Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 (5 page)

The distinct possibility that the contemplated actions in Scandinavia would bring additional countries into the German camp and severely damage Allied reputations in the Dominions and among neutrals did not seem to worry Churchill. In a memorandum to the War Cabinet dated February 19, 1940, dealing with the stoppage of German traffic in Norwegian territorial waters, he wrote:

Some of these conclusions are certainly open to question. It is difficult to see how it would be more advantageous for the British to have the Scandinavian countries in the German camp rather than neutral. The loss of the large Norwegian merchant fleet and the raw materials coming from Norway and Sweden would certainly lead to a strained situation for the British, and seems a strange contention in view of Churchill’s emphatic statement two months earlier that “it cannot be too strongly emphasized that British control of the Norwegian coast-line is a strategic objective of first-class importance.”
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That the British forces would be able to establish and supply themselves at temporary bases on the Norwegian coast using sea power was a dangerous assumption.

Furthermore, it was unlikely that the Germans would need to move any forces into Sweden for that country’s defense. What they needed to move into Norway were primarily air and naval forces. This move, which was being urged by high officials in the German Navy, would immediately improve the German strategic position without a shot being fired.

While Allied policy was shortsighted, the military planning for carrying it out was ineffective. The expeditionary force would risk facing not only Norwegian resistance but also that of Sweden, a country with a large citizen army that was better trained and equipped than that of its neighbor to the west. In addition, the expeditionary force could expect to meet the full fury of the German armed forces, as well as those of the Soviet Union if the Allies made good on their promise to help the Finns.

It appears that the Allied policy makers had become so preoccupied with the importance of interrupting Germany’s importation of iron ore, and of embroiling that nation in military operations in Scandinavia, that they ignored realities and the obvious risks to themselves.

Chamberlain and Halifax came down on the side of Ironside. In this way, they demonstrated willingness to aggressively pursue the war and to bring help to the Finns, while winning precious time for their desired peaceful solution to the war. Such action was also in line with Chamberlain’s well-known anti-Soviet views and the views of the military leaders that supporting the Finns was necessary not only to prevent a Soviet attack on Norway and Sweden but also to protect Allied interests against possible Soviet aggression in other areas of the world. Churchill, on the other hand, had expressed considerable understanding for the Soviet demands vis-à-vis Finland, and he viewed a war between the Scandinavian countries and the Soviet Union as an advantage to the Allies, since it would give them excellent reasons for establishing themselves in Scandinavia.
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A number of key Allied policy-makers believed that the landings could be carried out with the approval of Norway and Sweden and would therefore not be regarded by the United States and the Dominions as a breach of neutrality in the way that mining Norwegian waters almost certainly would be.

The proposed help to Finland camouflaged the real objective: to occupy Narvik and secure control over the Swedish mining district. The French government under Edouard Daladier had another hidden objective in mind in helping the Finns. The French faced the German Army on their eastern border. Memories of the enormous suffering and destruction during World War I were still fresh in French memories, and Daladier also hoped for a change of leadership in Germany that could lead to peace. In the meantime, however, the French government viewed operations in Scandinavia as an excellent opportunity to divert the war to someone else’s territory while pacifying the demand from the French populace that action be taken to aid the Finns.

A French plan formulated in the middle of January 1940 sought to avoid the necessity of asking the Swedish and Danish governments permission to breach their neutrality. It called for British and French forces to land at Petsamo, in former Finnish territory and for a naval blockade of the Soviet coast between Murmansk and Petsamo. The British objected to this plan since it would certainly lead to war with the Soviet Union. Why the British did not think that active Allied intervention on the side of the Finns would lead to a similar result is difficult to understand, unless one assumes that the policy-makers never intended for Allied forces to advance further than to the Swedish iron ore districts.

The only measures undertaken at the War Cabinet meeting on December 22, 1939 were to make diplomatic protests to Norway about the misuse of its territorial waters by Germany and to provide instructions to the military chiefs to consider the implications of any future commitments in Scandinavia. The cabinet authorized the military to plan for a landing at Narvik in the north and to consider the consequences of a German occupation of southern Norway.

The military chiefs had been somewhat skeptical about the risks involved in an operation against the iron ore districts in northern Sweden. Some of this skepticism now began to fade. General Ironside, while stating that it would not be an easy matter to reach the iron ore districts in snow and difficult terrain, concluded that the Allies could reach the mines before any possible Russian counter-moves. He further concluded that, if the British army were to be confronted by superior forces, a line of retreat was available after the mines were destroyed. He estimated that a force of three or four thousand men on skis or snowshoes would be sufficient.
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Admiral Pound tried to ease worries that the Germans might occupy southern Sweden and Norway by stating that the disadvantages if they did so would be more than offset by cutting the iron ore supplies to Germany. The danger of war with the Soviet Union was now viewed as an acceptable side-effect of an operation that could cut the iron ore supplies to Germany. Fears of the Soviet military machine were somewhat abated when it was stopped in its tracks by the small Finnish conscript army. Military planners no longer considered the Soviets capable of creating problems for the Allies in other parts of the world or of providing a great deal of help for Germany in Scandinavia.

