Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy (21 page)

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Authors: Mark M. Lowenthal

BOOK: Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy
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THE NEED FOR PHOTO INTERPRETERS
 
Two incidents underscore the difficulty of interpreting even not-so-subtle images A convincing sign of planned Soviet missile deployments in Cuba in 1962 was an image of a peculiar road pattern called “the Star of David” because of its resemblance to that religious symbol. To the untrained eye it looked like an odd road interchange, but trained U.S. photo interpreters recognized it as a pattern they had seen before—in Soviet missile fields Without explaining the image, and perhaps without showing photos of Soviet missile fields, interpreters could have faced ridicule from policy makers
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, when Cuba was sending expeditionary forces to various parts of the Third World, newly constructed baseball fields indicated their arrival. To understand the significance of these fields, policy makers need to know that Cuban troops play baseball for recreation. Interpreters would have to supply supporting analysis, perhaps a note explaining how serious Cubans take baseball, to avoid being dismissed out of hand New fields, in this case, could have meant large troop concentrations
 
An ancillary effect of the purchase of commercial imagery was to circumvent the shutter control issue. The United States can impose shutter control over commercial satellites operated by U.S. companies for reasons of national security. Concerns arose that civil liberties groups or the news media would mount a legal challenge to an assertion of shutter control, the outcome of which was uncertain. By simply purchasing the imagery, NIMA avoided the entire issue. (The French Ministry of Defense banned the sale of
SPOT
images of the Afghan war zone. The French commercial satellite
SPOT
has a 10-meter resolution.)
Increased use of commercial imagery to support intelligence has become official U.S. intelligence policy. In June 2002, DCI Tenet ordered that commercial imagery would be “the primary source of data for government mapping,” with government satellites to be used for this purpose only in “exceptional circumstances.” Tenet had two goals: to reserve higher resolution satellites for collection tasks more demanding than map making and to provide a base for a continuing U.S. commercial satellite capability. This policy was expanded in April 2003, when President George W. Bush signed a directive stating that the United States would rely on commercial imagery “to the maximum practical extent” for a wider range of requirements: “military, intelligence, foreign policy, homeland security and civil uses.” Again, U.S. government systems are to be reserved for the more demanding collection tasks.
In addition to shutter control, the U.S. government reserves the right to limit collection and dissemination of commercial imagery. (The secretary of commerce regulates and licenses the U.S. commercial imagery industry. The secretaries of state and defense determine policy with regard to protecting national security and foreign policy concerns.) The new policy also allows the use offoreign commercial imagery. NGA’s current contracts with commercial imagery firms call for 0.5 meter resolution (1.6 ft.) by 2006. One U.S. company has applied to the Department of Commerce for a 0.25 meter (less than 10 in.) resolution.
A second major imagery development has centered on UAVs. The use of pilotless drones for imagery is not new, but their role and capability have expanded greatly. UAVs offer two clear advantages over satellites and manned aircraft. First, unlike satellites, they can fly closer to areas of interest and loiter over them instead of making a high-altitude orbital pass. Second, unlike manned aircraft, UAVs do not put lives at risk, particularly from surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). Not only are UAVs unmanned, but operators also can be safely located great distances (even thousands of miles) from the area of operation, linked to the UAV by satellite. A third advantage is that the UAVs produce real-time images—they carry high-definition television and infrared cameras—that is, video images are immediately available for use instead of having to be processed and exploited first. This capability helps obviate the “snapshot” problem. In 2006, the Senate Intelligence Committee stated that it wanted NGA to be able to provide video and images to troops via laptop computers, thus increasing tactical imagery support.
The United States currently relies on two UAVs, the Predator and the Global Hawk. Predator operates at up to twenty-five thousand feet, flying at the relatively slow speeds of 84 to 140 miles per hour. It can be based as far as 450 miles from a target and operate over the target for sixteen to twenty-four hours. Predator provides real-time imagery and has been mated with air-to-ground missiles, allowing immediate attacks on identified targets instead of having to relay the information to nearby air or ground units. In the war on terrorism, Predators have been armed with Hellfire missiles, which are guided to the target by a laser. Thus, once a target has been located and identified, no time is lost in calling in an air strike. The Predator was used in this manner against al Qaeda terrorists in Yemen and a senior al Qaeda leader in Pakistan. Global Hawk operates at up to sixty-five thousand feet at a speed of up to four hundred miles per hour. It can be based three thousand miles from the target and can operate over the target for twenty-four hours. Global Hawk is designed to conduct both broad area and continuous spot coverage.
In 2005, Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld (2001-2006) talked about building fifteen Predator squadrons (twelve UAVs per squadron) over the next five years, emphasizing both the intelligence collection and the hunter killer missions in which the UAVs carry missiles as well. The Air Force is also looking at the possibility of flying very large drones (perhaps 200 ft. across and 90,000 lbs.) in which the sensors would be embedded in the wings. Planners would like to see these drones stay aloft for up to two days at a time. According to
Scientific American,
DOD is also looking at a UAV that would be launched over the target area via ballistic missile, allowing surveillance of any suspicious location within one hour (assuming the UAV and missile were already mated and poised on a launch pad). Another UAV project seeks to develop a UAV that can remain aloft for up to five years, relying on solar energy or some other easily stored power source. As of September 2007, the record for keeping a UAV aloft is fifty-four hours during the test flight of a British UAV.
A growing number of much smaller UAVs (some weighing as little as two kg. or 4.5 Ibs.) can be carried and launched by individuals. These UAVs (sometimes called TUAVs—tactical UAVs) have smaller operating ranges and shorter flight times but are useful for tactical intelligence collection. Some UAV advocates have shown interest in stealth UAVs that could begin collection close to a presumed enemy prior to hostilities without detection. Critics argue that overflights of territory by UAVs would be precluded prior to hostilities (an incursion violating international law) and that therefore stealth is unnecessary.
DOD is also examining the utility of very small satellites, sometimes referred to as microsatellites (approximately twenty inches high and forty-one inches in diameter).
TacSat-1
(tactical satellite) could be launched as demands for collection increased. TacSats would not have the multiyear orbital lives of the more traditional large satellites and would not carry as large a payload of sensors, but they would provide a more flexible collection array and might be useful if satellites were lost to ASATs. Press reports suggest, however, that these satellites still do not have sufficient support within DOD. Tactical satellites also run counter to another U.S. government program, fostering the sharing of satellites by military and domestic agencies. Such satellites would need to have a large array of collectors to be of more general use, which again necessitates a larger satellite.
There have also been several press articles about the possibility of creating microdrones. These are typically compared to dragonflies, and can be as small as six inches (15 cm.) in wingspan. Microdrones are powered so their flight can be controlled and can be equipped with tiny cameras. Microdrones are still experimental and no U.S. agency will acknowledge such a program. These platforms would have the advantage of being relatively inexpensive and could access locations that even UAVs could not target.
The third major imagery development related to the war on terrorism has been the use of NGA imagery platforms on potential terrorist targets within the United States. These have included the 2002 Olympics in Utah, the 2004 political conventions, and other public events that would attract large crowds or locations (such as nuclear power plants) that might be targets. Unlike CIA and NSA, NGA is not restricted in its activity within the United States, although as a defense component NGA cannot be used to support law enforcement. In August 2007, however, the Bush administration announced that it would allow greater access to imagery by state and local officials. Officials argue that this is necessary both to improve homeland security (in such areas as seaport and border security) and also to help with disaster planning or relief. They also argue that these uses do not violate the law enforcement restrictions. Still, various groups that are concerned about intrusive government activities have raised questions about this domestic imagery collection, as have some members of Congress. In October 2007, the Department of Homeland Security announced postponement of the program to address the legal and civil liberties ramifications.
Finally, space-based imagery capabilities have proliferated. Once the exclusive preserve of the United States and the Soviet Union, this field has expanded rapidly. France and Israel have independent imagery satellites. India has a nascent capability; China is rapidly developing one and has announced that it is building a national engineering and research center to design small satellites, hoping to produce six to eight annually. China plans on launching more than one hundred satellites by 2020 for a variety of monitoring tasks within China itself—economic, ecological, and others. Germany has decided to create its own satellite capability. Furthermore, cooperation among current and would-be imagery satellite powers has increased. Israel is reported to have cooperative imagery relationships with India, Taiwan, and Turkey. Brazil and China are cooperating on satellites. Russia, eager for cash, has helped several nations launch satellites, including Israel, Japan, and Iran. Some experts believe that the Iranians seek an independent launch capability, which could be part of their overall missile development program. Perhaps more significant, France is working with several European partners—Belgium, Italy, and Spain—on its next generation of imagery satellites. This independent capability within NATO could prove troublesome, as the United States may have to deal with allies having their own imagery and different interpretations of events. This apparently happened in 1996, when France refused to support a U.S. cruise missile attack on Iraq because the French maintained that their imagery did not show significant Iraqi troop movements into Kurdish areas. France, Germany, and Israel also have indigenous UAV programs. In 2004, Iran admitted supplying eight UAVs to the Hezbollah terrorist group, one of which penetrated Israeli airspace.
Imagery proliferation also has a commercial aspect. A British firm, Surrey Satellite Technology, has pioneered a range of imagery satellites, including nanosatellites and microsatellites weighing as little as 6.5 kilograms, or just over fourteen pounds. These satellites do not approach resolutions of the best national systems, but they are sufficient for many nations’ needs. Among the firm’s clients are Algeria, Britain, China, Nigeria, and Thailand. These satellites also have the ability to get close to other satellites and image them, which is of concern to the United States because of their potential to be used as ASAT weapons. Several nations, including Australia, Malaysia, and South Korea, as well as some current Surrey customers, are looking at small satellite demonstration projects.
The proliferation of imagery capabilities could be a problem for the United States should it become engaged in hostilities with a state that has access to space-borne imagery satellites. Therefore, DOD has begun considering countermeasures. One such system, Counter Surveillance Reconnaissance System (CSRS, pronounced “scissors”), would have blinded or dazzled imagery satellites with directed energy. However, Congress refused to fund the program.
 
SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE. SIGINT is a twentieth-century phenomenon. British intelligence pioneered the field during World War 1, successfully intercepting German communications by tapping underwater cables. The most famous product of this work was the Zimmermann Telegram, a 1917 German offer to Mexico of an anti-U.S. alliance, which Britain made available to the United States without revealing how it was obtained. With the advent of radio communications, cable taps were augmented by the ability to pluck signals from the air. The United States also developed a successful signals intercept capability that survived World War I. Prior to World War II, the United States broke Japan’s Purple code; Britain, via its ULTRA decrypting efforts, read German codes.
Today, signals intelligence can be gathered by Earth-based collectors—ships, planes, ground sites—or satellites. NSA is responsible for both carrying out U.S. signals intelligence activities and protecting the United States against hostile SIGINT. UAVs, which have been primarily GEOINT platforms, are being used for SIGINT as well. Global Hawk will be configured to carry electronic intelligence (ELINT) and communications intelligence (COMINT) payloads. This enhances the utility of the UAV, as it allows collection synergy between GEOINT and SIGINT on a single platform that can be targeted or retargeted during flight. Greatly increased cooperation between SIGINT and GEOINT has been a recent development. NSA and NGA created a Geocell, which is jointly manned unit that allows quick handoffs between the two INTs, which can be especially important when tracking fast-moving targets, such as suspected terrorist activities.

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