Hitler's Bandit Hunters (11 page)

Erich Julius Eberhard von Zelewski was born in March 1899 in Lauenberg, a small Pomeranian town in West Prussia. His rise to prominence was rapid and unsurprising. Although the son of a Junker family, he grew up poverty stricken. His father, Otto Johannes von Zelewski, was born in 1859. He undertook a range of jobs, including in civil service and agriculture, and died on April 17, 1911, in Dortmund while working as an insurance clerk. His mother, Eveline Schimanski, was born in Thorn in April 1862 or 1864. His parents married in Lauenberg in June 1890. The family reputation was also blighted: his father’s brother was the ill-fated Emil von Zelewski who brought disgrace to the nation. Young Erich lived to restore the family honor. He spent his formative years under the guidance of his uncle, Oskar von Zelewski, who became his stepfather and was killed in action on the Eastern Front in 1915. Oskar was twenty-five years old and Erich just sixteen. Like his stepfather, Erich joined the army and, in November 1914, had the status of the youngest recruit of the war.
⁴⁸
His first posting was to the 3rd West Prussian Infantry-Regiment Nr.129 (
Neustettin
). While serving with this regiment, he was awarded the Iron Cross (Second Class), and he received his first wound in 1915 and then earned a battlefield commission in 1916. The psychological effects of his wounding and extreme pain haunted him for the rest of his life. As Leutnant von Zelewski, he was posted to the Grenadier Regiment König Friederich Wilhelm (1st Silesian) Nr.10 based in Schweidnitz. This elite regiment had served in China during the Boxer Rebellion and fostered a close relationship with both Trotha and Lettow-Vorbeck. The regiment prided itself on a reputation for passing on its military skills and expertise from one generation of officers to the next. Leutnant von Zelewski found a home freely mingling with other Junker vons, including Manteuffel, Lüttwitz, Blankensee, Kleist, Bonin, and Bülow.
⁴⁹
In July 1918, he was awarded the Cross of Honor (
Ehrenkreuz
) for his war service and then the Iron Cross (First Class). Leutnant von Zelewski ended the war as a young, battle-scared hero.

In November 1918, following the kaiser’s abdication, Germany descended into revolution. During the ensuing chaos, Leutnant von Zelewski took his first political steps. His 1944 SS curriculum vitae (
Lebenslauf
) notes that in 1919 he joined the monarchist and right-wing German National People’s Party (DNVP). His military career appeared safe in July 1919, although the regiment lost its monarchical status and became the 11th Infantry Regiment. It became part of Reichswehr Brigade 6 (formerly the 11th Infantry Division), within military district (Wehrkreis) III, and retained its home depot in Schweidnitz. From 1919 to 1924, the regiment was committed to German–Polish border duties. Leutnant von Zelewski made a memorable impression on Kurt von Bülow, his battalion commander, as a trustworthy (
Vertrauensmann
) officer revealing qualities of leadership and bravery. He led an aggressive reconnaissance, was wounded in the arm, and, in another incident, led a squad in the
arrest of a doctor and his daughter working for the Polish authorities.
⁵⁰
The young Leutnant received a new batch of medals for bravery, including the “Silesian Eagle” (
Schlesischer Adler
I and II), the “Protection of Silesia Medal,” and the courage award (
Tapferkeitsabzeichen
). It was significant that the awards came from fighting against Polish nationalism. His SS files also list service with the former 4th Foot Guards, which was later renumbered to “29.” In 1947, he alleged that, at the time of the Kapp putsch (1920), he was serving as the ordnance officer for the 29th Infantry Regiment of the Reichswehr based in Berlin-Moabit.
⁵¹
Both regiments came under Wehrkreis III, and for a war-commissioned officer without a specific base, his postings were common. The reasons for his departure from the army remain obscure. Under interrogation in 1946, he blamed his sisters for marrying Jews and destroying his reputation. He also suggested he became a battalion commander in the Black Reichswehr under Buchrucker. Given his proximity to the events, he was probably granted a battalion posting to soften the impact of his eventual demobilization and was released after the putsch.
⁵²
In the mid-1930s, he briefly returned to the army, reactivating his reserve status with the 8th Infantry Regiment (Schweidnitz), and was promoted to Hauptmann. On October 23, 1925, the young Zelewski changed his name by legal decree from the justice ministry to include “von dem Bach.”
⁵³
Years later, he wrote to Himmler referring to Bülow’s book. He failed to explain why the author referred to Leutnant von Zelewski in the narrative but listed “von dem Bach-Zelewski” in the index.
⁵⁴
His military career had closed at the age of twenty-five; yet he had taken on a new identity and delved into politics.

