In God's Name (26 page)

So, according to Spada, a man whose name was synonymous with Vatican Incorporated, a man who was born into the business dynasty of the Spada family – his great grandfather banker to Prince Torlonia, his grandfather a director of the Bank of Italy, his father Luigi an exchange agent, he himself having worked for Vatican Incorporated since 1929 – according to a man with that illustrious record, the entire Italian banking industry was up to its neck in criminal activity, yet he claimed to be ignorant of what was going on in the very banks where he sat as a director.

After the crash estimates of the size of the Vatican losses were many and varied. They ranged from the Swiss banking estimate previously referred to of 240 million dollars to Vatican Incorporated’s own estimate: ‘We have not lost a cent’. The truth can probably be found in the region of 50 million dollars. When the multi-national across the Tiber talked of not losing a cent they were no doubt allowing into the calculation the previous massive profits made through their association with The Shark, but a reduction of overall profit from 300 million dollars to 250 million is a loss in any language, including Latin.

Added to that 50 million dollars, Sindona-created loss, was a further 35 million dollar loss sustained by Vatican Incorporated in the curious affair of Banco di Roma per la Svizzera in Lugano (Svirobank). The Vatican Bank held the majority 51 per cent share in the Swiss bank – the Bank President was Prince Giulio Pacelli, the Executive Director, Luigi Mennini. Like other Vatican-linked banks, Svirobank speculated with the black funds which it held on behalf of the illegal exporters of lire and sections of the criminal fraternity of Italy. Gold and foreign exchange speculation was an everyday occurrence. In 1974 a hole began to appear. The blame was fastened upon Deputy Manager Mario Tronconi which, in view of the fact that the person who materially transacted the deals was another Svirobank employee Franco Ambrosio, is odd.

In the autumn of 1974 Mario Tronconi was ‘suicided’ – his body was found on the Lugano–Chiasso railway line. In his pocket was a farewell letter to his wife. Before his death, doubtless for the sake of tranquillity, Pacelli, Mennini and the other Svirobank directors had obliged Tronconi to sign a confession in which he assumed full responsibility for the 35 million dollar hole. No one denounced
Ambrosio, the man who had actually created the hole. Indeed, Ambrosio was given the task of recovering the loss. The truth came to light only two years later when Mario Barone, one of Banco di Roma’s joint chairmen of the board (Banco di Roma held the other 49 per cent of Svirobank), was arrested and questioned about Il Crack Sindona. Clearly Italian banking has many attendant risks. Mario Tronconi was only one member of the fraternity whose death was made to look like suicide. In the following decade the list would grow alarmingly. The Italian Solution would be applied to a growing number of problems.

While Michele Sindona fought his extradition from New York and plotted revenge, Vatican Incorporated was already back speculating again through his successor, Roberto Calvi. Calvi was known in Milan business circles as ‘Il Cavaliere’, The Knight; a curious nickname for the man who was paymaster to P2. It originated in 1974 when Giovanni Leone, the then President of Italy, made him a Cavaliere del Lavoro (Knight of Labour) for his services to the economy. Calvi was to be Sindona’s replacement as laundryman for the Mafia, and the man who carried out the biggest theft in the history of banking.

Roberto Calvi was born in Milan on April 13th, 1920, but his family roots are in the Valtellina, a long alpine valley near the Swiss border and near the home of Albino Luciani. They were both men of the mountains. After studying at the prestigious Bocconi University he fought for Mussolini on the Russian front in the Second World War. Then he followed his father into banking. In 1947 he went to work for Banco Ambrosiano in Milan. Deriving its name from St Ambrose, the bank exuded religiosity. Like Banca Cattolica del Veneto it was known as ‘The Priests’ Bank’. Baptismal certificates establishing the holder was Catholic were obligatory before a bank account could be opened. Prayers thanking God for the annual figures were offered at the end of board meetings. In the early 1960s there was a greater air of reverence inside the bank than in a number of the nearby churches. The Knight with the ice-cold eyes had other plans for this sleepy diocesan bank which included among its customers the Cardinal Archbishop of Milan, Giovanni Montini. By the time Montini became Pope Paul VI in 1963 Calvi had advanced within the bank to Central Manager. When Pope Paul decided to call Sindona into the Vatican to relieve the Church of its embarrassingly large Italian holdings, The Shark and The Knight were close friends. They were already plotting to gain control of Banco Ambrosiano and transform it into a very special kind of international banking institution. In 1971, Calvi became Managing Director of the Bank. At fifty-one years of age he
had risen far above his father’s humble clerical position. The average man might have been content to rest on his laurels for a while and enjoy leading the prayers at the board meeting. The only thing that was average about Roberto Calvi was his height. His ability to dream up crooked schemes for laundering Mafia money, exporting lire illegally, evading tax, concealing the criminal acts of buying shares in his own bank, rigging the Milan Stock Market, for bribery, for corruption, for perverting the course of justice, arranging a wrongful arrest here, a murder there – his ability to do all of this and more puts The Knight in a very special criminal class. Calvi was prone to advise all and sundry that if they really wanted to understand the ways of the world then they should read Mario Puzo’s novel
The Godfather.
He carried a copy everywhere, rather like a priest with his Bible.

