gence service – the SD – into the Reich Security Main Office (RSHA) in
1939, Heydrich commanded a sizeable shadow army of Gestapo and SD
officers directly responsible for Nazi terror at home and in the occupied
territories. As such he was also in charge of the infamous SS mobile
killing squads, the
Einsatzgruppen
, during the campaigns against Austria,
Czechoslovakia, Poland and the Soviet Union. Secondly, in September
1941, Heydrich was appointed by Hitler as acting Reich Protector of
Bohemia and Moravia, a position that made him the undisputed ruler of
the former Czech lands. The eight months of his rule in Prague and the
aftermath of his assassination are still remembered as the darkest time in
modern Czech history. Thirdly, in 1941 Heydrich was instructed by the
second most powerful man in Nazi Germany, Hermann Göring, to find
xiv
INTRODUCTION
and implement a ‘total solution of the Jewish question’ in Europe, a solu-
tion which, by the summer of 1942, culminated in the indiscriminate and
systematic murder of the Jews of Europe. With these three positions,
Reinhard Heydrich undoubtedly played a central role in the complex
power system of the Third Reich.
Yet, despite his major share of responsibility for some of the worst
atrocities committed in the name of Nazi Germany and the continuing
interest of both historians and the general public in Hitler’s dictatorship,
Heydrich remains a remarkably neglected and oddly nebulous figure in
the extensive literature on the Third Reich. Although some 40,000 books
have been published on the history of Nazi Germany, including several
important studies on other high-ranking SS officers such as Heinrich
Himmler, Ernst Kaltenbrunner, Adolf Eichmann and Werner Best, there
is no serious scholarly biography that spans the entire life of this key figure
within the Nazi terror apparatus.2 The only exception to this remarkable
neglect is Shlomo Aronson’s pioneering 1967 PhD thesis on Heydrich’s
role in the early history of the Gestapo and the SD, which unfortunately
ends in 1936 when the SS took full control of the German police. Written
in German and never translated into English, Aronson’s research has left
a mine of material on Heydrich’s early life that no later historian in the
field can ignore, but his study is not a biography and was never intended
to be one.3
Several journalists have attempted to fill the gap left by professional
historians. Although not without merit, particularly in gathering post-war
testimonies of Heydrich’s former SS associates and childhood friends,
these earlier Heydrich biographies reflect a by now largely obsolete under-
standing of Nazi leaders as either depraved criminals or perversely rational
desk-killers – an interpretation that built on the post-war testimonies of
Nazi victims and former SS men alike.4 The Swiss League of Nations’
High Commissioner in Danzig between 1937 and 1939, Carl Jacob
Burckhardt, who had met Heydrich in the summer of 1935 during an
inspection tour of Nazi concentration camps, famously described him in
his memoirs as the Third Reich’s ‘young evil god of death’.5 Post-war
recollections of former SS subordinates were similarly unflattering.
His deputy of many years, Dr Werner Best, characterized Heydrich as
the ‘most demonic personality in the Nazi leadership’, driven by an ‘inhu-
manity which took no account of those he mowed down’.6 Himmler’s
personal adjutant, Karl Wolff, described Heydrich as ‘devilish’, while
Walter Schellenberg, the youngest of the departmental heads in the Reich
Security Main Office, remembered his former boss as a ragingly ambitious
man with ‘an incredibly acute perception of the moral, human, profes-
sional and political weakness of others’. ‘His unusual intellect’, Schellenberg
I N T R O D U C T I O N
xv
insisted, ‘was matched by the ever-watchful instincts of a predatory
animal’, who ‘in a pack of ferocious wolves, must always prove himself the
strongest’.7
Such post-war testimonies of former SS officers must be approached
with caution. With Heydrich, Himmler and Hitler dead, and the Third
Reich in ruins, Best, Wolff, Schellenberg and other senior SS men in
Allied captivity were keen to whitewash their own responsibility and to
‘prove’ that they had merely followed orders from superiors who were
too powerful and scary to be disobeyed. Yet their characterizations of
Heydrich stuck in the popular imagination, fuelled by books such as
Charles Wighton’s 1962 biography,
Heydrich: Hitler’s Most Evil Henchman
.
Wighton perpetuated a powerful myth in explaining Heydrich’s murderous
zeal: the myth of his alleged Jewish family background which originated
in Heydrich’s early youth and, despite the best efforts of his family to
refute it, continued to resurface both during and after the Third Reich.
