Hitler's Lost Spy (23 page)

Nothing. When his troops murdered 200,000 people during the infamous attack on Nanking in December 1937 what was the emperor's response? Silence, but an uncle of Hirohito, Prince Asaka, was a commander of the forces responsible for the massacre.

The Emperor's approvals for Japanese military expansion during the 1930s were unmistakable, and his endorsement of the great naval expansion from mid-1935 was equally apparent. When fresh international condemnation focused on Japan's appalling military conduct, Hirohito may have edged towards addressing the more outrageous of the incidences, but never quite enough to hinder the ultimate goals.

An insight into Hirohito's war plans was evident in the ‘Imperial Rescript', or Proclamation from the Throne, signed by Hirohito and issued on 8 December 1941, formally declaring war on ‘the United States of America and the British Empire'. The bulk of the proclamation is a factually farcical summary of Japanese propaganda of the previous twenty years. The final paragraph, however, includes a revealing ambition of Hirohito, which for a decade or more he had quietly nurtured through his immense but elusive powers.

… We
¹⁹
 rely upon the loyalty and courage of Our subjects in Our confident expectation that the task bequeathed by Our forefathers will be carried forward …

‘The task bequeathed by Our forefathers' – just six words divulging to the world that the historical roots of achieving Japan's destiny lay in the expansion of the Empire by military force. When Hirohito issued the proclamation he had been stirred by assurances from his military leaders that Japan would win the war. The 
success of the surprise attack at Pearl Harbor had endorsed those assurances.

Hakko Ichiu – All Under One Roof – Japan's Roof

The term
Hakko Ichiu
was coined in the early twentieth century to describe, with varying degrees of interpretation, the role of the ‘pure' Japanese people as the righteous leading light to the remainder of the world. 
This was transformed by the militarism of the 1930s to something more sinister. The ‘leading light' was translated into close proximity to aggression, occupation and slavery. Japan's destiny demanded this and the term inserted neatly into the aspirations of the armed forces.

Hakko Ichiu
received a full endorsement from Hirohito and the royal family. As the Japanese people were accorded a divine origin – unlike anyone else – and the emperor was a god – unlike anyone else – the idea of world dominance would appear, to any patriotic Japanese person, a natural progression for humanity. It presented the Japanese militarists with the ‘right' added to the ‘might'.

This is the substance of how the ‘no plan for Australia' advocates have misread Japanese history in the period 1900 to 1945. There
was
a plan for the Japanese to occupy Australia, but it was probably not a neat and detailed military operation with meticulous logistics and the appropriate authorisation. The plan was integral to the objective of embracing the future enlarged Japanese Empire. But the true measure of this could not be fully comprehended due to a large number of historical interpretations of events prior, or subsequent to, Japan's war of destiny – the great Pacific conflict. Very quickly, however, Japan became yesterday's enemy, and correspondingly many of the unpalatable deeds of the Emperor and his advisors were buried in the field of political convenience.

A Partnership Paradox – The Japanese in Australia
1890–1941

Australia's early relations with Japan began when some enterprising businessmen recognised potential trading benefits available through engaging with the emerging nation. This occurred in the 1850s, very early indeed in the modern era of direct trade by Japan with Western nations. But a visit to Japan in 1870 would have revealed an industrially backward, feudal, and class-entrenched society. Daily life was governed by social and political values not only at a huge variance to the West, but also to other Asian countries.

A Westerner, travelling slowly between towns and villages, would have noticed something else. The arable land was completely utilised with the cultivation of rice and other crops, and small foundries and factories manufactured metal products and construction materials. The production of silk was huge. A sense of opportunity to buy and sell would have greeted any astute trader prepared to undertake a challenging journey to the newly opened Japan, with its unique identity and violent history.

From about 1890 limited numbers of Japanese trickled into Australia. The reasons were usually economic as the Japanese government worked to take control of the nation's trade with the building of a significant merchant fleet and the encouraged growth of the large trading houses, or
zaibatsu.
The Japanese presence in Australia centred on the import-export operations of these companies, usually located in Sydney or Melbourne. Several small clusters of Japanese found work in regional areas and industries such as the pearling industry in Broome, or in a variety of small businesses in the larger population centres. But it would be names such as Mitsui, Kanematsu, Mitsubishi, Tashima and Iwai that would dominate the Japanese economic impact in Australia, exporting wool, minerals and farm produce to Japan, and importing back cotton yarn, textiles, toys, electrical goods, machine tools, crockery and a variety of household products.

Until the attack on Pearl Harbor, the relationship between Japanese residents and the general Australian community was usually cordial. The Japanese had shaped a commercial and social level of conduct that most Australians respected. They were law-abiding, commercially reliable and provided good service to their Australian suppliers and buyers on both product delivery and price. Marriages between Japanese men and local women were not rare. It was not unusual for deportation notices issued to Japanese businessmen at the expiry of a visa term to be appealed and supported by substantial community petitions.

An example of the relationship between Japanese residents and the broad population is found in an early twentieth century road map of the pleasant Blue Mountains town of Leura, about 100 kilometres west of Sydney. Just north of the Great Western Highway was a cluster of streets with names including Togo Parade, Iwasaki Parade, Ito Parade, and Tokio Road. The streets were named following the visits to Sydney of the Japanese naval training squadron in 1903 and 1906 and echoed the regard held for the Japanese at that time. 
Unsurprisingly, the street names were changed shortly after the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. They remain today as Churchill Street, Roosevelt Street, Victory Parade, and the like.

However, there was another side to the Australian-Japanese relationship. While the behaviour of Japanese residents may have been exemplary, the conduct of Japan's rulers was, at least in the eyes of Australian defence strategists, alarming. The stunning victory scored by the Japanese over Russia in 1905 commenced a serious security and intelligence unease that would increase each time the Rising Sun was raised in new territory, where the legal or moral right to do so had not previously existed.