Calvi was introduced to Bishop Marcinkus by Sindona in 1971 and instantly joined the very select Vatican clan of ‘uomo di fiducia’, men of trust: that small elite group of laymen who worked with and for Vatican Incorporated; men such as Sindona, Spada, Mennini and Bordoni; men chosen with the greatest possible care.

In 1963 he formed a Luxembourg company called Compendium – the name was later changed to Banco Ambrosiano Holdings SA. This shell company was the keystone to Calvi’s schemes. Millions of borrowed eurodollars were destined to flow through the Luxembourg holding company. The number of banks world-wide which would be conned into lending money direct to this small shell company is in excess of 250. The amount of money is in excess of 450 million dollars.

The Knight’s empire grew rapidly. Already in the early 1960s Banco Ambrosiano had acquired Banca del Gottardo in Lugano, Switzerland. This became the main conduit for washing Mafia money after the collapse of Sindona’s Amincor in Zürich. Other foreign assets were to follow. One of these was Banco Ambrosiano Overseas Ltd, Nassau. This branch in the Bahamas tax haven was founded in 1971 and had from its inception on its board of directors Bishop Paul Marcinkus. It was originally called Cisalpine Overseas Bank to deflect further any inquiring members of Italy’s Finance Police.

The profits being channelled into the coffers of the Vatican Bank grew proportionately with Calvi’s empire. To understand many of the very complicated and often deliberately over-complicated financial convolutions in which Calvi indulged throughout the 1970s, one fact has to be grasped: essentially, Banco Ambrosiano of Milan and the Vatican Bank were interlocked. Many of the crucial operations were joint operations. The reason that Calvi was able to break the law again
and again was because of the ready assistance given to him by the Vatican Bank. Thus when on November 19th, 1976 Calvi wished to acquire 53.3 per cent of Banco Mercantile SA of Florence, the purchase appeared to be on behalf of the Vatican Bank. The shares found their convoluted way on December 17th to Milan stockbrokers Giammei and Company, who frequently acted on behalf of the Vatican. By dexterous paperwork the shares were ‘parked’ on the same day at the Vatican Bank. The fact that the Vatican did not have adequate funds in a particular account to pay for the shares was overcome by crediting on December 17th to the Vatican Bank, in a newly opened account, number 42801, 8 billion lire. The following summer, on June 29th 1977, Giammei bought the shares back from the Vatican Bank through Credito Commerciale of Milan. As the shares followed this snake-like path they were undergoing, at least on paper, a dramatic price increase. The original purchase had been made at 14,000 lire per share. By the time the shares found their way back to Giammei they were deemed to be worth 26,000 lire per share. On June 30th 1977 the shares were then sold by Credito Commerciale to Immobiliare XX Settembre SA, which was controlled by Calvi. On paper the Vatican Bank had made a profit of 7,724,378,100 lire as the price of the shares was hiked. The reality was that Calvi paid the Vatican Bank 800 million lire for the privilege of using their name and facilities. The Vatican Bank, situated in the independent State of Vatican City, was beyond the reach of the Italian Bank Inspectors. By selling himself shares he already owned at twice the original purchase price Calvi vastly increased the worth, on paper, of Banco Mercantile and stole 7,724,378,100 lire, less, of course, the kick-back he gave to the Vatican Bank. Subsequently Calvi sold his shares to Milan business rival Anna Bonomi for 33 billion lire.

