Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 (30 page)

Four torpedoes were fired at the Norwegian warship from
Wilhelm Heidkamp’s
aft torpedo tubes. Captain Willoch had meanwhile given the order to open fire on the German destroyer. The chief gunnery officer had just given the order, “Port battery, salvo, fire” when three of
Wilhelm Heidkamp’s
torpedoes hit
Eidsvold
. The torpedoes hit along
Eidsvold’s
port side and the effect was devastating. Their detonation set off the ammunition magazines and the enormous explosion broke the ship in two pieces. It sank within 15 seconds. The time was 0437 hours. Only six men from the crew of 181 were saved. Captain Willoch went down with his ship. Three survivors managed to swim to shore while the other three were rescued by the Germans.
Wilhelm Heidkamp
proceeded to Narvik.

The Sinking of the
Norge

As soon as
Norge
cleared for action, she headed towards the harbor entrance. Around 0420 hours, the ship was in position about 300 meters from the Iron Ore Pier with the port battery aimed at the harbor entrance. Shortly after she took up her position, the two German destroyers,
Bernd von Arnim
and
Georg Thiele
, were seen through the snow squall at the harbor entrance. Because of the earlier report from the patrol boat
Senja
about a British cruiser near Ramnes and the sighting of numerous British warships in Vestfjord the previous day, Captain Askim was not sure about the nationality of the two warships. Admiral Diesen’s message that British warships were not to be fired on had been received moments before the foreign warships appeared and Askim decided to challenge the ships with signal lights. The challenge went unanswered and the warships disappeared in a snow squall before he could open fire.

It was at this time that Captain Willoch radioed for instructions and Askim learned that the ships were German. Shortly thereafter, a muffled explosion was heard from the direction of the harbor entrance. Poor visibility prevented
Norge’s
crew from witnessing the tragic fate of their sister ship.

On their way to the Steamship Pier, the two German destroyers were again observed passing between the many merchant ships in the harbor. Askim ordered his ship to commence fire and four or five 8.3-inch rounds and five salvos from the starboard 6-inch battery were fired at the German ships at a range estimated at 800 meters. It was almost impossible to see the targets through the telescopic sights. The first salvo fell short. Overcompensation caused the other salvoes to pass over the German destroyers and land ashore.

The German ships were in the process of docking on opposite sides of the pier and starting to disembark troops as
Norge
opened fire.
Bernd von Arnim
docked with the starboard side against the pier and its skipper, Lieutenant Commander Kurt Rechel, ordered the 5-inch guns as well as the machineguns to open fire on the Norwegian ship. Rechel was not in an enviable position. He had to fight a naval action on his port side from a stationary position while German mountain troops were scrambling ashore over the starboard side. The German fire was inaccurate and none of the 5-inch shells hit the Norwegian ship.
Bernd von Arnim
also fired seven torpedoes at the coastal defense ship.

The torpedoes were seen from
Norge’s
bridge and an attempt was made to bring the ship parallel to their tracks. The first five torpedoes missed but the maneuver to bring
Norge
parallel to their track was not completed when the last two torpedoes hit their target, one aft and one amidships. As was the case with
Eidsvold
, the result was devastating. The ship capsized to starboard and sank with the bottom up in less than one minute. The ship had a crew of 191 and 101 of these went down with their ship. A boat from
Bernd von Arnim
saved nine sailors while merchant ships anchored in the harbor saved another 81. Captain Askim was brought ashore unconscious.

Within 23 minutes, the two largest ships in the Norwegian Navy were sent to the bottom with the loss of 276 lives, and without accomplishing anything against the enemy. The two coastal defense ships were floating coffins when pitted against modern warships. The prewar civilian and navy leadership in Norway must shoulder much of the responsibility for this disastrous event. These two ships were in Narvik in an attempt to compensate for the failure of successive governments over half a century to heed the pleas of the military to build coastal fortifications in the approaches to Narvik. By failing to provide adequate resources to the military in the interwar period, the labor government condemned Norwegian sailors to serve on ships that were antiquated and belonged to an earlier period of naval development.

