Independence (38 page)

Very near the time in December that the American Prohibitory Bill was passed by Parliament, a young Frenchman disembarked from a vessel in the harbor of Philadelphia. Achard de Bonvouloir was a French army officer, but he was dressed as a civilian and posed as a merchant from Antwerp. He had been in Philadelphia once before, in the fall of 1774 while on a tour of American cities, and he had quietly met with some delegates to the First Congress. He may have been sent to America in 1774 as a secret agent of the French government. There was no question that he returned just before Christmas 1775 as the representative of the French foreign minister, Charles Gravier, comte de Vergennes.

Following his initial visit, Bonvouloir had hurried to London, where he met with comte de Guines, France's ambassador to Great Britain, and reported on the rebellion that was simmering in the American colonies. While he thought hostilities were likely, Bonvouloir did not know whether the colonists possessed the resources to adequately wage war. After listening intently, Guines wrote to Vergennes to urge that the young soldier be sent back to Philadelphia to take “a good look at them [the colonists] politically and militarily.”
26

Vergennes had been France's foreign minister for only a few months, but like his predecessors, he had kept a watchful eye on Anglo-American relations. Since the Stamp Act troubles, France had sent a string of secret agents to America, and all had reported hearing talk of independence by many colonists. Prudently, France opted not to try to foment a rebellion, but just the same, it had devoted its energies to rebuilding its navy—which Great Britain had decimated in the Seven Years' War—and to solidifying its alliance with Spain, both necessary precursors to any conflict with Britain. In the meantime, it watched and waited.

Vergennes, who was fifty-five in 1775, was large, handsome, polished, and charming but suitably grave, thoughtful, and renowned for his industry. The foreign minister knew that an Anglo-American war would present France with both opportunities and dangers. It could produce a realignment of the European balance of power in France's interest. It might additionally open to the French a lucrative transatlantic trade that otherwise would remain closed so long as the American colonies remained part of the British Empire. On the other hand, a misstep could be ruinous for France. The most obvious miscalculation would be to openly support the American rebellion, only to learn that the colonists lacked either the means to fight capably or the will to persevere in the face of adversity. Above all else, Vergennes wished to avoid a situation in which France would find itself alone at war with Great Britain. That, almost certainly, would result in a worse defeat than France had suffered in the Seven Years' War. So it was also vitally important for Vergennes to learn whether the Americans would really wage war for independence, as a reconciliation with their mother country offered no benefits to France.
27

By late summer 1775, Vergennes had discovered much through his careful observation of Anglo-American relations. He knew that the colonists had fought valiantly and effectively along Battle Road and atop Bunker Hill, Congress had authorized an invasion of Canada, and George III on August 23 had declared the colonists to be in rebellion. News of the king's action convinced Vergennes that reconciliation between the Americans and British was unlikely. But he needed more information before acting decisively. He wanted to know whether the Continental army could stand up to British regulars. He also wished to learn what France could do to assist America's war effort. For six months Vergennes had sat on Guines' recommendation that Bonvouloir be sent back to Philadelphia. Late in August the foreign minister made his decision. Bonvouloir was to return to America to report on the military situation. He was also to assure Congress that France had no aspirations to repossess Canada, to divulge that France admired the American quest for liberty, and to intimate that American merchant vessels would be welcome in French ports.
28
Vergennes had decided to do what he could to move the Continental Congress toward a declaration of independence.

