Hitler's Bandit Hunters (3 page)

This book is divided into three parts.
Part 1
traces the origins and development of Bandenbekämpfung in terms of security warfare. The purpose behind this first section is to explain how a minor function turned into a dominating policy.
Part 2
examines Nazi Bandenbekämpfung in detail, principally from the viewpoint of the Soviet Union, focusing on organization, doctrine, terrain control, and operations. Examining Bandenbekämpfung by its salient points exposes the flaws in its doctrinal formulation while explaining its apparent high performance.
Part 3
examines its climactic decline. The application of
Bandenbekämpfung in Poland, Yugoslavia, Italy, and France highlights how far the practice became the universal doctrine of German occupation. The contrast between the demands of the conventional military equation of troops, terrain, and tactics set against the flexibility and simplicity of Bandenbekämpfung made its application universal. In the final chapter, attention turns to the war crimes process, explaining the problem of eradicating such an insidious concept as Bandenbekämpfung and the origins of denial common to revisionist circles.

This book was completed in several phases and across many years. The only constant has been the generosity of people. Professor Richard Holmes, PhD supervisor, mentor, and friend, shaped the first phase of the project. His team—Professor Chris Bellamy, Peter Caddick-Adams, Steph Muir, and his wife, Lizzie Holmes—have encouraged and supported me through the research, the examination, and beyond. This phase concluded with the viva conducted by Keith Simpson, member of Parliament and erstwhile scholar of German counterinsurgency methods. The germ of the idea for this book came from discussions with members of the Polish Liberation Institute in London. Dr. Jürgen Zimmerer introduced me to the fundamentals of German colonial history and its influence in shaping security thinking. In 1998, I was fortunate to discuss the question of training with the late Professor Wilhem Deist; he advised scrutinizing the training methods of the SS and Wehrmacht. During the brief existence of the Anglo-German study group, in London 1997–98, I struck up what has proved to be a long-lasting friendship with Dr. Bernd Lemke, a military historian at the MGFA. Immeasurable help and advice has come from Professor Stig Förster, Dr. Jan-Bart Gewalt, Professor Brian Bond, and Professor M. R. D. Foot, Dr. Gerhard Wiechmann, and Emeritus Professor Martin Edmonds.

Archivists I have since discovered to my cost come and go, but a precious few ensured that the research went relatively smoothly. Stephen Walton of the Imperial War Museum advised me on the German sources very early on. Herr Dilgard the former director of Bundesarchiv Zentralnachweisstelle in Aachen-Kornelimünster, his deputy Herr Meentz, and Herr Genter, responsible for handling the Wehrmacht personnel files, worked hard to ensure my visits were successful. A particular thanks should go to the unsung heroines
of the military archive in Freiburg, Frau Noske and Frau Weibl. Niels Cordes, his wife, Virginia, “Sunshine,” and “Lucky” deserve a special mention for opening their home to me during a particularly difficult period of transition. During my visits to the National Archives at Columbia Park, Niels; Robin Cookson, an archivist; and Jim Kelling, responsible for the microfilm room, offered regular advice that improved my research. The librarians of the Rheinisch-Westfälische Technische Hochschule (RWTH-Aachen) deserve thanks for locating works through the German academic library service.

I would like to thank the following for allowing me to present my research: the Weiner Library for a work-in-progress paper; the interdisciplinary seminar of the RWTH-Aachen, German security methods (2000); the Institute of Historical Research (University of London), hosting the 2000 Anglo-American
War and Peace
conference, a paper on Bandenbekämpfung; the Florida Conference of Historians (2003); and the Open University for a paper and subsequent publication as a chapter on policing. I should like to mention my former colleagues, Professor Paul Thomes, Christoph Rass, Marc Engels, and students from the Institute of Economic and Social History at the RWTH-Aachen, who endeavored to help me settle into German society while I was completing my PhD. I have profound gratitude for Dr. Roy Douglas, Surrey University History circle, for his patience and encouragement in the early days. I would also like to mention Stefan Pehker and Toshiba International for their technical support and generosity over recent years.

