Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 (86 page)
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Authors: Henrik O. Lunde
Tags: #Bisac Code 1: HIS027100
The aircraft carrier
Furious
was present in the waters off North Norway until April 26. This carrier had no fighter aircraft aboard and this, and the difficulty in keeping aircraft serviceable, severely limited its usefulness. For most of the next two weeks, the Allies had no combat aircraft other than a squadron of seaplanes in the Narvik area. The aircraft carrier
Ark Royal
arrived off Narvik on May 6, and remained there until May 21 when the carrier
Furious
delivered a squadron of Gladiators to operate from Bardufoss. The threat to the aircraft carriers from German aircraft and submarines was a grave concern in the British Navy. While the carriers operated from well offshore in order to minimize the air threat, their aircraft and those of the Norwegians were initially able to contest German air operations, carry out attacks against shore targets, and provide limited support for ground operations.
The Allied evacuations in south and central Norway freed German air assets for use in the north. The opening of a land connection between Oslo and Trondheim allowed the Luftwaffe to base and support expanded air operations from Værnes Airfield and this soon made itself felt in the Narvik area. German close air support operations were, as already mentioned, hampered by two facts. First, the scale of Luftwaffe maps (1:1,000,000) made effective close air support practically impossible. The lack of ground-to-air communications was the second problem. While the 3rd Division received the necessary radio equipment on May 6, an air force liaison officer was not provided until May 20. His efforts increased the effectiveness of close air support operations and resulted in improved coordination and support from the air operation center in Trondheim, which directed all air operations in North Norway.
Increased German air presence in the Narvik area and the inability of the carrier aircraft to effectively contest this increased threat speeded up Allied efforts to establish shore-based air operations. The increased German air activity also began to take its toll on the British Navy. The battleship
Resolution
was withdrawn from the area after a German bomb penetrated three decks on May 18. The antiaircraft cruiser
Curlew
was lost on May 26 with many of her crew as she provided antiaircraft protection for the construction of the airfield at Skånland.
Ash writes that Admiral Cork “had been scouring the countryside for possible landing grounds since his earliest days in Norway.”
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In fact, construction of a new airfield at Skånland was started but never completed to the point where it could be used. Several fields that could be made operational with much less effort were available. There were fields at Bardufoss, Elvenes in Salangen, Banak, Bodø, and Mo but all had to be cleared of snow and improved to support fighter operations. Hundreds of civilian laborers were involved in making Bardufoss and the field at Bodø ready to receive British fighter aircraft. Within two weeks after the decision to station two squadrons of fighters at Bardufoss, a number of protective shelters for aircraft were built and snow was cleared from three 900-meter runways.
Because of the delayed decision to bring in land-based fighters, the Bardufoss Airfield was not ready to receive British fighter aircraft until May 21. The 263rd Gladiator Squadron took off from the aircraft carrier
Furious
. The weather was bad and two of the 18 aircraft crashed into a mountain on the way to Bardufoss. However, by the following day the Gladiators were established on the airfield and able to conduct air operations in the Harstad-Narvik area.
It was planned to have the 46th Hurricane Squadron operate from Skånland. This squadron took off from the aircraft carrier
Glorious
on May 26 and attempted to land at Skånland “but three out of eleven aircraft tipped on to their noses on landing as a result of the soft surface of the runway.”
15
The squadron was diverted to Bardufoss from where it operated until the end of the campaign.
It was not until the middle of May that the British decided to establish an airbase at Bodø. The Norwegians provided a large labor force from the Bodø area and they had the field ready for operations on May 26. Initially, the ground proved too soft here as it did at Skånland but this was rectified when the runway was re-laid in 14 hours. Except for the three Gladiators that came down from Bardufoss, the British never used this airfield and its capture by the Germans after the British evacuated Bodø gave them an operational airfield close to Narvik.
