Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 (58 page)

C
AMPAIGNS IN THE
S
OUTH

“… shocking inaction of the Navy at Trondheim, for which you and your pusillanimous, self-satisfied, short-sighted naval advisers must bear full responsibility.”

A
PRIL
29, 1940
LETTER FROM
A
DMIRAL OF THE
F
LEET
S
IR
R
OGER
K
EYES TO
C
HURCHILL.

In order to understand the unfolding operations in North Norway it is necessary to examine the campaigns in eastern and central Norway. These operations and the strategy dictating them had profound effects on events in the Narvik area and they created ill feelings between the Norwegians and the Allies, feelings that took on added importance as the focus shifted to Narvik. The operations in western Norway are not included in this summary since they had little effect on what transpired in the north.

The German Buildup

The German assault elements landing at various points on the Norwegian coast were lightly armed and it was anticipated that they would need immediate reinforcements, equipment, and supplies. These were provided for in the operational plans.

In general, the German sea transport operations must be viewed as a success. During the campaign, about 370 merchant ships brought in 107,581 troops, 109,400 tons of supplies, 20,339 vehicles, and 16,102 horses. While the Germans lost 21 merchant ships, 15 escort vessels, and about 2,000 men, these losses were judged acceptable from their point of view. The Allies lost six submarines—four British, one French, and one Polish.

The Luftwaffe also made a significant contribution to the rein forcement and supply effort. It carried out successfully the largest air transport operation in military history up to that time. Five-hundred-eighty-two transport aircraft flew 13,018 sorties. These brought in 29,280 troops and 2,376 tons of supplies.

The rapid German buildup in southern Norway contributed greatly to their success. The disrupted and cumbersome Norwegian mobilization machinery and the confused and hesitant efforts by the Allies were no match for the rapid pace at which German forces were reinforced and supplied.

The German Offensive Begins

The German offensive into the interior to link up with their beachheads in Trondheim and Bergen began in earnest on April 13.

The northward advance of General Richard Pellengahr’s 196th Division was divided into two groups. Colonel Hermann Fischer, commander of the 340th Inf Regiment, commanded one group. His task was to advance north through Østerdal towards Trondheim. Colonel Ländle, commander of the 345th Inf Regiment, led the second group. His mission was to advance north through Gudbrandsdal along the east shore of Lake Mjøsa.

Two German battle groups drove northward towards Gjøvik and Dokka. Colonel Zanthier was commander of the 349th Inf Regiment, 181st Division, and his battle group consisted of two infantry battalions from the 349th Regiment as well as the motorized portion of the 1/324th Inf. Artillery and engineers supported this group, as they did the others. Its mission was to advance along the railroad towards Gjøvik. The forces on both sides of Mjøsa Lake were to converge in the Lillehammer area. Groups Ländle and Zanthier sent out side columns for mutual support and these became Group Nickelmann, under Colonel Helmuth Nickelmann commander of the 324th Inf Regiment, 163rd Division. It eventually consisted of three infantry battalions, artillery, engineers, a tank detachment, and two separate infantry companies. This group advanced along the west shore of Lake Mjøsa.

One, Group Adlhoch, under Colonel Xaver Adlhoch, commander of the 236th Inf Regiment, 69th Division, consisted of four infantry battalions and two separate companies as well as artillery, engineer and tank elements. Its mission was to advance north on both sides of Randsfjord to capture Fluberg, Dokka, and Bagn. From there, the group would press on in a northwest direction and establish contact with the German forces moving east from Bergen. Adlhoch decided to subdivide his forces on April 14.

Group Adlhoch consisted of two infantry battalions and an engineer company. This group advanced north along the east shore of Randsfjord towards Fluberg and Dokka. Major Daubert had command of two battalions for an advance towards Bagn along Sperillen Lake. Group Ritzmann consisted of one infantry battalion with supporting elements. It advanced in the direction of Gulsvik. The 163rd Division also had smaller groups operating to the west and southwest with the mission of securing the coastal areas between Oslo and Kristiansand and capturing the remaining Norwegian mobilization centers in that part of the country.

