Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 (104 page)

17
Quoted in Dickens,
Narvik
, p. 30.

18
Ibid.

19
The four destroyers that laid the minefield had undergone a conversion. Both torpedo tubes and two guns were removed in order to compensate for the weight of the mines.

20
Quoted in Steen,
Norges Sjøkrig 1940-1945
, vol. 1, pp. 154-155.

21
Renown
had a displacement of 32,000 tons, could reach a speed of 29 knots, and carried a crew of 1,200. Her main armament consisted of six 15-inch guns and her secondary armament consisted of 20 4.5-inch guns. The German battleships had a displacement of 31,850 tons, and were capable of a speed of 31.5 knots. Each had a crew of about 1,800, a main armament of 11-inch guns, and 12 6-inch and 14 4-inch guns as secondary armament.

22
Fuehrer Conferences 1940
, April 13, 1940, vol. 1, p. 36.

23
Admiral Forbes received several intelligence reports from the Admiralty on April 8, but they were not all timely. The Polish submarine
Orzel
sank the
Rio de Janeiro
about 1015 hours GMT on April 8. The Admiralty learned about this in the early afternoon and it was reported by Reuters from Oslo at 1930 GMT. However, Admiral Forbes was not given this information until 2255 GMT.

24
See, for example, Moulton,
Study of Warfare
, p. 102; MacIntyre,
Narvik
, pp. 29-33 Dickens,
Battles in the Fjords
, p. 28. Stephen Wentworth Roskill writes, “Admiral Forbes has stated that by this time (after the
Glowworm
engagement) he was convinced in his own mind that a German attack on Norway had started.” (
The War at Sea 1939-1945
[London: HMSO, 1954], vol. 1, p. 160).

25
See, for example, MacIntyre,
Narvik
,
p.
33.

26
MacIntyre,
Narvik
, p. 52.

1
Quoted in Trygve Sandvik,
Operasjonene til lands i Nord-Norge 1940
(2 vols; Oslo: Forsvarets Krigshistoriske Avdeling, 1965), vol. 1, p. 65.

2
Carl Gustav Fleischer,
Efterlatte papirer
(Tønsberg: Tønsbergs aktietrykkeris forlag i kommisjon hos T. Landberg, 1947), p.17.

3
The fact that a number of officers and NCOs in the units undergoing mobilization were in other parts of the country at the time of the German attack caused problems. Few of these individuals were able to reach their units. Some who did manage the long journey did so in fishing vessels or by traveling through Sweden.

4
Odd Lindbäck-Larsen,
Rapport om 6. Divisjons-kommandos virksomhet under nøytralitetvakten 1939-40 og felttoget 1940
Section 1, pp. 4-5.

5
Palle Ydstebø,
Geostrategi, trusselvurdering og operativ planlegging. Forsvaret av Nord-Norge 1880-1920
(Tromso: University of Tromso, 2000), p. 141.

6
Ydstebø,
Geostrategi
, p. 154.

7
Sandvik,
Operasjonene
, vol. 1, p. 80.

8
Sandvik,
Operasjonene
,, vol. 1, p. 83.

9
Steen,
Norges Sjøkrig 1940-1945
, vol. 4, p. 44.

10
At the outbreak of World War 2, Foreign Minister Koht suggested that Narvik be declared a restricted military zone. The 6th Division supported this suggestion but it met serious opposition from the permanent undersecretary at the Foreign Office and from the military authorities. Their argument was that to take such action after the outbreak of hostilities might be interpreted as provocative by the belligerents.

11
There were 27 merchant ships in Narvik on April 8. These included ten German iron ore freighters and the German tanker
Jan Wellem
. In addition, there were four Norwegian, six Swedish, one Dutch, and five British merchant ships in the harbor.

12
Colonel Løken’s report on February 21, 1941 as quoted in Sandvik,
Operasjonene
, vol. 1, p. 93.

13
Report by Captain Løken on November 9, 1945 as quoted in Sandvik,
Operasjonene
, vol. 1, p. 94 and Colonel Sundlo’s report on December 14, 1941 as quoted in Steen,
Norges Sjøkrig 1940-1945
, vol. 4, p.59.