The Norwegian air group was down to one serviceable aircraft in early May. The rest were shot down, had crashed, or were unserviceable due to lack of spare parts. The aircraft flown in from the southern part of the country performed well in support of the forward brigades but the lack of spare parts reduced their number because some aircraft had to be cannibalized to keep others flying. Some pilots without aircraft were sent to England to receive fighter aircraft training and new aircraft.
Norwegian-Allied Friction
There was growing bitterness between the Norwegians and the British as the operations in Norway progressed. Many Norwegians viewed British actions since the outbreak of war in 1939 as designed to pull their country into that conflict. The Norwegians were promised on April 9 that quick and large-scale assistance would be forthcoming. When the assistance did arrive it was inadequate in both quantity and quality. Continual promises and assurances during the operations in southern and central Norway never materialized. The displeasure over the adequacy of the assistance was closely tied to the question of strategy.
Norwegian recommendations on strategy failed to alter the British War Cabinet’s preoccupation with Narvik and the iron ore. The British decision makers failed to realize that control of central Norway would lead to eventual success in North Norway, while giving up in central Norway doomed any efforts in the north. Frequent Norwegian suggestions that the Allies use forces sitting idle in the Narvik area in Nordland Province were unheeded until it was too late. They could not understand the relative inactivity of the British Navy or the Allied failure to provide adequate air resources for the forces they sent to Norway. General Ruge’s comments on the air support situation in southern Norway were shared by his fellow officers in northern Norway:
It turned out that, as on many other subjects, the British had difficulties coping with the conditions in the country. They did not risk following our recommendations…. Our airmen were used to operating from frozen lakes in the winter… . The British pilots, not used to working under such conditions, did not venture to base their operations on such provisional arrangements and continued to search for what they called real airfields. In this way, much valuable time was lost.
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The British displayed an attitude of deep distrust and arrogance towards their new allies from the very beginning, often based on fallacious information. Intelligence Summary No 227 in mid-April, for example, reports that Norwegian inactivity was due to low morale, mass desertions, a country riddled with Nazi agents, and an army of disloyal elements. Reports by Auchinleck to Dill in May demonstrate disrespect for Norwegians in general and especially for their military. Reflecting on British/Norwegian relations in 1946, Ruge wrote:
To start with, the British did not have a high opinion of Norwegian defense forces. Our apparent collapse on April 9 did not exactly improve the respect for us by a people who had not yet felt what it meant to confront the German war machine and be placed in a hopeless position by German air power. Excessive talk here at home in the days after April 9 about treason and Quisling and his followers created the impression in London that Norway was full of traitors …
17
It is understandable that the Norwegians were bitter towards the Allies. Norwegian operational recommendations, based on their intimate knowledge of local conditions and better intelligence on German forces, were brushed aside, often with tragic consequences. Agreed on cooperation with Allied land forces were altered without timely notification. Moulton observes that the Allies felt that the Norwegian Government and its military were unwarlike, negligent in their security, and that there was a large number of Norwegians who sympathized with the Germans.
The behavior of ill-disciplined British and French troops added to the bad atmosphere. Colonel Tue, commanding the 4th Regiment in Romsdal, reported, “Very young lads who appeared to come from the slums of London. They had taken a very close interest in the women of Romsdal, and engaged in wholesale looting of stores and houses.”
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Kersuady also attests to such behavior:
It was hard to deny the evidence, as the Foreign Office grudgingly acknowledged shortly thereafter: ‘Drunk’ British troops had on one occasion quarreled and eventually fired upon some Norwegian fishermen. Again, some of the British Army officers had behaved ‘with the arrogance of Prussians’ and the Naval Officers were in general so cautious and suspicious that they treated every Norwegian as a Fifth Columnist and refused to believe vital information when given them.
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Chamberlain’s speech to a very unfriendly parliamentary session on May 7 did not improve things. In trying to play down the extent of the defeat in South and Central Norway, he stated, “the German strike was made easy by treachery from inside Norway.” The Norwegians felt betrayed and such statements only served to increase their bitterness.