The Norwegian forces contesting the German advance were primarily elements of four regiments of the 2nd Division. The forces to the east of Lake Mjøsa consisted of the Kongsvinger Battalion, Colonel Hiorth’s 5th Inf Regiment, and Colonel Jørgen Jensen’s 2nd Cavalry Regiment. Colonel T. H. Dahl’s 4th Inf Regiment and Colonel Carl Mork’s 6th Inf Regiment covered the area between Lake Mjøsa and Randsfjord. Colonel Østbye’s 4th Field Brigade, redeploying from western Norway, was moving into the area northwest of Sperillen Lake.

The Germans encountered stiff resistance as they reached the 2nd Division’s defense line south of Mjösa, Randsfjord, and Sperillen. Fighting was heavy and the Germans sustained considerable losses. As they moved into the interior, they also encountered deep snow that made movement off the roads very difficult. Norwegian defenses fell into a pattern that would characterize the rest of the campaign in central Norway. They were based on a series of barricades and cuts in lines of communications, supported by flanking fire that made German clearing actions difficult. The Germans adapted quickly to the conditions confronting them and their tactics were quite effective. They organized their columns into combined arms teams of infantry, artillery, engineers, and armor. These attempted to break the Norwegian lines under heavy supporting fires while ski troops worked around the defenders’ flanks.

The various attacking columns operated in near flawless cooperation. When the advance in one sector reached a point where it was behind Norwegian defenders in the next sector, smaller groups would peel off from the more advanced column. These became threats to Norwegian flanks and rear, often forcing precipitous withdrawals. The innovative tactics and German superiority in artillery, tanks, and complete dominance in the air soon made themselves felt. The Norwegians had no tanks, no effective antitank weapons, and no air support.

Group Fischer captured Kongsvinger on April 16 and turned north to the opening of Østerdal. It had to fight hard as it made its way northward against stubborn Norwegian resistance. Group Ländle advanced along the east side of Lake Mjøsa while the Norwegian troops withdrew slowly to a strong defensive position at Strandlykkja where the German attack was stopped temporarily. There were no obvious ways to turn the Norwegian flanks. Lake Mjøsa was partially covered with ice and the Germans gambled that it was thick enough to send a force across the southern end from the west shore, threatening the Norwegian right flank and rear. One infantry battalion was sent across the lake and the operation was successful. The Norwegians made a hasty retreat towards Hamar, which fell to the Germans on April 18.

This event had far-reaching consequences. The Germans sent a group east towards Elverum that made rapid progress and linked up with Group Fischer on April 20. Colonel Hiorth’s forces in Østerdal found its right flank and rear exposed by the German group advancing from Hamar and was forced to withdraw. The last railroad connection to Sweden was severed. The Hamar broadcasting facilities, through which the Norwegian Government had communicated with the occupied areas, were captured.

General Pellenghar began a relentless pursuit of the Norwegian forces withdrawing north from Hamar. He took personal command of the offensive in Gudbrandsdal as troops from the 163rd Division, advancing north along the west shore of Lake Mjøsa, came under his command. The Norwegians succeeded in withdrawing to Lundehøgda on April 18 and 19.

The German advance west of Mjøsa also met stubborn resistance in the early days of the offensive. Group Zanthier’s advance encountered an ad hoc Norwegian unit at Hakadal and the fight raged all night of April 14–15. The Norwegians withdrew in the morning. The Germans encountered a better-prepared defense near Bjørgeseter (about 25 kilometers southeast of Brandbu) the following day. The first German attack was repulsed. The German commander wanted to wait for more artillery before resuming the attack but he was overruled by the division commander. The second attack also failed after heavy German losses, mostly caused by Norwegian ski troops operating against the German flanks.

