, sources of material, expertise, and so forth. This also represents a shift, as a sub rosa network of goods and expertise has developed, complicating efforts to isolate and understand programs. The most obvious problem is that these programs all operate covertly, and some of them may have perfectly legal, nonlethal applications as well. This is certainly true of nuclear programs, which can have connections to peaceful uses of nuclear material, such as power plants.
BOOK: Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy
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