World War I brought the Micronesian Islands into the Japanese Empire. The Manchurian incursion in 1931 
created the puppet state of Manchukuo. Open warfare with China commenced in 1937, by which time all of Southeast Asia looked on fearfully at the ruthless military conquests around them. Accompanying these expansionist policies was the Japanese retreat from international agreements. Included in this withdrawal was the naval treaty known as the Washington Conference of 1921 in which the capital ships of the American, British and Japanese navies were restricted by proportion. The decision by Hirohito in 1934 not to renew this treaty was the signal for a massive naval expansion, a prerequisite for war with the West.

By the close of 1937 Japanese militarism in China had callously exposed to the world its aggression and viciousness. Fears in Australia were intensified and defence planning was stepped up.

Campaigning for the Emperor

From 1930, when Japan was undecided as to which path its aggression would take (Siberia had been a serious option), significant effort was injected into marketing propaganda within nations of interest. The Manchurian invasion in 1931 and later the open invasion of China were accompanied by international propaganda campaigns – even the atrocities committed at Nanking were imaginary, said the Japanese. After all, their objective in Asia was peace and goodwill. Government officials could make these statements, but support of such propaganda was vital in avoiding an unwanted conflict with the West – until, that is, Japan launched the Pearl Harbor attack.

Disseminating Japanese propaganda in Australia was the responsibility of consular officials who sought and nurtured suitable outlets. Included in these were journalists, Chambers of Commerce, compliant or corrupt individuals, businesses and, more alarmingly, politicians and their close associates.

The noted historian, Barbara Winter, portrays in her book,
The Most Dangerous Man in Australia
, the disturbing degree of Japanese penetration into New South Wales politics in the early 1930s.

In June 1940, Vice-Consul Kenichi Otabe told Kenneth Easton Cook, a deep-cover intelligence agent, that some politicians were not above accepting bribes … and Joseph Lamaro, State Attorney-General in the Lang government, had a ‘back door entrance' to the Japanese community, including the Consulate. Military Intelligence phone taps showed that Lamaro was a friend of Sleeman. Indeed, through Sleeman, several of Lang's colleagues in government were tainted with Japanese influence and money.

John Sleeman was a scheming businessman who freely embarked upon, among other dubious activities, underhand services on behalf of the Japanese Consulate in Sydney. He was ‘corruptly close' to Labor Party identities Jack Lang and Eddie Ward.

Whatever the extent of dodgy relationships between the Japanese and Australian politics of the era, one unpleasant certainty derives from it. Beneath the intrigues of the politicians were layers of people, with various motives, who contributed assistance to an enemy-in-waiting.

Participating in one of these ‘layers' was a businessman turned soldier, William John Scott. In his misguided understanding of Japanese intentions, Scott diligently supported the Japanese government line through organisations such as the Australia–Japan Society. The big danger with Scott was his appointment into the Military Intelligence service until he was transferred into a regular army unit. In an ironic twist, reports exist in Annette Wagner's Military Intelligence file that were signed off by Scott, as well as other memoranda which were initialled by him.

There is a suggestion that Scott drifted to the Japanese through his known dread of Communism – but if so, it was an empty argument. He clearly lacked the necessary understanding to perceive the difference between dealing with a real enemy and matching political wits with a Communist system the free world could live with.

As the large Japanese naval task force commenced its historic route across the Pacific towards the Hawai an Islands in November 1941, intelligence agents observed smoke pouring from the chimneys of the Japanese Consulate in Sydney. They noted the unseasonal smoke, but the reason would have eluded them. The purpose, however, would not have escaped the attention of Captain Eric Nave, an Australian naval intelligence officer, who had broken the Japanese consular code known as J-19. He had decoded a message from Tokyo to the Japanese Consulate in Melbourne, received on 19 November 1941, referring to ‘the pressure of the international situation'. The message advised that should pre-arranged weather reports be issued during Japanese news broadcasts, codes and documents were to be destroyed. The Sydney consulate had received the weather reports, and acted accordingly.

As the Japanese armada slipped out of its secret pre-arranged moorings, Hirohito's fateful decision was locked in, and in the true Samurai tradition of surprising the enemy to gain the initial advantage, he had ordered his navy to destroy Pearl Harbor.

Annette's Imperial Flight

The subject of Japan's intent toward Australia in the Pacific War now has a new initiative – Annette's flight for the Emperor. By inserting her contribution into the formula of probabilities, a loop is closed. The result is clearer. Australia was destined for Japanese occupation – 
but only when the war situation allowed.

FOOTNOTES

17
 An American journalist, Willard Price lived in Japan from 1933 
to 1938, working as a newspaper and magazine correspondent. His journey through the mandated islands drew Japanese suspicion that he was spying for the United States, and in 1999 he acknowledged that this was correct. It is not known if Price's motive was solely patriotic or whether he was on the US military's payroll.

18
 The huge lagoon at Truk in the Caroline Islands sheltered the Japanese navy's largest base in the region.

19
 ‘We' and ‘Our' refer to Hirohito personally.

Abwehr
: The central German military intelligence branch from 1921 to 1944.

Auslands Organisation
: The division within the Nazi party responsible for the political influence and the securing of party membership of Germans living abroad. Party membership was not available to Germans who were naturalised in their host country. Securing popular support for the Third Reich from German citizens in foreign countries was the paramount objective of the organisation.

Clancy, Jack Patrick
: Close friend of Annette Wagner after meeting at the Sydney branch of Alliance Francaise in 1938. 
He was briefly the subject of a security enquiry following his piloting of a light aircraft to Newcastle with Wagner as passenger in April 1939.