Group Adlhoch started its attack at dawn on April 15 with two battalions along the road that led north from Hønefoss. The attack was stopped by the 1/5th Inf after heavy fighting. Colonel Adlhoch’s report to the division that evening reads in part: “Both battalions have suffered heavy losses. The position is unfavorable since the enemy dominates the terrain with their heavy weapons. Have committed the last regimental reserve. The attack will be continued in the morning.”
¹
The message went on to request artillery, air, and tank support. Six tanks and some mountain troops were provided overnight.

The Norwegian 1/5th was relieved by the 2/5th during the night. The German attack resumed on April 16 after a 30-minute mortar bombardment. The two battalions again attacked along the road but this time they had tank support. The Norwegians, with two companies forward, had no effective weapons against tanks and these were able to drive into the Norwegian positions. The right flank company was able to disengage before it was overrun but was overwhelmed in its new positions 500 meters further back. At that point, the position of the left flank company became untenable. Tanks appeared in its rear and forced a withdrawal. The unit was scattered and only a few soldiers reached friendly lines. A counterattack by the battalion reserve failed. The battalion commander was killed and the unit was scattered. The destruction of the 2/5th Infantry made the positions of other units opposing Group Zanthier untenable and forced a general withdrawal.

Group Adlhoch captured Fluberg on April 19. One battalion turned east on April 20, along the road to Gjøvik. Group Zanthier advanced north through the middle of the area between Randsfjord and Lake Mjøsa and captured Tobru, about halfway between Fluberg and Gjøvik. Group Nickelmann continued along the west shore of Lake Mjøsa and captured Gjøvik on April 19. One battalion continued north in the direction of Vingnes the next day.

The Germans were stopped temporarily at Bråstad, about six kilometers north of Gjøvik. Heavy fighting took place from Bråstad westward on April 20 and 21. Several Norwegian units were isolated, but the Germans were held in check by committing every available reserve, including staff and support personnel. Colonel Dahl, who commanded Norwegian forces between Lake Mjøsa and Randsfjord, decided to retire to new defensive positions near Fåberg on April 21.

In the area between Sperillen Lake and Randsfjord, Major Daubert’s forces made progress against the reserve battalion of the 6th Inf Regiment after capturing Hallingby at the southern end of Sperillen on April 14. Bjørnevika, near the northern end of the lake, was captured on April 16. Group Daubert reached the vicinity of Bagn on April 18. There followed three days of hard fighting with Norwegian forces, reinforced by units from the 4th Field Brigade that had arrived in the area to the west of Bagn.

The reserve battalion of the Norwegian 6th Inf had marched and fought for nine days and the 1/10th of the 4th Brigade relieved it on April 18. The Norwegians overwhelmed a German company on April 21 after heavy fighting. The Germans lost 13 killed, 19 wounded, and 65 prisoners. Major Daubert concluded on April 20 that his two battalions could not break Norwegian resistance and he withdrew his forces to Hønefoss where they arrived in the evening of April 21. From there they joined Group Adlhoch in the Fluberg area.

The Failed German Airborne Assault on Dombås

The Germans realized soon after their landings that the link-up with other bridgeheads in south and central Norway would not be as easy and quick as they had hoped. Von Falkenhorst was frustrated at the inability of his two divisions to trap and destroy major elements of the 2nd Norwegian Division. Rumors of planned Allied landings at Åndalsnes and Namsos reached the Germans on April 13. To speed the link-up with the forces in Trondheim and trap Norwegian units in Gudbrandsdal, the Germans attempted an airborne operation in the Norwegian rear at Dombås. This was an important road and railroad junction, where the routes from Oslo to Trondheim intersected with those leading west to Åndalsnes.

The airborne operation was launched on April 14 in haste, without adequate intelligence, no time for planning, in unfavorable weather, and with inadequate forces. Fifteen German aircraft carried the reinforced Co 1, 1st Airborne Regiment (185 men). The company commander had the only map of the Dombås area, which was at a scale of 1:100,000. Dombås is located in the mountains but the German paratroopers had no winter or camouflage clothing. The soldiers had provisions for only three days and ammunition was limited to what they carried. The element of surprise was lost when one aircraft was shot down near Lillehammer by Norwegian antiaircraft fire.