The future beckons and some special people have helped bring about the completion of this book. Bettina Wunderling gave expert advice on translations, grammar, and vocabulary. Lt. Col. Roger Cirillo (retired) of the Association of the U.S. Army has become a dear friend and colleague. His confidence in this project eased the transfer from thesis to book and his sponsorship for the forthcoming
Wehrmacht at War
series. Rick Russell and the team at Potomac Books have enabled the smooth transfer of my thesis into book form. Special thanks are deserved for Dr. Nick Terry, a close friend and the technical adviser of both the PhD thesis and this book. His research will change our opinion of German arms. Dr. Declan O’Reilly has regularly advised and confided his thoughts on my work with his scholarly criticism.

Finally, I wish to mention my family and friends. My parents, Pamela and Peter Blood, who have always encouraged and supported me. My extended family include Manny, Maria, Ricky, and Lenny, Mike and Chris Buckley, Gary Ward and Christina, Ian and Alison, sadly now departed, Ron and Mitzi Orner, Tim and Manass Wells, and, my godchildren, Charlie, James, and Emma.

There is a full glossary of relevant German and Bandenbekämpfung terms in
appendix 1
.

Military politics troubled the world in 1919. Military interventions, from Ireland to India, stretched British security capabilities. The U.S. armed forces were involved in “sphere of influence” actions in Panama, Honduras, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic. The
Entente Cordiale
had seen fit to intervene in Russia, as their former ally descended into revolution and civil war; allied troops were still there in 1919. Together with France and Belgium, Britain and America deployed occupation troops in the Rhineland, the symbol of Germany’s military-industrial complex. In April 1919, two events occurred that have cast a long, dark shadow over the history of civil-military relations. At Amritsar, in India, British troops massacred nearly four hundred men, women, and children; a further fifteen hundred were injured. In Munich, troops from the former Imperial Army and Freikorps encircled the city on April 27. Their mission, sanctioned by the Weimar government, was to eradicate the Munich Soviet republic (
Räterepublik);
cleansing the city of left-wing “dirt and filth” was completed by May 1, 1919. Amritsar contributed to the end of British rule in India. Munich was an object lesson in German military security capabilities. From the perspective of this book, Munich proved to be the more profound event. German soldiers had the opportunity to carry out their long desired and planned-for intervention into German politics, set aside in 1914. The application of full-scale professional violence against civilians and poorly trained militia failed to disturb a world reeling from the consequences of total war. Munich was the culmination of trials and errors in German military security methods, percolating down since 1814, and was evidence that the army had perfected its capacity for police actions.

Between the occupation of the Rhineland by Prussia in 1814 and by the allied powers in 1919, Germany developed extraordinary military capability,
which has been attributed to rapid industrialization, extension of bureaucracy into military organization, and the rise of a professional army. With these developments, Munich marked a watershed in military culture that has largely gone unnoticed, occurring when it did as the army was reduced in size and authority. Weimar placed security on the political agenda and looked to a professional police force as a cure-all. Long before Munich, the army was the “pillar” of the German nation, and national security the remit of the Great General Staff of the Imperial Army. A doctrine of military security had developed from theories of war and military establishment. The origins of all modern military security began with the bureaucratization of baggage trains as permanent corps of security and supply, new formations added to the army’s traditional order of battle. The very emphasis of security changed from a dull backwater duty into an essential component of the offensive. Victory and occupation forced the army into contending with military government and policing. A tide of security expertise washed through the army officer corps and transformed it into a fully fledged operational responsibility with the potential to become a generalissimo. This flowering of the security concept within the realm of German military science, however, was not the corollary of a specific school of security, but only the residue from an army deliberately expending considerable state resources on studying, planning, and preparing for aggressive war. Consequently, Germany scaled the heights of Harold Lasswell’s “garrison-state and security determined by the specialists of violence.”
¹

Munich had been on the receiving end of a security action then known as Bandenbekämpfung. The operation was praised in right-wing and military circles as a resounding political and military success. Operationally, Munich demonstrated that professional soldiers and militia volunteers could work together toward a common mission irrespective of different service backgrounds. Munich proved that ad hoc and scratch units with a minimum of training could be turned into effective combat groups under firm and determined leadership. This presented commanders in the field with greater flexibility in preparing a concerted plan of action, while using resourceful officers to bring these groups into the combat area, with minimal confusion. Approaching the target area from the north, south, east, and west, the combat groups had successfully brought about the complete encirclement of the city. They then systematically exterminated “the enemy,” on that occasion, communists. This lesson had a profound effect on German security culture.