Here Come the Black Helicopters!: UN Global Governance and the Loss of Freedom (7 page)

Moyo says that revenues such as what the Law of the Sea would cause to flow to the third world creates a pot of money over which various factions, tribes, parties, and regions can compete. She likens it to diamond mines or oil wells, “a kind of curse because it encourages corruption and conflict, while at the same time discouraging free enterprise. Not only is aid easy to steal, as it is usually provided directly to African governments, but it also makes control over government worth fighting for. And, most importantly, the influx of aid can undermine domestic savings and investment.”
¹⁸

US foreign aid has failed in its primary mission of alleviating poverty. Since 1980, the United States has given more than $309 billion (in inflation-adjusted money) in development assistance to poor countries. (This sum does not include military aid or humanitarian relief for natural disasters.) And it hasn’t worked.

Of the 97 countries that got development aid from the United States between 1980 and 2006:

• a quarter actually saw a net drop in their per capita GDP.
  
• 28 had almost no growth— less than one percent.
  
• 39 had minor growth averaging only 1–4 percent per year.
  
• Only 4 had real economic growth of 5 percent or more. They were Bosnia, Serbia, Cambodia, and Botswana.
  

WE’D HAVE TO GIVE AWAY OUR TECHNOLOGY, TOO

But sending money to third world dictators is not even the most obnoxious part of the Law of the Sea Treaty. Beyond taxing royalties, the treaty obliges American energy companies that wish to drill more than two hundred miles off our Continental Shelf to share their technologies—for free—with the ISA.

Senators Orrin Hatch (R-UT) and John Cornyn (R-TX)—both opponents of the treaty—warn that under it “nations with mining and resource recovery technologies like the United States will be obligated to share those technologies with Third World competitors, and that is one of the many issues, which trouble those of us opposed to the treaty.”
¹⁹

They add: “in other words, US companies would be forced to give away the very types of innovation that historically have made our nation a world leader while fueling our economic engine.”
²⁰

In a phrase out of
Star Trek
, the treaty sets up an “Enterprise” to facilitate third world access to drilling technology. It provides that “if the Enterprise or developing States are unable to obtain” drilling equipment commercially, there is a duty imposed on signatory nations to “facilitate the acquisition of mining technology.”
²¹

Sensibly, the Cato Institute argues that “the Enterprise and developing states would find themselves unable to purchase machinery only if they were unwilling to pay the market price or were perceived as being unable to preserve trade secrets. The clause might be interpreted to mean that industrialized states, and private miners, whose ‘cooperation’ is to be ‘ensured’ by their respective governments, are then responsible for subsidizing the Enterprise’s acquisition of technology.”
²²

Cato also notes that the treaty empowers the Seabed Authority to “take measures . . . to promote and encourage the transfer to developing States [of] technology and scientific knowledge so that all States Parties benefit therefrom.” If the US signs the treaty, the Seabed Authority would have enormous leverage over American energy companies to compel them to “share” their technology for free!
²³

American firms will have to survey the ocean floor, locate mineral reserves, raise the capital to drill, assume the risk of failure, and even pay the Enterprise a quarter-million-dollar application fee to get their approval for the well. Then, when they get oil, they must pay royalties to the Seabed Authority and give the Enterprise access to their technology!

And the application fee and royalty tax could go higher. Cato warns that the treaty allows an “as yet undetermined, level of royalties and profit sharing. The Institute notes that the ‘system of payments’ . . . shall be ‘fair both to the contractor and to the Authority,’ fees ‘shall be within the range of those prevailing in respect of land-based mining of the same or similar minerals,’ even though, as Cato notes, “seabed production is more expensive, riskier, and occurs in territory beyond any nation’s jurisdiction.”
²⁴

Yet some major oil companies support the treaty! They argue that their legal claims to the right to drill far offshore (beyond the two-hundred-mile limit) are shaky and that recognition of their wells by an international authority would give them the legal protection that they need.