14
Lindbäck-Larsen,,
Rapport
Section 4, p. 3.

15
Report by Captain Løken dated November 9, 1945 as quoted in Steen,
Norges Sjøkrig 1940-1945
, vol. 4, p. 59.

16
Steen,
Norges Sjøkrig 1940-1945
, vol. 4, p. 59.

17
In answer to questions from his subordinates about what was going on when he ordered the bunkers occupied, he allegedly told them that he did not know. Some subordinates thought the whole thing was one of the periodic alerts and not the real thing. See letters and reports from two lieutenants and one sergeant in 1940 and 1946 as quoted in Sandvik,
Operasjonene
, vol. 1, pp. 100-101. It is doubtful that this apparent lack of information stems from Captain Dalsve failing to brief Captain Langlo. Sundlo briefed Langlo and others on the developing situation at 1700 hours. Langlo spoke with Sundlo on several occasions that night and received orders to reinforce the guard detail at Nordal Bridge, to place his company on alert, to send a snow removal detail to Øyord, and to send an officer or NCO to each of two bunkers. It is very unlikely that the reasons for these orders were not mentioned or that Captain Langlo failed to ask the reasons for these actions.

18
Witness statement by Captain Munthe-Kaas on April 22, 1947 as quoted in Sandvik,
Operasjonene
, vol. 1, p. 98.

19
Report by Major Spjeldnæs on August 27, 1940 and report by Major Omdal on May 23, 1940 as quoted in Sandvik,
Operasjonene,
vol. 1, p. 102.

1
The actual composition of the various flotillas changed from time to time when ships were attached or detached.

2
XXIKTB
, No 3.279/16, reports that the strength and equipment of a mountain infantry battalion on leaving Wesermunde was: 25 officers, 528 non-commissioned officers and enlisted, nine motorcycles, 27 light machineguns, 10 heavy machineguns, nine light mortars, six heavy mortars, and two light infantry guns. Each of the three battalions consisted of a headquarters, a heavy weapons company, and three rifle companies. The heavy weapons company numbered 104 men and the armament consisted of six heavy mortars and two light antitank guns. The infantry companies also had 104 men and their crew-served weapons consisted of nine light machineguns, two heavy machineguns, and three light mortars. The companies in the German mountain divisions were numbered consecutively. That means that the first battalion in a regiment consisted of companies 1-5, the second battalion of companies 6-10, and the third battalion of companies 11-15. The next to the last company in each battalion (4, 9, and 14) were the heavy weapons companies while the last (5, 10, and 15) were headquarters companies.

3
Colonel Alois Windisch (1892–1958) was an Austrian and an exceedingly capable officer who proved to be a tough opponent for the Norwegians and French in the Narvik area. General Hovland calls him the most talented German officer in the Narvik Campaign and a dangerous opponent. He spent all of World War 1 at the front, was wounded three times, and highly decorated. He had a balanced career in troop command, combat, and general staff service. He organized the 139th Mountain Infantry Regiment in 1938 and commanded it during the Polish Campaign. His regiment participated in the attack on the Soviet Union on the arctic front. He was relieved of his command in March 1942 because he had launched a regimental attack without promised air support. For a while, he was in charge of the prisoner of war camp at Bezirk Kirowgrad. He was promoted to major general in 1943 and was later given command of the 285th Security Division in Yugoslavia. He became a Soviet prisoner of war in 1945, was handed over to Yugoslavia, tried, and sentenced to 20 years in prison. He was released in 1953.

4
Gerda-Luise Dietl and Kurt Hermann,
General Dietl
(Munich, 1951), p. 17.

5
Steen,
Norges Sjøkrig 1940-1945,
vol. 4, p. 28, second note and vol. 1, p. 136.

6
Colonel Sundlo is also mentioned in Admiral Raeder’s operational directive of March 6, 1940. It states that the military commandant in Narvik, Colonel Sundlo, is friendly and that it was not expected that he would create any difficulties for the Germans.

7
Dickens,
Battles in the Fjords
, p. 32.

8
Captain Steen writes that the outgoing message from
Norge
identified the ships as German and implies that it somehow was muddled at the 3rd Naval District. General Sandvik writes (
Operasjonene
, vol. 1, p. 104 n. 52) that the message from
Norge
“was made to agree with the message” from
Michael Sars
, which simply identified the ships as “foreign”. We will probably never know for sure where the mistake occurred since
Norge’s
message log went down with the ship.