The military chiefs also focused on the advantages of shifting the war to Scandinavia, where they reasoned that the Germans would need at least 20 divisions while the Allies, with the help of the Swedes and Norwegians, could make do with a much smaller force. It was believed that the German army had only limited reserves of iron ore on hand, and the chiefs concluded that this fact would force the Germans to attack in the west in the near future or to invade Sweden to secure the Swedish ore. Such an action would also require the Germans to invade Norway, and these combined operations would demand resources on a scale that would force them to postpone indefinitely an attack in the west.

The chiefs gave their blessings to the proposed operations in northern Norway and Sweden, and recommended that the first part of the force be dispatched no later than March 1940 in order to secure the mining districts and the port of Luleå before the northern Baltic became navigable. No direct military action was contemplated against the iron ore mines in central Sweden. They were to be made inoperable by sabotage.

The military chiefs’ acquiescence in the operation against northern Scandinavia carried with it several assumptions. It was imperative to obtain the cooperation of the Norwegian and Swedish governments, although such cooperation would place both those nations at odds with Germany and very possibly the Soviet Union as well.

The chiefs expected that an operation against Narvik would cause German counter-action in southern Norway and Sweden. The Scandinavian nations would be promised help and this help would come primarily through Trondheim in central Norway. The forces landed there would proceed to Sweden, and in cooperation with that nation’s military, establish a defensive line south of Stockholm. Since a German occupation of southern Norway would place Trondheim within the reach of their air force, it was deemed necessary to also occupy Bergen and Stavanger. It was considered essential to carry out these operations almost simultaneously, and this required much shipping and very large naval forces.

Churchill kept pressing for his more limited option of mining the territorial waters. He presented a five-point plan to the War Cabinet on December 29 calling for quick action, pending execution of Ironside’s more ambitious plan:

As already stated, Churchill was well aware that the elimination of the iron ore shipments through Norwegian waters would not alone have a severe effect on German war industry. His plans in the fall of 1939 and spring of 1940 were simple. He hoped for a German reaction to interference with their ore shipments. This would provide the Allies with the requisite excuse needed to move into Scandinavia and eliminate the source of iron ore and other valuable supplies for Germany. The northern blockade would be much more effective with British bases on the Norwegian coast. While Churchill hoped that the Scandinavian countries would resist a direct German attack and become part of the Allied camp, he was not overly concerned if, instead, there was a hostile reaction by these countries to British actions and a request from them for German assistance. While the cabinet members were impressed with Churchill’s arguments, they made no decision.

The military Chiefs of Staff, with Air Chief Marshal Sir Cyril Newall as spokesman, advised against Churchill’s proposal on January 2 when they presented the plan they had developed. They reasoned that Churchill’s plan could lead to German countermeasures that would jeopardize the larger project—the seizure of Narvik and the Swedish iron ore districts. This was in accordance with views expressed by Ironside at the War Cabinet meeting on December 22. Furthermore, the army was not prepared to counter a German move against southern Norway. While expressing favor for Churchill’s project, Chamberlain used the Chiefs of Staff’s objections to delay any actions except for the dispatch of a note to Norway.

The minutes of the meeting on January 2 clearly indicate that there was no realistic understanding of possible Swedish, Norwegian, and German reaction to an Allied entry into northern Scandinavia. They also demonstrate lack of under standing for the complexities of operations in a rugged, road less arctic wilder ness. Churchill maintained that Allied forces were sufficient to seize the iron ore districts regardless of Norwegian and Swedish reactions. The Dominions Secretary, Anthony Eden, suggested that 5,000–7,000 Canadians could be available for the operation in March. When it was pointed out that the Canadians were not trained on skis, General Ironside noted that they had snowshoes, and felt that was sufficient. The lack of reality of these and other assumptions by Allied leaders was quickly demonstrated when they sent forces to Norway in April.

British Note to Norway on January 6, 1940

Lord Halifax delivered the British diplomatic note to the Norwegian Ambassador in London, Erik Colban, on the evening of January 6. The note used the sinking of one Greek and two British merchant ships in 1939—
Thomas Walton
on December 8,
Garoufalia
on December 11, and
Deptford
on December 13—as examples of Norwegian failures to prevent the misuse of its territorial waters.
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The note, a copy of which was provided to Sweden, stated it would be necessary in the future to permit British warships to operate in Norwegian waters because the Germans had turned them into an operational area.

The Norwegian reaction was stronger than the British had anticipated. The Norwegians viewed the note as the most serious threat yet against their neutrality. They were probably aware that some British officials, Churchill among them, were hoping for a German reaction. In Churchill’s view, the Scandinavian countries were afraid of Germany and they would react favorably to Allied demands only if they were more afraid of them than the Germans. Foreign Minister Koht probably selected his words deliberately when he voiced the suspicion “that the British Government’s goal was to bring Norway into the war.”
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To the Norwegians, the note sounded suspiciously like the unreasonable accusations that sometimes preceded action by major powers. In addition, they felt particularly offended that this note was directed at a nation that had lost many lives and much property bringing supplies and foodstuffs to Great Britain through the German blockade.