Humphry Clinker (19 page)

76
. (
p. 121
) The Manicheans were a sect who taught that the universe is governed by two independent principles, one the source of good, the other the source of evil. This heresy was opposed by St Augustine, who had earlier been an adherent. Bayle's account of the Manicheans is an important source for Hume in this part. Philo's view that the evil in the world presents an insuperable obstacle for natural theology based on
a posteriori
reasoning is reminiscent of Bayle's statement about the Manicheans: ‘They would soon have been defeated by
a priori
arguments; their strength lay in
a posteriori
arguments. With these they could have fought a long time, and it would have been difficult to defeat them.'

77
. (
p. 122
) There is here again an echo of Bayle. His unflinching refusal to accept any theodicy which tries to explain away the fact that God creates a universe containing sin and suffering opened him to the accusation, also made against Calvin, that he portrayed God as the author of sin. See Labrousse, op. cit., pp. 61-8. It is this implication that horrifies Demea.

78
. (
p. 126
) With Philo's statement that his intentions will not be mistaken by anyone of common sense, compare Bayle, op. cit., ‘Clarifications', the general and preliminary observation. For the similarity between Bayle and Philo on the claim that ‘the divine being… discovers himself to reason, in the inexplicable contrivance and artifice of nature', see Labrousse, op. cit., pp. 54-6.

See also: ‘The whole frame of nature bespeaks an intelligent author; and no rational enquirer can, after serious reflection, suspend his belief a moment with regard to the primary principles of genuine theism and religion.' NHR.21.

79
. (
p. 126
) Claudius Galen, (AD 131-200), Greek physician. He studied in Smyrna and Alexandria, and practised in Rome, becoming personal physician of the emperor, Marcus Aurelius. He wrote extensively on anatomy and the theory of science and medicine. The work to which Hume refers is ‘On the formation of the foetus'.

80
. (
p. 127
) ‘If
Galen
so many ages ago, could find in the construction and constitution of the parts of the human body, such undeniable marks of contrivance and design; as forced him
then
to acknowledge and admire the wisdom of its author; what would he have said, if he had known the
late
discoveries in anatomy and physic, the circulation of the blood, the exact structure of the heart and brain, the uses of numberless glands and valves for the secretion and motion of the juices in the body, besides several veins and other vessels and receptacles not at all known, or imagined so much as to have any existence,
in his days.'
Samuel Clarke, op. cit., pp. 226-7.

81
. (
p. 127
) Compare
Part I
, above: ‘… it is that very suspense or balance, which is the triumph of scepticism.'

82
. (
p. 130
) ‘The greater part of mankind are naturally apt to be affirmative and dogmatical in their opinions… But could such dogmatical reasoners become sensible of the strange infirmities of human
understanding, even in its most perfect state, and when most accurate and cautious in its determinations; such a reflection would naturally inspire them with more modesty and reserve, and diminish their fond opinion of themselves, and their prejudice against antagonists.' E.161.

83
. (
p. 130
) ‘The conduct of a man, who studies philosophy in this careless manner, is more truly sceptical than that of one, who feeling in himself an inclination to it, is yet so over-whelm'd with doubts and scruples, as totally to reject it. A true sceptic will be diffident of his philosophical doubts, as well as of his philosophical conviction; and will never refuse any innocent satisfaction, which offers itself, upon account of either of them.' T.3 20.

It seems evident
…
on the necessity:
This paragraph originally appeared in Hume's manuscript as a note. Hume later deleted it, and rewrote it at the end of the manuscript. In the printed edition of 1779, it appears as a note; and later editors have followed that precedent. But J. V. Price has pointed out that the manuscript instructions to do this do not seem to be in Hume's handwriting; and I agree with his reasons for incorporating it into the text. See A. W. Colver and J. V. Price (eds.), 1976, p. 250, n. 5.

84
. (
p. 132
) ‘The world is full of people who prefer to commit a sin rather than displease a prince who can make or break their fortunes. People every day sign formularies of faith against their conscience in order to safeguard their wealth or to avoid jail, exile, death, or the like.' Bayle, op. cit., ‘First Clarification'.

85
. (
p. 132
) ‘The fabric and constitution of our mind no more depends on our choice, than that of our body… As a stream necessarily follows the several inclinations of the ground, on which it runs; so are the ignorant and thoughtless part of mankind actuated by their natural propensities.' Hume, ‘The Sceptic', in
Essays: Moral, Political and Literary.