Bach-Zelewski married Ruth Apfeld in September 1921, and together they had six children. Ruth’s family came from Ratibor, which in 1921 lay close to the Polish and Czechoslovakian borders. Bach-Zelewski showed in his diary their devotion to one another: he called her
Mutti
(as in mother), and she referred to him as
Vati
(father). They owned a farm near Dühringshof near Frankfurt on the Oder, and later he set up home in Breslau.
⁵⁵
Between 1924 and 1930, he became involved in local farming association politics, building a reputation for soldiering and farming that would place him at the forefront of Himmler’s Blut und Boden warriors. In 1930, he joined the Allgemeine-SS and came under Daluege’s command in the Frankfurt/Oder area. Daluege thought very highly of him, probably because they had both been youthful volunteers in the Great War. The SS records indicate that Daluege assessed Bach-Zelewski as “true and honest, starkly impulsive, in many cases unrestrained, uncontrolled recklessness (
hemmungslos
). Promotion is recommended if he controls his impulsiveness.”
⁵⁶
Bach-Zelewski’s transfer of loyalty to Daluege proved immediately valuable in the attempted internal coup by the Berlin SA in April 1931. Walter Stennes and Bruno Buchrucker had become members of the SA. True to form, they attempted to inspire a revolt in Berlin against Hitler. Intervention by Daluege, assisted by Bach-Zelewski, tipped off Hitler, and the
coup was crushed. Afterward, Hitler wrote to Daluege a letter of thanks that included the words “my honor is loyalty” (
Meine Ehre heist Treue
), which Himmler had etched into the blade of all SS ceremonial daggers.

In the 1930s, senior SS officers were required to prove their racial ancestry. Bach-Zelewski wrote to the SS Race and Resettlement Office in December 1935 explaining that he had not been able to retrieve the appropriate documentation from Poland. He alleged that proof of his wife’s Aryan ancestry was in her brother’s possession, the police chief of Neisse-Schlesien (Poland). Bach-Zelewski promised to make every effort to retrieve the documents. On January 11, 1937, however, the SS Race and Resettlement Officer of Breslau declared that the Poles had frustrated their efforts. The SS, in the 1930s, also institutionalized proselytism as religion and paganism existed in a permanent state of flux. Bach-Zelewski changed religion from Catholic to Evangelist in 1933 and then to “believer in a higher form of life” (
gottgläubig
) in 1938, further evidence of his immersion into SS orthodoxy.
⁵⁷
In 1935, Himmler accepted one of Bach-Zelewski’s children as a godson (
Patenkind
), in his evergrowing list of politicized godchildren.
⁵⁸
The bond between Himmler and Bach-Zelewski thrived during the war.

Bach-Zelewski began his SS career of political killing in 1930 with the murder of three communists. On July 2, 1934, he ordered his subordinates, SS driver Paul Zummach and SS-Hauptsturmführer Reinhardt, to kill Anton Freiherr von Hohberg und Buchwald in Eylau in East Prussia. In 1935, he was chief of SS and security police in Königsberg. He very quickly came to blows with Gauleiter Koch over a series of matters, including, most significantly, who controlled Königsberg.
⁵⁹
In August, Hjalmar Schacht, in his role as president of the Reichsbank and economics minister, attended the Königsberg eastern conference (
Ostmesse
) to present the keynote speech on the consequences of Nazi economic policies. Schacht was critical of the growing attacks on Jews. He said they were detrimental to the performance of the economy and weakened Germany’s currency trade balances with foreign countries. Bach-Zelewski was incensed. He shouted at Schacht, calling him a traitor to the German people, while declaring that the Jews would pay for their crimes. He ordered the SS and police to leave the conference in a deliberate show of blatant anti-Semitism.
⁶⁰
Koch took exception to Bach-Zelewski’s behavior and reported him to Goebbels and Himmler. Attending the conference were representatives from the army and the navy who witnessed the incident and reported it to their respective commanding officers. Both officers condoned Bach-Zelewski’s behavior, placing on the record that he was a fine comrade and correct, endorsing the professionalism of his actions against Schacht.
⁶¹