With the close and continuous co-operation of the Vatican Bank, Calvi was able to dance an illegal and criminal path through the Italian laws again and again. Operations such as that described above could not take place without the full knowledge and approval of Marcinkus.

With regard to the Sindona/Calvi/Marcinkus scheme concerning Banca Cattolica del Veneto all the available evidence suggests a criminal conspiracy involving all three men.

Marcinkus wanted to keep the operation secret, even from Pope Paul VI. Some years afterwards Calvi recalled the deal to friend and business associate Flavio Carboni:
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Mercinkus, who is a rough type, born in a suburb of Chicago of poor parents, wanted to carry out the operation without even telling the boss. That is the Pope. I had three meetings with Marcinkus regarding Banca Cattolica del Veneto. He wanted to sell it to me. I asked him: ‘Are you sure? Is it available to you? Is the boss in agreement with it?’ It was I who insisted and told him, ‘Go to the boss, tell him’. Marcinkus took my advice. Later Marcinkus told me, yes, he had spoken with Paul VI and had his assent. Some time later Marcinkus got me an audience with Paul VI, who thanked me because in the meantime I had sorted out some problems of the Ambrosiano Library. In reality I understood he was thanking me for buying Banca Cattolica del Veneto.

If anyone seeks confirmation that by the early 1970s the Pope had acquired the new title of Chairman of the Board it can be found in Calvi’s description. The Holy Father and Vicar of Christ is reduced to ‘the boss’. Equally illuminating are Roberto Calvi’s anxious questions to Bishop Marcinkus. ‘Are you sure? Is it available to you?’ The Milanese banker was obviously fully aware of the close ties that bound the bank to the Vicenza clergy. The fact that Marcinkus wished to keep the Pope ignorant of the transaction is a further indication of just how dubious the sale to Calvi was. Cardinal Benelli’s advice to Albino Luciani that the Pope would not intercede on behalf of the Patriarch, his bishops and his priests, is demonstrated as being wise. There was not much point in complaining about the sale to the man who had given it his personal blessing. What Pope Paul VI, with the aid of Calvi, Marcinkus and Sindona, had created was a time bomb which would continue to tick until September 1978.

Fearful of a hostile reaction from Venice, all news of the sale of the bank was suppressed by Marcinkus and Calvi. On March 30th, 1972 Calvi’s group announced that they had acquired 37.4 per cent of Banca Cattolica, but the documentary evidence I have acquired tells another story.

On July 27th, 1971 Calvi wrote to Marcinkus:

With this letter we wish to inform you of our firm offer to buy up to 50 per cent of the shares of the Banca Cattolica del Veneto, Vicenza, at a price of 1,600 lire each share with normal usufruct to take place through the following steps:

1   For 45 per cent of the shares making up the aforesaid company, that is 16,254,000 shares with the application
depending on your acceptance of our firm offer and against a payment by us of $42 million.

2   For the remaining shares, that is up to a further 5 per cent of the capital, 1,806,000 shares, to take effect from the date of the ‘declaration of intent’ concerning the aforementioned Banca Cattolica del Veneto, to take place before October 31, 1971, and against a payment of $4,500,000 on 29.10.1971.

The Vatican Bank received 46.5 million dollars, at the 1971 value. A comparable figure today would be 115,000.00 million dollars.

Calvi, who was aware that, at his insistence, this offer would be shown to the Pope, continued in his letter:

We inform you that we formally assume the responsibility of maintaining unchanged from the point of view of the high social, moral and Catholic religious purposes the conduct of Banca Cattolica del Veneto’s activities.

The Vatican copy of this letter is officially stamped and signed by Marcinkus. Thus the secret sale of 1971 became known to Venice nearly one year later.

The ‘high social, moral and Catholic religious purposes’ were so rapidly dispensed with by Calvi at the Banca Cattolica that the entire clergy of the region had been up in arms and besieging Luciani’s residence in Venice by mid-1972. Luciani had hurried to Rome, but 1972 was clearly not the time for remedial action, with Paul VI blessing the transaction. The time for action was to be September 1978.