86
. (
p. 133
) ‘In a little time, the inspired person comes to regard himself as a distinguished favourite of the Divinity; and when this frenzy once takes place, which is the summit of enthusiasm, every whimsy is consecrated: Human reason, and even morality are rejected as fallacious guides…' ‘Of Superstition and Enthusiasm', loc. cit.

87
. (
p. 134
) Compare NHR. passim, but especially pp. 70-3.

88
. (
p. 135
) ‘The religious philosophers… paint, in the most magnificent colours, the order, beauty, and wise arrangement of the universe, and then ask, if such a glorious display of intelligence could proceed from the fortuitous concourse of atoms, or if chance could produce what the greatest genius can never sufficiently admire. I shall not examine the justness of this argument. I shall allow it to be as solid as my antagonists and accusers can desire. It is sufficient, if I can prove, from this very reasoning, that the question is entirely speculative.' E.135.

89
. (
p. 135
) ‘What a noble privilege is it of human reason to attain the knowledge of the supreme Being; and, from the visible works of nature, be enabled to infer so sublime a principle as its supreme Creator? But
turn the reverse of the medal. Survey most nations and most ages. Examine the religious principles, which have, in fact, prevailed in the world. You will scarcely be persuaded, that they are any thing but sick men's dreams.' NHR.75.

90
. (
p. 135
) The reference that Hume gives to the
Histories
of Polybius does not seem to be accurate. He may have had in mind Book 6, Chapter 56, sections 6-12, where Polybius approves the Roman use of religion for maintaining the cohesion of the state, and criticizes ‘the moderns' (he does not mention Epicureans as such) who, in undermining religious beliefs, have, among the Greeks, produced people who cannot be trusted.

91
. (
p. 135
) Euripides,
Iphigenia in Tauris
, probably first presented in 414
BC
. Hume possibly had in mind the scene in which Iphigenia fools Thoas, using her sanctity as a priestess to cover her lies, and in the course of her deception remarks that ‘Greeks are never to be trusted'.

92
. (
p. 136
) ‘Whether therefore the being and attributes of God can be
demonstrated
or not; it must at least be confessed by all rational and wise men, to be a thing very
desirable
, and which they would heartily
wish
to be true, that there were a God, intelligent and wise, a just and good being, to govern the world.' Samuel Clarke, op. cit., p. 10.

93
. (
p. 136
) ‘Without having read the fine treatise of Seneca on benefits, everyone knows by the natural light that it is essential to a benefactor not to bestow gifts that he knows will be abused in such a manner that they will only serve to bring about the ruin of the person to whom they are given.' Bayle, op. cit., ‘Paulicians'.

94
. (
p. 137
) ‘Any of the human affections may lead us into the notion of invisible, intelligent power; hope as well as fear, gratitude as well as affliction: But if we examine our own hearts, or observe what passes around us, we shall find, that men are much oftener thrown on their knees by the melancholy than by the agreeable passions.' NHR.31.

95
. (
p. 137
) Compare Philo, at the beginning of this Part: ‘… no one, I am confident, in whose eyes I appear a man of common sense will ever mistake my intentions.'

96
. (
p. 137
) Seneca,
Epistulae Morales,
xcv, 50:
'Primus est deorum cultus deos credere';
that is, ‘The first way to worship the gods is to believe in the gods', translation by R. M. Gummere,
The Epistles of Seneca
, Loeb, London, 1925, Vol. III, p. 89.

97
. (
p. 139
) ‘I proceed now to the main thing I at first proposed to my self; namely, to endeavour to show… that the being and attributes of God, are not only possible or barely probable in themselves, but also strictly demonstrable to any unprejudiced mind from the most uncontestable principles of reason.' Samuel Clarke, op. cit., p. 14.

98
. (
p. 139
) ‘This is a great step toward the Christian religion; for it requires that we look to God for knowledge of what we ought to believe and what we ought to do, and that we enslave our understanding to the obeisance of faith. If a man is convinced that nothing good is to be expected from his philosophical enquiries, he will be more disposed to pray to God to persuade him of the truths that ought to be
believed than if he flatters himself that he might succeed by reasoning and disputing. A man is therefore happily disposed toward faith when he knows how defective reason is.' Bayle, op. cit., ‘Pyrrho'.

99
. (
p. 139
) ‘Here the conversation ended, and we parted, Velleius thinking Cotta's discourse to be truer, while I felt that that of Balbus approximated more nearly to a semblance of the truth.' Cicero, op. cit., p. 383.