After 1945, it was cultivated by former SS officers such as Wilhelm Höttl,
who maintained in his autobiographical book
The Secret Front
(1950) that
Heydrich ordered his agents to remove the gravestone of his ‘Jewish
grandmother’.8 Others jumped on the potentially lucrative bandwagon of
‘exposing’ the chief organizer of the Holocaust as a Jew. Presumably
to boost his book sales with sensational revelations about the SS leader-
ship, Himmler’s Finnish masseur, Felix Kersten, maintained in his highly
unreliable memoirs that both Himmler and Hitler had known about
Heydrich’s ‘dark secret’ from the early 1930s onwards, but chose to use the
‘highly talented, but also very dangerous man’ for the dirtiest deeds of
the regime.9
Wighton was not alone in fal ing for the myth of Heydrich’s Jewish
origins. In his preface to the Kersten memoirs, Hugh Trevor-Roper
confirmed ‘with al the authority that I possess’ that Heydrich was a Jew – a
view supported by eminent German historians such as Karl Dietrich
Bracher and the Hitler biographer Joachim Fest.10 Fest’s brief character
sketch of Heydrich – characteristical y bril iant in style but unconvincing in
content – added fuel to the popular debate about Heydrich’s al egedly split
personality. Fest reiterated the rumours about Heydrich’s Jewish family
background and attributed his actions to a self-loathing anti-Semitism. As
a schizophrenic maniac driven by self-hatred, Heydrich wanted to prove his
worth and became a ‘man like a whiplash’, running the Nazi terror
apparatus with ‘Luciferic coldness’ in order to achieve his ultimate goal of
becoming ‘Hitler’s successor’.11
Fest’s characterization of Heydrich was called into question by the
emergence of a second influential image of senior SS officers, which is
captured in the iconic photograph of Adolf Eichmann in his glass booth
xvi
INTRODUCTION
in the Jerusalem District Court. Hannah Arendt’s famous account of
that trial and her dictum about the ‘banality of evil’ shaped the public
perception of SS men in the decades that followed.12 For many years, the
bureaucratic ‘technocrat of death’ – the perversely rational culprit behind
a desk – became the dominant image of Nazi perpetrators. These perpe-
trators focused on their duties, accepted the administrative tasks assigned
to them and carried them out ‘correctly’ and ‘conscientiously’ without
feeling responsible for their outcomes.13 The mass murder of the Jews was
now seen not so much as a throwback to barbarism, but as the zenith of
modern bureaucracy and dehumanizing technology that found its ulti-
mate expression in the anonymous killing factories of Auschwitz.
Mass murder was represented as a sanitized process carried out by profes-
sional men – doctors and lawyers, demographers and agronomists – who
acted on the basis of amoral but seemingly rational decisions derived from
racial eugenics, geo-political considerations and economic planning.14
Such images strongly impacted on another popular Heydrich biog-
raphy, first published in 1977: Günther Deschner’s
The Pursuit of Total
Power
. Deschner, a former writer for the conservative daily
Die Welt
,
rightly dismissed the pseudo-psychological demonizations of Wighton
and Fest. Instead he followed the prevalent trend of the 1970s and 1980s
in describing Heydrich as the archetype of a high-level technocrat prima-
rily interested in efficiency, performance and total power, for whom Nazi
ideology was first and foremost a vehicle for careerism. Ideology, Deschner
suggested, was something Heydrich was too intelligent to take seriously.15
If the popular perception of Heydrich as the Third Reich’s cold-blooded
‘administrator of death’ has remained largely unchallenged over the years,
the basic tenets on which this image rests have been well and truly eroded
in the last two decades. First, it is now clear that ideology played a
key motivational role for senior SS officers and that any attempt to
dismiss them as pathologically disturbed outsiders is highly misleading. If
anything, SS perpetrators tended to be
more
educated than their average
German or Western European contemporaries. More often than not, they
were socially mobile and ambitious young university graduates from
perfectly intact family backgrounds, by no means part of a deranged
minority of extremists from the criminal margins of society.16
Second, it is now generally accepted that the decision-making processes
which led to the Holocaust developed through several stages of gradual
radicalization. The idea that Heydrich consciously planned the Holocaust
from the early 1930s onwards, as was still argued by his biographer
Eduard Calic in the 1980s, is a position that is no longer tenable.17
Although central to the development of persecution policies in Nazi
Germany, Heydrich was only one of a large variety of actors in Berlin and
I N T R O D U C T I O N
xvii
German-occupied Europe who pushed for more and more extreme
measures of exclusion and, ultimately, mass murder. Nazi Germany was
not a smoothly hierarchical dictatorship, but rather a ‘polycratic jungle’ of
competing party and state agencies over which Hitler presided eratically.
The ‘cumulative radicalization’ in certain policy areas emerged as a result
of tensions and conflicts between powerful individuals and interest groups
who sought to please their Führer by anticipating his orders.18 Within this
complex power structure, individuals contributed to Nazi policies of
persecution and murder for a whole range of reasons, from ideological
commitment and hyper-nationalism to careerism, greed, sadism, weakness
or – more realistically – a combination of more than one of these
elements.19
For a biographer of Heydrich, the revisionist arguments of the past
decades pose a whole series of difficult questions. If the Holocaust was not
a smoothly unfolding, centralized genocide and Heydrich and Himmler
were not responsible for every aspect of the persecution and mass murder
of the Jews, what exactly were they responsible for?20 If, as some historians
quite rightly suggest, the Holocaust was merely a first step towards the
bloody unweaving of Europe’s complex ethnic make-up, what role did
Heydrich play in the evolution and implementation of these plans?21 Even
more fundamentally: how did he ‘become’ Heydrich?
The answers provided in this book revise some older assumptions about
Heydrich’s personal transition to Nazism and his contribution to some of
the worst crimes committed in the name of the Third Reich. Born as he
was in 1904 into a privileged Catholic family of professional musicians in
the city of Hal e, Heydrich’s path to genocide was anything but straight-
forward. Not only was his life conditioned by several unforeseeable events
that were often beyond his control, but his actions can be ful y explained
only by placing them in the wider context of the intel ectual, political,
cultural and socio-economic conditions that shaped German history in the
first half of the twentieth century.
Heydrich was both a typical and an atypical representative of his
generation. He shared in many of the deep ruptures and traumatic experi-
ences of the so-called war youth generation: namely, the Great War
and the turbulent post-war years of revolutionary turmoil, hyperinflation
and social decline, which he experienced as a teenager. Yet while these
experiences made him and many other Germans susceptible to radical
nationalism, Heydrich refrained from political activism throughout the
1920s and was even ostracized by his fellow naval officers for not being