Elliot Richardson, who led the American delegation that negotiated this treaty during the Carter years, says that the United Nations’ assertion that the ocean’s resources are “the common heritage of mankind” has made it impossible for any seabed mining without UN approval. He warns that “if any mining defied international law, its output would be subject to confiscation as contraband.”
²⁵

The Cato Institute rightly asks “who would do the seizing?” There is no UN Navy, but there is a US Navy that would protect our commercial interests in the face of a hostile seizure.
²⁶

Indeed, Cato stresses that the arguments of the oil companies make it “all the more important that the United States refuse to ratify the [Law of the Sea Treaty]. Once Washington has done so, a future renunciation of the LOST might not be considered enough to reestablish Americans’ traditional freedom on the high seas.”
²⁷

Backers of the treaty see the agreement as a fait accompli since more than the necessary sixty nations have already ratified it, putting it into effect (according to its own terms). But, as Cato notes, “nations cannot be held to surrender their rights because other states have ratified a treaty. Put bluntly, it matters little whether or not Djibouti, Fiji, or Zambia approves of American mining consortia operating in the Pacific.”
²⁸

SHACKLING THE US NAVY

The Law of the Sea Treaty has other horrific implications. Essentially, it makes the entire seabed and the waters above it the sovereign property of the United Nations and disempowers the US Navy.

Ever since the United States won the Cold War and acquired unquestioned global military superiority, the other nations of the world have sought to rein in American force. Two treaties represent their most audacious effort to stop the United States from exercising its military sway throughout the world.

The Law of the Sea Treaty gives the International Seabed Authority (ISA) the right to adjudicate disputes over the seas, deciding who can sail where and drill where on the seabed. Currently, the US Navy, as a practical matter, makes these determinations since no one can challenge its power. But prevailing anti-American sentiment throughout the world is leading other nations to try to reduce its power.

The second effort to restrain our military power is through the International Criminal Court. It would ban any American president—on possible penalty of criminal prosecution before the court—from going to war without the approval of the UN Security Council, a body hobbled by the Russian and Chinese veto power. The treaty would, in effect, require the approval of Moscow and Beijing before our armed forces could be committed to combat. (See more on the ICC in Part Six.)

The right of open seas and freedom of navigation is maintained for all nations by the unrivaled and unequaled power of the US Navy, which, after Great Britain found its resources too limited to afford a large navy, has protected open seas for almost a hundred years.

But, now, in an era of defense spending cuts, some urge that the US Navy pull back from its historic mission and turn the protection of free navigation over to the International Seabed Authority.

Disputes that were once adjudicated by the US Navy will now go before international arbitrators meeting in Hamburg, Germany, appointed by the ISA—and almost certainly hostile to American interests. The arbitrators, whose decisions are binding on signatory nations, are chosen by the parties to the dispute, each getting the right to name one or two of the five judges. In the event that a fifth judge satisfactory to the contending nations could not be negotiated, the power to appoint the judges would fall on the secretary-general of the United Nations, Ban Ki-moon, whose tenure has been noted for its corruption, anti-Americanism, and overt advocacy of the transfer of resources to the third world. Good luck getting a fair trial out of him!

Peter Brookes of the Heritage Foundation asks the key question: “Why risk sacrificing US sovereignty under the treaty if it makes us no more secure? After all, what initially established and still ensures freedom of navigation under international law is naval power. To secure navigational freedom, territorial rights and all national and international interests addressed in LOST, we must maintain the strength of the US Navy, not look to an anachronistic pact that is intent on advancing a one-world agenda.”
²⁹

The treaty itself has been kicking around for years. Negotiated by the misguided globalists of the Carter administration, the drive for US participation was only temporarily halted after Reagan refused to sign on in 1982.