The captains of the two ships must also share in the responsibility for what happened. They knew the severe limitations of their ships and had toyed with the idea of beaching one on each side of the relatively narrow entrance to Ofotfjord or Narvik’s harbor, to use them as shore batteries. This was the only sensible course of action after the civilian leadership and naval authorities allowed these ships to be taken out of mothballs. As a witness during the court martial of Colonel Sundlo, Captain Askim stated that he would have beached the two ships on opposite sides of the harbor entrance if he had known how things were to unfold. However, he also stated that he could not do this without orders from Admiral Diesen.

To my knowledge, Captain Askim never requested conditional authority to beach the two ships if he deemed it necessary. By beaching the ships in preselected locations, those crewmembers not needed to operate the gun batteries could have been sent ashore. By the evening of April 8, conditions were such that beaching the ships at or near the harbor entrance would have been the wisest course of action. In his testimony at Sundlo’s trial, Askim stated that he kept his ships in or near the harbor because it would have been idiotic to try to meet foreign warships in the fjord at night in conditions of near-zero visibility. If he had beached the two old ships, it is possible that they could have inflicted severe damage on some of the German destroyers. Whatever the outcome, such a course of action would have saved many Norwegian lives that morning.

There was not much left of the Norwegian Navy in the Narvik area after the two coastal defense ships were sunk. As already noted, the Germans captured the patrol boat
Senja
. The two patrol boats at the Ofotfjord entrance,
Michael Sars
and
Kelt
, were also intercepted by German destroyers and ordered to Narvik. When they hesitated, the Germans fired several close warning shots. Under the circumstances, these small vessels had no choice but to proceed to Narvik.

Now aware of the German attack, the 3rd Naval District ordered the two submarines and the tender
Lyngen
to the Lofoten Islands.
B1
and
Lyngen
were later instructed to remain in Liland because the Germans were reported to have mined the Ofotfjord entrance.
B1
remained in Ofotfjord without accomplishing anything and it was scuttled in 60 feet of water at 1020 hours on April 13 to keep it from falling into German hands. The timing was unfortunate since British naval forces took control of the fjord less than one hour later.
B3
managed to slip out of Ofotfjord on April 9 and continued to the Lofoten Islands. The 3rd Naval District ordered the submarine to remain in that location until further orders. The British asked the Norwegians not to employ this submarine in order to give them a free hand to attack any underwater contacts. By April 13, the Ofot Division was reduced to only
B3
and
Lyngen
, and ceased to be an operational organization.

The Comparative Strength and Condition of the Norwegian and German Forces

Some writers maintain that Colonel Sundlo, with over 1,000 troops at his disposal, could have driven approximately 400 seasick German soldiers out of Narvik without much difficulty. There are several points wrong with this assertion. First, the numbers are incorrect and misleading. Second, the Germans may have been seasick, but they had almost recovered in the seven hours that passed since the destroyers came leeward of the Lofoten Islands. The Norwegians themselves were not exactly well rested, fully organized, and ready for battle. Finally, numbers are seldom the determining factor in the outcome of a battle. More often than not, the numbers involved are much less important than other factors. These factors include leadership and the troops’ faith in that leadership, training, equipment, battle experience, esprit de corps, and a strong sense of purpose. In all these categories, the Germans held a decisive advantage.

Company 2, commanded by Captain Langlo, was the primary combat unit at Colonel Sundlo’s disposal before the arrival of the battalion from Elvegårdsmoen. A machinegun platoon from Co 4, commanded by Lieutenant Landrø, was attached to Captain Langlo’s company. The full strength of an infantry company in the Norwegian Army was 182, including 12 non-combatants. It appears that the strength of Co 2 was about 150 on April 8. However, this was not the present for duty strength in Narvik when the Germans attacked. Twenty-one men had been sent to reinforce the guard detail at Nordal Bridge at 1800 hours on April 8. Another twenty-one men were sent to Øyjord around 2300 hours to prepare positions for the motorized artillery battery. One officer and six enlisted men were involved in preparing quarters for the battalion. The machinegun platoon had approximately 40 men. Thus, before the arrival of the battalion from Elvegårdsmoen, only about 150 troops in Narvik were trained to fight as infantrymen.