The old idiom, absence makes the heart grow fonder, described Weimar’s relationship with Germany’s former colonies. Instead of fading away, interest
in the colonies continued to flourish. This resilience was a boon and a burden for politicians. The Weimar constitution made provision for the colonies, although these had been sequestrated by the Versailles Treaty, and the German colonial administration remained in service. Trade schools (
Berufschulen
) continued to train recruits for overseas service during the interwar years. A typical case was that of a former sergeant of the Tanganyika
Schutztruppen
who was able to send his son to colonial university because the costs were paid by the Foreign Office.
⁶²
The Minister of Interior and Education even opened a new colonial school for women (
Koloniale Frauenschule
) in 1926.
⁶³
Ideologically, Hitler thought the colonial issue was dead, superseded by his concept of Lebensraum. His brand of Lebensraum (and there were others) was not only geo-political in concept but also racial and militaristic in its dimensions.
⁶⁴
Yet until 1938, Nazi policy appeared to endorse the claim for the return of the colonies. Hitler declared, “The German Lebensraum is too small without a colonial addition to guarantee an undisturbed sure and constant food supply for our people.” Even in 1941, a Nazi publication declared, “We demand land and territory [colonies] for the sustenance of our people, and colonisation for our surplus population.”
⁶⁵
Was it a decoy for his real intentions? Did Hitler manufacture an internal struggle between the followers of traditional colonialism against the believers in Lebensraum fundamentalism? There are indications that Hitler used this ideological battle as a yardstick of loyalty within his inner circle.

The leading exponent of the old colonialism was Franz Ritter von Epp. The doyen of the extreme right, the Feldherr of Munich, had sealed a special relationship with Hitler. Epp also maintained strong links with the army and, after 1919, joined the governing elites of Munich. He was the Nazis’ secret benefactor and, through his undoubted political authority in southern Germany, became their Trojan horse and protector.
⁶⁶
In 1927, his defection from the Bavarian People’s Party to the Nazis was hailed as a measure of their political maturity. Once in the party, Epp patronized the colonial question, the Nazi motor corps (
Nationalsozialistisches Kraftfahrkorps
), and the SA; he was after all a close associate of Röhm.
⁶⁷
Once Hitler came to power, Epp became a Nazi director (
Reichsleiter der NSDAP
) and governor of Bavaria (
Reichsstatthalter für Bayern
). His first cabinet included Himmler, Röhm, and Hans Frank, the Nazi legal expert. He promoted Himmler and Heydrich to responsibility for security policing. Epp’s political tentacles reached beyond the senior Nazis to include middle-ranking officers from the SS-Police and Wehrmacht. In 1934, Epp’s influence over Hitler was broken when he tried to grant Röhm an honorable court-martial. Adding weight to Hitler’s suspicions, Epp’s personal clique included many homosexuals, including a disgraced senior SA officer, Edmund Heines.
⁶⁸

Before 1938, Hitler was unable to remove Epp either by force, as in the case of Röhm, or through political deception. Within colonial circles, the
Munich “victory” was heralded as a vindication of their fighting ability and comradeship. This had spurred many to join the party, and Peter Merkel believed this colonial contingent brought a swashbuckling adventurism. The colonialists were vehemently anti-French, anti-British, and imbued with hatred for Weimar.
⁶⁹
In 1927, Epp gave his first official speech on the colonial question at a party rally for former colonial veterans in Königsberg. Two years later, he hosted the twenty-fifth anniversary commemorations of the war against the Herero. In 1933, he hosted several colonial conferences, including the Marine- und Kolonialkriege Verbände annual gathering. A year later, Hitler promoted him as Nazi Party colonial policy director (
Kolonialleiter der NSDAP
). This led to a new department created from the amalgamation of the Colonial Department of the Foreign Office with the planning and press offices of the Ministry of Economics, and the
Kolonialreferat
of the army.
⁷⁰
Epp’s job entailed raising the political temperature of the colonial debate. In parallel with these developments, the former colonial association (
Kolonialge-sellschaft
) was renamed the
Reichskolonialbund
, known as the RKB, and in 1936, Epp became its national leader (
Bundesführer
). In 1934, the membership of the RKB stood at forty thousand; by October 1936, it had increased to two hundred thousand, and it reached its ceiling of one million in 1938. This proved Epp’s power of persuasion and was the reason Hitler could not easily dispense with his services in the 1930s.