President Clinton signed the treaty Reagan had rejected, after it was renegotiated in 1994. The changed treaty was hailed as solving all the objections Reagan had raised and Clinton called for prompt Senate ratification. But a careful examination of these changes revealed that they were largely cosmetic, fudging some issues and avoiding others. Those who had opposed the treaty are largely still opposed. Conservative objections to the revised document were so strong that the Republican majority on the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee refused to report the treaty to the floor of the Senate in the 1990s.

Now, in the current drive for ratification, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton mocked those who raised legitimate questions about the treaty in her Senate testimony, saying that the arguments against the treaty “cannot even be taken with a straight face.” She said the opposition to the treaty was “based in ideology and mythology, not in facts, evidence, or the consequences of our continuing failure to accede to the treaty.”
³⁰

As noted, the secretary of state dismissed concerns over the treaty, noting that if the US signed it or any UN treaty, “[o]f course, that means the black helicopters are on their way,”
³¹
a reference to conspiracy theories about a world government and a quote that inspired the title of this book. Thank you, Hillary!

One of the changes made in 1994 excluded military vessels from the regulation of the International Seabed Authority. But Senator James Inhofe (R-OK) notes that while

proponents say the treaty exempts military activity from international litigation, those of us opposing it are deeply concerned because this terribly flawed document fails to define what is included in that exemption. In addition, it opens the US military to the jurisdiction of international courts and governing bodies.

The Senator noted that “military training exercises that do not have the approval of other nations could be prevented because of potentially negative environmental impacts. US military vessels could be stopped on the grounds that they are too heavy a polluter.
³²

Currently, the US Navy is subject to the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization, now called the International Maritime Organization (IMO). The IMO sets maritime laws to improve safety at sea, facilitate trade, and protect the marine environment. The Law of the Sea Treaty would supersede the IMO. The IMO already gives the US a free hand to pursue commerce and military operations around the globe. So why hamper and hinder our own Navy and subject us to the jurisdiction of the Seabed Authority?

CAN THE TREATY STOP CHINA AND RUSSIA FROM THEIR TERRITORIAL CLAIMS?

Defenders of the Law of the Sea Treaty say that it is necessary to resolve two regional problems: China’s attempt to assert control over the South China Sea and Russia’s efforts to claim sovereignty over the Arctic ice shelf, where the warming global climate may make oil drilling more technically feasible in the future.

China is a signatory to the Law of the Sea Treaty but, nevertheless, it is ignoring one of its key provisions—the offshore exclusive economic zone. The treaty gives each country bordering the ocean a zone of two hundred miles off its coast in which it can drill for oil or engage in any economic activity. Even though the treaty bars other nations from economic activity—such as oil drilling—within another country’s two-hundred-mile zone, China is claiming that it can drill anywhere in the South China Sea, even right off the Vietnam coast.

In June 2012, the China National Offshore Oil Corporation announced that it was “offering a new batch of oil-exploration blocks inside the 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone granted to Vietnam under the United Nations’ Law of the Sea Treaty.”
³³

Vietnam protested, but the International Seabed Authority—charged with enforcing the treaty—did nothing to bar the Chinese action. China does whatever it wants, wherever it wants, as usual, and only nations like the United States scrupulously abide by their treaty commitments.

To believe that China would be deterred from its imperialistic ambitions by the rulings of the International Seabed Authority is ridiculous. The fact that China is already a signatory to the treaty has obviously not stopped it from trying to elbow aside not only Vietnam, but also the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia for control of the South China Sea.

Peter Brookes debunks the idea that the treaty would inhibit China, noting that China, “claims ‘indisputable sovereignty’ over the entire South China Sea—more than 1 million square miles. (LOST allows for 12-mile territorial waters and a 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone—or EEZ—from a country’s coastline.) Beijing has flouted LOST for years while building a mighty military machine, especially a navy, to assert its claims. It’s fantasy believing that an American signature on a piece of paper will change China’s mind about the South China Sea and EEZ freedom of navigation.”
³⁴