Derry notes that the shortcomings of the Norwegian forces and their lack of morale were not helped by a lack of sympathy and continual mistrust by the British. General Moulton notes that there was enough blame to go around for both sides but claims that neither side behaved badly in southern and central Norway.
Moulton underestimates the ill feeling among Norwegians in the Narvik area. They remembered the unannounced Allied withdrawals from the southern and central parts of the country where they were kept in the dark until the last moments, resulting in large segments of their troops being placed in untenable positions and forced to surrender. This pattern continued with the withdrawals from Mosjøen and Bodø. The plan to withdraw from Bodø was kept from General Ruge despite a solemn promise to the contrary on May 16. This action, which left Roscher-Nielsen’s forces isolated in Røsvik, so infuriated the Norwegian Government that the British command suspected that it might conclude peace with the Germans.
The British had the lead in the Norwegian campaign and they went to great lengths to insure that this command authority was kept intact. Auchinleck’s instructions were that, in case he became ill or incapacitated, a junior British officer be temporarily promoted to lieutenant general and assume command. In the planned operation against Trondheim, again without consulting or informing the Norwegians, it was stipulated that all forces, including Norwegians, would come under British command. Auchinleck, after taking over from Mackesy, requested authority not only to assume command of Norwegian forces but the right to regulate the non-military sector, including mass movements of civilians.
In a letter to General Dill, Auchinleck wrote, “I shall shortly have to have a wholesale clearing out of the inhabitants from the occupied areas. The place is riddled, I am convinced, with spies.”
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There is no mention of where he intended to move the civilians in this winter wilderness or how he proposed to feed and care for them after such a move. While these proposals and suggestions were never acted on, they illustrate the extent of the mistrust that existed.
There was a complete lack of systematic coordination and cooperation between the Allied military leaders in North Norway and the Norwegian authorities. The British commanders, Cork, Mackesy, and Auchinleck, never visited Ruge or Fleischer’s headquarters. Fleischer had likewise not visited the Allied headquarters in Harstad until Ruge brought him along on May 16. This conference was General Fleischer’s first and last direct contact with the British leadership during the campaign.
Liaison officers were exchanged but they were not provided with adequate communications and were often purposely kept in the dark about planned operations. Consequently, they had little or no influence on the planning and conduct of operations at the highest echelons. The failure to include Norwegian officers on the operations and intelligence staffs at Harstad is deplorable.
News of what had transpired in southern and central Norway made Norwegians, especially Fleischer, suspicious of Allied plans and intentions. The way the evacuations were carried out was looked upon by many as treachery, particularly since the Norwegian forces were not given an opportunity to be evacuated. The broken promises caused bitterness and dejection from cabinet level to the privates who suffered at the front.
Fleischer’s suspicions were evident when Admiral Cork sent a wing commander to arrange for British use of Bardufoss Airfield for two fighter squadrons. After keeping the British waiting for twenty minutes and then listening to the request, Fleischer demanded written assurances that there would be no sudden withdrawal of aircraft and pilots. Fleischer also rejected the use of Allied troops to clear snow at Bardufoss. He no doubt thought they could be used to better purpose somewhere else. According to some, the meeting was at times heated but in the end, Fleischer agreed to British use of the airfield, arranged for a workforce to clear the field, and provided a battalion as protection. Victor MacClure writes that Fleischer’s agreement was contingent on his chief-of-staff going to Harstad to present Fleischer’s conditions to Admiral Cork.
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Ash, while not mentioning any demands by Fleischer for his chief of staff to be taken to see Admiral Cork, also describes the meeting as tense and Fleischer as “completely intransigent” and says that he made it “plain that his intransigence would continue until he had evidence of some Allied will to fight.”
22
Ash, who describes Fleischer as “resentful and uncooperative,” notes that the general had some good reasons for his bitterness. Moulton writes that the British account is denied by Lindbäck-Larsen who termed it inaccurate and insulting.