Bonvouloir sailed from London late in the summer and reached Philadelphia about a week before Christmas. Through the contacts he had made a year earlier, Bonvouloir likely was routed to John Hancock, the president of Congress, who in turn must have arranged a meeting between the French agent and the members of the Committee of Secret Correspondence. The committee was new, having been created three weeks earlier, when Congress sanctioned trade in the Caribbean with foreign nations. At that time, Samuel Chase had proposed sending an agent to France to discuss trade possibilities, a motion seconded by John Adams. Most saw such a move as too radical, or at least premature, and opted instead for the creation of the Committee of Secret Correspondence, a five-member panel that was charged with establishing communication with America's friends in both the mother country and Europe. Though most members of the committee were confirmed reconciliationists, every member hoped to open commerce with foreign nations. Trade was essential for waging a war. In addition, for Dickinson, Jay, and Thomas Johnson, foreign trade might be the ploy that would force North's ministry to the negotiating table. For Franklin and Benjamin Harrison, trade with France was a crucial precursor to an alliance.
29

In the first days of its life, the committee wrote to Arthur Lee in London and to Charles-Guillaume-Frédéric Dumas at The Hague. Lee, the thirty-five-year-old brother of Richard Henry Lee, had lived in London since 1768 and not only was deeply enmeshed in English politics but also had close ties with many opposition figures. Dumas, a man of letters who had long corresponded with Franklin, knew nearly every envoy at The Hague, a hub of European diplomacy. The committee directed Lee to act with “great Circumspection and impenetrable Secrecy” in forging links with America's friends in the mother country. It set Dumas on a different course. Franklin, in a letter signed by Dickinson and Jay, confided that during 1776 America expected to be “threatened from England with a very powerful force.” Consequently, Congress found “it necessary to ask aid of some foreign power.… [W]e wish to know whether any … from principles of humanity, is disposed magnanimously to step in for the relief of an oppressed people.” Or, the letter continued, if the Americans “declare ourselves an independent people,” would any European nation “be willing to enter into an alliance with us for the benefit of our commerce.” At this same moment Franklin also wrote privately to the heir apparent to the Spanish throne, thanking him for the gift of a book. Franklin went on to make it sound as if independence was inevitable and that the United States and Spain would share mutual concerns. America, Franklin wrote, was “a rising state” destined “soon to act a part of some Importance on the stage of human affairs.” It will be “a powerful Dominion … whose interest it will be to form a close and firm alliance with Spain” against the predatory nations of Europe who will look covetously on North and South America and the Caribbean.
30

Serendipitously, Bonvouloir arrived in Philadelphia just days, perhaps only hours, after these letters were written. He met with the committee three times. Each session was held at night in Carpenters' Hall. The Committee of Secret Correspondence wanted no one outside Congress to know that talks were under way with a French agent. It is also likely that the committee did not want every member of Congress to know of the discussions. Bonvouloir drank in what the committee told him. His report to Guines, which eventually reached Vergennes in March 1776, was exceedingly optimistic. “Everyone here is a soldier,” he exclaimed. At least fifty thousand men had volunteered to serve without pay. Those who were in the Continental army were “well clothed, well paid, and well commanded.” The Canadian invasion was proceeding smoothly, and Quebec was expected to fall shortly. The Americans needed arms, munitions, and military engineers but nothing else.
31

Seemingly by coincidence, while Bonvouloir conversed with the Committee of Secret Correspondence, two other Frenchmen arrived in Philadelphia and met with another congressional committee. Around the time that Bonvouloir had come down the gangplank in Philadelphia, Pierre Penet and Emmanuel Pliarne, who were representatives of a private firm in Nantes—but in good standing with the French government, which almost certainly had sanctioned their venture—arrived in Providence, Rhode Island, hoping to do business with the colonists. In return for whale oil and tobacco, they offered to supply “the Continent with Arms & Ammunition.” Merchants in Providence immediately escorted their French counterparts to Washington's headquarters in Cambridge, Massachusetts, The American commander in chief just as rapidly sent them to Philadelphia. Washington was so eager for them to meet with Congress that he even picked up the tab for the expenses they incurred on their journey southward from New England.
32

Penet and Pliarne reached Philadelphia on December 29 and within forty-eight hours were meeting with Congress's Committee of Correspondence, a nine-member panel created in September and entrusted with contracting for arms from abroad. But when the committee members realized that the Frenchmen were not agents of the French government, they reacted warily. Discussions had continued for three fruitless weeks when, on January 17, Congress's session was interrupted by the arrival of a courier bearing “disagreeable Accotts [accounts] from Canada.”
33
No news that reached Philadelphia after the outbreak of the war had a greater impact on Congress than the dire tidings from Canada.