The first elements of the 1/13th Inf, two machinegun platoons from Co 4, arrived in Narvik about 0200 hours. The second group to arrive in Narvik consisted of Co 3. It arrived in Vassvik around 0300 and reached Narvik about 0330 hours. The company left behind a guard detail of 17 men in Elvegårdsmoen. In addition, the sled drivers were left behind in Øyjord when the ferry skipper refused to load the horses. Company 1, minus its sled drivers, arrived in Vassvik around 0415 hours and reached Narvik about 0445 hours, after the engagement between
Norge
and the German destroyers. The mortar platoon from the headquarters company arrived at the same time. Since no journals were kept, the above times are approximations based on the testimony of participants.

About 205 troops from the 1/13th Inf reached Narvik before the Germans landed. This brought Colonel Sundlo’s infantry strength to about 355 and another 180 arrived while the Germans were landing. At the most, Colonel Sundlo had 535 infantry troops that could take up the fight with the Germans. Even if the combat support and service support personnel are added, the total is only 775.

The Germans landed about 600 infantry in Narvik, not 400. The 400 often referred to are no doubt the troops carried on the destroyers
Bernd von Arnim
and
Georg Thiele
. These were the first troops ashore but they were joined within minutes by the 200 troops aboard
Wilhelm Heidkamp
.

The German troops were relieved to disembark the destroyers. Most of them came from Austria and the interior parts of Germany and they had never been to sea. They had traveled crowded under deck in the destroyers as these headed into the storms they encountered from the time they left Germany until they arrived in Narvik. The destroyer captains welcomed the stormy weather since it would help conceal them from the British. The destroyers, heading north at high speed in order to stay on schedule and keep up with the battleships, were tossed around like toys in the heavy seas. The troops were also tossed around below deck and suffered not only from seasickness but also from broken bones and other injuries. Some, who ventured on deck to help secure equipment, were swept overboard.

Nils Ryeng, quoting a customs official who witnessed the landing, writes, “several hundred soldiers, running, walking, crawling, apathetic, indifferent and seasick. They looked like they were drunk and many fell into the water.”
¹⁶
This observation deserves further scrutiny.

The two German destroyers were in the process of docking when a larger Norwegian warship opened fire on them at a range of only 800 meters. The German warships were stationary targets and it was imperative that they offload their troops quickly in order to get underway and start maneuvering. There was no time to put out gangplanks as
Bernd von Arnim
engaged the Norwegian warship with its main batteries, machineguns, and torpedo salvoes. It was imperative for the officers and NCOs to get the 400 troops off the warships as quickly as possible since Norwegian 8-and 6-inch shells were whistling overhead. The next puff of smoke from the Norwegian warship might well bring death. The troops scrambled over the railings and jumped onto the pier with no attempt at unit cohesion. Some may well have fallen into the water in the process. When ashore, unit cohesion had to be restored as quickly as possible because they expected fire from Norwegian troops at any moment. To an untrained observer, the scene must have looked like chaos as the German infantry companies scrambled ashore and reformed.

While the mountain troops endured great hardships during their passage, there is little to indicate that this reduced their combat effectiveness. German writers have not considered the effects of seasickness an important factor. The fact that the German troops seized the designated facilities in Narvik in a rapid and organized fashion is a further indication that seasickness had not demoralized them or impaired their combat effectiveness.

The adrenalin rush in soldiers going into battle helps them focus on their mission and survival and set everything else aside. Sometimes this phenomenon is so strong in battle that a soldier may not even notice an otherwise painful wound. Dietl’s troops were among the best trained in Germany and they had been battle tested in the Carpathian Mountains in 1939. The soldiers likely spent the hours before landing with their NCOs and officers, going over the details of their mission for one last time. These intense activities probably helped them to forget their horrible experience at sea and calmed any fears they may have experienced in the minutes before landing.