9
“Rapport fra sjefen for Norge og Ofotavdelingen til Kommanderende Admiral av 20 april 1940,’ 4.

10
Steen,
Norges Sjøkrig 1940-1945
, vol. 4, p. 88.

11
Witness statement by Captain Siem on April 22, 1947, as quoted in Sandvik,
Operasjonene
, vol. 1, p. 107 n. 58.

12
Steen,
Norges Sjøkrig 1940-1945
, vol. 2, p. 124, vol. 4, p. 64, and 89. Torkel Hovland,
General Carl Gustaf Fleischer. Storhet og fall
(Oslo: Forum-Aschehoug, 3rd edn, 2000), p. 78) reports that the General Staff order came at 0330 hours, the same time given by Lindbäck-Larsen.

13
Lindbäck-Larsen,
Rapport
, Section 4:3. It is likely that General Fleischer received this information 30 minutes earlier since he had a telephone conversation with Colonel Mjelde at 2130 hours, five minutes after Mjelde’s headquarters received the message from the General Staff. See also Sandvik,
Operasjonene
, vol. 1, p. 99.

14
Spjeldnæs’ testimony in Colonel Sundlo’s trial on April 19, 1947, quoted in Sandvik,
Operasjonene
, vol. 1, p. 101.

15
Dietl and Hermann,
General Dietl
, p. 72.

16
Hovland,
Fleischer
, p. 79. The source given for this description is Nils Ryeng,
De fem trojanske hestene i 1940
.

17
Despite these instructions and the fact that their unit went on alert the previous evening, we find that Co 2’s commander and executive officer spent the night at their quarters in Victoria Hospice, about one kilometer from their headquarters. Likewise, Major Spjeldnæs apparently stayed at his quarters in Bromsgård.

18
The sources give a confusing summary of how Co 2 was deployed. We know that it had an assigned strength of about 150. Forty-two soldiers were away from Narvik. Another six were involved in preparing the quarters for the units arriving from Elvegårdsmoen. The harbor defense force that was located in its quarters numbered about 20. The company reserve numbered 30-40 soldiers, depending on which source is used. That leaves 42-52 soldiers not accounted for. I believe these were also assigned to posts in the harbor area between Fagernes and Framnes. The NCO in charge of the harbor guards located in their quarters refers to them as “the remainder of the defense force.” The explanation is probably that this force is in addition to 36 soldiers that Steen states were sent to occupy posts along the three kilometers long waterfront. These troops were probably deployed some time between 2000 hours when Colonel Sundlo placed Co 2 on alert and ordered the bunkers occupied and 2330 hours when he ordered that an officer be sent to each of the bunkers. This still leaves from 6 to 16 soldiers not accounted for. Some of those were probably cooks and runners. It is also possible that the detail preparing quarters for the arriving units involved more than six men.

19
Spjeldnæs testimony on April 19, 1947 as quoted in Sandvik,
Operasjonene
, vol. 1 p. 110 and n. 60.

20
Loc cit.

21
Quoted in Sandvik,
Operasjonene
, vol. 1, pp. 116-117.

22
Verbal report by Colonel Sundlo to the Military History Division on May 1, 1958 as reported in Steen,
Norges Sjøkrig 1940-1945
, vol. 4, p. 95.

23
The sequence of events that led to the surrender is that found in the official Norwegian histories of land and naval operations in North Norway in 1940 as well as in some German accounts. A number of the more popular and widely read accounts of these events deviate from the earlier histories without offering any new evidence.

24
Ottmer,
Weserübung
, p. 96. It seems obvious that Ottmer relied on secondary Norwegian sources to arrive at these conclusions.

25
Sandvik,
Operasjonene
, vol. 1, pp. 186-187.

26
The court decided unanimously “the defendant’s [Sundlo’s] actions pertaining to the surrender under the prevailing conditions can not be considered punishable. The conditions had reached a point where a completely superior enemy surrounded the defendant and his troops. All defensive means must be viewed legally as taken, despite the fact that they were not activated, and every possibility of breakout or timely assistance had to be viewed as hopeless. The defendant had to make an immediate decision and weight the probable catastrophic results of resistance at that point against the duty to uphold the country’s and own honor … Accordingly, the accused is acquitted of point II of the prosecution’s accusation and, similarly, he is found not guilty with respect to paragraph 83 of the penal code …”