The Canadian campaign had originated with Congress late in June. Expectations of success had abounded, as all signs indicated that Canada was lightly defended. Major General Philip Schuyler, a member of New York's delegation to Congress prior to being named one of the original general officers in the Continental army—and the commander of the Northern Department—was vested with discretionary authority to advance only if he found that the Canadians welcomed the invasion and the Indians appeared likely to remain neutral. Congress was also confident that Schuyler would have sufficient men. Nearly three thousand troops were scattered throughout New York, many New Englanders were thought likely to join in, and Ethan Allen and his Green Mountain Boys were available.
34

With the formidable Canadian winter on everyone's mind, the original plan was for Schuyler to lead his invasion force down Lake Champlain in July. In the best-case scenario, Schuyler was to take the British installation at St. Johns, advance on Montreal, and reach Quebec City long before the first snowfall. Taking Quebec was the great plum, for its conquest would be tantamount to laying hold of Canada.

Trouble surfaced immediately. Recruiting and logistical difficulties caused delays, as did Schuyler's health. Throughout the late summer he complained of a stunning array of physical ailments that beset him with “Inflexible Severity.” First there was “a bilious Fever,” next a “Barbarous Complication of Disorders,” after which “violent rheumatic Pains” set in, followed by “a violent flux.” These myriad afflictions led him to speak of “the shattered Condition of my Constitution.” July passed, then most of August. The invasion force was still at Fort Ticonderoga. It had not taken a single step northward. As the weeks of inactivity passed, some officers grew to believe that Schuyler's maladies were psychosomatic. Some thought him indecisive and lacking the “strong nerves” necessary for high command, and they may have been correct. Schuyler was a political appointee whose military background was in the supply service. Commanding an operation of this magnitude may have been beyond his abilities.
35

With his own doubts about Schuyler increasing, General Washington intervened to get the campaign under way. On his own initiative, Washington on August 20 proposed sending a secondary force of some one thousand men through Maine to Quebec. His idea was that if the British regulars in Quebec City came after Schuyler, the men coming up from Maine could easily take the city. If the redcoats debouched to take on the Maine expedition, the way would be open for Schuyler. If the British remained at Quebec, the two American forces would unite and attack the city. With overwhelming numerical superiority, a rebel victory seemed assured.

Schuyler consented to Washington's plan. Nearly two months to the day after Congress authorized the invasion, the army of the Northern Department at last moved northward, though Schuyler, still pleading illness, was not with his men. He remained at Fort Ticonderoga, leaving his second-in-command, Brigadier General Richard Montgomery, a sixteen-year veteran of the British army who had resigned his commission and emigrated to New York in 1771, to lead the army. Every inch the soldier, Montgomery provided excellent leadership, though by the time he and his men set out, the nights were already cold and the British had been given three months to prepare for the invasion. A couple of weeks after Montgomery's army started north, the second force, under Colonel Benedict Arnold, whom Washington had selected to be its commander, sailed from Massachusetts for the Kennebec River in Maine. It was to advance on Quebec in newly constructed bateau and by portaging between Maine's wild rivers.
36

Every imaginable problem, and some that would have been difficult to conceive, plagued the American forces that autumn. Montgomery never had more than 1,700 men, too small a number for such a difficult undertaking. There had been little time to train them, the supply system was an inefficient work in progress, and the army launched its campaign with a piteously inadequate train of artillery—merely five field pieces and three mortars. Moreover, whereas Congress had imagined that the army might reach Quebec in September, it was November before Montgomery successfully completed a siege operation at St. Johns, and Montreal still had to be taken. Montgomery and his men finally reached Quebec during the first week in December. The city was already in the depths of winter.